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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are under 15 years of age is expected to increase from 1.1 billion to 1.5 billion.

As the world's population grows, the demand for food and other resources will increase. This will put pressure on the environment and on the world's food supply.

One way to meet this demand is to increase the amount of food that is produced. This can be done by using more land for agriculture or by using more intensive farming methods.

Another way to meet this demand is to reduce the amount of food that is wasted. This can be done by improving food storage and distribution systems.

There are many other ways to meet this demand, and it is important that we find ways to do so that do not harm the environment or the world's food supply.

One of the most important things we can do is to make sure that we have enough food to eat. This means that we need to make sure that we have enough land for agriculture and that we have enough food to eat.

There are many things we can do to make sure that we have enough food to eat. We can make sure that we have enough land for agriculture, and we can make sure that we have enough food to eat.

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**ANNUAL REPORT**  
**OF THE**  
**AMERICAN HISTORICAL**  
**ASSOCIATION**

**FOR THE YEAR**

**1942**

**IN THREE VOLUMES**

**VOLUME II**

**LETTERS FROM THE BERLIN EMBASSY**  
**1871-1874, 1880-1885**

**EDITED BY**  
**PAUL KNAPLUND**



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LETTERS FROM THE BERLIN EMBASSY  
SELECTIONS FROM THE  
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF  
BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AT BERLIN  
AND FOREIGN SECRETARY  
LORD GRANVILLE  
1871-1874, 1880-1885

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EDITED  
WITH INTRODUCTIONS  
BY  
PAUL KNAPLUND  
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## CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	5
INTRODUCTION.....	7
CHAPTER I. Odo Russell's First Encounter with Bismarck.....	21
II. December, 1871–December, 1872.....	45
III. January, 1873–February, 1874.....	79
IV. May–December, 1880.....	129
V. 1881.....	181
VI. 1882.....	243
VII. 1883.....	285
VIII. January–August, 1884.....	307
IX. October 1884–February, 1885.....	343
X. March–June, 1885.....	383
INDEX.....	415



## FOREWORD

The creation of the German empire by Otto von Bismarck marked the beginning of a new epoch in modern history; Bismarck ranks among the few individuals who for good or evil have profoundly affected the affairs of mankind. Due in part to policies and attitudes inaugurated by him and in part to economic and social forces beyond the control either of him or of the British statesmen of his era, Britain and Germany were estranged, an estrangement which ultimately led to the tragedies of our own day. How these great nations became rivals and finally enemies has challenged and will perhaps for all time challenge the curiosity of students of history and cause them to delve into the records of the departments most directly concerned with international relations.

In the nineteenth century British foreign secretaries conducted a large private correspondence with the representatives of Britain in foreign capitals. Since this material was usually not laid before parliament or even before the cabinet, the correspondents could write without reserve; and these letters constitute a very important source for British diplomatic history, for the history of international relations, the history of the country to which the representatives of Britain were accredited, and for the study of the character and policies of leading statesmen of that time.

Most of the letters published in this volume were written as private and confidential communications. As has been indicated in footnotes, only a very few of them appeared in the *Life of Lord Granville*; the great majority are here printed for the first time. Some scholars have used them in manuscript, notably Dr. William Osgood Aydelotte, but it is worth noting that Dr. Winifred Taffs states in the preface to *Ambassador to Bismarck Lord Odo Russell First Baron Ampthill* (London, 1938) that "private letters have been destroyed"; she therefore bases her work mainly on the records of the British foreign office. What actually happened was that upon the death of Lord Ampthill private letters received by him from the secretaries of state of foreign affairs were returned to the senders. Consequently among the Granville Papers at the Public Record Office are found not only the original letters which he received from Lord Ampthill but also several of the originals as well as copies of letters sent to Ampthill.



Lord Ampthill died in August, 1884, just as Anglo-German interests were beginning to clash. Some of the points then in dispute were not settled until the spring of the following year; for this reason it seemed desirable to include in this selection of letters from Berlin the additional ones received by Lord Granville to June, 1885, when he retired from the foreign office.

At one time the editor hoped to publish a selection of the letters from Lord Ampthill to all three occupants of the foreign office during his term as ambassador to Berlin. But this plan was abandoned because the Earl of Derby refused to grant access to the Stanley Papers, which contain the correspondence of the fifteenth earl, foreign secretary from February, 1874, until March, 1878.\* On the other hand, Lady Gwendolen Cecil graciously permitted transcripts to be made of her father's correspondence with Odo Russell, April, 1878–April, 1880; this forms, however, a unit by itself, which the editor hopes to be able to publish at some later time.

Unless otherwise indicated, all letters are from the Granville Papers, Gifts and Deposits, 29, abbreviated to G. D., at the Public Record Office; other abbreviations used are "P. P.," for the British Parliamentary Papers; "G. P.," for *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914*; and "D. D.," for *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871–1914*.

Grants from the research fund at the University of Wisconsin enabled the editor to examine the original manuscripts, to have them transcribed, and to secure for him the competent assistance of Dr. Carolyn M. Clewes, now instructor in history at Wheaton College. For this support and aid he wishes to express his sincere thanks.

PAUL KNAFLUND.

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## INTRODUCTION

Brushing aside historical and ideological obstacles, Otto von Bismarck planned and executed the political and diplomatic maneuvers which transformed Germany from a loosely knit confederation of states, a mere geographical expression, into a powerful empire, the strongest in the world. It was a Herculean task. To be sure, the people of Germany wished to unite, and Bismarck had many collaborators, the most notable of whom were William I, king of Prussia and first German emperor, and Generals Helmuth von Moltke and Albrecht von Roon;<sup>1</sup> but Bismarck was the one who directed their efforts. He was the master mind of the combination which defeated Austria and France and effected the political unification of Germany.

A review of the methods used to achieve unification is desirable that we may understand more clearly Anglo-German relations in the Bismarckian era and the historical importance of the *Letters from the Berlin Embassy* during this epoch. Efforts in the middle years of the nineteenth century to create a great liberal Germany had ended in fiasco. This failure strengthened Bismarck's contempt of liberal ideas, convinced him that German unity could be achieved only by the method which he afterward described as one of "blood and iron." As he entered upon this task he first made sure that Russia would be friendly, benevolently neutral, while Prussia gathered strength. Indeed, to keep Russian friendship was always one of the chief objectives of Bismarckian diplomacy. Next he assisted in the rebuilding of the Prussian military machine, in which King William I was deeply interested. To this end Bismarck in 1862 virtually destroyed the comparatively liberal constitution of Prussia, an act which made him forever suspect in English eyes, but by then he had learned that Britain was both unwilling and powerless to interfere in Continental affairs; her opinion could be ignored. With a magnificent army at his disposal, Bismarck by astute diplomacy isolated seriatim the victims of his aggression: Denmark, Austria, and France. After his second war, that with Austria, 1866, Prussia was enlarged by the annexation of Schleswig, Holstein, the kingdom of Hanover, the free city of Frank-

<sup>1</sup> William I (1797-1888), king of Prussia, 1861-1888, German emperor, 1871-1888, Field Marshal, Count Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (1800-1891). Field Marshal, Count Albrecht Theodor Emil von Roon (1803-1879).

fort, and portions of Hesse-Darmstadt; Austria was expelled from Germany; the German Confederation of 1815 was dissolved; and a new creation of Bismarck, the North German Confederation, with Prussia as the leading member, facilitated the formation of the German empire proclaimed triumphantly at Versailles on January 18, 1871.

Germany now became the leading power on the Continent, and Berlin supplanted Paris as the center of European diplomacy. Bismarck had no faith in the possibility of peaceful co-operation among the powers of Europe. Fearing a French war of revenge he brought Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia together in 1872, in the League of the Three Emperors, and later sought an understanding with Britain. Rebuffed by the British foreign secretary, Lord Derby, he began working for still closer relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 the interests of the latter clashed with those of Russia and the Three Emperors' League lost its efficacy. Bismarck then in 1879 founded the dual alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary which three years later became the famous Triple Alliance with the inclusion of Italy. But he remained faithful to the principle never to quarrel with Russia and managed to revive the Emperors' League and to conclude a re-insurance agreement with Russia which lasted until he had retired from office in 1890.

After 1871 France was alternately threatened and cajoled by Bismarck. In 1875 it was credibly reported that he planned another assault upon her. Prompt diplomatic action by Britain and Russia disclosed that in such an eventuality France would not be isolated as in 1870, and Bismarck then protested loudly that he had been misjudged.<sup>2</sup> From that time on he kept France in virtually a moral coventry. Republicanism, which he detested, was encouraged in France for the simple reason that a French republic was an oddity among the powers and thus less able to organize effectively for aggressive action. He supported French intervention in Tunis, which made Franco-Italian co-operation impossible, and he encouraged British intervention in Egypt, which destroyed the Anglo-French entente.

A net result of the strength and military prestige of Germany combined with situations created or manipulated by her chancellor was that in the eighties Bismarck became the umpire in all serious diplomatic disputes, whether they concerned Europe, Africa, or Asia. Questions such as the boundaries of Balkan states, the treatment of Armenians in the Turkish empire and of Jews in Rumania, the financial affairs of Egypt, Russian expansion in the Middle East, the war between France and China, and the partition of Africa had to be referred to Berlin; Bismarck held the key to all these problems.

<sup>2</sup> The story of the war scare, 1875, is fully told from confidential dispatches in the British archives by Winifred Taffs in *Ambassador to Bismarck Lord Odo Russell First Baron Ampthill* (London, 1938), 75-106. See also Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 1938), 351-354.

France sought to gain his good will, and Britain could not settle issues on her imperial frontiers without his aid.

Unfortunately for Germany, Europe, and the whole world, Bismarck was a statesman with a narrow vision; he was a selfish, astute, master politician whose actions were guided by a curious mixture of love of Germany, lust for power, and fear. He provided his country with a hard shell, military strength and brilliant diplomacy, but as a statesman he failed to create governmental machinery which could function effectively when he was gone; and he neglected to give his countrymen the political training and education upon which rest national strength and security. He had little respect for the political capacity of his imperial master or that of the German people. Yet he feared both. Consequently he kept them confused and bewildered by tricks, made them believe that he alone understood the mysteries of government, ruined or rendered powerless possible political rivals. Bismarck's manipulation of the press has long been common knowledge; his employment of the notorious Baron von Holstein to do his dirty work has been suspected; the letters from Odo Russell call attention to Bismarck's use of real or pretended ill-health to further political ends and hint at rather mysterious connections between Bismarck and the Jewish banker Gerson von Bleichröder.

Bismarckian diplomacy aimed, of course, at safeguarding Germany. But here also one will notice the absence of moral standards, of constructive ideas. With complacency he viewed the possibility of wars in the Balkans; he was unmoved by the plight of the Armenians; and in 1884 he would not assist Britain in terminating the Sino-French war. For the European concert he substituted a system of alliances; instead of fostering a sense of security, of the community of interests among nations, he promoted a race in armament; although he talked peace his actions engendered a war psychology. He was physically strong, but he constantly worried about his health; this was paralleled in German diplomacy where the strength of the country failed to produce a feeling of safety, of real well-being. As a man and statesman Bismarck is excellent material for the psychoanalyst. He was haunted by fear; the apprehension spread among his own people and to all peoples of Europe. The aftermath illustrates the truth of the dictum "Fear and be slain."

In the sixties, when Bismarck laid the foundation for the unification of Germany, he ignored admonitions of British statesmen and strictures by Queen Victoria and British public opinion. Palmerston in June, 1863, called Bismarck "the crazy Minister at Berlin" who should be warned of the consequences of "the unwise and unconstitutional system he is persuading the King to adopt."<sup>3</sup> And a month

<sup>3</sup> Palmerston, June 27, 1863. *Foundations of British Policy*, 251. For further discussion of this point see H. C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston* (London, 1936), II, 362-385.

later Palmerston stated bluntly in the house of commons that if Austria and Prussia threatened the rights, independence, and integrity of Denmark they "would find . . . that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend."\* Bismarck paid no heed; he knew that the British lion was toothless—lacked the army, the equipment, and the will to intervene effectively in Continental affairs. Similarly during the Franco-Prussian War British protests against the bombardment of Paris and British criticism of the harsh peace terms inflicted upon the defeated enemy were disregarded; mere wind could not restrain Bismarck. He was content with the present; gross and materialistic he failed to appreciate the role of moral forces, mutual trust, respect, and good will in shaping the relations between nations.

An understanding of the attitude of the British people, their sovereign, and their statesmen toward Germany, the Germans, and Bismarck is necessary for an appreciation of the letters which passed between British representatives at Berlin, 1872-1874 and 1880-1885, and the British foreign secretary. These topics will be discussed in order. Generally speaking, the people of Britain sympathized with the German aspirations for national unity. In the 1840's Britons were strongly influenced by theories favoring political democracy, the establishment of nation states, and world peace. For centuries France and Austria had sought to profit by German disunity; it had tempted them to military aggression, resulted in wars. A strong, united Germany would not be a cockpit for greedy neighbors. But the new state envisaged by its English friends was an enlightened democratic one, dedicated to the arts of peace. They were disappointed with Bismarck's creation. The path on which he had led the Germans to unity was strewn with broken promises and ruined states. Blood and iron were repugnant to liberal-minded Englishmen; the new militaristic Germany they suspected and feared; its creator they considered an ogre, cunning, ruthless, amoral. That he had outwitted British statesmen was not so much of a crime as that he had fastened conscription upon Germany and Europe and repudiated the sacred principles of free trade. Bismarck's Germany made Britons first uneasy, then apprehensive, and finally openly hostile.

They disliked Bismarck but not the Germans, who in the fifties and sixties were treated with friendly condescension by their English cousins. They realized there had been great German poets and musicians, but that figment of popular imagination, the typical German, was believed to be an easygoing, beer-drinking, bull-necked, sentimental individual. Of course the Prussian might be different—a bully and a martinet—but he was not regarded as representative. Admit-

\*Hansard, House of commons, July 23, 1863. Quoted, *Foundations of British Policy*, 253.

tedly skillful at toy-making, glass-blowing, and sundry other crafts, the Germans were not considered dangerous competitors in banking, trade, and industry. Britain ruled the sea, was the workshop and the banking center of the world, and had passed unscathed through periods of war and widespread revolution. Consequently, Englishmen were complacent; they felt safe and strong and looked upon the Germans as amateurs and bunglers in business as well as in politics.

The fact that since 1714 the British royal family had been German did not elevate that nationality in the estimation of the British people. The first two of the four Georges had been a convenience; they had helped save England from popery and the Stuarts; but they had also been a nuisance with their foreign ways and their desire to drag Britain into stupid German quarrels for the sake of Hanover. The third George was the best of the lot; he had gloried in the name of Briton; but a large share of the blame for the loss of the American colonies was laid on his shoulders. During the last 10 years of his life he had been blind, deaf, and insane, a human wreck for whom one felt sympathy, not love, loyalty, or admiration. As for George IV—the less said the better. By common consent he had been an undutiful son, a bad husband, and a false friend. Most Englishmen applauded the verdict of the Duke of Wellington that the sons of George III were “the damnedest millstones around the neck of any Government that can be imagined.” Of course Queen Victoria, too, was German, but she was a woman and that made a difference; and her eldest son who some day would inherit the throne was most assuredly English in spirit, despite his priggish German father.

After their empire had been proclaimed, Germans expected and demanded respect. Long buffeted by Frenchmen, Swedes, and Austrians the citizens of imperial Germany had become touchy, hypersensitive; a slight or fancied slight was fiercely resented. Englishmen failed to perceive this; the old picture of Heinie did not vanish overnight just because of Sadowa and Sedan. The island people were said to be supercilious; Germans watched for this attribute in Englishmen and thought they found it, even though what they saw was often only natural reserve or shyness; they bristled, grew bumptious, exhibited traits which are peculiarly offensive to Britons. Thus dislike developed between the two peoples, a dislike greatly increased when they became rivals in business and competitors in the scramble for colonies.

Britain was not alarmed by the sudden rise of Germany. She was farther from the important sea lanes and the shores of Britain than was France. Moreover, despite her overwhelming military successes,

\* For a general discussion of the English attitude toward Germany see Raymond James Sontag, *Germany and England Background of Conflict, 1848-1894* (New York, 1938), 3-39, 93-128.

the Germany of 1871 had not upset the balance of power in Europe. Her population was then 41,000,000 as against 36,000,000 for France and 32,000,000 for the United Kingdom. In 1870 the German foreign trade was valued at 212,000,000 pounds; the British totaled 576,000,000. The German empire was then far behind Britain in industry and commerce. It was, of course, annoying that British statesmen had been flouted by Bismarck, but for this much blame was thrown upon Gladstone and his colleagues. They were accused of mismanaging foreign affairs; in 1874 they were decisively defeated in a general election, and Benjamin Disraeli replaced Gladstone as head of the British government.

For six years Disraeli (he became Earl of Beaconsfield in 1876) governed the British empire. He dazzled Britons with his Balkan policy, restored British prestige in international affairs, and returned from Berlin in 1878 bringing peace with honor. Judging by all accounts Bismarck behaved correctly at this time; [the war scare of 1875 was forgotten, and for the moment Britons buried their distrust of him.] However, had they known about his alliance overtures to Lord Derby, they would no doubt have applauded the foreign secretary's action in rejecting them. The policy of diplomatic isolation in times of peace, the avoidance of entangling alliances, represented deeply rooted British convictions.<sup>6</sup> Besides, Bismarck was known to be tricky; Britons suspected that they had not a spoon of the required length to sup with him.

In the seventies some of Bismarck's actions were applauded in Britain. For instance, his attacks on the Roman Catholics won praise from nonconformists and evangelicals. The venerable elder statesman, Earl Russell, registered warm support of the Falk Laws.<sup>7</sup> The news of the Austro-German alliance, 1879, was hailed by the British foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, somewhat irreverently as "glad tidings of great joy."<sup>8</sup> The German adoption of a protective tariff fell into a different category; it was, of course, a stupid thing, not a cause for worry. "Heinie" simply did not know the inner secrets of trade.

Anglo-German relations grew more strained after Gladstone returned to office in April, 1880. In part this change may be attributed to the fact that he and Bismarck were antithetical in outlook and principles, but there were other more potent causes of the Anglo-German estrangement. Bismarck had reached the zenith of his power as umpire in international disputes. It was galling to British

<sup>6</sup> *Foundations of British Policy*, 354-356.

<sup>7</sup> Dr. Falk, "Kultus Minister" of Prussia, had fathered the laws which attempted to restrict ecclesiastical influence over education. The ensuing conflict is commonly referred to as the "Kulturkampf." Taffs, pp. 12, 13, 24-29.

<sup>8</sup> Lady Gwendolyn Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury* (London, 1921), II, 370.

pride that no important diplomatic question could be settled without reference to Berlin. An upstart power and a boorish statesman had to be consulted before Britain could arrange Egyptian financial affairs, decide on boundaries for her African colonies, or annex islands in the Pacific—a humiliating situation for British imperialists. In the eighties Britain experienced a depression of trade; in seeking the causes of that depression the commercial policy of Germany was found to be one of them. Britons now began to grow uneasy about Germany and the Germans.

Long before this time Queen Victoria had decided that Bismarck was a wicked man who was using his power to harm Britain. Her husband, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, had been a strong supporter of the movement for German unity, but Bismarck achieved it in a way distinctly at variance with the plan drawn up by the prince, Victoria's beloved "angel." Moreover, the Prussian annexations of 1866 destroyed the kingdom of her Hanoverian cousin, reduced the patrimony of one son-in-law, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, and disgraced the family of another, Prince Christian of Augustenburg; that the oldest daughter was married to the heir to the throne of Prussia did not compensate for the other losses and humiliations. Later, when this daughter stood out as the bitterest political foe of Bismarck, the English royal family united against him. The crown princess of Germany, Britain's princess royal, was a talented but not a wise woman, and Bismarck's hatred of the English influence with the German imperial family was due largely to her political indiscretions. Queen Victoria, always a strong matriarch, sided unreservedly with her daughter; she could match Bismarck's hatred; thus the matrimonial bond between the ruling houses of Britain and Germany promoted discord instead of harmony in the Bismarckian era.

Gladstone was prime minister of Britain in the years covered by these letters from the Berlin embassy. The most catholic in interests and sympathies among the European statesmen of the period, he was in every respect the opposite of Bismarck. Gladstone believed strongly in law and justice, in the equality and community of interests of all nations as guiding principles in international affairs. He abhorred war and large armaments; he promoted political democracy and strove for equality of opportunity within the state; he advocated self-determination for English colonies and for Ireland; and he supported the idea that the nations of the earth should grow great in common. These liberal doctrines to which Gladstone clung so firmly were denounced by Bismarck as stuff and nonsense. His "Realpolitik" was based on the principle that "might makes right"; he sneered at the English statesman as a rhetorician, a crazy professor. But behind



this scorn lurked fear of the forces which Gladstone represented.<sup>9</sup> Bismarck had seen Europe thrown into convulsions by a widespread desire for liberty and equality; he was conscious of the deep-seated antagonism between these forces and those which he represented; and he was haunted by the apprehension that his side might ultimately lose. With men of the world, slightly cynical and doubtful about liberal nostrums, like Disraeli and Salisbury, Bismarck felt a bond; the gap separating him from Gladstone was unbridgeable.

In common with other liberals Gladstone had supported the idea of a united Germany but disapproved of Bismarck's methods and policies.<sup>10</sup> He detested German militarism as inimical to freedom and dangerous to peace; he denounced the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine; to transfer people like chattel he considered a barbarous policy, a relic of past and barbarous times. Writing in the *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1870, Gladstone expressed doubt whether "Germany will be worthy of the confidence of Europe. We may hope but we cannot venture to affirm."<sup>11</sup> And after the terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt were known, he wrote to his friend Professor Max Müller: "I am afraid . . . that Germany, crowned with glory & confident in her strength, will start on her new career . . . without the sympathies of Europe: which in my opinion no nation, not even we in our sea-girt spot, can afford to lose."<sup>12</sup>

There were but two points on which Gladstone and Bismarck agreed: both felt that the Vatican Decrees of 1870 represented a dangerous usurpation of power by the papacy,<sup>13</sup> and both believed that colonial expansion might weaken the parent state. The means employed by the two men in fighting the papacy reveal their differences in temperament and outlook. Bismarck sought by law to curb the power and restrict the privileges of the Roman Catholic church in Germany. Force should do it. Gladstone, on the other hand, had great faith in the power of general ideas; in a spirited pamphlet he attacked the Vatican Decrees with arguments. Neither made any headway against the Roman curia. The German had to repeal the laws obnoxious to Catholics; despite vehement protestations to the contrary he was forced to Canossa. The Englishman suffered no

<sup>9</sup> A memorandum by Lord Tenterden, dated October 30, 1880, contains a résumé of a conversation with Lord Odo Russell. "He [Russell] said that he understood Pce Bismarck to be afraid of Mr. Gladstone's policy and to distrust him as encouraging Socialist ideas." Original MS., the Granville Papers.

<sup>10</sup> *Edinburgh Review*, American edition, CXXXI, 301.

<sup>11</sup> Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1935), 62.

<sup>12</sup> Gladstone believed that the decree of papal infallibility "aimed a deadly blow at the old historic, scientific, and moderate school; it was a degradation of the episcopal order; it carried to its furthest point that spirit of absolute centralisation, which in its excesses is as fatal to vigorous life in the church as in the state." John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (New York, 1911), II, 515, 516. Bismarck was convinced "that the pretensions of the Vatican were inconsistent with the supremacy of the state . . . a challenge to German unity." Taffs, 11, 12.

such humiliation; his effort was simply fruitless. On the issue of imperial expansion both were routed, overwhelmed by the rising tide of the economic imperialism which brought their countries into conflict. Gladstone had no share in bringing it about; he believed that Germany was entitled to colonies; he did not object to having these colonies adjoin those of Britain. But here, too, he resented the methods employed by Bismarck; they resembled blackmail.

For nine years (1870-1874, 1880-1885) George Leveson-Gower, second Earl of Granville, held the seals of the British foreign office.<sup>13</sup> In this capacity it was his special duty to match wits with Bismarck whenever British interests demanded it. So he did on several occasions and came to grief thereby. For this reason Granville has fared badly at the hands of historians of international relations. He lacked the ruthlessness of the German as well as his skill. Moreover, during his second term of office Granville fell heir to complex problems which gave Bismarck many initial advantages. A Whig in politics, by disposition a courtier, and by training a diplomatist of the era of Metternich, Granville was not burdened with the ideological encumbrances which handicapped Gladstone in his dealings with Bismarck. Nevertheless, he labored under many other disadvantages, chief of which were perhaps lack of self-confidence and the habit of using language which the German chancellor could not appreciate. Granville's successor, Lord Rosebery, who was foreign secretary in the third Gladstone government, in 1886 served notice that he would employ the same menacing tone that the Germans used. This they understood and liked.

Granville took office on the eve of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. No amount of diplomatic skill in a British foreign secretary could have averted the conflict desired by both combatants. Nor can much fault be found with Granville's diplomacy during the war. Britain could only watch on the sidelines. In opposing a proposal by the prime minister that Britain should insist upon a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine the foreign secretary carried his colleagues with him.<sup>14</sup> The Gladstonian plan was fair, sound, and just but not practicable, since Britain was unable to back it with a display of force; and only an argument so supported had any chance of success with Bismarck. In the following years Granville neither garnered glory nor sustained defeat in his dealings with the German chancellor.

The period 1880-1885 was different. Bismarck's diplomatic position had grown stronger and Granville faced an unusually large number

<sup>13</sup> Granville (1815-1891) was the son of the first earl by that name who served as British ambassador at Paris, 1824-1841. The second earl succeeded to the peerage in 1846, was foreign secretary, 1851-1852, 1870-1874, 1880-1884, president of the council, 1852-1854, 1855-1858, 1859-1866, colonial secretary, 1868-1870, 1886.

<sup>14</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 56-61.

of knotty problems, problems made difficult in part by actions and commitments of the outgoing government and in part by the fact that the Liberals had been swept into office and power on the wave of an emotional reaction against the Conservatives' foreign policy. For this reaction Gladstone's crusading campaign in the Midlothian district of Scotland was responsible. Like his chief, Granville failed to appreciate that time and tide in world affairs ran counter to the older liberal ideals and traditions. His first task was to carry out provisions of the Treaty of Berlin concerning Balkan boundaries. The Conservatives had failed to press the Turks for a settlement, fearing that this would throw them into the arms of Russia. Gladstone, notoriously anti-Turk, was believed to be pro-Russian; his government was therefore expected to bring the Turk to terms. A conference at Berlin in the summer of 1880 reached an agreement on Balkan problems; but the agreement was difficult to execute because Germany and Austria desired to gain the good will of the sultan. In October, 1880, resolute action by the British government forced the Porte to yield on the issue of the Montenegrin boundary. Britain then wished France to take the lead in settling a similar question concerning the Greco-Turkish frontiers, but France hesitated and the matter dragged for some time.<sup>15</sup> The Cyprus Convention of 1878, by which Britain was pledged to protect Turkey in Asia, the Disraelian purchase of Suez Canal shares, the Anglo-French dual control over Egypt, questions concerning Armenia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, the French intervention in Tunis, and the later British intervention in Egypt produced a lousy crop of complications and numerous opportunities for Bismarck to establish his position as arbiter in international affairs—a position strengthened immensely by the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund in 1881 and the triple alliance of 1882.

Britain's international difficulties were complicated further by a resurgence of imperialism at home and in the self-governing colonies. British economic interests demanded new fields for the investment of surplus capital, while colonizing movements by other European powers aroused apprehension for the safety of British imperial frontiers. The colonies of Australasia and South Africa advanced Monroe doctrines for their respective regions; their pleas found supporters at home. The autonomous position of these colonies created embarrassments for Lord Granville. He had to consider public and parliamentary opinion in Britain and overseas; he found it necessary to keep in close touch with the colonial office, which in turn consulted colonial governments, while anti-imperialistic statements of the prime minister and other leaders of the Liberal party added to the complications confronting the easygoing foreign secretary.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 181-180.

Bismarck, too, had troubles. He knew that the Empress Augusta, the crown prince, and the crown princess were antagonistic to him, that he had bitter political enemies, and that his position at home depended upon support of the emperor, successful manipulation of the political factions within Germany, and diplomatic triumphs. His defeat in the Kulturkampf smarted; in the spread of Marxian socialism he saw a deadly peril for the fatherland; powerful though he was he could not carry on without the support of some pressure group or groups within Germany. Among the latter were the commercial interests of Bremen and Hamburg which in the early eighties demanded colonies for Germany; in the summer of 1884 Bismarck embraced their cause. Lord Ampthill, the British ambassador to Berlin, had repeatedly assured Granville that Bismarck was not interested in the colonial movement; hence the British foreign secretary refused to believe that the German chancellor had had a change of heart. Moreover, Anglo-German colonial negotiations were retarded by the need for consulting British colonies whose claims were supported by some of Granville's colleagues as well as by British imperialists. Impatient at delays and knowing that he held trump cards, Bismarck assumed a bullying attitude. This stiffened British resistance, but the complexities of Egyptian finance could not be unraveled without Bismarck's support. And with brutal frankness he let it be known that this support could be had only at a price—colonies for Germany. Since France was hostile to Britain and new disputes with Russia brought war within the range of possibility, the British government had no choice. Bismarck got what he wanted. It was not that Gladstone or Granville objected to German colonization; they resented Bismarck's methods in securing colonies. In 1885 Anglo-German relations were severely strained.

Odo Russell, first Baron Ampthill, served as British ambassador to Berlin from the end of 1871 until his death in August, 1884.<sup>16</sup> He had held various posts abroad and in the foreign office before he was chosen successor to Lord Augustus Loftus at the Berlin embassy. Among Russell's previous appointments were those of special British envoy to the Vatican, 1858-1870, and to the German headquarters in France during the Franco-Prussian War. In the former capacity he had had opportunities to watch the working of the Roman curia at the sessions of the Vatican council; and at Versailles, during the siege of Paris, he became acquainted with Bismarck. He then estab-

<sup>16</sup> Odo William Leopold Russell (1829-1884) was the son of Major-General Lord George William Russell, his mother was Elizabeth Anne Rawdon, niece of the first Marquis of Hastings. In 1872, when his older brother Francis became ninth Duke of Bedford, Odo received the courtesy title "Lord"; in 1881 he was elevated to the peerage as first Baron Ampthill. His wife, née Lady Emily Theresa Villiers, was the daughter of George William Frederick Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800-1870), who served as British ambassador at Madrid, 1833-1838, and foreign secretary, 1853-1858, 1865-1866, 1868-1870.

lished an interesting personal relationship which endured until his death.

Odo Russell, the name by which he became famous, achieved the unusual feat of becoming *persona grata* with Bismarck and all the members of the German imperial family, including Bismarck's enemy, the crown princess. The diplomatic successes of Russell were due in part to family connections and training, but the principal reasons must be sought in certain inborn personal qualities: exquisite tact, quick intelligence, and natural sympathy and kindliness. As grandson of the sixth Duke of Bedford and brother of the ninth, nephew of the former British prime minister and foreign secretary, Earl Russell, and son-in-law of the famous statesman and diplomatist, the fourth Earl of Clarendon, Odo Russell had a plethora of golden keys for admission to the best social circles. His wide experience in such different and difficult embassies as Constantinople, Paris, Vienna, and Washington and his service under several foreign secretaries developed to a high degree a natural aptitude for diplomacy.

Of the many testimonies to the skill and success of Odo Russell those by Lord Tenterden and Sir James Rennell (afterward Lord) Rodd may serve as samples. Tenterden, permanent undersecretary in the British foreign office, 1873-1882, was a keen observer and often a caustic critic of the men in the diplomatic service. Writing to Granville, September 25, 1880, after a "flying visit to Germany," Tenterden said: "Odo Russell is the right man at Berlin. He is a favorite at Court and never bothers Bismarck who although he meddles in everything hates interviews. . . . At Court Odo Russell picks up his information and hence the style of his despatches and letters which I never previously could understand."<sup>17</sup> Rodd, ambassador in Rome during World War I, began his diplomatic career in June, 1884, as attaché at the British embassy in Berlin. He says of Lord Ampthill:

There never lived a kindlier chief, or a more attractive personality than Odo Russell . . . I have known many ambassadors since, but none perhaps so admirably equipped to occupy a post to which he did honour. As a linguist he was remarkable, and his knowledge extended also to the literature of the four languages which he spoke with equal facility. A profound student of Dante he was equally familiar with the whole bibliography of Goethe. He gave to all impartially the best of his singularly gifted mind with a natural and unself-assertive charm of expression which was entirely winning. He may have had his enemies and critics, but I never met them, and during the three months of our intercourse I could not detect the place which might have invited attack. His popularity in Berlin was unquestioned.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Tenterden to Granville, September 25, 1880. Original MS., the Granville Papers.

<sup>18</sup> Sir James Rennell Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories 1884-1893* (London, 1922-1925), I, 45.

And Rodd reports that the news of the death of Lord Ampthill on August 25, 1884, elicited demonstrations of deep and unaffected grief by all classes in Germany.

The private letters to Lord Granville bear testimony to the intimacy which existed between the British ambassador and the German chancellor. While some of Bismarck's outpourings may have been designed to produce a definite effect upon his hearer and through him upon the government he represented, many seem quite spontaneous; Odo Russell's accounts of conversations with Bismarck reveal the great man in undress and throw light upon his methods and policies.

Ampthill's successor, Sir Edward Malet, was the son of Sir Alexander Malet, a friend of Bismarck's from his days as Prussian representative at Frankfort. Sir Edward was received with great cordiality but his arrival in Berlin, late in October, 1884, coincided with preparations for the Berlin conference on Africa, the appearance of new complications in Egypt and the Sudan, and increased tension between Britain and Germany over colonial problems. The friction was perhaps inevitable, but there is the possibility that Lord Ampthill, with his tact, prestige, and experience, could have averted some of the worst manifestations of ill-feeling. In March, 1885, Russia's occupation of Penjdeh in northwestern Afghanistan created a war scare in London. Again resort was had to the good offices of Bismarck; he was called upon to find a way out of the Anglo-Russian imbroglio. His position was impregnable and Germany's request for colonies could not be resisted. The second Gladstone government fell in June, 1885, and left a legacy of friction with Germany to its Conservative successor.



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**CHAPTER I**  
**ODO RUSSELL'S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH BISMARCK**

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## CHAPTER I

### ODO RUSSELL'S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH BISMARCK

In August, 1870, Odo Russell accepted an appointment as assistant undersecretary of state in the foreign office. His wife's family considered the new post a demotion,<sup>1</sup> and Russell himself was reluctant to leave Rome where he had been very happy, but with the Italian government occupying Rome the position of the pope was uncertain; he might accept the British offer of an asylum at Malta.<sup>2</sup> Consequently Russell chose to take the position at the foreign office where he would be at the center of things and where the work was heavy on account of the Franco-Prussian War.

The new undersecretary was immediately assigned tasks connected with the war. Shortly after its outbreak powerful German armies crushed all French opposition and invaded France with Paris as their goal. Lord Granville grew uneasy about the reaction of the British public to a bombardment of the French capital and asked Russell to find a method whereby Bismarck could be persuaded to spare the city.<sup>3</sup> Believing that such an attempt would fail Russell wrote to his chief on August 31, 1870: "Advice must be so offensive at this moment that I do not believe any form of advice could be rendered acceptable to Germany and might defeat its object." Nevertheless, he drafted a dispatch to Loftus at Berlin which asserted that "The bombardment of Paris would be a wanton act of cruelty," and the ambassador was asked to point out to Bismarck that extreme measures "would not weaken but only implant an ardent desire of revenge in the hearts of an already vanquished and humiliated population."<sup>4</sup>

This dispatch was "put by for the present,"<sup>5</sup> Granville apparently agreeing with Russell that the moment for tendering advice to the

<sup>1</sup> "I accept your kind offer most gratefully, but I regret to say without the approval of my wife & her family, who think the Assistant Under Sec<sup>y</sup> a step backwards instead of forwards notwithstanding my eloquent proof of the contrary!" Russell to Granville, Aug. 11, 1870. Original MS., the Granville Papers, Public Record Office, Gifts & Deposits, 29:92.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Granville dated August 15, 1870, Russell mentioned the possibility of appointing someone to the Vatican "until the Pope has made up his mind to await and accept the protectorate of Italy or to fly to Malta on board a man of War." *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Request was made on August 29 in letter to Russell. See his reply dated August 30, 1870. Original MS., *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Quotations from letter and draft of August 31. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Notation on draft in Granville's handwriting.

Germans had not yet arrived. By the middle of October, however, Russell thought mediation might be offered, as will be seen from the following letter:

*Private.*

THE GROVE, WATFORD,  
*Sunday 16 Oct. 70.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

When you asked me after the surrender at Sedan to draw up a despatch against the bombardment of Paris I could not see my way to giving advice in that sense,<sup>6</sup> however desirable, without offending both Belligerents and irritating the adherents of neutrality at home.

Since then the situation has changed and public opinion has undergone modifications.

The Prussians are masters of the situation,—the French realize that they have no Allies,—the Neutrals know that the issue of the war is no longer doubtful and Public opinion at home and abroad ardently desires to save Paris from bombardment and thousands of Parisians from death by starvation as foreshadowed in Bismarck's last circular.

Of course it is as impossible now as it was then to ask Prussia to desist or France to surrender; nor can the Neutrals express opinions on the conditions of peace without ceasing to be Neutral. On the other hand Public Opinion does not admit a diplomatic "non possumus" and will never understand why H. M. Gov<sup>t</sup> can do nothing but look on "les Bras croisés" while fellow creatures are being shot down in an enclosed arena like game in a Royal German Park.

Now it strikes me that the problem of humane mediation without political interference so as to disarm hostile criticism in the future, might perhaps be met and solved by addressing a Circular to the Neutral Powers inviting them to join in a collective step, the object of which would be to say to the Belligerents in the name of humanity and without touching upon the political question:—"We the Neutrals who are in a position to take a calm and dispassionate view of the present State of the war, beseech of you Prussia, before you cause the death of another million of human beings—and you France, before you sacrifice Paris and the Parisians to the apathy of the Provinces, to consent to one more meeting of Bismarck and Favre<sup>7</sup> on whose renewed interchange of ideas the lives and welfare of millions depend." &c &c.

A circular of this kind inviting the Cooperation of the Neutrals

<sup>6</sup> The battle of Sedan was fought on September 1. Russell was probably confused about the date of Granville's letter to him. See note 3.

<sup>7</sup> Jules Favre (1809–1880), leader in the government of national defense, 1870–1871. He had proposed the deposition of the emperor in the legislative chamber after the battle of Sedan, and in an interview with Bismarck on September 18 he sought peace on easy terms for France.

to an act of pure humanity, free from all political colouring, could offend nobody and would disarm the criticism of those who would accuse H. M. Gov<sup>t</sup> of culpable inaction, whilst it would throw the responsibility and odium of the bombardment of Paris and future horrors of the war once more on Bismarck and Favre if they declined to meet, or met without pacific result,—and might possibly prevent the massacre of the parisiens “faute de s’entendre”——.

Sincerely Yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

By this time Granville had gained confidence in the tact and skill of his new subordinate and entrusted him with a most difficult and delicate mission to Bismarck. This mission grew out of Russia's abrogation of the clause in the Treaty of Paris, 1856, which limited her naval forces in the Black Sea.<sup>8</sup> The act constituted a violation of an agreement forced upon Russia by Britain and France. The latter was now, of course, helpless and Britain could neither coerce Russia nor compel her to accept a face-saving formula without the assistance of Bismarck. To secure his aid was a task rendered extremely difficult by the fact that he had suggested to Russia the course which she had followed. Before embarking on his mission Odo Russell ascertained the views of two ex-foreign secretaries, Lords Derby and Russell, on the clause under dispute. Lord Derby<sup>9</sup> declared bluntly that “he should resist any desire to go to war about Constantinople or the Black Sea . . . he would go to War for the neutrality of Egypt,—but not for the neutrality of the Black Sea.”<sup>10</sup> Earl Russell<sup>11</sup> advised that Britain should agree to the cancellation of the article in question in return for a modification “of the special Convention annexed to the Treaty [of Paris].”<sup>12</sup> On November 12 Odo Russell left London for the German headquarters at Versailles. He worked well and swiftly. Two weeks later Bismarck issued an invitation to a conference held in London for the purpose of discussing the Black Sea clause in the Treaty of Paris. From the outset Russell got on remarkably well with Bismarck, and that Lord Granville trusted his special envoy will be seen from the following selection from the letters which passed between them.

<sup>8</sup> See Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *Life of Second Lord Granville* (London, 1905), II, 71-76.

<sup>9</sup> Edward Henry, fifteenth Earl of Derby (1826-1893), foreign secretary, 1866-1868, 1874-1878, and colonial secretary, 1882-1885.

<sup>10</sup> Odo Russell to Granville, undated but endorsed “Nov. 5, 1870.” Original MS., the Granville Papers.

<sup>11</sup> Lord Russell (1792-1878), better known as Lord John Russell, prime minister 1846-1852 and 1865-1866, foreign secretary 1852-1853 and 1859-1865; he was created Earl Russell in 1861.

<sup>12</sup> Odo Russell to Granville, dated Wednesday night, and endorsed “Nov. 9, 1870.” Original MS., the Granville Papers.

[Copy]

WALMER CASTLE, Decr 2/70.

*Private.*

MY DEAR ODO,

Aspirations from B[ismarck] for an Alliance with us and with Austria,<sup>13</sup> which he does not see his way to realize seem to be an embryo, which does not at present require notice. But any such announcements are agreeable, as showing at the least, a present desire to please.

As you seem on good terms with him, encourage him to give his views as to the Conference. If he suggests conceding all that Russia asks, get him to tell you whether he sees no objection on the part of Germany to Russia having eventually the naval command of the mouths of the Danube. If he talks of compensations, ask him what they would be, sound him whether he would be inclined with Italy to join us in the tripartite treaty of April 1856.<sup>14</sup> Ask him what he would think not of throwing open the Bosphorus but restoring to the Sultan his sovereign right to keep it shut and closed at all times as he thought best.

Please do this as if from your own head, & seeking information

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

With regard to Armistice or Peace with France, nolo episcopari must be your motto.

You have been kept informed, but you have been instructed that your mission was on the Eastern Question.

If encouraged be of as much use as you can.

It is difficult for them after we have been so ready to accept their good offices in the convention affair, to be as sensitive as they have been against any apparent intervention on our part.

They say "we are afraid of your listening to the French being an encouragement to them."

We might have said the same thing as to their encouraging Russia, but we were not so childish or thinskinnd.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

<sup>13</sup> Russell's letter, which must have referred to this matter, was not found among the Granville Papers at the Public Record Office.

<sup>14</sup> Treaty dated April 15, 1856, by which Britain, France, and Austria agreed to defend Turkey against Russia. For text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, XLVI, 25-26. Bismarck refused to join. See *Foundations of British Policy*, 330. This treaty was discussed by Granville at some length in letter to Gladstone, Dec. 10, 1870. See *ibid.*, 333, 334.

[Copy]

*Private.*

BRUTON STREET Dec 7/70.

MY DEAR ODO,

I have read your letter of the 30<sup>th</sup> Ult<sup>o</sup> with the greatest interest.<sup>15</sup>

I have no doubt of the anxiety you must have felt, but it only makes your successful taking possession of the ground the more satisfactory.

The character and conduct of the Crown Prince <sup>16</sup> is the only reassuring point with regard to our future relations with Germany—you may probably be of use to him, as well as to us by your presence at Head Quarters.

Whenever you have an opportunity of saying something respectful and civil from me to H. R. H., pray do so. Any such expressions are perfectly sincere on my part.

I trust to your tact to say what is best to Bismarck.

As I have desired everything to be sent to you regarding Russia, I have little to add. You will see that up to this moment we have nothing but the word of Bismarck for the acceptance by Russia of the terms upon which we insist. To me this appears sufficient, but the watchful Hammond <sup>17</sup> is of a different opinion.

You will have received a telegram directing you to consult Bismarck on certain points to be considered in the conference.

A real coup which would immortalize you would be to persuade Bismarck (in supporting Russia's views as to the Convention, and believing her assurance that she has no intention to encroach upon Turkey) to join the tripartite Treaty of 1856.<sup>18</sup>

I have had to resist all sort of proposals. France wished for a public or secret encouragement to introduce the war at the conference.

Beust <sup>19</sup> proposed a preliminary meeting at Constantinople where Austria, Italy, Turkey & England were to settle proceedings in the London Conference.

It will require some consideration whether you should enter Paris with the King,<sup>20</sup> particularly if you are the only Diplomatic agent with H. M.—but pray stick close till that event happens, or until you receive further instructions. In the mean while you can go on alluding to your duties at the F[oreign] O[ffice].

<sup>15</sup> This letter was not found among the Granville Papers. It is, however, mentioned in *Life of Granville*, II, 78.

<sup>16</sup> Frederick (1831-1888), afterward emperor, husband of Queen Victoria's eldest daughter, the princess royal.

<sup>17</sup> Edmund Hammond (1802-1890), permanent undersecretary in the foreign office, 1854-1873; created Baron Hammond in 1874.

<sup>18</sup> See note 14.

<sup>19</sup> Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809-1886), foreign minister of Saxony, 1849-1866, and of Austria, 1867; chancellor of Austria-Hungary, 1868-1871, ambassador at London, 1871-1878, and at Paris, 1878-1882.

<sup>20</sup> King William I of Prussia.

I will see whether we can send you proofs of the armaments sent by America. You will use them or not as you think best.

Yrs.

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

[Copy No. 25]

*Confidential.*

VERSAILLES, 14 Dec<sup>r</sup> 1870.

MY LORD,

In reply to Your Lordship's Telegram of the 5<sup>th</sup> inst, I stated my conviction that the position of Prussia was so strong that no peace negotiations short of unconditional surrender would be entertained by Count Bismarck.

In obedience to Your Lordship's instructions I have not alluded to the subject of an Armistice, but Count Bismarck has told me in general conversation that the conclusion of peace would be delayed for many months by the absence of any legal Body of men in France to represent the national will; and that if, the Self-Constituted Gov<sup>t</sup> of Defence valued the interests of France more than their personal tenure of office they would convoke the Legislative Body, that had never been legally dissolved, as the "Conseils—Généraux", or a new assembly able to decide in the name of the people of France between Peace or War.

When Paris had yielded to famine and France had exhausted her fighting powers, the war would come to an end of itself,—but there would probably be no Gov<sup>t</sup> in the Country.

The only course for Prussia would then be to occupy and appropriate the produce for the next few years of certain Provinces "like Caterpillars on a Tree", and in the rest of France facilitate the convocation of the Legislative Body so as to enable the Empire to restore itself with its captured Sovereign, Field-M Marshals, Generals, and army of 400,000 men, which His Excellency is carefully keeping in store for such a contingency.

Cynical as these conjectures must appear, they may yet be realized and the day come when a restoration of the Empire will be hailed by the Party of Order as the only safeguard against the anarchy which threatens France after the fall of the Gov<sup>t</sup> of Defence.

It is an illusion the Press so much indulges in to believe that France has anything to gain or Germany anything to lose by a continuation of the War, and while they justly admire the spirit which inspires France to resist to the last, they do not realize that that very resistance is detrimental only to herself and beneficial only to Germany. The French declaration of War has made Germany, the continuation of War will "undo" France. The peace conditions Gambetta<sup>21</sup> & [illeg.]

<sup>21</sup> Léon Gambetta (1838–1882), hero of the French resistance after the defeat at Sedan.

might enact to-day, will shrink into unconditional surrender when Paris yields to famine.

I have ———

(signed) ODO RUSSEL.

VERSAILLES, 6 PLACE HOCHÉ,  
18 December, 1870.<sup>22</sup>

*Private.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Bismarck seems to delight in having someone to talk at who will listen without interruption to the torrent of his ideas and "*fauté de mieux*" he pours them into my delighted ears.

He is most kind and hospitable, asks me often to dinner, takes me out driving with him alone, sends his carriage and a Secretary to come and fetch me to sit and smoke with him and gives me long and interesting accounts of his past and present difficulties with the King, the Crown Prince and the Royal family whom he finds it so difficult to deal with because they will have "convictions" and know everything better than himself,—an unpardonable offence in Count Bismarck's opinion because it makes him "bilious".

He has been very "bilious" for the last week and has twice received me in his bedroom and on his Sofa.

The King, he says, has "Olympic convictions" and believes Germany to have been created for him,—and not he for Germany,—that the Sovereigns of Germany *alone* can give him the Imperial crown, and that therefore the deputation of the Reichstag who have just arrived to acknowledge the new Emperor are a pack of revolutionists who are encroaching on the rights of the Minor Sovereigns of Germany and should therefore not be received at all—&c., &c.

After a long nocturnal altercation the Chancellor told the King he would resign if the deputation was not received and took to his bed,—

The Crown Prince and others have since interfered and they have made it up.

I marvel at the freedom with which he finds fault with his Masters and should not like to put on paper all he said in detail about them,—but I will now endeavour to put down all he said about the Conference and the War as accurately as I can.

In the course of two very long conversations about the conferences he threw out the course of proceeding reported in my despatch N° 25 of the 14 of December which he had evidently settled tele-

<sup>22</sup> Brief excerpts from this letter are found in *Life of Lord Granville*, II, 74.



graphically with Prince Gortchakoff<sup>23</sup> and Bernstorff<sup>24</sup> but he would not commit himself to any move of adjustment saying that he had no particular opinions on the subject and no interest in the matter but the maintenance of Peace.—He condemned the Russian Circular<sup>25</sup> but he sympathized with their wish for a revision of the Treaty and would support any scheme likely to satisfy all parties.

He finally asked me to suggest a scheme but I said Lord Granville had given me no instructions beyond consulting his opinion because it would be matter of great satisfaction to H[er] M[ajesty's] Govt, if, without prejudging the action of the conference, they found that there was a general harmony in the views of Prussia and England as to the objects to be attained.—

"Very well" he said, "the object to be attained is peace",—what would you do in my place"?—

"In Your Excellency's place" I said "I should at once accede to the tripartite Treaty between England, Austria and France of the 15<sup>th</sup> April 1856 which guarantees the independence and integrity of Turkey and I should invite Italy to do the same so as to prove to the world that the secret understanding you are accused of having established with Russia respecting Turkey is really a myth; as Your Excellency was pleased to assure me yourself the other day,—Such accession would afford the most valuable guarantee for the maintenance of peace in the Levant you could give and would facilitate the revision of the separate convention.—

Count Bismarck reflected for some time and said he did not think the German Parliament would ratify an engagement of this kind which in the present temper of the people of Germany would be very unpopular.—

I said that if for the sake of peace he put his name to it, it would become popular.—

No Count Bismarck replied "the Germans will now be solely employed in organizing their political strength at home and will resist any engagements to fight for other nations abroad, and having no conquests to make for themselves will only care to resist invasion, while the conquest made by others will be indifferent to them."

But I asked, "would Germany not, for instance, object to Russia having the naval command of the mouths of the Danube?"

Count Bismarck replied that it would be a matter of perfect indifference to Germany so long as her commerce on the Danube was not

<sup>23</sup> Prince Alexander Gortchakoff (1798-1883), Russian chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, 1856-1882.

<sup>24</sup> Count Albrecht von Bernstorff (1800-1873), Prussian and later German ambassador in London, 1854-1873, except for a brief interlude, 1861-1862, when he served as foreign minister of Prussia.

<sup>25</sup> Circular of October 31, 1870, in which Russia denounced the clause in the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, which limited her naval forces in the Black Sea. For text see *British Parliamentary Papers* (hereafter cited as *P. P.*), 1871, LXXII, c. 245, pp. 1-4.

interfered with and she could make commercial Treaties with any power who conquered the Shores of the Black Sea.

I asked whether it would equally be indifferent to Germany who held the Principalities<sup>26</sup> and he said it would,—Germany would not care or go to War if Russia or Austria took possession of Roumania although he personally would prefer to see them in the hands of Austria because the German element was more civilizing than the Russian.—Meanwhile he hoped they would remain as they were and he had advised Prince Charles<sup>27</sup> to throw himself entirely under the protectorate of Turkey and the guaranteeing Powers and to turn a deaf ear to the Hungarian Statesmen who recommended a Coup d'Etat and the creation of a Danubian Kingdom under Hungarian protection,—he hated all those sorts of wild schemes, and would never listen to them.

After the present war Germany would care for nothing but peace and would be very unwilling to follow any but a policy of strict non-intervention and neutrality.—

I observed that from all he had said I concluded that he not only declined to join the Tripartite Treaty,—but was indifferent to the maintainance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

Personally he replied he was far from indifferent, but he felt sure that no German Parliament would support a Minister who proposed to go to war for Turkey,—on the other hand he could assure me that Russia could not bribe Germany to acquiesce in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.—

“Granted” I said “but could England Austria France & Italy not bribe Germany into guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, by acceding to the Tripartite Treaty.—

“If you put it in that form” Count Bismarck replied “I cannot answer without much reflection,—for England and Austria are the natural Allies of Germany and their alliance would offer advantages to Germany she could not prudently reject even at the cost of sacrifices of friendship.”

“Very well,” I said, “I leave your Excellency to reflect and shall consider your first refusal as “non avenu” like the Russian Circular.”

I then asked him how he proposed to deal with the Black Sea question, and after a great deal of conversation and hesitation he concluded that Turkey would prefer to keep her Sovereign Rights over the Bosphorus so as to let in or exclude the Ships of other nations at

<sup>26</sup> The Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, which in 1862 united as Rumania.

<sup>27</sup> Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, elected hereditary prince of Rumania in 1866 and proclaimed king on May 22, 1881.

her will and pleasure,—but he could and would give no positive opinion until he knew what Turkey really wished and you advised. He would support none but a peace policy in the conference and seek to conciliate all parties.—The sympathies of Germany and of the Royal family were with Russia and the Imperial family, and Prussia would have to support the reasonable wishes of Russia,—but he would resist any exaggerated demands on her part, if she put forward any, as he had resisted her ill-timed and ill-advised Circular.—More than that he could not say until he became acquainted with the views and respective positions of the Powers in Conference assembled,—but he had no preconceived opinions and was open to conviction.—

On one occasion he asked whether England wished for a naval station in the Black Sea,—to which he saw no objection,—on another he observed that opening the Black Sea altogether might have a very civilizing influence on the populations, but he committed himself to no positive opinion beyond the often repeated conviction that the sooner the Conference meets the better, so that their labours may be pacifically completed before the various Parliaments of Europe meet again.

That is all I have been able to learn from the great man respecting the Conference.

I am inclined to believe in the truth of his often repeated assertions that no *secret understanding* exists between him and Russia,—but on the other hand I see that there is an open, avowed, unconcealed alliance between them which he not only does not attempt to deny, but openly declares to be a national and family alliance of friendship and gratitude for past services and which it is his duty to Germany to maintain until future events bring about more advantageous alliances.—

It should not be forgotten that he has devoted and will devote his whole life to the creation of an all powerful Germany and that he will shrink from nothing, (like Cavour,<sup>28</sup>) to accomplish his object.—

Now that I know him I shall no longer be surprized to see him change the Map of Europe far more than the Emperor Napoleon was expected to do and we must be prepared for many disagreeable surprises.

He has no love for England because he feels that we stand in the way of his ambitious plans and he hates Count Beust because he stands between him and an alliance with Austria, which he ardently desires.

Driving in the Versailles park alone with Count Bismarck on Friday a shot was fired in the bushes close to us, which I imagine came from some poacher,—but to my surprise the Chancellor stopped the

<sup>28</sup> Count Camillo di Cavour (1810–1861), the statesman who united Italy.

carriage and drew from under his uniform an enormous revolver which he pointed at the bush saying that he was always prepared for Franc-tireurs.—Seeing nobody we drove on and he told me the curious story of Carl Blind, who had attempted his Life at Berlin before the war with Austria.

He afterwards told me of the Circular he had sent you about Luxembourg, which he described as an act of self defence or rather as "loud oath with his hand on his sword at a set of ruffians who annoyed him and worried his children" &c &c. the object of which was simply to put an end to the active assistance Luxembourg was giving to the french <sup>20</sup>—

I said I was very sorry to hear of a measure which must give just offence in England and render the establishment of those friendly relations we so much desired more and more difficult.—

Count Bismarck replied that it was a threat to Luxembourg but not a breach of Treaty engagements and he requested me to assure you that he had neither wish nor intention to annex Luxembourg.

The most he would do, would be to levy a war contribution of a million or more of francs to teach them manners.—He attributed the anti-german intrigues in Luxembourg and Belgium to the Priests and to the Catholic Party,—and said he had written you full explanations through Count Bernstorff?—

I said that in the absence of instructions I would only express my fear that they could not prove satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

Count Bismarck then told me that the Empress Eugenie had renewed her peace-negotiation on the basis of a cession of territory and population, not larger than Savoy and Nice,—but that he had rejected them for two reasons: 1<sup>st</sup> because she was an unreliable intriguing woman with whom he did not think it safe to negotiate, and 2<sup>nd</sup> because the territory Germany would annex was larger than what the Empress was prepared to concede.—

I said I was very sorry to hear him speak again of annexations which would render friendly feelings between us more and more distant.—

He said he was very sorry for it but that after the sacrifices Germany and more especially Southern Germany had made a safe frontier was the least they had a right to expect.—

I said I supposed he was alluding to Alsace?

He said Alsace & a part of Lorraine that is, a line of frontier would be drawn from Luxembourg to Switzerland including Thionville and

<sup>20</sup> Alleging that Luxembourg had aided France, Bismarck stated that the German government "no longer considers itself bound to any consideration of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy." Circular dated Versailles, Dec. 3, 1870. P. P., 1871, LXXI, c. 246, p. 1.

Metz,—but probably not Nancy,—but of course "*Champagne* would have to be occupied," (for some years perhaps) until the war indemnity was paid, and of course the longer the war lasted, the greater would be the bill of damages,—and he compared the army of occupation to Caterpillars on a Tree eating their way all over it.—

I said I could not sufficiently express the regret I felt at all he told me.—

He replied that he had not commenced or wished for the war. France had declared it and it was Germany's duty to herself to protect future generations from the recurrence of french aggressions.—The formation of a strong and powerful Germany was the safest guarantee for the peace of Europe.—

He next went on to say that the Emperor Napoleon was in favour of the convocation of the "Conseils generaux" and of the Legislative body with an executive under Palikao,<sup>30</sup>—but that he paid no attention to these and other schemes because he would only assist in the reestablishment of the Empire if he could find no other government in France to conclude peace with.—The present Gov' of Defence had no hold over France otherwise he would willingly have assisted them in holding a Parliament at Orleans or anywhere else,—but the certainty that a national representation would begin by turning them out of office,—made them decline his offer.—He could never consent to a revictualling of Paris, because it would only lengthen the Siege operations and the war,—Paris must now surrender "*à discretion*".

He had always been against the investment of Paris and all its consequences,—but the King and his Generals had insisted upon it, and there was now no help for it, and it must be carried on to the end even if it lasted several years!!

He understood that General Trochu<sup>31</sup> intended to retire into the forts, to which he was sending food for a year, when famine compelled him to give up the town of Paris.—

The horrors of war filled him with sorrow and he deeply deplored the unnecessary waste of Life, the Gambetta administration was inflicting on France for the war was virtually over and France vanquished and every additional man killed could change nothing, beyond adding to the expense, in the final settlement.

I said I fully shared his sorrow at the horrors of war around us,—and I wondered whether any outer influences could put a stop to so much waste of life and property.—

<sup>30</sup> General Charles Palikao (1796–1878), minister of war and president of the council in the short-lived French government organized after the fall of Ollivier, Aug. 10, 1870.

<sup>31</sup> General Louis Trochu (1815–1896), governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of the forces defending the capital; on September 4 he was made president of the government of national defense.

Count Bismarck replied that outer influences only encouraged the resistance of the Government of Defence and that after all the more completely France was vanquished the better in the end for Germany, and the more lasting the peace.

Later when talking of Thiers's mission,<sup>22</sup> he told me that Thiers had through a third person offered to make peace and cede Alsace and Lorraine in exchange for Belgium by giving France to King Leopold,<sup>23</sup>—and that King Leopold was most favorably disposed to the scheme but that it would not suit Germany to strengthen France again, after all the sacrifices made to weaken her.—

He believed that the french sympathies of the Belgians amounted almost to a moral annexation, which it would be a mistake to encourage.

Many, he said, had been the attempts made by foreign governments to send their diplomatic agents to Versailles, but that he had by order of the King declined to receive them,—indeed the King on finding that the Russian Gov<sup>t</sup> wanted to leave Prince Wittgenstein<sup>24</sup> here, had caused him to telegraph to Prince Gortchakoff to order his agent home to Petersburg which had been done.—The King would not allow a single member of the Diplomatic Body at Berlin to come to Versailles notwithstanding frequent applications.

On my asking why His Majesty objected to diplomatists at Headquarters, Count Bismarck explained that their presence would add much to the immense labours and anxieties of the Campaign and interfere with the conditions of peace between France and Germany whenever those negotiations began.—

"Then" I said "I must be doubly grateful to His Majesty for his permission to come and the gracious reception he has granted me." "Not at all" said Count Bismarck, "England is the exception and Her Majesty [*sic*] Government to whom we could refuse nothing they asked, has done us a favour and your presence has done great good already".

I merely mention this to shew how very civil the Chancellor is to me.—Nevertheless I shall be very glad to get home, whenever you think I can do no more good at Headquarters, for the sake of my wife's health about which I am growing anxious.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>22</sup> Louis Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877) in the autumn of 1870 visited the capitals of neutral powers in a vain effort to obtain aid for his country. He was president of France, 1871-1873.

<sup>23</sup> Leopold II, king of the Belgians, 1865-1909, was a grandson of Louis Philippe, king of the French, 1830-1848.

<sup>24</sup> Wittgenstein was believed to be the tsar's aide-de-camp. Bismarck distrusted him. See Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History* (New York, 1898), I, 263-264.

*Private.*

VERSAILLES, 20 December 1870.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The arrival of the Reichsrath Deputation with the address asking the King to prosecute the war, for which Germany desired to make any and every sacrifice,—and for a rectification of the frontiers of the Fatherland and for the acceptance of the proffered Imperial Crown is a great event in the history of Mankind.—

In obedience to your instructions I conveyed the congratulations of Her Majesty's Government first to Count Bismarck and then to the King who had graciously asked me to dinner again, and I must say that His Majesty and the Chancellor appeared sincerely gratified, as was also the Crown Prince when he heard of it.—The King said he felt doubly gratified because it had been an unexpected surprize to him and that he would instruct Count Bernstorff to thank you.—

Among the thirty Members of the Reichsrath deputation I found several old friends who called on me to say that they all took the side of England in the Eastern question and condemned Russia in strong terms,—and hoped that a better feeling between Germany and England might be achieved and an alliance follow the war.—

I have carefully avoided the subject of Luxemburg until I knew what H. M. Govt had decided to say or do.—

Count Bismarck told me that he had informed you through Count Bernstorff that the french Chargé d' Affaires at Constantinople had proposed to Aali Pasha<sup>\*\*</sup> to introduce the subject of the War at the London Conference,—and that if in consequence of the refusal of the other Powers to entertain the french proposal the Government of Defence declined to be represented at the Conference it would be best to proceed without France and keep the Protocols open for their future consideration,—because he thought it very desirable that the meeting of the Conferences should not be delayed.

I told Count Bismarck that you had done the same as Aali Pasha and declined the french proposal, which he said he was very glad to hear——

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Dec. 20/70.

MY DEAR ODO,

I am glad to be able to send you good accounts of Lady Emily. I will telegraph to you at once with leave, if there was any chance of your being wanted home.

Your stay at Versailles must be irksome but it may become exceedingly useful at any time.

---

<sup>\*\*</sup> Turkish representative at the London conference.

I presume from your telegram that the Luxemburg affair is likely to be settled at all events for the present.

I wish I could get a day fixed for the Conference. I hope to do so either for next week, or for the first week in the new year. There is no hitch now, but the stupid wish of the French to send a Plenipo. from Paris, instead of appointing Tissot<sup>26</sup> whom we all like who would get on with Bernstorff, & has knowledge of Eastern Affairs. I have written to Lyons to do what he can.

Our programme which I have talked over with Bernstorff is nearly settled for the first day.

I am to send out an invitation which will be of a formal character. I shall be named President. I shall then make the speech I enclose or something like it. You will see a passage marked, the substance of which I shall propose as a protocol ad hoc. Brunnow<sup>27</sup> has promised to sign it, with the others.

It appears to me that this will be sufficient as a snub to the Circular and a proof that we do not admit the principle involved in it. I shall ask Brunnow to make his proposals which he will do in a speech to which none of the P. P. [plenipotentiaries] see any objection. I shall then ask Musurus<sup>28</sup> whether he will speak at once or put off for a couple of days his speech on so important a Comm<sup>a</sup>.

This he will do, & Bernstorff will probably postpone till after his speech the declaration which he has been ordered to make in favour of the non neutralization of the Black Sea.

I have declined to discuss with Brunnow anything beyond the first days proceedings, but before the second we shall have some more pour-parlers. I do not see why the Conference should take more than three days whether it is to end ill or *well* as is almost certain.

Have you ascertained why Bismarck has made such a mess of Luxemburg. I never saw Gladstone so angry but I hope it will all end well.

I am also in some hopes of the U. S. becoming more reasonable as regards us, but this is a sanguine view.

Cannot you write sometimes in cypher telling us news of the real prospects of the war. Is it true that there is considerable dissension at the German Head Quarters.

Can you find out anything as to how far the negotiations have gone with the Emperor, and whether there is any reason for alarm about Belgium.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Joseph Tissot (1828-1884), secretary at the French embassy in London, 1869-1871, minister to Morocco and Greece, 1871-1876, ambassador at Constantinople, 1880-1882, and at London, 1882-1884.

<sup>27</sup> Count Ernest Philip Brunnow (1797-1875), Russian ambassador at London, 1840-1854, 1868-1874.

<sup>28</sup> Constantin Musurus Pasha (1807-1891), Turkish minister at London, 1851-1856, ambassador, 1856-1885.



*Private.*

F. O., Dec. 24/70.

MY DEAR RUSSELL,

I read with painful interest your Despatch no 25, giving Count Bismarck's views as to possible means of restoring peace. The difficulty of the position is certainly great for Germany. It has been created by the Collapse of the Empire, the encouragement which that event and military success gave to extended demands on the part of Prussia and the march to Paris, dictated as it seems to have been by military pride rather than by statesmanlike policy.

It is impossible for any of us to say what Germany may require of her Rulers, after the sacrifices she has made, and the victories she has obtained. But there is nothing in the present state of things which makes me doubt, that moderation at the moment of success is the best and wisest policy.

It looks as if the French had no chance of changing their bad fortune, but the defence of Paris, and the fighting in the Loire has saved their honor, which was sadly tarnished by Sedan & Metz. I have not scrupled to tell Frenchmen of all shades of opinion, that they are the best judges of what chance remains to them, that if they can turn the tables on their enemy no one can blame them for the attempt, but if they believe it is necessary to save France that an early peace should be made, it is moral cowardice to shrink from direct communication with the Prussians for the purpose. I shall be glad indeed to find that there are men sufficiently patriotic to undertake such a measure. On the other hand I cannot believe that Count Bismarck really considers the plan which he unfolded to you, as one only injurious to France, and of no detriment to Germany. Putting aside all claims of humanity, what an inauguration it would be of the Unity of Germany. The Germans justly boast that their marvelous army is the representation of the Nation, that it owes its success not only to its training, but to its moral & intellectual qualities. It is added that it is an army of defence as its constitution makes it ill adapted for any continuous aggressive movements. What effect will it have, upon Germany, upon her ambitions, upon her habits of public & private morality, upon its commerce and industry, upon her consideration with other nations, if for some years she employs hundreds of thousands of her best men, to govern despotically, and to grind down in every way, a large portion of so spirited and intelligent a nation as the French.

The King, the Crown Prince, and Count Bismarck are men of different characters, and probably of different habits of thought, but I cannot conceive how they can really think that such a future as has

been sketched by Count Bismarck to you would not prove a curse to all those concerned in it.

Yours sincerely

GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O. Jan<sup>r</sup> 1/71.

MY DEAR RUSSELL,

I took occasion to ask Count Bernstorff how it was that he had described my answer to Count Bismarck's circular on Luxemburg as comparing the conduct of the latter with that of Prince Gortchakoff. He assured me that he had not done so, that he had only said it was the view which public opinion in England took of it.

There is no doubt that it was possible to put that construction on it, particularly as it came so soon after Prince Gortchakoff's circular, but I took pains to frame the despatch on a contrary assumption.

The assurances of His Majesty are very satisfactory on this point, and I think the written answer from Count Bismarck will put the matter at an end.

Chandordy<sup>39</sup> complains of your presence at Head Quarters which is hardly reasonable, when Lyons is following him from place to place.

Our Press is getting very wild. I believe Parliament will approve of our Foreign policy. But war like other great crimes produces a wish for imitation, and any unfortunate series of accidents might create an explosion.

The Turk's messenger bearing his instructions is not arrived. Cadorna's<sup>40</sup> instructions do not appear to have been written, and Favre cannot arrive I presume on the 3<sup>d</sup>. They declined to let Tissot represent him on the first day. I believe when we begin we shall not be long.

Lord Russell wrote twice to tell me that you ought to come back, but in his last letter he advises that you should remain.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) G.

[Copy]

*Private.*

16 BRUTON ST Jan 8th 1871.

MY DEAR ODO,

Your frequent letters are of the greatest interest to me—and it is clear your presence at Versailles is of great importance. Otway<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Jean Baptiste A. D. Chandordy (1826-1889), in charge of foreign affairs in the French government of national defense at Tours, later ambassador to Russia, 1881-1889.

<sup>40</sup> Carlo Cadorna (1809-1891), Italian ambassador at London, 1869-1875.

<sup>41</sup> Arthur Otway, parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, had resigned his office.

has left us in consequence of our agreement to go into conference. He stands on the "Pall Mall" platform. He says we should have summoned Prussia to declare on which side she was, unless the answer had been unequivocal we should have formed an alliance with France, Austria, Italy, Spain, the smaller states, encouraged the Turks to send their fleet into the Black Sea.

It is hardly credible but I believe he will find many admirers—There is an uneasy feeling that we are not playing our part. War like all other great crimes produces imitators—& there is a not unnatural feeling of sympathy with the French in their Great Misery. I believe a great effort is about to be made by the latter to create a serious alliance with us and with Austria. Lyons tells me that the country which alone is popular at Bordeaux, and on whom they rely is Russia.

I hope you will soon get an answer directed to us from Favre. I believe if he does not consent the French will send no one. What I should have preferred would have been Tissot who would make no difficulties.

If as I intend we go on without France, I wish to know that all possible opportunities have been given her, both by the Prussians, and by us. We shall meet, and I suspect make short work of the conference.

Your's sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O. Jan<sup>r</sup> 9/71.

MY DEAR ODO.

I am glad to receive from Bernstorff a telegram which must I think appear satisfactory with regard to the Colliers, if the spirit of it is carried out in the final arrangements. I have observed on more than one occasion the decision with which Count Bismarck gives a speedy affirmative answer, when once he has made up his mind that such should be given. The good effect is often lost by persons delaying to do that to which they have made up their minds.

I send you as conciliatory a desp<sup>t</sup> as was possible on the affairs of Luxembourg.

I am not surprised at the difficulty of persuading Moltke of the merits of the question respecting the export of arms.<sup>42</sup> But the tu quoque argument is open to the meanest apprehension, and in this case it is most important not as a question of retaliation, but as a proof of what has been usage.

I should carry the war with Moltke into the enemy's camp, and accuse him of a want of foresight, so rare in his arrangements. War

<sup>42</sup> For a discussion of the arms controversy see *Life of Lord Granville*, II, 87-89.

having been likely for some years to come between the Countries, he was bound to take into consideration all the resources of the enemy. How was it possible that he should have excluded from these the power the French would have of receiving warlike supplies from the U. S. and this Country, and how would he believe that the 2 latter countries would change the usage which they have always adopted, & which up to this time has been adopted by both the Belligerents.

I have had 2 conversations with Bernstorff about the war. He has asked my opinion whether the fall of Paris would put an end to the war. I answered that I was incompetent to judge, that the surprises of this war have been so great, that it is difficult to foresee what would now happen. That my 1<sup>st</sup> impression was that as Paris & France were separately much encouraged by the belief in the other, that the capitulation or taking of Paris would lead to an early Peace, but that I said that Lord Lyons did not think so, that he thought encreasing disorganization and continued resistance would probably be the result. I said that I could not help believing that if Germany was unable to conclude the war at once, obtaining her own terms of Peace, She would regret the persistent way in which she had shewn her determined objection to make use or to allow of the friendly offices of the Neutral Powers. I quite understood that being successful in a great war of which she had to bear all the brunt & all the sacrifices she had determined not to be dictated to by those who had stood aloof. It was probably the same feeling which had prevented the Imperial Gov<sup>t</sup> from consenting to any mediation. The Republican Gov<sup>t</sup> had made different appeals to us, to these we had invariably answered that we could not interfere unless our mediation or advice would be acceptable to both or likely to be effective. If this war was continued, if France became totally disorganised, a curse to herself & to Europe, utterly incapable of indemnifying Germany for the costs of the war, Germany having no resource but to seize and occupy vast territories occupied by unwilling inhabitants, some blame would attach to her for having steadily rejected, not the intervention, but the good offices of some of the Neutral Powers, of a character which had so often led to satisfactory results.

I hardly know how to deal with this question of the correspondents. Cannot you speak to some of the most sensible, and best conditioned of them, telling them what you hear in the Prussian Head Quarters.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Jan. 18/71.

MY DEAR ODO,

We got well through the first sitting of the Conference. We shall be a good deal attacked here on account of the absence of the French

Plenipotentiary, who unless you have been inventing Telegrams, has made a fool of himself.

Bernstorff insisted upon alluding to Prussia being the author of the Conference which obliged me to point out that it was not exactly the Prussian proposal which had been accepted, because the French had originally objected to accept a proposal from their enemy, to which I answered that what they were asked to accept was more in the nature of a counter proposition. I shall take some public opportunity of acknowledging how useful the influence of Prussia has been in bringing the Conference to a result.

I wish you could stop the bombardment of the defenceless parts of Paris. It is doubtful whether it does not create more anger than fear, and it is certain that it excites sympathy elsewhere.

Yours sincerely

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Janr 21/71.

MY DEAR ODO,

I am much annoyed to hear of the refusal that Count Bismarck has sent to M. Favre's application for a safe conduct.

Count Bismarck received M. Favre some time ago in order to negotiate an armistice or Peace with him; since then he requested me to invite France to attend the Conference. He has constantly pressed that the Conference should proceed and acquiesced in M. Favre coming thro' the German lines in order to attend it. But giving one reason of form for not sending him the safe conduct, he now gives another for refusing it when M. Favre applies for it in a possibly irregular manner, but which might have been met by sending a military safe conduct, or even by a Diplomatic one, which would not have been more of an official recognition of M. Favre than the facts to which I have alluded.

It is impossible to resist the impression that Count Bismarck does not wish M. Favre to come out. Although it was embarrassing to hold the Conference without M. Favre, yet as long as it was his fault, I decided to do so. I have not had time to consider what I shall now do.

Yours ———,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., March 1, 1871.

MY DEAR ODO,

I hope you will take an opportunity of saying all that I feel about the Crown Prince.

His kind reception of yourself his moderation during the War, his humane feelings towards the conquered, & his much larger political views than the persons who direct negotiations appear to have been—are all well known here & appreciated as they deserve.

And it is an immense thing for the future relations of the two countries, that his feelings about England are so well understood.

H. R. H. will easily understand that it is impossible that much sympathy should not at this time be felt for the French—But unless Count Bismarck gives some reasons for suspicions which are current about his future policy, I have great confidence that the two nations will be the friends, which for so many reasons they ought to be.

Yours sincerely

(sd) GRANVILLE.



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## **CHAPTER II**

**LETTERS, DECEMBER, 1871-DECEMBER, 1872**

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## CHAPTER II

### LETTERS, DECEMBER, 1871—DECEMBER, 1872

In March, 1871, Odo Russell returned to his duties as assistant undersecretary in the foreign office. But his success in dealing with Bismarck made him the logical choice as successor to Lord Augustus Loftus, who in the summer of 1871 was transferred from Berlin to St. Petersburg.<sup>1</sup> In June, 1871, Russell was offered the embassy at the German capital, now the most important in the British diplomatic service, and the offer was of course accepted with alacrity. The appointment was, however, kept secret for a time<sup>2</sup> and it was not made official until October 16. An important reason for the delay was that the new ambassadress expected to be confined in December; her health was delicate, and Russell did not wish to leave her and assume the duties of his Berlin post until after the confinement. Late in September, 1871, he made a hurried visit to Berlin for the purpose of securing a house, engaging a household staff, and purchasing some furniture.<sup>3</sup> In November he went to Berlin to present his credentials, then secured leave, and returned in February, 1872, to assume the regular duties of his post. From the beginning Odo Russell was received with the greatest cordiality in Berlin.<sup>4</sup>

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 December 1871.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I reached Berlin on Tuesday night and early the very next morning Prince Bismarck sent Mr Abeken,<sup>5</sup> one of his Undersecretaries

<sup>1</sup> With characteristic modesty Russell did not look upon himself as the logical successor to Loftus. Writing to Granville on April 11, 1871, Russell said: "My diplomatic dream would be Morier at Stutgardt [sic] or Munich,—and Lord Acton Ambassador at Berlin,—and if he would not undertake the task for which he is more admirably qualified than any man living, then Sir James Hudson for Berlin." Original MS., the Granville Papers. Acton was the famous historian; Sir James Hudson (1810–1885) had served as minister at Turin, 1851–1863.

<sup>2</sup> On June 28, 1871, Russell wrote to Granville: "This morning Morier writes in a huff because I have not informed him myself of my appointment which he has heard from others.—"

"Under these circumstances I feel I can no longer withhold the good news from Emily and my Mother,—but I will tell them in strict confidence." Original MS., *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> For a description of the British embassy in Berlin during Russell's occupancy see Rodd, *Memories*, I, 48. In a letter to Granville, October 3, 1871, Russell wrote: "My visit to Berlin was quite successful,—I took Loftus Embassy and paid the first quarter in advance—bought what he left of his furniture for £1085,—got a few servants and came back here well pleased with what I had done." Original MS., *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Taffs, *Russell*, 3, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Heinrich Abeken (1809–1872), one of Bismarck's closest advisers in the German foreign office, which he had entered in 1853; he died August 8, 1872. See Hedwig Abeken, *Heinrich Abeken, ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit, aus Briefen zusammengestellt* (Berlin, 1898).

I had known at Versailles, to say that he and Mon<sup>r</sup> de Thiele [*sic*]<sup>6</sup> were both ill in bed with influenza, that he regretted he could not receive me at once,—but that he would do so as soon as his Doctor allowed him to speak and that meanwhile Abeken would do all the needful about my Audience.—Mr Abeken was most “gushing” on his own account, and said the Emperor would receive me the moment he returned from Hanover where he was gone to shoot.—

Today the Lord Chamberlain<sup>7</sup> called to tell me all about the ceremonial and added that the Emperor, who returned tonight would probably fix Monday or Tuesday for my reception, after which he overwhelmed me with civil speeches which I cannot possibly repeat.

After he had left me Abeken called again and not finding me at home left a note to say that Prince Bismarck would receive me tonight if I would excuse his “lying on a sofa.”—

In short nothing can be more satisfactory or gratifying than the preparations for my reception so that I hope the best for the future.

That is all I have to say by this Messenger.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, BRITISH EMBASSY,  
17 February 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Here I am at last, and after so many domestic anxieties very thankful to be in possession of my Embassy with the blessed feeling that wife and children are well and soon able to join me, please God!—<sup>8</sup>

I have little to say by this my first messenger home.—

The Emperor has unhappily had a slight attack of bronchitis, and though better, has not yet left his bed.—

The Court are in mourning for the Duchess of Meiningen.<sup>9</sup> Prince Frederick Charles<sup>10</sup> has left for Italy and Egypt. The Crown Prince and Crown Princess<sup>11</sup> were pleased to send for me immediately after

<sup>6</sup> Hermann von Thile (1812–1899), Prussian undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1862–1872; German foreign secretary, 1872–1873, when he retired. While at the foreign office Thile was considered second only to Bismarck. See Johann Sass, “Hermann von Thile und Bismarck,” *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Berlin, 1929), CCXVII, 257–279.

<sup>7</sup> Chamberlain von Roeder was in charge of introducing the representatives of foreign courts.

<sup>8</sup> Russell returned to England in December in order to be with his wife at the birth of their daughter, Constance, on January 1, 1872. He was sworn in as a privy councillor during a stay at Osborne as guest of Queen Victoria, February 5–7.

<sup>9</sup> Feodora (1839–1872), daughter of Ernest, prince of Hohenlohe-Langenbourg, in 1858 married George, a grandson of Frederick William II of Prussia, who became Duke of Saxe-Meiningen in 1866. The duchess died on February 10, 1872.

<sup>10</sup> Prince Frederick Charles (1828–1885) was the eldest son of Prince Charles (1801–1883), brother of Emperor William I. Known as the Red Prince, he commanded one of the German armies during the Franco-Prussian War.

<sup>11</sup> Frederick (1881–1888), afterwards Emperor Frederick III, in 1858 married Victoria (1840–1901), princess royal of Britain.

my arrival. I was deeply gratified by the cordial condescension of their reception and the manner in which they asked after you and Lady Granville. I gave Their Imperial Highnesses your messages and they desired me to convey their best thanks to you.—They were also pleased to ask me to dinner tonight.—

The day after my arrival the three Ambassadors called on me. Count Oubril, the Russian,<sup>12</sup> and Count Karolyi, the Austrian,<sup>13</sup> are old friends whom I have known all my life.—The French Ambassador, Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron<sup>14</sup> is a new acquaintance. All three were eloquent in their assurance of friendship, good will and cooperation. De Gontaut-Biron says he knew you in Paris and desired to send you his hommages.—He appears to be an amiable and agreeable representative of the Fbg. St. Germain ultramontane Legitimist party<sup>15</sup> and has already made himself generally popular in Berlin society.—He is a widower with 17 living children out of 22!—At present he is alone here, but he tells me he intends to send for some of his daughters to do the honours of his Embassy.—

Prince Bismarck called on me and I on him, but without meeting yet.—The Ambassadors tell me that he is neither visible or [*sic*] accessible, that they transact business with Thile and only ask to see Bismarck when strictly necessary.—

The subject uppermost in men's minds here is the discussion of the Bill for the supervision of Educational establishments in Prussia which Bismarck has declared his intention to carry by every constitutional means in his power.<sup>16</sup>—The debate on this bill will take place on the 5th March in the Upper House and Count Münster,<sup>17</sup> with whom I dined last night, assures me that notwithstanding the great conservative opposition it is calling forth, the Bill will pass by a small

<sup>12</sup> Count Paul Petrovitch Oubril (1820-1896), Russian minister and ambassador in Berlin, 1863-1879; ambassador to Austria-Hungary, 1880-1882.

<sup>13</sup> Aloys Karolyi (1825-1889) represented Austria-Hungary at Berlin as minister, 1860-1866, and as ambassador, 1871-1878; ambassador at London, 1878-1888.

<sup>14</sup> Armand Elie, Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron (1817-1890), French ambassador at Berlin, 1872-1877; member of the French senate, 1876-1882.

<sup>15</sup> The Legitimist party in France, led by the Count of Chambord, grandson of Charles X, stood for the unrestricted restoration of the Bourbons, their white flag, and Roman Catholicism. The party was supported by some ancient aristocratic families, like that headed by Viscount Gontaut-Biron. Many of these noble families had Paris residences in the district known as Le Faubourg Saint-Germain, which accounts for the application of that title to a section of the party.

<sup>16</sup> The bill provided for the supervision of all schools, public and private, by the state; inspectors were to be state officials, not responsible to any religious denomination. It had passed the lower house of the Prussian parliament by a vote of 197-171, and on March 7 passed the upper house by a vote of 125-76.

<sup>17</sup> George Herbert Münster (1820-1902), born in England and married to the sister of the Earl of Rosslyn; member of the reichstag under the Confederation and empire, 1867-1873; German ambassador in London, 1873-1885, and in Paris, 1885-1900. See Kenneth Bjork, *Count Münster and Anglo-German Relations, 1873-1885* (unpublished, University of Wisconsin Ph. D. thesis, 1935).

majority after a severe fight in the "*Herrn Hause*". I am not sufficiently acquainted with the subject to say much about it yet.

As far as I have been able to learn Public opinion in Berlin is favourable to our view of the Alabama claims and the Americans have met with no sympathy, as was to be expected from a sensible people like the Germans.—

The three principal Americans here, Bancroft,—Bigelow and Fish junior<sup>18</sup> appear to have made themselves somewhat ridiculous by proclaiming that "England would Knock under whenever America shewed her teeth!"—

Count Münster said to Bancroft: "Take care you don't get your teeth knocked down your throat by shewing them too much."

Bancroft replied: "I thought you were a German, but now I see you are not," and turned his back upon him.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private and Conf<sup>l</sup>.*

BERLIN, 26 February, 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your several instructions respecting Slave Trade and Commerce & etc. have reached me and I will attend to them at once.

My social duties will be as easy as pleasant at Berlin for I meet with the most marvellous civility and "*Zuvorkommenheit*" from all sides. The Diplomatic Body, including the Ambassadors and the Military Secretaries attended my Diplomatic Levée on Thursday without a single exception and I had every reason to be highly gratified by the manner in which they "hailed" me as their Doyen,—although the youngest among them. Bancroft and his staff stayed over three hours,—and Delbrück<sup>19</sup> sent me word that he had shortened the sitting of the Council of the Realm to enable the German Dips to come early to me. The Crown Prince honoured me with a long and interesting visit,—and the high functionaries of the Court have all called. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies has advized me to put off my

<sup>18</sup> George Bancroft (1800–1891), United States minister at Berlin, 1867–1874, had also served as minister at the Court of St. James, 1846–1849. The famous American historian had received his doctorate at the University of Göttingen in 1820, and the fiftieth anniversary of this event was imposingly celebrated in Germany. John Bigelow (1817–1911), United States minister to France, 1865–1866, was living in Germany in 1872, engaged in historical research. Nicholas Fish (1848–1902), a son of Hamilton Fish, then American secretary of state, was attached to the American legation in Berlin as assistant secretary, 1871–1874, and as secretary, 1874–1877; he became chargé d'affaires in Switzerland, 1877–1881, and minister to Belgium, 1882–1886, and then turned to banking in New York.

<sup>19</sup> Martin Friedrich Rudolf Delbrück (1817–1903), historian, Prussian liberal statesman and free trader, minister of state, 1868–1876, and president of the German federal chancellery. Described by W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1867–1914, and the Unity Movement* (New York, 1919), II, 11–12, as Bismarck's righthand man until 1876, when he resigned over the issue of free trade.

"State reception" of the Society until Emily is here, which I am very glad of.—

I have had private Audiences of the Princes and Princesses but not yet of the Queen Dowager and Prince Adalbert,<sup>20</sup> who are both ill.—

Last night I was asked to a Concert at Court given in honour of the Queen of Würtemberg,<sup>21</sup> whose visit here, is considered an event and an act of submission to the Empire. I was invited to sit beside Their Majestys [*sic*] the Empress Augusta<sup>22</sup> and the Queen of Würtemberg during the concert as well as at Supper and was honoured with marked distinction from first to last.—The Empress and the Queen desired to be remembered to you.—

The Emperor was not yet well enough to appear, I regret to say, and the Crown Princess no longer goes out at night. The interest and sympathy for the Prince of Wales<sup>23</sup> seems as great here as in England and Prince Arthur<sup>24</sup> has won every heart in Berlin. My late visit to Osborne enabled me to answer the never ceasing and anxious enquiries about Her Majesty the Queen on the part of all the Royal Family, and the deep interest taken in Her Majesty's welfare at Berlin is very gratifying to a loyal subject.

It is often said that Prussians are stiff and formal, but I must say that I never met with more demonstrative cordiality, even in Italy.

The Queen of Würtemberg, whom I had known at Rome, seemed very nervous and struggling against a desire to cry, and whispered to me that she could not get accustomed to the new state of things in Germany and that the duties of Royalty were sometimes beyond human endurance,—and the more so as there was no escape from them.—Her Majesty had been obliged to see Prince Bismarck and little as she sympathized with his policy she confessed to having been deeply impressed by his commanding presence.—Her Majesty desired me to thank you privately and confidentially for having kept up our mission at Stutt-

<sup>20</sup> The queen dowager was Elizabeth of Bavaria (1801-1873), widow of Frederick William IV of Prussia (1795-1861). Prince Adalbert (1811-1873) was a son of the emperor's uncle, Prince William of Prussia (1783-1851).

<sup>21</sup> Olga (1822-1892), daughter of Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, in 1846 married the prince of Würtemberg, who ruled as King Charles I, 1864-1891.

<sup>22</sup> Augusta of Saxe-Weimar (1811-1890) in 1829 married Prince William, later King William I of Prussia and first German emperor.

<sup>23</sup> Late in 1871 the prince of Wales was stricken with severe typhoid fever, and on December 27 he suffered a relapse. A thanksgiving service for his recovery was held at St. Paul's on February 27, 1872. See Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII, a Biography* (London, 1925), I, 320-325, and George E. Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria* (London, 1926), 2d Ser., II, especially 169-181.

<sup>24</sup> Prince Arthur (1850-1942), third son of Queen Victoria, created Duke of Connaught in 1874, married Princess Louise Marguerite of Prussia in 1879, served in the British army, 1868-1909, and as governor general of Canada, 1911-1916.

gardt,—She did not yet know Petre,<sup>25</sup> and regretted the Moriers,<sup>26</sup> but hoped to like the former as much as the latter.

The concert and Supper in the great circular Ballroom of the Palace and the general "coup d'oeuil" were truly magnificent and I was altogether charmed with my first impressions of the Court of Germany.—

Bismarck called again twice and then sent Abeken to say that he was much engaged but hoped to see me in a few days. Thile has been promoted from the rank of Under Secretary to that of Secretary of State, so as to remove the complaint of some Dips that they were only allowed to transact business with the Under Secretary instead of with the Chancellor of the Empire.—Thile offers to call on the Ambassadors if asked to do so by them, which is civil.—The Ambassadors have agreed to write and ask for an hour, as they do in London, so as not to wait. The rule in the Berlin F. O. is that Dips are received by the Foreign Secretary as they come and not according to rank.

Faucher,<sup>27</sup> the Cobdenite, tells me that he and the Free traders of Germany are urging the Government to propose the negotiation of a Commercial Treaty or at least a revision of Tariffs to Her Majesty's Government.—He, and others say that nothing would more develop the natural affections of England and Germany than improved commercial relations.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 March 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Nothing could be more gratifying than the general demonstrations of sympathy called forth here, by the infamous attempt on Her Majesty's Life at Buckingham Palace the day before yesterday.<sup>28</sup>—We are now anxiously awaiting details.—Many thanks for your telegram of last night which I sent at once to the Crown Princess who had written to ask if I had heard from you.—

<sup>25</sup> Sir George Glynn Petre (1822–1905) entered the diplomatic service in 1846 in the British legation at Frankfort and served at Hanover, Paris, the Hague, Naples, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Berlin before his appointment as chargé d'affaires at Stuttgart in 1872; he remained at Stuttgart until 1881, when he was sent as British minister to Argentina; in 1882 he was transferred with a similar rank to Paraguay, and in 1884 to Portugal, where he remained until 1893.

<sup>26</sup> Sir Robert B. D. Morier (1826–1893), British chargé d'affaires in Würtemberg from August, 1871, to February, 1872, when he was transferred to Munich; later he became minister at Lisbon (1876), at Madrid (1881), and finally ambassador at St. Petersburg (1884). His lifelong intimacy with Crown Prince and Princess Frederick handicapped his advancement in Germany. See Rosselyn Wemyss, *Memoirs and Letters of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Morier, G. O. B., from 1826 to 1876* (London, 1911).

<sup>27</sup> Julius Faucher (1820–1878), once secretary to Richard Cobden, the famous English free trade leader, returned to Germany from England in 1861; he founded and edited the official journal of the German Free Trade party, which he helped to organize.

<sup>28</sup> On February 29, 1872, as Queen Victoria was alighting from her carriage, seventeen-year-old Arthur O'Connor pointed an unloaded pistol at her, apparently with the intention of forcing her to sign a document relating to Fenian prisoners. The queen's account in her Journal is printed in *Letters*, II, 197.

I am going steadily through the slow process of returning visits and making new acquaintances,—but instead of finding my task tiresome as people said it would be, I find it pleasant and interesting in consequence of the immense civility I meet with everywhere. Indeed I am myself astonished at the quantity of friends I made at Versailles last winter, who come up to me in the most demonstrative manner, and of whom I have not the remotest recollection, but whom I am, of course, delighted to see again nevertheless.

Prince Bismarck gives me and *all* my Staff a dinner tonight.

Nothomb, the Belgian Minister<sup>29</sup> tells me that the Emperor Napoleon has sent an Agent to Petersburg to sound Gortchakoff<sup>30</sup> as to how a restoration of the Empire in France would be taken in Russia—and another agent to the Ex-Duke of Brunswick at Geneva<sup>31</sup> to ask him for a private loan of four million of francs, cash.—The name of the Agent to Russia he does not yet know,\* but the one to Geneva he says is an Englishman called “Smiths”.—

The Royal family do not appear at all reassured about the Emperor William’s health, who continues to be very weak and low.—

There is something going on about the Luxemburg Railway question which I have not yet been able to fathom.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

\*Arnim has just called and tells me that Fleuri [Fleury]<sup>32</sup> is the negotiator in question.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 March 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I telegraphed the congratulations to you and Lady Granville of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess as well as my own on the birth of your son and I repeat them with all my heart today.

From Arthur & Hastings<sup>33</sup> I hear with unbounded satisfaction that H. M. G. have weathered the gale at the commencement, and are now safe for the rest of the Session. The political lull continues

<sup>29</sup> Jean Baptiste Nothomb (1805-1881), Belgian minister at Berlin, 1845-1881.

<sup>30</sup> See “1870-1871,” n. 23.

<sup>31</sup> The ex-Duke of Brunswick was Charles (1804-1873), who had succeeded his father in 1815 and had been declared incapable of ruling by the German Diet in 1830. He spent the rest of his life in exile, chiefly at Paris.

<sup>32</sup> Count Harry Karl Kurt Edward von Arnim (1824-1881) was an old friend of Odo Russell’s. He later served as German ambassador in Paris, quarreled with and was broken by Bismarck. See Taffs, 39-47; “Fleuri” is doubtless a misspelling. General Count Emile Felix Fleury (1815-1884) was a Bonapartist leader often used by Napoleon III on confidential missions.

<sup>33</sup> Arthur and Francis Hastings were the elder brothers of Odo. Lord Arthur (1825-1910) was private secretary to Lord John Russell, 1849-1854, and M. P. for Tavistock, 1857-1885. Hastings (1819-1891) was M. P. for Bedfordshire, 1847-1872; on May 26, 1872, he succeeded his cousin as ninth Duke of Bedford.



here, which I am not sorry for, as it gives me time to extend my social relations.—I will not weary you with details, I will only say that I am astounded at the hearty reception I meet with from *all classes* of Society here.—Bismarck is more cordial and friendly than ever.—His dinner for the anniversary of the conclusion of Peace, and the Crown Prince's dinner for the anniversary of our departure from Versailles, and the Russian Ambassador's dinner to the "Doyen" were done with Royal magnificence.—I find my duties as Doyen rather trying for a constitutionally shy man, but I conceal my shyness as best I can and lead my Dip. Corps to dinner and dancing as if I had been "*nourri dans le sérail*" [*sic*].

Having nothing to say, I have said too much already, and so say no more today.

Sincerely yours, •

ODO RUSSELL.

H. E.

ODO RUSSELL ESQ.

[Copy]

*Private.*

BRUTON ST., March 11/72.

MY DEAR ODO,

I congratulate you on your social success, which I trust is a good omen for any political matters with which you may have to deal.

Hastings and Arthur take a somewhat sanguine view, but the Gov<sup>t</sup> is looking up a little—our most obvious rock is the Alabama question. There is a desire on both sides to come to a settlement, but our paths are divergent.

If you have an opportunity tell Bismarck casually that there is no foundation for the statement that either the Gov<sup>t</sup> or the Commissioners said one word to the U. S. against the German Emperor as the nominator of an Arbitrator—under the Treaty of Washington.<sup>34</sup>

It is "*nourri*" or "*élevé*" dans le sérail.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN. 16 March 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your letter of the 11th.—Bismarck is gone to Luxemburg for his health but he has asked me to his King's birthday dinner on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, so I shall then be able to tell him casually that there is no foundation for the statement that either H. M. G. or the Commis-

<sup>34</sup> The five members of the board of arbitrators to settle the Alabama claims were chosen by Queen Victoria, the king of Italy, the emperor of Brazil, the president of the Swiss Confederation, and the president of the United States. Evidently the German emperor had been considered.

sioners said one word to the U. S. Gov<sup>t</sup> against the nomination of an Arbitrator by the German Emperor.—

Bismarck has not spoken to me on the subject of the Alabama claims but Delbrück, Thile and Karolyi have and none of them, strange to say, can see why we should not submit the whole American case as it stands to the Geneva Arbitrators who would, they think, decide in our favour.

I have explained our standpoint to them, but they don't see it. Public feeling is with us in Germany on this question and far more Anti-American than I expected, but at this moment they can think and talk of nothing but the coming war with the Church.—Old Thile confided to me that he feared Bismarck was overdoing it and exciting popular animosity against the Clergy through the press to such a pitch that he would find it difficult to manage the anticlerical masses he was now arming and urging on.—Bismarck's determination to raise the storm and fight the Church was so sudden, he says, that he and Bismarck's private Secretaries can mark the day and hour of the change that came over him like an inspiration but that they have not yet found out what brought about this sudden and bold resolution, which they none of them quite like in the Berlin F. O.

Thile seemed to think that no good could come of it all, and that Bismarck has courted popularity to a dangerous degree.

As far as I can make out he is acting in spite of the Court.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

I am going as far as Cologne tonight to meet my wife and shall be back the next day.—

*Private.*

BERLIN, 23 March, 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The week has passed without incidents of particular interest excepting the celebration of the Emperor William's birthday, which is a national feast.—Sixty German Princes and Princesses have come from all parts of Germany to congratulate the old King whose health is much improved and who really was most wonderfully gracious to Emily & me at Court last night.—I am most intensely gratified at Emily's reception by the Royal Family and Society here. The Empress Augusta and the Crown Princess gave her an Audience the day after her arrival and the Princess Charles <sup>35</sup> the next day.—I must not take up your valuable time by details, but you will be pleased from an international point of view to hear that she really was the object

<sup>35</sup> Princess Marie (1808-1877), daughter of Charles Frederick, Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, in 1827 married Prince Charles of Prussia, brother of Emperor William I.

of an *ovation* at Court last night, so marked and so general that I only hope it may not give umbrage to her Colleagues—male & female.—

Bismarck came from Luxemburg to give the Dip. Body a dinner last night and returned there this morning again for the further benefit of his health. He told me he would not come back to Berlin until after Easter.—I was able to say incidentally that we had never objected to the Emperor's choice of an Arbitrator in the Alabama question and he replied that he knew it perfectly and had not been deceived by the report.—The Chancellor is looking much better than he did ten days ago.

From all sides I meet with expressions of friendship and good will towards England and Her Majesty's Government, and I soon hope to understand German interests sufficiently well to report upon them with more precision than I have hitherto been able to do.—

I hope your son is thriving.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 6 April 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We have not got through all our Royal and Social Duties yet,—but next week will bring rest as the Royal family disperse and go to the country.

There is little to write about, but an immense deal to be achieved by personal intercourse with leading men and *women*.—

Emily's social qualifications are invaluable and her visit to Berlin with Lord Clarendon at the coronation is favourably remembered by her generation.

Bismarck paid me a visit on his birthday<sup>\*\*</sup> and has announced himself again for this evening.—He is most amiable and satisfactory in regard to friendly relations and peaceful intentions, and not quite so keen as he was about fighting the Church, although more than ever determined to Germanize the Poles. He admitted to me that he would prefer an arrangement with the Vatican to a fight with the German Catholics, but he did not see his way to the former, and feared the latter was inevitable.—

The Empress Augusta has been urging me confidentially to use my influence with Bismarck—(*comme si j'en avais!*) to be mild with the Church as she dreads religious strife in Germany.—Of course I said respectfully that I could and would not interfere in matters that did not concern me and felt sure the great man knew what he was about.—

Thile and Abeken, Bismarck's confidential Secretaries and friends,

<sup>\*\*</sup> Bismarck was born April 1, 1815.

came to speak to me privately in the same sense as the Empress and I gave them the same answer.

There is a vast amount of political intrigue going on at Court, the object of which appears to be to bell Bismarck, whose appetite for Power and Principalities is a source of alarm to the poorer members of the Royal family.—Napoleon I was not more powerful than Bismarck is at this moment.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 April 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Crown Princess is going on most favourably and I had the privilege of seeing the youthful Princess with dark hair <sup>27</sup> before she was three hours old,—a lovely baby. The Crown Prince telegraphed for me and Mr. de Schleinitz <sup>28</sup> on the night of the 22nd just as I was going to bed and I hurried off with him by special train to Potsdam and from thence to the "New Palais" where we were most graciously received by the Crown Prince and invited to Supper.—As soon as possible we were conducted to the Royal Nursery to see the little Princess, after which we drew up our protocols for our respective Governments and returned as we had come by special train at 4 a. m. to Berlin.—

Last night the Empress Augusta was pleased to announce to me her departure for England on Monday next—29th inst. to "fulfil a long cherished and ardent desire to visit Her Majesty Queen Victoria at Windsor for whom she entertained more friendship and admiration than for any one in the world." <sup>29</sup>

I rejoice to think that this visit will make an excellent impression in Germany where the Empress Augusta has become more popular than ever since the War.

The Emperor William paid Emily a long visit some time ago and was most gracious and amiable to her, but on leaving the Embassy and stepping into his carriage his foot slipped and he fell and hurt his knee.—Although now otherwise well he is not allowed to walk much, I am sorry to say, and some of the reviews will have to be put off in consequence.

<sup>27</sup> Princess Margaret, born April 22, 1872, married in 1893 Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Gustav Adolf von Schleinitz, aide-de-camp to Crown Prince Frederick since 1861; from 1858 to 1861 he had been foreign minister of Prussia.

<sup>29</sup> The Empress Augusta concluded her visit to Queen Victoria May 13, 1872. See *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II, 204.

Bancroft asked me to dinner the other day to meet his nephew Bancroft Davies [*sic*] <sup>40</sup> fresh from Geneva, and Bismarck. Talking to the latter about the Empress's journey to England he became excited and said to me: "I wish you would keep the Empress for ever in England and never let her come back to Berlin for she is interfering in public affairs in a manner that will kill my old King who wants rest and Quiet!"

This outburst of temper led me to further inquiries and I found that the situation at Court is as follows:—Bismarck having committed himself publicly to the popular declaration of War against the Church of Rome wants the Emperor's sanction to various anticlerical measures,—which the Empress who has strong French and Roman sympathies is exerting her influence with His Majesty to counteract. She represents Bismarck as usurping powers that do not belong to him and implores the Emperor not to abdicate his independence without reflection. She reminds His Majesty that he never sanctioned Bismarck's antiroman policy and that the thousands of congratulatory addresses to Bismarck from all parts of Germany never even alluded to the existence of the King but virtually addressed the Chancellor as the Sovereign of Germany.—If he does not resist these encroachments, Bismarck will become even more powerful than he is and the cause of Royalty will be in danger, &c &c &c.

The Emperor is partly worried partly impressed by the Empress's persistent but powerful eloquence and withholds his sanction to Bismarck's proposed policy.—

Bismarck, whose nervous system is shattered by overwork and nocturnal beer and pipe orgies, and who can no longer stand contradiction without getting into a passion, frets and fumes at what he calls the ingratitude of a Sovereign who owes him everything—political power,—military glory and an invincible Empire, and whose confidence ought therefore to be boundless.—

The old King, who is a pious man, and who is suffering from the moral and physical fatigue of his last campaign thinks he has not long to live and the less so since he has passed the average age of the Hohenzollerns his forefathers, and he ardently desires to die at peace with all the world. The prospect of a conflict with his Catholick subjects grieves him to the Soul,—besides which the unexpected so-called "revenge policy" of Monsieur Thiers fills him with sorrow because he apprehends that his duties to Germany may compel him to undertake

<sup>40</sup> John Chandler Bancroft Davis (1822–1907), United States assistant secretary of state, had just delivered the counter case of the United States on the Alabama claims to the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva; he had been secretary of the American legation in London, 1849–1852, and American correspondent of the *London Times*, 1854–1861; he was assistant secretary of state, 1869–1874, and American minister in Berlin, 1874–1877.

another campaign against France which he may not have time to fight out before he dies.—His Generals tell him that it would be safer to fight France before she is ready than after. Then again comes Bismarck who scorns the Generals and tells him he can fight France morally much better through Rome by destroying the unholy alliance of the Church with the enemies of German Unity in Europe. Then comes the Empress encouraging his peace proclivities by surrounding him with the pleasantest representatives of the Franco Catholic party in Berlin and giving every encouragement to the Gontauts, the Sagens, the Dinos, the Talleyrands, the Castellans, the Radziwills, the Polignacs, the La Ferronages, the Ratibors &c. &c. . . . Even Cardinal Hohenlohe <sup>41</sup> has been brought from Rome on a visit to his brothers and dying nephew at Berlin.—

Bismarck would like to blow them all up, so furious is he at their growing influence at Court.—The Courtiers are divided among themselves, parties are forming and the situation seems fraught with danger.—In all probability when the Empress is away Bismarck will get the better of the Emperor as he has done before and have his own way, for he is intellectually and politically too strong for them all and has ten thousand strings to his bow in Europe and no rival in Germany.—Except perhaps the Empress whose popularity as “erste Deutsche Frau and Kaiserinn”,—granddaughter of Karl August <sup>42</sup> &c., &c.—defies opposition. For the Crown Princess the difficulties to contend with will, I fear, be greater coming after the first German Empress.

If Cardinal Hohenlohe's appointment as German Envoy to Rome be true then I presume Bismarck wants to gain time to pacify his Court, conciliate the Vatican and allow public opinion to ripen on the matter while the Parliamentary Commission presided over by Professor Gneist <sup>43</sup> is reporting on Ecclesiastical reforms and the proposed expulsion of the Jesuits, for Bismarck must feel by now that it is one thing to declare war to the Church in Parliament, and another to obtain conditions of peace at the Vatican.—

<sup>41</sup> Gustav Adolf, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1823-1896), made a cardinal in 1866, was proposed as German envoy to the Vatican in 1872 but was refused by the pope; the sympathies of the Hohenlohe family, expressed by the cardinal's older brother Chlodwig, later chancellor of Germany, 1894-1900, were obviously with Bismarck's anti-papal policy.

<sup>42</sup> Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar and Eisenach, was born in 1757 and succeeded his father the following year. At his death in 1828 he was succeeded by his son, Karl Frederick (1783-1853), father of the Empress Augusta. Her mother was Marie Paulowna, daughter of Tsar Paul I of Russia.

<sup>43</sup> Heinrich Rudolf Hermann Friedrich von Gneist (1816-1895), professor of Roman law in the university at Berlin, 1844-1895, and noted authority on constitutional law and history, had entered politics as a National Liberal and supported Bismarck in the Kulturkampf; he sat in the Prussian lower house, 1858-1893, and in the federal parliament, 1868-1894.

Bismarck is still so angry at Thiers for his Army bill that he accuses him now of every enormity under the sun and says: "that man will not only lose my esteem but also my support".—The next story which will be made to appear in the Newspapers against Thiers is already in circulation to the effect that he has made secret offers of alliance to Russia against Germany through General Le Flô,<sup>44</sup> and the Emperor of Russia who has denounced this conspiracy to the Emperor William represents himself as receiving Thiers' message through Le Flô with such honest indignation that: "Le Flô qui l'apporta recule épouvanté."

Believe me, dear Lord Granville,  
Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 May 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

My Colleagues have all asked me whether I believed the current report that Prince Humbert<sup>45</sup> is coming from Italy to Potsdam to be Godfather to the Crown Princess's Baby and whether it would not prove the existence of an alliance between Germany and Italy?—I told them that the report was contradicted at Court and that a Roman Catholic standing Godfather to a Protestant was canonically impossible as the Pope told me himself in 1869.

Arnim told me a few days ago that he had worked hard from conviction at an alliance between Germany and Italy, but that he did not find the Emperor or Bismarck as convinced of its utility as himself, which he greatly deplored.—

I am most anxiously awaiting the result of your last Alabama negotiation,—the Times, I fear, has led me to hope too much from your Speech on the 2nd inst.<sup>46</sup>

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 May 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Emperor William is much gratified at the reception the Empress Augusta has met with in England and desired me to tell you so

<sup>44</sup> Adolphe Charles Emmanuel Le Flô (1804–1887), who became a general in 1848, was sent to Russia as minister from France, 1848–1849; in exile from 1851 to 1857, he returned to St. Petersburg as French ambassador, 1871–1879.

<sup>45</sup> Prince Humbert of Italy (1844–1900) in 1878 succeeded his father, King Victor Emmanuel II, as King Humbert I, "the Good."

<sup>46</sup> Granville commented in the house of lords on May 2 that Her Majesty's government had "grounds to hope that an arrangement satisfactory to both countries will be come to" in relation to the indirect claims of the Alabama controversy, although he denied that a dispatch just received from Fish, American secretary of state, afforded any solution. *Hansard*, 3rd. Ser., CCXI, 73.

last night at a supper at the Duchess Alexandrine of Mecklenburg.<sup>47</sup> His Majesty also told me that he had been much touched (*sehr gerührt*) at the Queen having conferred the Victoria and Albert order on the Empress.

He is still rather lame and stiff, but otherwise he is looking much better than a week ago.

It is now again said that Prince Humbert and Princess Marguerite<sup>48</sup> are to come to Berlin for the christening of the young Princess on the 5th of June; but nobody seems to be quite convinced of the truth of this report,—not even the Italian Minister.—

Prince Bismarck is so nervous and irritable that he does well to follow his Doctor's advice and seek rest at Varzin for the summer months.—His Colleagues and Subordinates seem delighted at the prospect.—Some people think his irritability is partly caused by the Emperors reluctance to expel the Jesuits and quarrel with the Roman Catholic Bishops.—The last time I saw him he told me he could not sleep all night and was obliged to stay in bed till 3 or 4 in the afternoon from exhaustion.

My Colleagues all agree that in the present political lull Bismarck's absence will not be felt.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

16 BRUTON STREET, May 16/72.

MY DEAR ODO,

The Empress Queen's visit was a great success.

I have had a letter from the Queen saying that she was very sorry to part with the kind Empress. She was so kind so discreet and is so much and so truly attractive to the Queen, and is so *true* a friend. Excepting the Queen's own dear sister, and sister in law the Empress of Germany, is the only person in her own station who is not very much younger, with whom she is at all intimate!!

The Empress was (but that is not new) exceedingly gracious to me and mine.

H. I. M. gave me two messages from the Emperor and from the Prince Chancellor, which I have recorded in a confidential despatch to you.

<sup>47</sup> Alexandrine (1842-1906), daughter of Prince Albert of Prussia, the emperor's brother, in 1865 married Duke William of Mecklenburg (1827-1879).

<sup>48</sup> Marguerite (1851-1926), princess of Savoy, married Prince Humbert of Italy in 1868.



The American Senate have not yet decided on our Article, but Thornton telegraphs to us, and Belmont to Rothschild,<sup>49</sup> that their decision will probably be favorable.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 May 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck called twice this week on Emily to take leave and said he wanted six months to get well but that he feared the Emperor would send for him in the course of the Autumn. He was pleased at the result of the Debates in the Reichstag on the appointment of Cardinal Hohenlohe and the expulsion of the Jesuits,—which had given the Gov't a large majority in favour of a continuance of Diplomatic relations with the Pope, notwithstanding the refusal to receive Hohenlohe at Rome, and of the bill the Gov't were about to bring in regarding the Jesuits.—

Bismarck said that in leaving Berlin he was happy to think there were no foreign questions on the "European Carpet".

My Colleagues all say the same thing and in another week they, and the rest of the Society will have left Berlin for the Country, the sea side and the "Brunnens".—

The Emperor whom I have met almost every evening this week has repeatedly expressed his great satisfaction at the Empress's reception in England to me, to Emily and to General Walker.<sup>50</sup> That visit has done a World of good in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 25 May 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your letter of the 16th instant. The Empress Queen's visit has indeed been a success as you say, and the Emperor has proved his high appreciation of it by the magnificent Queen's Banquet he gave us yesterday. His Majesty, I am told, has not been in the habit of giving annual Dinners for the Queen's birthday as he does for the Emperor of Russia's birthday, so that yesterday's Ban-

<sup>49</sup> Sir Edward Thornton (1817–1906), British minister at Washington (1867–1881), served also as minister to Brazil (1859), Paraguay (1863), Argentina (1865), and went from Washington to St. Petersburg (1881–1885) and then to Constantinople (1885–1886). August Belmont (1816–1890), a New York banker, was agent for the Rothschilds in the United States. Baron Meyer de Rothschild (1818–1874) of London sat in parliament (1859–1874) and was banker, sportsman, and art collector.

<sup>50</sup> Sir Charles Pyndar Beauchamp Walker (1817–1894) was British military attaché in Berlin, 1865–1877.

quet is talked of as an event at Berlin by the people and by my colleagues.

Emily says she never remembers anywhere so much real civility and hearty cordiality as she meets with at Court and everywhere here.

All this is very satisfactory and I hope may prove useful hereafter.

If you can do anything for the protection of the Jews in Roumania you will earn golden Laurels in Germany. Bernstorff is going to consult you about the "*modus operandi*".

Sincerely yours

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 June 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The death of the Duke of Bedford<sup>51</sup> has prevented my attending the daily festivities in honour of Prince Humbert and Princess Marguerite,—but as I am told that importance is attached to our presence at Potsdam for the Royal Christening on Tuesday, I have telegraphed to ask you whether we ought to attend notwithstanding our mourning?

Of course the old report has now been revived of an alliance between Germany and Italy, to which is added that Moltke is working out a campaign in Italy in the event of France attempting to reestablish the Pope's temporal power &c &c.

There is of course no "*documentary*" alliance, but a very cordial understanding has sprung up based on mutual interests, which unites Germany and Italy against their common enemies—France and the Pope.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 June 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Royal Christening at Potsdam was a grand affair and the Italian Visit an immense success.—Everything was done to give it a political character and to make it as offensive as possible to France and the Pope, those two powers Germany intends to wipe out of the world.—The Italians were delighted! The Emperor told me that Bernstorff had telegraphed H. M. Gov<sup>t</sup>. were in danger and His Majesty expressed great regret at the prospect of a Ministerial crisis in England. He desired me to tell you in particular how sorry he would be if you ceased to be Foreign Secretary.—I told His Majesty that I shared his sympathies but that I felt convinced you were per-

<sup>51</sup> William Russell (1809-1872), eighth Duke of Bedford, died on May 26 and was succeeded by his cousin, Odo Russell's elder brother Francis Hastings (see above, n. 33).

fectly safe and would weather all the storms of the Session at which His Majesty expressed the greatest satisfaction.

All being quiet and in good order I need trouble you no further today.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 June 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

A troublesome cough, for which I am taking Ems Water in bottles, keeps me at home.

I carried out your instructions and sent in the San Juan Counter case <sup>52</sup> to the Emperor through Bismarck, and to Bancroft and I gave him and Admiral Preyost <sup>53</sup> a dinner which went off most cheerfully.

Since then I heard privately from Thile that the Emperor had received the two Counter cases and had consulted Bismarck as to the Lawyers he should employ to assist him in drawing up the Statement of arbitration.—Thile thinks Bismarck will recommend the Law officers of the Prussian House of Lords called: "Kron-Syndici dess Herrn Hauses" as the highest authorities on public and international Law.—The Emperor leaves for Ems, Baden and Gastein on the 22nd but the Law Officers and the Counter cases will follow him wherever he goes until his decision is taken.—

The visit of the Emperor of Austria early in September to attend the Autumn manoeuvres has given great and universal satisfaction in Berlin ever since it has been officially announced.

All quiet here.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 June 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have had and have still rather a serious cold in my lungs for which the Berlin Doctors after a consultation recommend me to take Ems or Carlsbad and an "after cure" of Reichenhall if I wish to get through the social winter campaign in Berlin without a renewal of bronchitis.—If I do not get better by the beginning of August when

<sup>52</sup> Under the Treaty of Washington, 1871, the disputed boundary of the United States south of Vancouver Island (the Canal de Haro *vs.* the Rosario Straits) was submitted to the German emperor for arbitration. The decision, rendered October 24, 1872, was in favor of the American claim, and a protocol was signed at Washington in March, 1873. The British Counter Case, sent in by Russell on June 14, 1872, may be found in *P. P.* 1873, LXXIV, c. 692, and in 42 Cong., 3 Sess., *House Ex. Doc.* No. 1, V, 195–251. See also *Taffs*, 5–7.

<sup>53</sup> Rear Admiral James Charles Prevost (1810–1891) prepared the British case in the San Juan dispute. He had served as British boundary commissioner in a dispute between Vancouver and Oregon, 1856–1862, and in the San Juan case covering the same ground, 1871–1873.

Parliament is up at home, and Berlin is empty and business at a standstill I shall be obliged to ask your leave to go to one of these places for three or four weeks.—

My cold kept me at home unfortunately and prevented my going to parties where I might have met the Emperor and picked up some news,—but Emily went and found his Majesty charming and still delighted with the reception of the Empress Augusta in England.

The Emperor leaves tomorrow for Ems, Baden and Gastein and does not return to Berlin before September to meet the Emperor of Austria.—The Crown Prince and Princess and two babies go to Munich and Berchtesgaden for mountain air early in July, and send their other children to the Island of Föhr on the coast of Holstein for Sea bathing.

The Reichstag closed with the "Jesuit expulsion bill" on the 19th.—The absence of Bismarck during the debate offended his supporters but members were generally so tired of legislation that they broke up and left Berlin for the Country with undignified haste.—

Public opinion seems well pleased with the general result of the session.

The San Juan Arbitration has made no progress, for Bismarck has not recommended any Jurists to the Emperor to assist him in his labours.—

Bancroft, who is cheerful, pleasant and amiable, seems convinced that the Emperor must give it in his favour and wonders why there should be any delay.

The Emperor and Bismarck I fancy, are waiting to see how things go at Geneva before they take the trouble to read the cases.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 September 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Berlin is in a blaze of Sunshine, Uniforms and Imperial flags, tempered by clouds of Dust and horrid smells.—But everybody and his wife are overjoyed at the prospect of eternal Peace which the 3 Emperors are to decree to Europe and the "Kaiser Congress" promises to be an immense success.<sup>54</sup>

Lord Strathnairn<sup>55</sup> is much gratified at his reception which has been exceptionally civil and cordial on the part of the Emperor, the Royal family and Military Authorities.

<sup>54</sup> Alexander II, tsar of Russia, and Francis Joseph I, emperor of Austria-Hungary, visited the German emperor in Berlin, September 5-11, 1872. Their formal activities were reported each day in the *London Times*.

<sup>55</sup> Hugh Henry Rose (1801-1885), first Baron Strathnairn, returned from military service in India in 1865 to command the British forces in Ireland until 1870; in 1877 he was raised to the rank of field marshal.

The Emperors of Austria and Russia have asked me, as Doyen, through their Ambassadors to invite the Diplomatic Body to Special Audiences this evening and tomorrow at their respective Palaces; Gortchakoff and Andrassy<sup>56</sup> have called and I have received invitations to all the Non-Military feasts,—so by next Messenger I shall know more about the situation than I do today.—

The Ambassadors of Austria & Russia maintain stoutly that no business of any kind will be discussed by the Emperors, Andrassy, Gortchakoff and Bismarck and explain the presence of their respective Under Secretaries by saying that they have merely come to get their share of Stars, ribbons and decorations. The rest of the Diplomatic Body seem anxious and suspicious and inclined to think that some measures will be concerted to crush the "International"<sup>57</sup>

On all these matters I hope to report in detail next week.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 September 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Since I last wrote, Bismarck returned from the Country to Berlin for two days and called on us late on Saturday night. On taking leave of Emily he said he wished to speak to me and so we retired to another room.

Assuming his most cordial, intimate and confidential manner, he said he wished to apologize for his long absences from Berlin, which were partly owing to bad health and partly to causes which could scarcely have escaped me.—The Emperor William was perfectly happy and content reviewing his Soldiers and shewing them to his Imperial guests, or receiving complimentary addresses by post or by telegraph from his subjects,—whilst he totally neglected the less agreeable but more necessary duties of Government.—In fact His Majesty had become unable to take a decided course, and things were consequently at a standstill. His, Bismarck's influence was neutralized by the never ceasing interference, not to say intrigues, of the Empress Augusta who had more of the Statesman in her than the Emperor, and whose ultramontane and conservative sympathies stood in the way of national Legislation.—A modification of the Cabinet had become absolutely necessary.—Most of the present Ministers, his Colleagues, were invalids in body and mind and unfit to deal with a new order of

<sup>56</sup> Count Julius Andrassy (1823-1890), Austro-Hungarian chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, 1871-1879. See A. F. Meyendorff, "Conversations of Gortchakoff with Andrassy and Bismarck in 1872," *Slavonic Review*, VIII (1929), 400-408.

<sup>57</sup> The International Workingmen's Association was organized under the leadership of Karl Marx in London, 1864, and its social revolutionary tendencies grew with each congress. The issue of a manifesto by the London group under Marx in praise of the "glorious vanquished" of the Paris Commune in 1871 increased speculation as to how the International was related to that rising.

things which required new, young and vigorous intellects.—He had appealed in vain to the Emperor for a change of Ministry, but His Majesty could not make up his mind to part with old friends, and thus legislation had come to a Standstill, and Government would have to meet Parliament under very unfavourable circumstances. His own position between Parliament and the Crown had become intolerable.—Parliament attacked him as a responsible Constitutional Minister,—whilst the Emperor, who had never yet realized the meaning of National Representation or Ministerial Responsibility, still expected him to act and obey as the Chief Clerk of an absolute Sovereign.—

He was too loyal a subject and too devoted a Servant of his old Master (*mein alter Herr*) not to do his utmost to reconcile the conflicting duties imposed upon him, but it often made him feel a Hypocrite before his King and his Country.

At present, however, he had become useless, while the Empress was governing her husband and the Country,—and he would retire from the stage and let things take their course until Parliament met, by which time the Sovereign might possibly require his presence. During his absence Balan<sup>58</sup> would carry on the F. O.—I would find him an improvement on Thiele, who was past work and did wisely to retire. Germany, at present, required working men and not only amiable Veterans.

The meeting of the three Emperors was a pledge of peace,—he was determined it should be so,—but it was curious to see how little those three Potentates really knew of the arts of peace, of the wants of their subjects, or of modern Legislation. He was resolved to give the Austrian Empire the full support of the German Government and he now felt sure of Andrassy's sincere and intelligent cooperation.

Gortchakoff, who had forced himself on them with his scribes, had given some trouble for he would not desist from business, and had thereby exposed himself to some rebukes when attempting the discussion of subjects that in no way concerned Russia.

All things considered, he thought, the prospects of Peace had been improved and he was satisfied with the success of the Imperial Meeting.

On taking leave of me for some months he was gratified to think that our relations were so calm and friendly.

I reminded Bismarck of the San Juan arbitration which I begged might be settled before our Parliaments met.—He promised to urge the Emperor, who had long been in possession of the Law Officer's opinion, to make up his mind about it and give us his decision.—Whereupon we parted.

<sup>58</sup> Hermann von Balan, German minister to Brussels, 1868-1872, and head of the foreign office, 1872-1874.

The freedom of Bismarck's language about everything makes it often difficult to report him officially.—He is a powerful hater and makes no secret of it.—Much as he hates the Empress, he hates the Crown Princess even more, I regret to say. I never allude to Her Imp. Highness in his presence, so as to avoid a quarrel. With the Crown Prince, Bismarck has made up all his differences, since the War.

From all I gradually hear and observe I fear that the Crown Princess on ascending the Throne of Germany will meet with a more difficult task than is generally known.—I hope I may be mistaken! Amen!

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Oct 9/72.

MY DEAR ODO,

Bismarck's conversation with you was curious and characteristic. I presume the Emperor has no chance of preventing his chancellor doing whatever he wishes in public—although dismissals may be more difficult to accomplish.

Do you believe the attacks upon England, which seem to be cropping up again in the German Press, are suggested by Bismarck, and if so with what object.

What do cool headed people think of his anticlerical measures. He may be quite right as I believe he is, in wishing to keep the clericals in order, but it is a more difficult task than beating the French armies—and the attempt may create much evil.

I asked you to find out what has been said at the conference about our 3 rules in the Washington Treaty.<sup>59</sup>

It is a difficult matter. We are bound to submit them to other Maritime Powers. I presume you would not approve of our putting the dots too exactly on the i's, as to Germany not being a Maritime Country. If we submit the rules, as the Americans are with us about the export of arms, we should be placed in no difficulty on that point. But as we are the only country, excepting possibly France, who is not inclined to give immunity to private property at Sea, we should be isolated as to that matter.

Our policy for the moment must be not to move in the matter, and luckily ours was the last despatch on the wording of the submission, and it therefore remains with the U. S. to make the first move.

I hope you are all right and that Lady Emily is flourishing.

<sup>59</sup> The Washington Treaty, concluded in May, 1871, between the United States and Great Britain, aimed to provide for the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. For the three rules of maritime neutrality, see Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York, 1936), 409-410.

We have a Cabinet tomorrow, which will probably settle the terms of the French Commercial Treaty. In its proposed shape, there seems to be only two objections—1° the general objection to Treaties of Commerce—the 2° that we put ourselves in the position of possibly being left for a few years with differential duties against [us] although minimized.<sup>60</sup>

The French are ready to agree to everything else we propose.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 October 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks,—and many for your Letter of the 9th. I cannot answer your several questions in detail today, so I will only generally say that I do not think Bismarck has any share this time in the fencing match which is going on between the English and German Press.—I am carefully studying the Press question and shall soon submit my impressions to you. As regards the 3 Rules in the Washington Treaty I should think that the longer you can delay submitting them to other Maritime Powers, the better chance they will have of being accepted.—Beust's<sup>61</sup> objections to them have been published in the Austrian Red book. Andrassy takes a more favourable view,—but will probably have to yield to Bismarck's wishes in this as in many other matters.—

I have no objection to treating Germany as a non-maritime Power if Her Majesty's Gov<sup>t</sup> think it preferable to offend her, than to be snubbed by Bismarck in regard to the 3 Rules.

Emily desires me to thank you for your enquiries and to say that she is flourishing and happy and delighted with the civility, amiability and cordiality she meets with at Berlin.—

Sincerely yrs.

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 October 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Messenger has just brought me your Letter of the 13th asking me: "What for a man is Cardinal Panebianco and whether he is the successor whom the Pope desires".<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty, signed November 5, 1872, was never ratified. See Arthur L. Dunham, *The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France* (Ann Arbor, 1930), 315-316.

<sup>61</sup> See "1870-1871," n. 19.

<sup>62</sup> Granville had written:

*Private.*

MY DEAR ODO,

What for a man is Cardinal Pane Bianco, and do you believe he is the successor whom the Pope desires.

Yours sincerely,

F. O., Oct<sup>r</sup> 13/72.

GRANVILLE.



Antonio Maria Panebianco, a Sicilian, born in 1808, Cardinal Penitentiary of the Rule of St Francis, was at my time a special favorite of Pio Nono but not one of his Candidates for the Chair of St. Peter.—Pio Nono's favourite successors were Cardinal Patrizi of the Holy Office,—Cardinal Barnabò of the Propaganda and Cardinal Boffondi (since dead I think) and he recommended them to the College of Cardinals for election after his death in a Secret Chirograph.

Cardinal Panebianco, however, was the Candidate of the Bourbon and Legitimist party whose political creed he professed in my day, and I should think it likely Pio Nono thought he would now make a Pope after his own heart in the place of Boffondi, (deceased).—He, as well as the others I have named are "Papabill" as well as Riario Sforza Archbishop of Naples, Norechini Archbishop of Jesi, De Angelis Archbishop of Fermo and some others whose names do not occur to me at present.

The favourite changes every month almost, according to circumstances, and it is necessary to be at Rome to know the ups and downs of the Candidates "che papeggiano" in the Sacred College of Cardinals.

Among the Cardinals who have no chance themselves, but who will be most active and influential in the Conclave will be Cardinals di Pietro and De Lucca,—perhaps also Silvestri and Capalti.—They are men of little Faith and much Knowledge of the World, and Catholic Governments should seek to conciliate and come to terms with them before the next Conclave, for the election of the next Pope will be their work.

It is very difficult, as you know to foretell even while the Conclave is deliberating who will be elected,—but my impression is that the next Conclave will be short, and the Pope elect, one of the oldest *Italian* Cardinals and the least likely to live long.

In my day Panebianco was the Candidate of the Bourbon; Riario Sforza of the Moderate, and Morechini of the Italian Party in the Church, but all that may have changed since then. Panebianco would have the support of the Jesuits, perhaps also Riario Sforza, but not so Morechini who has the Dominicans and Benedictines on his side.—

The Franciscans although enemies of the Jesuits would probably support Panebianco as a Cardinal of their Order.—But, as I say, my impressions are antiquated now and I fear to misinform you.

Two years ago I should have answered your two questions unhesitatingly by saying: 1<sup>st</sup> Panebianco is in Theology an Ultramontane Infallibilist and in politics a Sicilian Bourbonite, and 2<sup>nd</sup> he is not the Successor the Pope desires in the first instance.

But almost every Cardinal has his day, and the Council and "Rome Capital" must have modified the position in and out of the church of many of my old friends.—

It is very presumptuous on my part to say so, but I fancy that Bismarck utterly misunderstands and underrates the power of the Church.—

Thinking himself far more infallible than the Pope he cannot tolerate two Infallibles in Europe and fancies he can select and appoint the next Pontiff as he would a Prussian General, who will carry out his orders to the Catholic Clergy in Germany and elsewhere. Hitherto his anticlerical measures have only produced the very State of things the Vatican was working for through the Oecumenical Council,—namely, Unity and discipline in the Clergy under an infallible head,—or the Prussian Military system applied to the Church.—

The German Bishops who were politically powerless in Germany and theologically in opposition to the Pope in Rome,—have now become powerful political party Leaders in Germany and enthusiastic defenders of the new infallible Faith of Rome, united, disciplined and thirsting for martyrdom, thanks to Bismarck's uncalled for and illiberal declaration of War on the freedom they had hitherto so peacefully enjoyed.

However his measures are popular with the great *No Church* party in Germany and his powerful mind and irresistible [*sic*] tactics may lead him to some sort of Victory in the end.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 October 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I send you the Emperor's award<sup>63</sup> by Admiral Prevost, who, after so many weeks and months of hopeful expectation is much cut up by the result.

Various friendly hints from the Emperor and Bismarck had misled me into hoping for a decision in our favour.—I was mistaken and regret it.

I called at once on Old Bancroft—we shook hands and swore international friendship to all eternity now that the Emperor of Germany had removed the last difference existing between England and America.

This morning early the Grand Duke of Baden<sup>64</sup> called on me quite privately to tell me that the award had cost the Emperor a long and painful conscientious struggle and that His Majesty hoped I would not allow his decision in any way to affect our future public relations.—

I said that my most anxious desire in Life was to establish and maintain cordial relations between Germany and England and that I should always act accordingly.

<sup>63</sup> The decision in the San Juan boundary dispute which favored the United States.

<sup>64</sup> Grand Duke Frederick I (1826-1907) of Baden was the son-in-law of the Emperor William I, whose only daughter, Princess Louise, he had married in 1856.

The Grand Duke thanked me warmly and remained over two hours discussing the internal difficulties Germany will now have to contend with.—

With great regret & disappointment  
Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Secret.*

BERLIN, 27 October 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Mr. de Bleichröder, our new Consul General has just been here to confide to me under the seal of secrecy that the French Ambassador had told him that the French Gov<sup>t</sup> were under an impression the German Gov<sup>t</sup> would like a further anticipated payment of the Indemnity and were prepared to do so if desired,<sup>65</sup>—and also that the Bank of England was about to buy gold in France. Mr. de Bleichröder replied that he knew for certain that the German Gov<sup>t</sup> had more money than they required and did not wish for advances on the War Debt.—

As regards the Bank of England he told me that the German Gov<sup>t</sup> has still nearly four millions of Pounds to claim but that Mr. Delbrück had agreed with him to withhold these demands as long as possible and to buy gold in Belgium and France instead, so as not to press too heavily on the Bank of England at the moment.

Excuse haste, the messenger is waiting.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

BERLIN, 3 November 1872.

*Private.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Hammond<sup>66</sup> has arrived and as I did not want to miss his visit I sent excuses to the Dinos and Sagans<sup>67</sup> who had asked me to shoot in Silesia.

<sup>65</sup> Gerson von Bleichröder (1822–1893), son of the founder of the Bleichröder banking house, was unpaid British consul general in Berlin from 1872 until his death. He acted as financial adviser to the governments of Prussia and Germany and was the German financial expert in 1871 when the French indemnity was fixed. He had been the Rothschilds' representative in Berlin when they recommended him to Bismarck, whose private financial adviser he became. See Paul H. Emden, *Money Powers of Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, 1938), 251–254. The indemnity laid by Germany on France at the close of the Franco-Prussian War was five milliard francs, to be paid by 1875.

<sup>66</sup> Edmund Hammond (1802–1890), permanent undersecretary at the British foreign office, 1854–1873, created Baron Hammond, 1874.

<sup>67</sup> The Duke of Dino at this time was Alexander, Marquis of Talleyrand (1813–1894), whose wife was Valentine, daughter of Count Sainte-Aldégonde. His elder brother Louis (1811–1898), the Prince-Duke of Talleyrand-Périgord, inherited the principality of Sagan in 1862 on the death of his mother, Dorothy of Courland; in 1861 he had married Pauline, widow of the elder Count Hatzfeldt.

Now Schleinitz has also asked me to shoot the Imperial preserves at Glogán next week and as he has asked some German Ministers and some of my Colleagues I shall go for the sake of business conversations.

Hammond is looking well I am happy to say and very cheerful.

The crisis in the Upper House on the abolition of feudal rights has produced very great political excitement in Berlin,—but nobody, from the Emperor downwards can explain Bismarck's absence and silence. He must be meditating some great stroke,—a change of Government or a change in the Constitution.? The Emperor must be very angry at the Members of His Household who voted against Government for he has ordered their names to be struck off the invitation lists of the Palace! No more dinners for those who vote against him!!!<sup>68</sup> As His Majestys interference in the Debate was directed against the Lords, the Conservatives and the Catholics, the *liberal* Press think his arbitrary proceedings quite constitutional, and would be delighted to see the Upper House abolished.—

The next session which opens on the 12<sup>th</sup> will be very interesting.

We were asked on Thursday last to dine "en famille" with the Crown Princess at Potsdam and found them very angry with the Emperor William's award in the San Juan question.

The Princess leaves today for Bex near the Lake of Geneva and the Prince goes on the 9th to Dresden with the Emperor for the "golden wedding" of old King John of Saxony.<sup>69</sup>

The feeling against us in Germany in consequence of our supposed French proclivities is as unreasonable as it is distressing,—and the growing hatred of France is to my mind as alarming as it is unfounded.—

A second war with France would almost be popular at this moment,—but why—I cannot tell you.—The Prussians seem to think France is still too strong for the future peace of Germany.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

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<sup>68</sup> The bill which aimed to abolish the feudal privileges of the aristocracy in the county districts of Prussia was defeated by a vote of 145-18 in the upper house on October 31; after a constitutional crisis, in which the creation of twenty-five new peers was threatened, Bismarck finally triumphed on December 9. See *The Times*, Nov. 1, 1872, and the *Annual Register*, 1872, 249-252.

<sup>69</sup> King John of Saxony (1801-1873) had succeeded his brother in 1854; by his marriage to Princess Amalie, daughter of King Maximilian of Bavaria, he became brother-in-law of King Frederick William IV of Prussia.

[Copy]

*Private & most Confidential.*

WALMER CASTLE DEAL, Nov. 6/72.

MY DEAR ODO,

Your letters have been of great interest.

There is one subject on which I should be glad to know exactly how the ground lies. Would it be perfectly safe for me (in *all* circumstances) for me to write to you a despatch recording my total disbelief in the American Rumour that you have been engaged in an intrigue to persuade the Emperor to give an award different from that which a sense of justice had impelled him to do—& stating that my only object in writing was to obtain a record of the falsehood.

You will understand my doubts—& it is not essential for me to put the question.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 November 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The lies in the American Papers about my intrigues with the Crown Princess to modify or defeat the judgment of the Emperor in the San Juan question appeared to me too ludicrous to be noticed.—However on receiving your Letter of the 6th inst. I consulted with Hammond who advised me to volunteer a denial of them at once which you could make use of or not as you liked, unless you had reasons for preferring to ask me the question as you propose in your Letter of the 6th, in which case you can cancel my Despatch and I will rewrite it in the shape of an answer to yours.

There never was a lie with less foundation and I should be glad if you could get Bernstorff to ask Bismarck, Thiele, Balan, the Crown Prince and the Emperor himself what they thought of my conduct and of Bancrofts throughout the whole affair.

I have refrained from saying or writing what I thought of Bancrofts intrigues not to give cause for just indignation at home and abroad, and I will say no more today beyond my utter denial of his lies in the New York Herald.<sup>70</sup>

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>70</sup> The article in the New York *Herald* appeared October 23, 1872, the day before the publication of the San Juan arbitration settlement, which went in favor of the American claim. Russell's official denial of interference may be found in the correspondence on the San Juan dispute, *P. P.*, 1873, LXXIV, c. 696, but a thorough discussion of this incident is readily available in Tafts, 5-8. There is no evidence to justify Russell's suspicion that Bancroft was behind the *Herald* accusation, which was first published in England by *The Times* on November 2.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 16 November 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Mr. de Nothomb, the Belgian Minister, who has just returned from the golden wedding at Dresden, has confided to me that Count Beust fully confirms the general impression in Berlin that our Commercial Treaty with France is not a Commercial measure but a political concession intended to reestablish the Western alliance of England and France against Germany.—Beust told him also that Public opinion in England was hostile to the German Empire and tired of neutrality and that H. M. Gov<sup>t</sup> would be obliged to take a more active part in European affairs than had lately been the case.—The conclusion of the Treaty with France was a first step towards this new policy.

Mr. de Nothomb found this view to be generally shared by the Princes and Diplomats assembled at Dresden.

I told him that Beust was evidently at his old tricks of pro-french and anti-german intrigues to wage a war of revenge on Bismarck and his plans.

Nothomb said he agreed, but that at the same time Delbrück had held the same language to him about our Commercial Treaty and that he noticed a regrettable tendency to put the grievances of susceptible Germany against France & England, into the same boat.—

For my part I can only say that I and mine meet with encreasing cordiality and civility everywhere from the Imperial family to the man in the street and an ever repeated desire for friendship with England.

The Parliamentary crisis which is clearly Bismarck's work to force the old Emperor into a reform of the Constitution and a change of Ministers was predicted by him in a conversation I reported to you confidentially in a private Letter on or about the 21<sup>st</sup> of September last.—His plan is to outwit the Empress, his enemy, and force the unsuspecting Emperor into the National and anticlerical policy of reform which His Majesty has hitherto resisted.—The Emperor has fallen into the trap by blowing up his faithful Peers for voting against the District Administration Bill sanctioned by him.—

If he now resists and declines to follow Bismarck,—the great Chancellor has but to resign to become the Idol of the national majority, whilst the Emperor and the House of Hohenzollern will be execrated by the People.—It is marvellous how, from his retirement at Verzin he has thus succeeded in mastering his Masters and the political situation in Germany not to say in Europe.

I am happy to think that the Crown Princess is out of the way in Switzerland during this crisis.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*F. O., Nov<sup>r</sup> 20/72.

MY DEAR ODO,

Beust is too bad. There is no foundation for the information which he has been good enough to spread—accepting articles in some of the papers which are hostile to [word left out] Thiers of course makes the most of it. The treaty<sup>71</sup> gives nothing which we care to lose, it obtains that which Germany thought it worth while to create, & Thiers' gain is what we consider a loss.

Beust's activity and power of seeing through Mill Stones is wonderful.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*BERLIN, 23<sup>d</sup> November 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The hostile feeling is growing so ridiculously strong against our Commercial Treaty in Berlin that I have endeavoured in private conversation with some of the leading German Press Men, favourable to our friendship, to persuade them to propagate in their Papers your interpretation of it at the Lord Mayor's dinner in preference to that of Monsieur Thiers in his Message, which has so much irritated the Prussians.—

They promised to write in the sense I desired but they did not conceal their leaning towards the "Times" views on the subject.

Delbrück called on me a few days since and volunteered a conversation on the Treaty saying that with all his Lifelong experience in Commercial matters he failed to understand its advantages from an English point of view,—while he thought it would be the cause of regret in Belgium, Austria and Italy,—in Prussia it would encourage the Protectionists to reopen their campaign against freetrade,—a prospect he greatly deplored.—He agreed with the "Times" in fearing that H. M. Gov<sup>t</sup> would have to encounter great opposition to the Treaty when Parliament met. In the course of conversation he calmed down and became confidential and said he had the friendship of England and Germany so much at heart that he wished to tell me quite privately that nothing could produce a more favourable impression in Germany than a reduction of our Spirit duties in England, and nothing could give him greater satisfaction from an international point of view than to be able to announce to the German Parliament that Her Maj. Gov<sup>t</sup> were prepared to revise those duties, which every German Landowner and Potato grower complained of as a grievance against England and her Government.—In return for a Concession of Spirit duties he could obtain very important commercial concessions

<sup>71</sup> See note 60.

from Parliament to British Trade and Industry and he could also successfully silence the Protectionists and enemies of Free-trade.

I explained to him in reply that it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to reduce our Spirit Duties at a moment when Parliament was legislating against Drunkenness,—at which he expressed great regret and said that any English Gov<sup>t</sup> that could find a favourable moment to do so, would win the hearts of the Land-owners and Free-traders of Germany.

On taking leave he begged I would consider this conversation as private.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 28 December 1872.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Emily desires me to convey to you and Lady Granville her best and grateful wishes for the New Year in which I most heartily join.

Since last writing to you we have twice dined with the Emperor and I have gone out shooting with him and found him most graciously disposed to England and to Her Majesty's Gov<sup>t</sup>. The Empress seems oppressed by her dislike to Bismarck which she makes no secret of.—

Bismarck makes himself as disagreeable as he can to her and to the Court but he has succeeded in so strengthening his position in the Country that he has become indispensable to the Crown.—You will see a curious conversation I had with him on the subject in my reports.—

I presume his future policy will be to neutralize the Prussian Ministry,—form a German Cabinet of National Liberals, like Forckenbeck<sup>72</sup> & his friends, and mediatize the Sovereigns of Bavaria, Würtemberg & Saxony so as to centralize the Power of Germany.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

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<sup>72</sup> Max von Forckenbeck (1821-1892) was one of the founders of the National Liberal party, president of the Prussian chamber of deputies, 1866-1872, and of the German reichstag, 1874-1879.





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CHAPTER III

LETTERS, JANUARY, 1873-FEBRUARY, 1874

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### CHAPTER III

LETTERS, JANUARY, 1873-FEBRUARY, 1874

The year 1873 was uneventful in Anglo-German relations. Although Britain watched with some concern forward moves by Russia in Turkestan, her statesmen apparently did not believe that the League of the Three Emperors constituted a threat to the interests of the British empire in either Europe or Asia. Bismarck's efforts to strengthen this league by visits of William I to St. Petersburg and Vienna caused no uneasiness in London.

The German chancellor continued to be much occupied with his war against the Roman Catholic church. Her prelates showed an unyielding attitude, some of them seemed to covet martyrdom; and in the elections to the reichstag in January, 1874, the Ultramontanes increased their strength from sixty-seven to ninety-one. The Catholic Centrum thus became the second strongest party in the German parliament. But Bismarck was not shaken in his resolve to continue his Kulturkampf; he did not apprehend that the new clerical party would ultimately cause him to "go to Canossa"; nevertheless, he welcomed the moral support provided by the sympathetic attitude of English evangelicals and he was highly appreciative of an encouraging letter from Earl Russell. A non-political Anglo-German alliance against papal pretensions was as much to his liking as a political one which would complete the isolation of France.

The rapid economic recovery of France was not to Bismarck's liking and he tried to counteract it by keeping her weak politically. For this reason he supported the French Republicans against the wishes of his imperial master. British public opinion was sympathetic with the plight of the old ally, France, but the Gladstone government was rather indifferent toward it and determined not to interfere in Continental affairs. Moreover, the ministers, having spent their majorities like gentlemen on issues of domestic concern, were described by Disraeli, spitefully but not inaptly, as a row of extinct volcanoes. Defeated in 1873 on the Irish University Bill, the government carried on in a limp fashion until the dissolution of parliament and defeat in the election of 1874.



[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE DEAL, Jan 1/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

Have you information on which you can rely as to Bancroft's proposal.<sup>1</sup> The U. S. might use a moment of peril for us, to squeeze something from us which they desired, but as to war they are quite as averse to it as we are.

Lady G. & I send our very best wishes for the new year to you and Lady Emily.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

Pray continue to keep me informed about Bismarck's position with his master, & the country.

Is Roon<sup>2</sup> in reality less good than he was.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 January 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In reply to your question about Bancroft's offer of American assistance to occupy the attention of England while Germany is fighting France, I will give you my reasons for the statement.—I had heard from my Colleagues, from Prussian Officials, Professors and Members of Parliament that Bancroft's hostility to England was a mania, and that he often predicted that Germany and America would unite to fight England together.—From the same people I heard that Bancroft Davis, his nephew, who was here last Spring, told the German Officials and Members of Parliament he spoke to, that America would always be ready to act with Germany in giving England a lesson.—

From Dr. Abel, the Prussian Correspondent of the "Times" I heard incidentally that Bismarck exaggerated the value of an American Alliance against England. With my own eyes I saw that Bismarck was more partial to Bancroft than to other Diplomats.—I therefore sought opportunities to sound Bismarck's friends and Secretaries and learnt from them that he held that America could be made a useful Ally to Germany and should be treated accordingly.

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<sup>1</sup> See the following letter.

<sup>2</sup> Count Albrecht von Roon (1803–1879), field marshal and minister of war and navy, 1859–1873; in 1873 he replaced Bismarck as head of the Prussian cabinet.

One day old Abeken, who was a devoted friend of England, told me in confidence that Bancroft had repeatedly made distinct offers of assistance on the part of America against England to Bismarck but without obtaining sympathy. Moltke,<sup>3</sup> he also told me, had reported to the Emperor on the necessity of concerting measures before the War of revenge broke out to prevent a recurrence of the purchase of arms in England by France. Moltke himself is so bitter about the prolongation of War after Sedan with arms bought in England that I now avoid the question whenever he brings it up.—He too, is unnecessarily partial and lenient to the United States. It was Thiele [*sic*] talking of the studies of the Secretaries, who let out that Krause<sup>4</sup> was getting up the subject of the various moral forces England and America might bring to bear against each other in case of a quarrel,—and General Walker who told me Roerdanz [*sic*]<sup>5</sup> had been ordered to report on the invasion of England.

Notwithstanding these details I do not for one moment believe in the existence of hostile intentions on the part of the German Government against us,—on the contrary I am convinced they are sincerely anxious for the closest alliance,—but failing that, I do see elements of trouble to us when the War of revenge is fought, because the idea is growing familiar to the Germans that England prefers France to Germany, that their interests are becoming identical and that France will never cease to threaten revenge and keep Germany under arms for self defence so long as England is her neutral Ally.

Now the Germans are making vast preparations to meet the War of revenge, and their idea is, that France must be finally reduced in such manner as to become harmless to Germany for ever after.

An invitation to America to occupy the attention of England might then become a measure of prudence if the German Government thought France could again purchase the means of a prolonged resistance in neutral English markets,—and the United States, however averse to War as you say, might yield to the influence of their German population roused by the cry of their old Fatherland and make use of a moment of peril to England to squeeze something out of us they could not hope to obtain in times of peace.

However, I can only repeat my conviction that German Statesmen would prefer an alliance to a war with England if they could but detach us from France. They are jealous of, and disappointed at

<sup>3</sup> Count Helmuth Carl Bernhard von Moltke (1800–1891), great military strategist, became a field marshal after the Franco-Prussian War and was German chief of staff until 1888.

<sup>4</sup> H. von Krause was counselor to the German embassy in London, 1871–1874, ranking next to the ambassador.

<sup>5</sup> Rudolf von Roerdanz (1828–1892) had been military attaché at the German embassy in London, 1869–1872, and was director of the German Military Artillery and Engineering School, 1872–1874.

our friendship for France, which they consider an unnatural alliance of inimical races, and would go great lengths to detach us from a nation they hate and whose influence they are determined to neutralize in Europe.

You will see by my public reports that Bismarck has fired his first shot at the Empress by denouncing the Clerical sympathies of one of her Chamberlains and has gone to the Country for a week to allow the Storm he has called forth to blow over.—Bismarck is becoming the Emperors "old man of the sea" but there is no one at Court able to cope with him,—he knows it, and will always have his own way in the end.—For the present the Emperor is delighted at having got rid of him as far as Prussian affairs are concerned and thinks he will have it all his own way in Prussia with his old & faithful servants Roon, Eulenburg and Itzenplitz\* and he little suspects that Bismarck will get the German Parliament to upset the Coach and the particularists, and force the Emperor against his will to form a German Administration of Bismarcks adherents, reducing Prussia to the first Province of the Empire. That is at least what I think most likely to happen in the course of the year.

The season has commenced and we have already more invitations than we can accept.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

The death of the Emperor Napoleon<sup>†</sup> has been the cause of regret at Court in Government Circles only,—the Public are indifferent.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 25 January 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We are jogging on very comfortably in Berlin and depend on the Press for excitement, the situation of Europe being devoid thereof.—Schouvaloffs mission<sup>‡</sup> was a legitimate subject for sensation, but the "Times" of the 21<sup>st</sup> gave too much importance to, and got into too great a passion at, the "Kreutz zeitung" on the subject, neither the Paper nor the Article having any official protection to boast of.

The Emperors Letter to Bismarck accompanying the Black Eagle in Diamonds just published ought at last to stop the controversy in the

\* Count Friedrich Albrecht von Eulenburg (1815-1881), minister of the interior, 1862-1878. See his *Zehn jahre innerer politik, 1862-1873* (Berlin, 1872). Count Heinrich von Itzenplitz (1799-1883), minister of commerce, 1862-May, 1873.

† The Emperor Napoleon III died on January 9, 1873, at Camden House, Chislehurst, England. *Annual Register*, 1873, 2-6.

‡ Count Peter Schouvaloff (1827-1889), Russian ambassador to London, 1874-1879, was sent to England early in January, 1873, to explain the Russian attitude on Central Asia and to reassure the British that the expedition being sent to Khiva was only punitive and not intended for occupation. *The Times* of January 21, 1873, carried an alarmist dispatch from its Prussian correspondent, warning of more sinister intentions.



Press as to Bismarck's position at Court and in the Cabinet. He seems to get on well with them all,—only Eulenburg wishes to exchange the Home Office for the Governorship of a Province and will probably succeed as he is in high favour with the Emperor.—F. M. Roon wishes to end his career with the passing of the new Imperial Army Bill for all Germany next Spring, and Bismarck is biding his time to obtain from the Emperor the power he solicits to form a German Administration responsible to himself instead of a Prussian one responsible to the King. Bismarck thinks the Empress the chief impediment in the way of his policy and the Empress attributes the present anticatholic movement to Bismarck—hence the conflict between them at Court, which the Press mistake for a serious conflict with the Emperor. The Emperor is much worried by it—but in the end Bismarck always carries his point.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 February 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck has again become invisible,—but I have seen the Emperor often lately at the Court receptions and at the Opera. His Majesty said he had heard with great satisfaction from St. Petersburg that the Central Asian question had happily resulted in a cordial understanding between Russia & England.<sup>9</sup> He said he wished to confide to me as his "Versailles friend" but not as British Ambassador that he had reason to think that Count Brunnow<sup>10</sup> had for reasons of his own raised difficulties where there were none, and which had not met with the approval of the Emperor of Russia. His Majesty would say no more, and begged that I would keep what he said to myself.

Not knowing Brunnow's policy in London, I was at a loss to understand what H. M. was alluding to.—

The Emperor also told me that Prince Gortchakoff was anxious to retire into private life,—and added with a smile that whenever that happened Brunnow would certainly not be his successor.

The Emperor and Royal Family appear much distressed at the demonstration of a large portion of the Aristocratic and Roman Cath-

<sup>9</sup> Schouvaloff had told Granville that he might make positive assurances to parliament that any prolonged occupation of Khiva by Russia was out of the question, and Granville announced an understanding on February 6, opening night of parliament's session. The extension of Russian control over Bokhara and Samarkand, now followed by the threat to Khiva, set up a permanent menace on the northern flank of Persia and made the British uneasy over India. For a good account of British fears, see the *Annual Register*, 1873, 106-107; correspondence between England and Russia, Oct., 1872-Jan., 1873, is also printed, 220-232.

<sup>10</sup> Count Ernest Philip Brunnow (1797-1875), Russian ambassador at London, 1840-1854, 1868-1874.

olic Families of Prussia who are conspicuous by their absence from Berlin and from the Court receptions to mark their disapprobation of Bismarck's German liberal and Anti-clerical policy sanctioned by His Majesty.

I am assured that the Court receptions were never so empty before.

Their Majesties have been graciously pleased to ask us to give them a ball, which is to come off on Monday next, 10th instant.—We are doing all we can to make it worthy of the honour conferred on us,—but the amount of worry, trouble and expense it causes is not to be told,—the House being much too small for the increased number of German & Berlin Society,—and supper has to be provided for 600 guests.

The French Ambassador is under an impression that the Russian Gov<sup>t</sup> has been encouraged by Bismarck to quarrel with us about Central Asia so as to get us into trouble &c., &c., but I can see no reason for this impression and believe him to be misinformed. Bismarck has too much to attend to at home to wish for foreign complications just yet in my opinion.

The War with the Vatican will give him more trouble than he expected and he wishes for the support of public opinion in England in his Antipopery policy.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 February 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck asked me this evening after dinner to come and smoke a Pipe with him in his sitting room. I did so, and found him alone. He said he wished to talk to me on various subjects but as he preferred in his dealings with me to speak with perfect freedom instead of with that diplomatic reserve which the dread of our Blue Books imposed on Foreign Ministers conversing with English Diplomats he hoped I would grant him the favour of reporting him privately and not officially.—

In the first instance he wished to solicit my cooperation in contradicting calumny.—It had been reported to him that the Queen of Holland <sup>11</sup> who, for incomprehensible reasons of her own was a bitter enemy of Prussia and of German Unity, had succeeded during her frequent visits to England in propagating the idea that Prussia sought to annex the Netherlands with a view to acquiring Colonies and a Fleet for Germany, and Her Majesty had even persuaded Monsieur

<sup>11</sup> Queen Sophie of the Netherlands (1818-1877), consort of William III. An excellent source of information on "la reine rouge" is Lady Burghclere, *A Great Lady's Friendships: Letters to Mary, Marchioness of Salisbury, Countess of Derby, 1862-1890* (London, 1933).

Rouher<sup>12</sup> to commit himself to the statement that Germany wanted the Zuider Sea.—This idea was utterly unfounded. No German Government could ever desire, nor would public opinion ever consent to the annexation of the Netherlands to the German Empire. Germany had long struggled for National Unity and now that it was happily established, he thought forty millions of united Germans were sufficient to maintain the national independence they had acquired without having to resort to the conquest of peaceful industrious and friendly neighbours like the Dutch.

He neither desired Colonies or Fleets for Germany.—Colonies in his opinion would only be a cause of weakness, because Colonies could only be defended by powerful Fleets,—and Germany's geographical position did not necessitate her development into a first class Maritime Power. A Fleet was sufficient for Germany that could cope with Fleets like those of Austria, Egypt, Holland and perhaps Italy,—scarcely with that of Russia,—but it could not be a German interest so long as she had no Colonies to rivalize with Maritime Powers like England, America or France.—Many Colonies had been offered to him,—he had rejected them and wished only for coaling stations acquired by Treaty from other Nations.

Germany was now large enough and strong enough in his opinion, and even the Emperor Williams insatiable desire for more territory had not led him to covet the possession of the Netherlands.

He had had trouble & vexation enough to combat the Emperors desire to annex the German Provinces of Austria, the population of which certainly desired to form part of the great German Family, but that desire he would oppose so long as he was in power, because he preferred the Alliance and friendship of Austria to the annexation of Provinces that would add nothing to the strength and security of Germany and the loss of which would lessen the value of Austria as an ally.—

The Swiss, for instance, were a German speaking nation, but Switzerland was of greater value as an independent friendly neighbor to Germany than as a province of the German Empire.—

After the Danish War the Emperor had not spoken to him for a week so displeased was His Majesty with him for not having annexed a larger portion of Denmark.—In his opinion Germany had too many Danish speaking subjects and he would willingly pay out of his own pocket to rid Germany of them, but public opinion would not yet allow a German minister to give up any portion of territory so recently acquired. In like manner he held that Germany had too many Polish subjects, but how to deal with them was a question which must depend

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<sup>12</sup> Eugene Rouher (1814–1884), close friend of Napoleon III and sometimes called the vice emperor; under the Republic he returned to France and led the Bonapartist party in the chamber of deputies, in which he sat (1872–1881).

on the success of the measures now under discussion for the neutralization of the antinational Roman Catholic Element in the new Empire. It was now evident that the strength of Germany was in the Protestant North,—her weakness in the Catholic South.

Prince Bismarck paused and puffed away the smoke from his long meerschaum pipe for some time in silence, and then he added in measured terms: "Our honour may compel us to deal differently with the South of Germany than we originally wished or intended."—He then rang his bell, called for a bottle of Beer and another Pipe and went on to say that he was glad the Central Asian incident was settled to our satisfaction. He was not well versed in the question but knowing that England was stronger than Russia in those countries the warwhoop of the Press had not alarmed him.—He thought Schouvaloff's mission unnecessary, but the Emperor of Russia got so bewildered by Brunnow and Gortchakoff's personal quarrels in the matter that he had sent Schouvaloff to judge impartially and come at the truth by personal intercourse with Your Lordship.—He did not wish to be quoted, but it might be useful to you to know that Brunnow represented Her Majesty's Government as seeking a quarrel and desiring hostilities with Russia.—

Prince Bismarck then went on to repeat his grievance against his Imperial Master for resisting the introduction of a system of administration under a responsible Premier as in England which he (Prince Bismarck) considered the best method of developing the political education of the Germans and teaching them the art of Self government.—If however, he should have the misfortune of outliving the Emperor William he foresaw no difficulty in persuading the Crown Prince to follow the good example of England, which His Imperial Highness understood and appreciated as the best for Germany.

After indulging in severe criticism of General Roon and Count Itzenplitz for administrative incapacity under the present difficult circumstances,—a degree of incapacity which ought to convince the Emperor William of the necessity of a change of Ministers if he was not a slave to habit and "routine", Prince Bismarck indulged in Self congratulation of having resigned the Prussian Premiership and left his former Colleagues to fight their battles with His Majesty without him, and on being solely responsible to himself and unhampered by Colleagues in the management of Imperial affairs as German Chancellor.

On my taking leave of him, he said with great cordiality that now that he was relieved of a portion of his former duties and had a little more time to himself he would like to arrange more frequent meetings than heretofore with me.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL

[Copy]

*Private.*

BRUTON STREET, Febr 12/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

I am afraid Bernstorff is very ill—water in the stomach and in the legs. I saw him yesterday—he looked better than I am afraid he is. I should think there is little chance of his remaining long here.

When there is any question of a successor I hope you will hint to Bismarck, that without the least pretention of suggesting who should be his successor, I hope it will be some person who has his complete confidence.

Bernstorff who was a good honorable man, but naturally huffy, was in a perpetual state of alarm lest Bismarck should not think him sufficiently active and intelligent—& in his desire to prove the contrary did much that was mischievous—& on the other hand I never felt the use of telling him many things, which it might be useful for him to know.

I should not like Arnim whom Bismarck described to Schouvaloff as not “Ehrlich”—Bernstorff as “ein esel”.

Yr (sd) G[RANVILLE].

But you know Arnim well, what do you think of him.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 February 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I am extremely sorry to hear of poor dear Bernstorffs sad condition, and shall seek an opportunity, in obedience to your Letter of the 12<sup>th</sup> inst., to sound Bismarck as to the future. At present Bismarck will not admit that Bernstorff is in any real danger or that a Vacancy need yet be anticipated.

The general impression, however, here is that Arnim will succeed Bernstorff.

I do not share the general impression because I happen to know that Arnim is out of favour with Bismarck, who suspects Arnim of aiming at office at home which is an unpardonable offence in the eyes of the great Chancellor.—He thinks that Arnim intrigued against him when he went to Baden last autumn to see the Emperor and Empress and recommended Their Majestys [*sic*] to favour Orleanism in opposition to Bismarcks present policy of non-interference in France so long as Thiers lasts.

When Bismarck described Arnim to Schouvaloff as not “Ehrlich” he was alluding to the fact that Arnim would not resist going shares with the Berlin Banker Hauseman who undertook part of the great War Loan,—and thereby realizing enough to buy an Estate in Silesia and some Houses in Berlin &c., &c.

My impression is that Bismarck is at present more inclined to dismiss Arnim than to employ him,—but then he changes his mind according to circumstances. Arnim is a favourite at Court for he is clever and agreeable. I know him very intimately and like him personally without being blind to his faults.—He is able, cultivated, a better English Scholar than Bernstorff, fond of England and English Sports, and owns an amiable English speaking wife, who was his cousin.—

On the other hand he is very ambitious and restless and ready for any amount of intrigue to further his plan of succeeding Bismarck as German Chancellor.<sup>13</sup>

Bismarck may very possibly not have his own way at first about the German Embassy in London because the Emperor and Empress will wish to select their Representative themselves, whilst the Crown Prince and Princess have a greater personal interest still, in the selection of a German Ambassador to England and they probably differ from Bismarck as to the qualifications necessary for the post. As far as I know the Crown Prince and Princess would like the Hanoverian Count Münster to succeed poor Bernstorff, and he would certainly make an excellent German Ambassador in every respect.—You know him of course.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 March 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

There was a dinner last night of 40 persons at Bismarcks in honour of the Ambassadors and of the "Bundesrattz" [*sic*] or Council of the Realm.—I sat between Princess Bismarck and F. M. Count Moltke with whom I had a long conversation, some portions of which may interest you.

Talking of Spain he said his information led him to think the Army would fight for the Alphonsists who had the best chances of success in the future.<sup>14</sup>

Talking of our Army reforms <sup>15</sup> Count Moltke said that while we possessed the best fighting qualities and material in the world we were

<sup>13</sup> For Bismarck's quarrel with Arnim, climaxed by the arrest of Arnim on October 5, 1874, see Taffs, *Russell*, 38-47.

<sup>14</sup> The abdication of King Amadeo in February, 1873, left the Spanish throne again a bone of intrigue, with Alphonso receiving German support against French support for Don Carlos. Alphonso was proclaimed king on December 31, 1874, and ruled until 1885. For a summary see Taffs, 57-68.

<sup>15</sup> See Sir Robert Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office: A History of His Administration, 1868-1874* (London, 1904), *passim*, but especially chapters x, xi, and xii on the abolition of the system of purchasing commissions, the reform which caused the greatest stir.

not a military nation as our Press and our Public Debates on military matters sufficiently proved,—besides which our System of Government and of public life were not favourable to the development of military institutions nor was freedom favourable to discipline. I asked whether he then still thought the invasion of England strategically as easy as he told me it was at Versailles in 1870?

Count Moltke replied that his frequent visits to England had left him under the impression that the invasion of England by foreign troops was quite possible and that we appeared unprepared for resistance if ever the attempt were made. Happily for us we were a peace-loving nation who could find safety in foreign alliances and he only regretted that we showed, by our commercial policy, so decided a preference for an alliance with corrupt Catholic France to an alliance with Kindred protestant Germany. He envied our insular position which enabled us to have so small an army. The exaggerated system of standing Armies in Europe, due to the attitude of France, was a public calamity and he hoped to live to see a general and simultaneous reduction of them, as War could be carried on with smaller forces as well as with millions of men, and War would last as long as humanity, God himself being favourable to War, as the Bible proved.—

I said that from no one could the proposal for a general reduction of Armies come with better grace than from himself. General Moltke replied that the reduction would only be possible after the war of revenge was over.

I asked whether the war of revenge could not be avoided?

General Moltke said it could not,—Germany wished for peace, but France did not, nor could there be peace in Europe until the war of revenge had rendered the French harmless.—The late war had left sufficient fighting power in them to keep Europe still in constant alarm and a second war was necessary to obtain the guarantees they had unfortunately not been compelled to give before Paris, that they would never again wantonly break the peace of Europe so that the other Powers might disarm and place their armies on a peace footing. He did not mean that Germany desired war,—quite the contrary, Germany desired peace, but the attitude and spirit of France rendered it impossible for Germany not to be ready for defence when France attacked her for the second time. Germany would have to resist the attack single handed,—he had little hope of assistance from the Italians, who with a little more decision might so easily regain the provinces France had wrested from them.—Italy should not forget that she owed Venice and Rome to Germany.

I said that I noticed a very general impression among Germans of all classes that war with Russia was unavoidable, but I could not understand what they wished to fight about?

General Moltke said the impression was founded on the hatred of races, and was more encouraged by the Russian Press than by the German,—but Russia had proved herself too good an ally of Germany not to know that she could reckon on reciprocity.—Russia and Austria he feared would come to blows in the East.—

I said, Germany would then side with Austria I presumed?—

General Moltke replied that Germany having no interests in the East would remain neutral, but if compelled to take an active part could only side with Russia in return for her offer to attack Austria if Austria had sided with France in the late war.

I asked what he thought of arbitration? The General replied that in his opinion arbitration was excellent for the settlement of money questions, but could not be applied to those of national honour with safety.

He was throughout very frank and friendly and repeatedly said the peace of Europe could be secured by a close alliance between England and Germany.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private & Confidential.*

F. O., *March 5/73.*

MY DEAR ODO,

Thiers is making every effort to induce us on different questions to come to more precise understanding with France & Russia, than is necessary for the transaction of business.

I doubt whether Russia is more anxious than we are to form any league against Germany.

Our own desire is the reverse, & Lyons<sup>16</sup> quite understands our policy.

I presume Bismarck is perfectly aware of the real meaning of Thiers exposé des motifs &c & other declarations of that sort.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 *March 1873.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We are both touched and gratified by the repeated marks of favour Their Majesties bestow on us.—It is so unusual for the Sovereign to dine “en petit comité” in a diplomatic House that the dinner Their Majesties were pleased to say they wished us to offer them has made

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<sup>16</sup> Richard Bickerton Pemell, Lord Lyons (1817-1887), the British ambassador at Paris, had entered the diplomatic service in 1839; he served as British minister at Washington, 1858-1865; ambassador at Constantinople, 1865-1867; and at Paris, 1867-1887. See Lord Newton, *Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy* (London, 1913).



a very great sensation in Berlin, and will go far to impress the public and the Press favourably in regard to our international relations.

Their Majesties selected to meet the Bismarcks, Schleinitz and Radziwills,<sup>17</sup> and to avoid international jealousies I asked to be allowed to add the Ambassadors of Austria, Russia, and France to our dinner, which pleased and conciliated my Colleagues. All went off most satisfactorily—nothing could exceed the gracious condescension of the Emperor and Empress.

I can say no more by this Messenger but I shall have an opportunity to write again by young Napier<sup>18</sup> who goes to Madrid via Paris and whom I am extremely sorry to lose.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

BERLIN, 15 March 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your telegram announcing the resignation of Ministers was a terrible blow to me and Emily the other night,<sup>19</sup>—but the Newspapers now bring a glimpse of hope that matters may yet be arranged and we, not lose you. The Emperor and Empress whom I spoke to last night were deeply interested in the crisis and expressed their anxious hope it might be settled without a change of government.

In your letter of the 5th inst. you ask whether Bismarck is perfectly aware of the real meaning of Thiers's "exposé des motifs" and other declarations of that sort.

I regret to say that Monsieur Thiers's explanatory declarations have only confirmed the first impression produced in Germany by our Commercial Treaty with France,—namely:—that it is a political step towards the reestablishment of the Western alliance, in answer to the creation of the Northern or three Emperor Alliance in September last at Berlin.—Besides Mr. Thiers's "exposé des motifs", our own Press is quoted in support of his grateful acknowledgements of our policy, by our German critics.—

The passage in the Emperor Williams speech of the 12th<sup>20</sup> at the opening of the German Parliament alluding to "the three Emperor"

<sup>17</sup> The Radziwills represented an old and wealthy Polish family. Prince Anton (1833–1904), at this time Colonel and aide-de-camp to Emperor William I, in 1857 married Marie de Castellane (1840–1915). See Rodd, *Memories*, I, 57, 58.

<sup>18</sup> William John George, later eleventh Baron Napier (1846–1913), served as attaché and then third secretary at the British embassy in Berlin (1871–1873), and returned there (1875–1877) after a time at Madrid; he went to Lisbon in 1877 and to Brussels in 1883; he was secretary of the legation at Buenos Aires (1886), at Stockholm (1887–1888), and at Tokyo (1888–1891); in 1898 he inherited his father's title.

<sup>19</sup> The Gladstone ministry resigned March 13, after losing a close vote on the Irish Universities Bill, but agreed to resume office March 18, after protracted negotiation and the refusal of Disraeli to form a government. See Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II, 446–456.

<sup>20</sup> *The Times*, March 13, 1873 summarized the emperor's speech and quoted this passage: "The relations with all foreign states justify our confidence in the maintenance and con-

visit as it is called, has given great satisfaction in consequence of the general impression that France and England are still allied.

The efforts made by Thiers to drag Russia into the alliance are well known here, as I wrote to you before, and are carefully communicated by Gortchakoff to Bismarck and by the Emperor Alexander to the Emperor William.

The understanding between Russia and Germany is real, intimate and sincere,—and France has nothing to offer that could detach Russia from Germany, or break up the understanding come to between them, respecting Austria, before the late War, and probably also respecting other questions of the future, not yet known to Diplomacy. Russia, as you most truly observe, cannot be anxious to form any league against Germany because Germany will help her to all she may want in the East so long as she continues to be in league with Germany, against France and Austria, as has been so successfully the case since 1866.—

It would be an act of kindness to warn Monsieur Thiers that everything he says to Russia is repeated to Bismarck and the Emperor William.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

F. O., *March 19/73.*

MY DEAR ODO,

We shall announce tomorrow that we are “as you were as to men & places”.

We do not mean to dissolve, unless we find we have really forfeited the confidence of the House of Commons, which I doubt.

I should have been glad of a little rest and holyday before getting too old to enjoy them, but it has seemed better otherwise to the gods.

Your conversation with Moltke is very interesting and not satisfactory. It is obvious that nothing will satisfy the Germans, but some wrangles between us and the French. I am not sure that these will not come. There are so many subjects on which we come into contact, and on which for many years we have acted together, that I suspect as soon as they have a little more corn, and have recovered their condition, they may make themselves very disagreeable. The Germans have behaved well at Zanzibar,<sup>21</sup> the French have not kept their

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solidation of peace. This confidence is most fully justified in consequence of the amicable relations with the Monarchs of the powerful neighbouring Empires, which were confirmed and strengthened by their personal visit. These relations to our neighbours, which are a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, will be cherished by the Emperor, and he will consider it as a desirable task, the fulfilment of which will, by God's help, be possible.”

<sup>21</sup> See R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890* (London, 1939), 189-198, on the British attempts to suppress the East African slave trade.

word. They are promising to be troublesome about the Suez Canal, and about the judicial reforms in Egypt.

I forgot to tell you that you were quite right in denying that the Daily Telegraph is my organ. I think it has been a mistake of Gladstone's making it so much his—and I doubt his inspiring it at all on Foreign Affairs.

He is well, but grieved at having lost a holiday, & repose which no one more richly deserved. He is an incessant worker, and always at high pressure.

I have found him a charming chief.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 March 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your Letter of the 19th and the good tidings about yr. crisis.—I am happy it is settled according to my wishes, well as I appreciate your own wish for rest.—

A bad sore throat has kept me at home for some days so that I have nothing to say.—At one o'clock I go to congratulate the Emperor on his birthday and later I dine with Bismarck. After dinner I may have something to say, but the through Messenger from St. Petersburg will by that time have left Berlin.

The Convention with France<sup>22</sup> seems to have satisfied everybody, even the military men who say: "the sooner the War of revenge is fought, the better for the future peace of Europe."

The idea of the "War of revenge" is growing popular as the means of settling every remaining difficulty, and alarms me profoundly.—I shall have to call your attention to the coming danger often I fear.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 April 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I waited until Prince Bismarck volunteered to speak to me about Bernstorff's successor to give him your message and I said that without the least pretention of suggesting who should be his successor you hoped it would be some one who had his, (Prince Bismarck's) complete confidence and to whom you could speak without reserve, a desire Bernstorff had not encouraged you to indulge in. Prince Bismarck said he had deeply felt the disadvantage of having Bernstorff in London, but

<sup>22</sup> The Franco-German Convention, March 16, 1873, provided for German evacuation of the four French provinces still held as a result of the Franco-Prussian War and for the payment of the fourth milliard of the war indemnity by May 5, and the fifth and last milliard by September 5, 1873, two years before the expiration of the original time limit.

he had never been able to persuade the Emperor to recall him, and he fully appreciated and reciprocated your wishes in regard to his successor.—The choice was not easy, many high qualifications were requisite and he would have to be guided by the opinion and commands of the Crown Prince who naturally took a deep interest in the appointment and would probably exercise great influence on the Emperor in the matter.—

Prince Bismarck then went on to say that among the Candidates thought of were, Arnim, whom he would have to remove from Paris,—Perponcher, now Minister at the Hague,—Prince Hohenlohe the Bavarian Ex-Minister,<sup>23</sup> Count Münster the Hanoverian Peer and Baron Schweinitz<sup>24</sup> the Ambassador at Vienna and others the Emperor had in his mind, and he asked me what I thought of those he had named?

I said that Arnim being an old Colleague and intimate friend of mine I had no hesitation in saying from my knowledge of his character that he was in no way suited to the post. Prince Bismarck laughed and said he fully agreed.

Count Perponcher,<sup>25</sup> I said, had many friend in England, including yourself, and felt sure his appointment would give universal satisfaction.—

Prince Bismarck said the objection to him was his intellect was not equal to the duties of so important a post.

Prince Hohenlohe, I said, had every desirable qualification, if Prince Bismarck saw no objection to Germany being represented at this moment by a Roman Catholic?

Prince Bismarck said the objection was a real one, besides which he might soon be wanted in Bavaria to save the young King from the difficulties he was creating for himself.

Count Münster, I said, being the favourite candidate of the Crown Prince and of the Crown Princess was probably admirably suited for London,—with Baron Schweinitz I was but too slightly acquainted to have an opinion of my own about his merits.—

Prince Bismarck said that of the two, Schweinitz was the abler man but he agreed generally in the Crown Princes estimation of Count Münster. He would press the Emperor to make his selection as soon as possible because he found "Krause much too eloquent for so young

<sup>23</sup> Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst (1819-1901), brother of Cardinal Hohenlohe (see above, "1872," n. 41), took his hereditary seat in the Bavarian parliament in 1845 and was Bavarian minister-president and foreign minister, 1866-1870; in 1871 he became vice president of the first German imperial parliament and in 1874 was sent as ambassador to France, where he remained until 1885, except for an interval in 1880 as temporary head of the foreign office; he was chancellor of the German empire, 1894-1900.

<sup>24</sup> Baron Hans Lothar von Schweinitz (1822-1901), German ambassador at Vienna, 1871-1876, and at St. Petersburg, 1876-1892.

<sup>25</sup> Count Wilhelm von Perponcher-Sedlnitzky, German minister at the Hague, 1863-1874.

an Agent", but he did not feel sure the Emperor would agree to any of the names we had been discussing. He was naturally most anxious to meet the wishes of Her Majesty the Queen and of yourself in selecting the new Ambassador and would let you know on whom the Emperor's choice was most likely to fall, as soon as he knew it himself.

The Crown Prince confided to me that Prince Bismarck is determined to find some foreign Post for General Manteuffel<sup>22</sup> when his command of the troops of occupation in France ceases, because he dreads his presence in Berlin and the real influence he has on the Emperor's mind. Bismarck would like to appoint Manteuffel Ambassador at Paris,—but he does not know what to do with Arnim if he cannot send him to London in Bernstorff's place.—

Knowing your objection to Arnim I thought it as well to tell Bismarck frankly that I did not think he would suit us, and I must say he appeared to agree in every word I said, but whether he was sincere or not is another question.

The matter therefore now stands thus: Bismarck would find it convenient to send Arnim to London to make room for Manteuffel at Paris.

The Crown Prince objects to Arnim and thinks Count Münster the best man for the post.—

To this both the Crown Princess and Empress agree.

The Emperor's wishes and intentions are not yet known.

Perponcher's relations at Court are moving Heaven and Earth to get the Emperor to select him,—but he has the Crown Princess against him I am told, as well as Bismarck.

It is impossible to say with certainty who will be chosen, but Münster is at present more powerfully backed than the others.—Bismarck will however throw him over at once if he finds out that he is the Empress Augusta's favourite for the post.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, DEAL, April 8, 1873.

MY DEAR ODO,

I am afraid it looks like Arnim.

I personally should like Münster, & I do not think the Queen retains her objection to him. He would be liked here, but would meet with

<sup>22</sup> General Edwin Hans Carl Manteuffel (1809–1885) commanded the German army of occupation in France, 1871–1873; on September 19, 1873, he was made field marshal, the climax of a long, successful military career; in 1879 he was appointed governor of Alsace-Lorraine.

furious opposition from the Cambridges,<sup>27</sup> which however would be his affair, and would not signify much.

I followed your suggestion as to giving a hint. He [Thiers] at first pretended to be surprised stupid and puzzled, and then to declare that he had never said anything to a Russian which he did not wish the Prussians to know. His bad conscience made him think that I meant more than I said, which has been explained to him, but I am not sorry that he should be aware that hiding his head and spectacles in the sand does not conceal his body.

The idea of our giving money and support to the Carlists is too absurd. Sir George Bowyer<sup>28</sup> is the principal supporter of the subscription on religious grounds.

Forbes Campbell, who I believe was employed by Bismarck in England, during the French War, is active in the Financiering work.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, DEAL, *April 17/73*

MY DEAR ODO,

The Queen has written to me referring to your despatch no. 181. H. M. wishes if it were possible that you and perhaps Count Münster should make some arrangement for the poor young Prince of Hanover,<sup>29</sup> who, H. M. says, is quite reasonable, to succeed to the private property and title even if without the sovereignty of the Duchy of Brunswick.

The messenger is going, and I have not time to read the argument which the Queen adds, and which is written less legibly than the Queen generally writes, so I send you the Queen's minute which please return.

I remember your alluding to this subject, but I cannot refer to your letters which are in London.

Pray do all you can to further this object which the Queen with so much reason has in view—but avoid subjecting the Queen to a direct refusal. I trust in your tact and energy.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

<sup>27</sup> George, Duke of Cambridge (1819-1904), was a first cousin of Queen Victoria.

<sup>28</sup> Sir George Bowyer (1811-1883), English lawyer and M. P. (1852-1868, 1874-1880), was converted to Roman Catholicism in 1850. For the rumor that Britain supplied money to the Carlists, see Taffs, *Russell*, 58.

<sup>29</sup> The crown prince of Hanover, Ernest August (1845-1923), Queen Victoria's first cousin once removed, was the grandson of her uncle Ernest, Duke of Cumberland, who became king of Hanover when Victoria succeeded to the throne of England in 1837.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 April 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have enquired confidentially into the present state of the question of the private property and title of the Crown Prince of Hanover as directed by your Letter of the 17th inst., and find it stands thus:

The Emperor William is most anxious to do justice to the Crown Prince of Hanover and let him succeed to his private property and titles but cannot take the initiative in the matter for the following reasons:

1<sup>st</sup> because the King of Hanover maintains the position of enemy of the Fatherland which he assumed by joining Austria during the War of 1866 and by raising a Hanoverian Legion in Austria to fight Prussia after 1866.

2<sup>nd</sup> because the Sequestration of the King's property which followed, was done by an act of the Prussian Parliament.

3<sup>rd</sup> because neither the King nor the Crown Prince have taken any serious steps to alter the position thus assumed, which might enable the Prussian Parliament to revoke the sequestration.

The Emperor is thus paralyzed at home and must await the initiative from without.

On the other hand Prince Bismarck and the great National party who support him are in no hurry to see the present situation altered, which is so favourable to their policy. They do not wish the House of Hanover to inherit but the House of Hohenzollern to absorb Brunswick, as they intend the House of Hohenzollern to absorb gradually the Sovereign Rights of all the reigning families of Germany.

The Emperor William has been gradually and step by step led to carry out a policy he little foresaw, and His Majesty does not, in my opinion, at present foresee the policy towards which Prince Bismarck is guiding his steps.

The Crown Prince and Crown Princess do, and to all appearances approve it.

But to return to the Crown Prince of Hanover's interests, the only steps that could compel Prince Bismarck to re-open the question and enable the Emperor to act in his favour would be:

1<sup>st</sup> the formal abdication of his Sovereign Rights by the King of Hanover, and 2<sup>nd</sup>—the recognition of and submission to the present government and State of things in Germany by the Crown Prince of Hanover.

After that his private property and title and perhaps also his rights of succession to the Duchy of Brunswick could be restored and recognized.

Count MÜNSTER, as you know, has always been the warmest and most active defender of the claims of the Crown Prince and has been

in opposition to Prince Bismarck about them, so he will be able to give you every detail you may require as he is most anxious that justice should be done to the Crown Prince who has been, as he says himself, so disgracefully treated.

I will talk the matter over confidentially with Count Münster, without mentioning names and as coming from myself, and try to ascertain what the present feelings and intentions of the King of Hanover are,—but the utmost prudence is necessary because sixteen millions of Thalers of His Majesty's property were handed over by the Prussian Parliament to Prince Bismarck as a secret service fund for his *irresponsible* use, so that he is extremely hostile to anyone who proposes to persuade the King of Hanover to give up the attitude he has assumed and be reconciled to the House of Hohenzollern and the German Empire.

It is a subject of curiosity to many to know, but nobody ventures to ask how Prince Bismarck spends the interest of those sixteen millions of Thalers or two millions and four hundred thousand Pounds.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 April 1873,

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck's journey to St. Petersburg<sup>20</sup> is believed to have the two fold object of converting the Czar and Gortchakoff to his German policy with which they are not quite satisfied, and of giving verbal instructions to Prince Reuss<sup>21</sup> with whom he is not quite satisfied.

Lord Augustus Loftus<sup>22</sup> has been privately warned by me and will be able to tell you what truth there is in these reports.

The Crown Prince and Crown Princess did us the honour of dining at this Embassy last night which gave us great joy.—Count Münster our new Ambassador<sup>23</sup> also dined with us at Their Royal Highness's request and appears to be beyond anything happy at his appointment.

<sup>20</sup> The German emperor, Bismarck, and Moltke arrived at St. Petersburg on April 27, 1873, and remained twelve days, returning the visit of the tsar to Berlin in September, 1872 (the meeting of the three emperors). A similar visit was paid to Franz Joseph in Vienna (October 17-23, 1873). A detailed social description of the visit to St. Petersburg may be found in Julian Klaczko, *The Two Chancellors Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck* (London, 1876), 314-319.

<sup>21</sup> Prince Henry VII of Reuss (1825-1906), German ambassador in St. Petersburg, 1871-1876.

<sup>22</sup> Lord Augustus Loftus (1817-1904) entered the diplomatic service in 1837 as an attaché at Berlin and occupied various posts in Germany and Austria until finally appointed British ambassador at Berlin in 1865; in 1871 he was moved to St. Petersburg, where he remained until 1879.

<sup>23</sup> On April 20, 1873, Queen Victoria had indicated her willingness to accept Münster; he was accredited May 17. See Bjork, *op. cit.*, 4.



Bismarck told him he would require his vote in Parliament till the end of June when he will proceed to London to present his credentials.—

The Royal family have now all left Berlin.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 7/73.*

MY DEAR ODO,

I shall be curious to hear what you learn of the interview of the Emperors.

It is probable that Bismarck will not exert himself to keep up better relations between the Russians & us.

If they settle anything about Spain will not S.[ecret] S.[ervice] Money be the principal weapon employed for the present.

I hear Thiers will attempt a compromise with the right.

Our elections go badly but I imagine we shall struggle through this session.

Lord Russell who is very well, has three motions on the Lords minutes for tomorrow night.

Your sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *10 May 1873.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your Letter of the 7th inst. I will do my best to ascertain what has been done at St Petersburg, but Bismarck will probably hold his own until the time comes for action.

I do not think Bismarck wishes for bad relations between us and Russia,—the interests of the two Countries do not interfere with those of Germany.—He has made his alliance with Russia and he would be glad to be on intimate terms with us.—

We only stand in his way so long as he thinks our neutrality a material advantage to France, which may facilitate the War of revenge, as it facilitated the War of defence after Sedan.—

He thinks Thiers has done nothing towards the more permanent maintenance of order in France after his death, that he leaves the "Deluge" to succeed him and that there is no reason why the Deluge should not come in the shape of a second war, or a second "commune".

The French Press preaches a second war, the late elections show that in Paris alone there are 180,000 Voters in favor of the "Commune".

The future of Spain is equally uncertain. Successful or Unsuccessful republics in Europe would not suit Imperial Germany, and Peace is *now* more necessary than War to her development.

Bismarck, whose policy has ever been calculated on future contingencies, has doubtless made his plans with Russia for the reestablishment of order or peace in France and Spain, as the only power on whose active cooperation he can reckon with certainty and whose conditions, whatever they are, can cost Germany nothing. Bismarck believes in the War of revenge and his visit to Russia is intended to awe France into keeping the peace and dispel Thiers's illusion in regard to a Franco-Russian Alliance. A cordial understanding between Germany and Russia neutralizes the independent action of Austria, who must obey them if she wishes to save her German and Slave populations from annexing themselves to either according to race. Hungary cannot stand alone.—

Thus Bismarck is making himself Master of the "European Situation" and since Germany is made he wants peace to carry out his policy, which is, the supremacy of Germany in Europe, and of the German race in the World.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 May 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck returned from St. Petersburg on Sunday and called on me today. He gave me a graphic account of the magnificence and cordiality of the Emperor's reception and dwelt particularly on the demonstrations of popular feeling which, he said, were far beyond his expectations. High Officials and Military Authorities were bound to be civil,—not so the peasantry, middle class, and the young people in Society,—and it was especially from them that he had received unexpected marks of sympathy in the Streets and in the Drawingrooms of St. Petersburg, which had given him the greatest satisfaction.—

He had two political objects in going to Russia,—one was to show France that Germany and Russia were Allies, the other was to plead his own cause to the Czar and Prince Gortchakoff, as he had reason to know that the Prussian Conservatives had calumniated him to them and he feared their indirect influence, through Russian Channels, on the mind of the Emperor William.—He was well pleased that he had gone himself and removed all evil impressions from the Imperial minds and that he had been able to renew the most cordial relations in regard to himself with his old friend Gortchakoff.

As I was anxious not to lose this opportunity of carrying out your private instructions of the 7th inst, I asked him to tell me his private impression in regard to the influence of the Central Asian question on our relations with Russia?

He said that he had found a sincere desire in Russia for cordial relations with England, but that the suspicious tone of our Press certainly offended the Court and the Government, and enabled young Colonels and rising Statesmen to declaim against England in return.—For his part he ardently desired cordial relations between England and Russia in the interest of Germany.—Germany wanted friends and could not get on without them,—she had a true friend in Russia and wished Russia to have powerful friends.—His wish was that England, Germany and Russia should be friends for the good of humanity and the peace of the world. It was a mistake to think Russian Statesmen meditated further conquests.—On the contrary they felt acutely that they had no men capable of administering and governing their vast possessions,—and it was the absence of that class of men which would cause the weakness of Russia for years to come. The rising man in Russia, who would succeed Gortchakoff, was Schouvaloff and he was a peace-loving Statesman and a true friend of an English alliance. The Czarewitch <sup>54</sup> was too idle and indolent ever to be ambitious.—Turkey had nothing to fear at present from Russia in his opinion.—The Khiva <sup>55</sup> expedition was a necessity for the maintenance of order among the lawless tribes Russia was afflicted with in Asia,—he only regretted it had been undertaken with what appeared an insufficient force. He thought we would find Russia a useful neighbour to India in course of time, and certainly one who could do us no harm.

I altered the course of conversation towards Spain and asked what Gortchakoff expected?

They had agreed, Bismarck said, that "poor Spain" would sink to the state of a South American Republic before a party strong enough could be educated by adversity to reestablish Law and Order.—The one man who might be of use appeared to be Serrano.<sup>56</sup> The State of Spain ought to serve as a wholesome lesson to Governments and Governed in Europe.—He felt deeply for the misfortunes of that

<sup>54</sup> The tsarewitch (1845–1894), who became Alexander III in 1881, was the second son of Alexander II and heir apparent, 1865–1881; his sympathies were definitely with the French throughout the seventies.

<sup>55</sup> The first Russian expedition to Khiva, sent out in 1872, was badly defeated, but the second expedition took Khiva on June 10, 1873. For an account, see Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia* (New York, 1933), 158–161, and the *Annual Register*, 1873, 239–241.

<sup>56</sup> Don Francisco Serrano y Domínguez (1810–1885), Marshal Serrano, was the leading Spanish statesman (1865–1874), captain general of Madrid, chief of the Liberal party, regent (1869–1871), president of the council, and chief of executive power under the republic (1874); he withdrew to France when Alphonso XII was proclaimed king on December 31, 1874, but returned to Spain in 1881.

unhappy Country but he did not see how Spain could be saved until she saved herself.

Talking of Serrano's escape he said that the German Minister Kanitz<sup>87</sup> had telegraphed to ask him whether he should in a similar case act as Layard<sup>88</sup> had done, to which he had replied: "Whatever you do, don't ask me."

That is all I could get out of Bismarck about Russia and Spain. In course of time I may get more. You will see by my Despatches what he said about the Pope.—To me his Papal policy appears irrational, but I await its development with deep interest. In the course of conversation he severely criticised the Dutch for their Atchin expedition and failure—the French for their mismanagement of the Paris elections,—and the Austrians for suspending their Bank Act.—He would willingly have lent money to the Austrian Government but was told by Schweinitz, the German ambassador at Vienna, that the offer of a loan would offend the Austrian Government,—a view he did not share with Schweinitz, and thought him wrong.—

On two occasions I have heard Bismarck complain in bitter terms of the timidity of Italian Statesmen and their absurd fear of France, and of his desire to detach them from France and attach them to Germany for their own good and national independence.

Count Münster now talks of going to England on the 12th of June.—His appointment has been most favourably received by the Berlin Press, and by the Members of the German Parliament with whom he is very popular.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

18 CARLTON TERRACE, S. W.,

May 21/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

It is curious to see what a different account Loftus gives of the Russian feeling, and of the reception of the Emperor, from that which Bismarck presented to you. But the latter may have been taken in.

It is clear that Gortchakoff & Schouvaloff are at daggers drawn. Brunnow who dislikes Bismarck, yet says that he knows that his influence was in favor of the more pacific Schouvaloff.

Perhaps you could find out on some occasion what Bismarck thinks of the position & chances of the two.

<sup>87</sup> Baron Julius von Kanitz and Dallwitz, German minister to Spain, 1867-1874.

<sup>88</sup> Sir Austen Henry Layard (1817-1894), the British minister at Madrid, 1869-1877, was also attaché in Constantinople, 1849-1851, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1852, 1861-1866, and ambassador at Constantinople, 1877-1880.

Fish is beginning to move about the submission of the 3 rules <sup>32</sup>—which may cause us some trouble and annoyance.

Lyons account of the feeling of the Paris [*sic*] is very gloomy. He says that he does not remember it worse in the time of the Commune.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 May 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Emperor gives a grand dinner in honour of the Queen's birthday today to which all the Members of this Embassy are asked.—I have in consequence put off my dinner tomorrow and have asked the Cabinet, the Household, the Fieldmarshals and the Diplomatic Body. I can answer your private question of the 21st at once.—Bismarck thinks Gortchakoff will remain in office as long as he lives, notwithstanding his frequent assurances to the contrary. The Czar would be sorry to lose his services, but as he is old and frequently ill, His Majesty has selected Schouvaloff, of whom he has the highest opinion, as his successor.—Bismarck shares the Emperors opinion of Schouvaloff.—He thinks Gortchakoff and Schouvaloff on good terms, but Gortchakoff and Brunnow at daggers drawn.—

Bismarcks dislike of Brunnow is intense not to say comical at times. He maintains that Gortchakoff and Brunnow are on the worst possible terms and hate each other cordially.

I am sorry to hear that Fish is beginning to move about the submission of the 3 rules,—because they will not meet with favour either at Berlin or at Vienna, which will be a triumph to our enemies.—I do not know what they think of them at St Petersburg, but my impression is that the three allied Powers will agree to reject them.—

Uncle John <sup>40</sup> wrote to me some time ago to ask me what people thought in Germany of the future of France?—

I told him that everybody in Germany expected that the future Rulers of France, whoever they were, would have to prepare the war of revenge to satisfy public opinion in France, for which reason the Germans thought it prudent to continue their armaments so as not to be unprepared in the event of a second attack.—

Uncle John, in reply, has sent me the enclosed letter, which I should be glad to have back, as I keep all his autographs, when you have read it.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>32</sup> See above, "1872," n. 59.

<sup>40</sup> See above, "1870-1871," n. 11.

*Secret.*

BERLIN, 24 May 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of February last you authorized me to write to you on the subject of the Duke of Edinburgh's<sup>41</sup> projected marriage with the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia. On the 19th February I told you all I then knew.—I will now betray to [you] under the seal of secrecy what is whispered at Court on the subject.

It is said that although Prince Alfred was invited by the Empress of Russia to Naples His Royal Highness did not meet with the favourable reception from the Grand Duchess Marie he was entitled to expect and that the projected alliance may be considered as broken off.

From Vienna I hear that Princess Metternich<sup>42</sup> exerted her influence against the Russian marriage and in favour of the Hanoverian alliance, for which she endeavoured to gain the sympathies of the Prince of Wales.

Princess Metternich as well as her husband, who passed through Berlin on Sunday last on his way from Stockholm to Vienna, are, as you know, most anxious to replace Beust at London,—an appointment which would cause great disappointment at Berlin,—as would also a marriage between the Duke of Edinburgh and a Hanoverian Princess, for obvious reasons.—

The Crown Prince and Crown Princess are bent upon preventing both these contingencies I am assured, but shall know more about it when Their Royal Highnesses return from Venice and Milan where they now are.

My former impression has been confirmed and I am now certain that the Royal family of Prussia are not favourable to a matrimonial alliance between the Royal families of England and Russia or Hanover.

On the other hand Prince Bismarck tells me that he hears from Russian sources and that he knows positively that the Duke of Edinburgh has been invited to meet the Imperial family of Russia at Ems, where the Prince's marriage with the Grand Duchess will be settled according to the wishes of the Emperor and Empress of Russia. He attributes the so called unfavourable reception of Prince Alfred at Naples solely to the fact that the Grand Duchess having been ill and not therefore looking her best, did not care to be seen by the Prince under unfavourable circumstances. But he looks upon the marriage as certain and assures me that he desires it to take place for political reasons, and would be sincerely disappointed if he thought it could be broken off.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>41</sup> Alfred (1844-1900), Duke of Edinburgh and later Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was the second son of Queen Victoria.

<sup>42</sup> Princess Pauline Metternich (1836-1921), daughter of Count Sandor, in 1856 married Richard Metternich (1829-1895), Austrian ambassador to France, 1859-1871.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, June 4, 1873.

MY DEAR ODO,

Pray send all the gossip you can pick up about the Shah's<sup>43</sup> doings and sayings. He appears to have been nobbled<sup>44</sup> by the Russians, and I do [not] know that we have any means of renobbling him.

Will your friends advise him to put confidence in the Czar or not.

I return L<sup>d</sup> Russell's letter with thanks. I have answered it to himself. The proposal is at all events a little premature. He is going to make a great speech on Ireland next Monday. I do not feel sure that it will not be somewhat Bismarckian in tone.

I do not know that we have any great cause to regret Thiers.<sup>45</sup> If the present Gov<sup>t</sup> does not become too clerical, I believe the change will be advantageous for France.

The opposition will continue to nag us, but there is not much chance of our being forced to dissolve the session.

Fish<sup>h</sup> has privately suggested the submission of the three rules. I have answered privately, that I am ready to consider any suggestion he has to make as to the mode of doing so with dignity and with chances of success.

Yrs,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 June 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have done as you bid me and sent you all the gossip, I know to be true, about the Persians. They have been overawed by the Russians and will not speak out until they have got rid of the Agents still hovering about them and can breathe freely in England.—

You ask me whether "my friends will advise them and the Shah to put confidence in the Czar or not"?

I know for certain that Bismarck said to the Emperor: "We have no direct interests in Persia, but however much we admire England in the East, we should remember that the Russian Army is more likely to be of use to us in Europe than the English Fleet."—

From this I conclude that Bismarck will favour the Czar's policy in preference to ours in Persia.

<sup>43</sup> Nasar-ed Din (1831-1896) became shah of Persia in 1848; he visited Russia (May 21-31, 1873) and then came to Germany.

<sup>44</sup> English slang, meaning "to gain over or influence by bribery or other censurable means."

<sup>45</sup> Thiers resigned May 24, and the Conservative majority immediately elected Marshal MacMahon president of France.

The Shah is a very rough Diamond and will give you some trouble. He does not however care much for ceremonies or dinners and prefers independence to go where he fancies.—

You will like the Grand Vizier and Malcom Khan,—they are tractable and intelligent.—Mr. Thomson <sup>46</sup> will be of great use about arrangements and I am glad to think he will be in London as soon as this Letter. The Berlin authorities have been very civil to him and Mr. Dickson, <sup>47</sup> and even wanted to pay their expenses here at the Hotel as forming part of the Shah's suite, for which I thanked them.—

If as you say the Shah has been nobbled by the Russians I have not a doubt you can renoble him by a grander reception and display of Power than he met with in Russia.

I greatly fear that the Emperor Williams symptoms are in reality [*sic*] the beginning of the end and that like his brother the late King he is threatened with softening of the brain.

There was an unmistakable tone about Bismarck when answering my questions about it and his allusions to a regency were very clear.

It now remains to be seen how the Emperor will bear the journey to Vienna on the 15th.—

Prince Bismarck will not allow Count Münster to leave Berlin while Parliament sits, because he wants his vote and his influence so that he will scarcely be in London before July.—Count Münster requested me to tell you so.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 June 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We dined the other day at Babelsberg with the Emperor and Empress and I am happy to say found the Emperor looking much better and nearly as cheerful as usual.—His Doctor, who was present, told me that His Majestys health depended on perfect rest and the difficulty he had to contend with was to persuade the Emperor to refrain from his daily work. Count Münster dined with us and took leave of Their Majesties who said everything that was gracious and cordial and pleasant to hear about England.—The Empress talked a good deal about her journey to Vienna alone without the Emperor, the prospect of which seemed to alarm but delight her.—

<sup>46</sup> W. Tylour Thomson was the British envoy to Persia, 1872-1879.

<sup>47</sup> Dr. J. R. L. Dickson was attached to the British legation in Persia for nearly forty years. Queen Victoria was told that he had saved the shah's life two years previous to this visit (*Letters*, II, 261).



Both the Emperor and Empress abused the Shah most cordially and hoped the Queen and Royal Family might not have to suffer from his manners.

As Their Majesties are about to leave Berlin for the rest of the Summer, we took our leave of them and they were pleased to drive us themselves to the Potsdam Railway Station and see us off, which was certainly most gracious.—

Münster has been alarmed about the Cambridges by Bismarck, who, having heard all they have said and written to the Mecklenburgs about his appointment, has warned Münster not to expose the Sovereign he represents to any slight.

I told Münster not to be alarmed and to ask Krause about it on getting to London.

I was present at a grand farewell dinner given by Members of Parliament of every shade of opinion to Münster and there saw again how popular he is in the German Parliament. The two objects they hope he may accomplish in England are the reduction of Spirit duties, and the purchase of Heligoland,<sup>48</sup> in both of which they are doomed to disappointment as I *playfully* tell them when they allude to the subject in after dinner conversations.—However Münster has no instructions to that effect, he has only been instructed by Bismarck to establish the best relations he can with Her Majesty's Government, and I think you will be pleased with him. Hanoverians are pleasanter men to deal with than Prussians.

The Session is drawing to a close and Berlin will soon be a desert, when I hope, with your leave, to take my wife and children to see my mother in England.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 25/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

We are making rather fools of ourselves about the Shah, but we are much pleased personally with him.<sup>49</sup>

Either you must have been unreasonable at Berlin in your expectations of a man's manners, who has never lived in society, or you must have drilled him well for our benefit.

<sup>48</sup> Great Britain continued to hold Heligoland until 1890. When Münster first came to London, he sounded out Granville on Heligoland, saying that Bismarck was bent on opening a way into the Baltic by means of a big harbor at Heligoland. But Münster never put the question formally, although he had said that he would, and Granville never had a chance to present his official answer. See Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville*, II, 361, 425.

<sup>49</sup> The shah was Queen Victoria's guest, June 19–July 5. The queen's reception for the shah at Windsor on June 20 is fully described in an excerpt from her Journal in *Letters*, II, 258–261.

In a long conversation he had with Gladstone Argyll<sup>80</sup> & me, he talked excellent sense from his point of view on subjects affecting Persian Interests.

We are trying to patch up a quarrel about Persian capitulations, between us him and the Turks, in order that his visit to Constantinople may not be given up.

I am delighted with the little I have seen of the new ambassador you have sent us. What a difference with poor Bernstorff.

I am in communication with the D.[uke] of Cambridge to prevent any scandals in that family.

Brunnow the other day let fall that if I wanted anything to be done with Russia of any difficulty, the best way would be to do it at Berlin with the assistance you can give by your intimacy with Bismarck.

He may have said this from a wish not to have any difficult questions to discuss here, but let me know whether you think his suggestion a practical one.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 28 June 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Brunnow's suggestion to you, about dealing with Russia through Bismarck is curious, and as you say, probably suggested by a desire for a quiet Life.

Bismarck is such a strange creature that no one can foretell how he will take things,—but my impression is that he would be flattered at being made the medium of difficult international communications, especially with Russia, and as far as I am concerned I am always at your orders if you wish to try the experiment.

At present he is in the Country and will not be visible till August when he goes to Gastein to see the Emperor.

As you have most kindly granted me Leave to come home I shall be better able to explain the situation of things verbally to you, which, as regards the Court, is too delicate to be committed to Paper.

Our children are already at Dover for sea air and we hope to follow and pick them up towards the end of next week if all goes well.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

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<sup>80</sup> George John Douglas Campbell (1823-1900), eighth Duke of Argyll, was Gladstone's secretary of state for India, 1868-1874, and lord privy seal, 1880-1881. His eldest son, John, Marquess of Lorne, in 1871 married Princess Louise, fourth daughter of Queen Victoria.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WINDSOR, July 2/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

I shall be glad to welcome you home.

As Bismarck is out of your reach, I shall try what I talked of in my last letter by communicating to Münster, of whom I like as much as I have seen, what has passed between the Grand Vizier and me since he has been here—& which in fact might be published in the Gazette.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

ATHENAEUM CLUB, PALL MALL,  
Saturday [July 19, 1873].

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have talked the Hanoverian question over with the Duke of Cambridge and have left matters as they were, to be rediscussed at some future date.

Both the Duke, the Princess Mary and Prince Christian have attacked me about Münster.

The Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg Strelitz appears to be his worst enemy, and the King of Hanover has written some strong Letters to them against him.<sup>51</sup>

Münster on the other hand promises not to mention their opposition to him at Berlin and to give them a year's reflection.

Yrs. ever,

ODO RUSSELL.

ATHENAEUM CLUB, PALL MALL, 5 Aug. 73.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

When I met you I was going to the F. O. to tell you that we had had a most gratifying reception from Her Majesty at Osborne and that I had found an opportunity of saying all I had to say about Münster and the Cambridges.

The Queen knew all about it, said She had wished for, and was delighted with Münster and begged *I would tell the Cambridges so*,—and added that if their opposition continued next season she wd her—

<sup>51</sup> The Cambridges included, besides the duke, the Princess Mary (1833–1897), his sister, married in 1866 to the Prince of Teck; the Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg Strelitz (1822–1916) was another sister, who had married Duke Frederick William in 1843. Prince Christian (1831–1917) of Schleswig-Holstein was the husband of Princess Helena, third daughter of Queen Victoria.

self speak to the Duke.—The difficulty will I think settle itself now, Münster being a quiet prudent man.

I am off to the Grove.

Yrs sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 October 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

On arriving here we found Berlin empty and devoid of political interest,—the Emperor and Bismarck on their way to Vienna, the Royal family travelling, Society in the Country, Chiefs of Missions on leave, Ministers absent, and Members of Parliament canvassing their electors.

Under these circumstances you will not be surprised at my inability to pick up any news to send you this week.

We spent two very interesting and pleasant days in Paris with the Lyttons<sup>22</sup> who are magnificently established and most cordially hospitable.—

I found my old friend and Colleague Arnim there, who told me that he had made up his differences with Bismarck and had been sent back to Paris to carry out views they were now both agreed upon. He asked us to meet Thiers at luncheon, who held forth for several hours on politics, history, literature, and art in his most fascinating manner.—“Il vous aime beaucoup” as the French say and spoke with sincere admiration, respect and gratitude of your Father.

The following remarks he made on the questions of the day struck me as curious.—Talking of the fusion he said, he did not believe in its success, but would give the “example of obedience” if Monarchy was reestablished in France.—He condemned the attitude of the Orleans Princes and said they had failed because they had not followed his advice, which was to remain in England—“je leur ai dit que dans leur position les absents auraient raison.”

He believed France could be best governed by a republic because democracy under a Republic voted for measures they would not concede to a dynasty. Had he not himself with the sanction of French democracy imposed heavier taxes and harder burdens, and executed and banished more Frenchmen in the name of a Republic than he could have ventured to do in the name of any dynasty?—The suppression of the commune had cost the lives of 20,000 civilians and 10,000

<sup>22</sup> Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton (1831-1891), who had succeeded his father as Baron Lytton in January, 1873, served as secretary of the British legations at Copenhagen, Athens, and Lisbon, 1863-1865, of the embassies at Madrid and Vienna, 1868-1872, and Paris, 1872-1874; he was minister at Lisbon, 1874-1876, viceroy of India, 1876-1880, and ambassador at Paris, 1887-1891. In 1864 he married Edith Villiers (1841-1936), daughter of the Honourable Edward Villiers and first cousin to Emily, wife of Lord Odo Russell.

soldiers and had been approved by the democracy of France. Could a Monarchy have done so much in the interest of order? And the people of France were now calmer and more reasonable than they had been for many years.—

To my surprise he spoke in a most kindly spirit of Napoleon III whom he described as goodhearted, generous but shortsighted.—He praised the quiet attitude of the Empress Eugenie and said the Prince Imperial had good qualities.

The late Emperor, he said, was in the habit of consulting him through Walewski<sup>53</sup> and although His Majesty unfortunately seldom followed his advice, his private relations with the Emperor had been more satisfactory and gratifying to him than his official relations with Louis Philip [*sic*]<sup>54</sup>!

The whole of Thiers's conversation in regard to the Empire and the Bonapartists and the fact that he is in daily communication with Arnim, led me to suspect that under given circumstances he might join the Bonapartists to defeat the Fusionists and perhaps get himself into power again.—

Bismarck, as you know, is dead against the Fusionists and Orleanists because of their military and clerical tendencies and would be glad to bring back Thiers into power if possible, until France is ripe for the Empire under the youthful Prince Imperial, whom I once heard him say might be made a useful "*Vassal*" to Germany.

Arnim is the man to work at such a policy.—What support he will meet with in France I do not know,—but he appeared to me confident that things would go as he and Bismarck wished.—I told you of Prince Reuss's visit to the Empress at Chislehurst.—Prussian diplomatic discipline would not admit of such a visit without Bismarck's sanction.

Of course I may be very much mistaken, but I give you my impressions for what they are worth.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 November 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Berlin continues to be very quiet. The Court is in mourning for the King of Saxony,<sup>55</sup> the Emperor has a cold and cannot attend the

<sup>53</sup> Count Walewski (1810–1868), natural son of Napoleon I and Marie Walewska, was French minister to Florence, 1849, and to Naples, 1850; ambassador to Spain, 1851, and to London, 1851–1855; minister of foreign affairs, 1855–1860, minister of state, 1860–1863, and president of the chamber of deputies, 1865–1867.

<sup>54</sup> Under Louis Philippe, Thiers had been minister of the interior, 1832–1836, and minister of foreign affairs and president of the council in 1836 and 1840.

<sup>55</sup> King John of Saxony died October 29, 1873.

funeral at Dresden. Bismarck is at Varzin, and his representatives Bülow<sup>56</sup> and Delbrück have little or nothing to say.

France is the centre of interest at this moment, and here at Berlin the Court, the Government and the Press ardently desire the failure of the Fusion and the continuance of the provisional republic.—The publication of the Comte de Chambord's Letter has given universal satisfaction, as it is hoped and believed that it will quash his prospects for ever.<sup>57</sup>—Notwithstanding, the French Ambassadors here and at St. Petersburg intend to go to Paris together on Monday next to vote for him!

The elections for the Prussian Parliament, as far as one can judge at present, will produce a good working liberal majority for the Government,—the Catholics having abstained from voting in many districts.

The elections for the German Parliament are put off until January or February next, and the present Parliament is to be dissolved without meeting again before.—[?]

The greatest satisfaction prevails in Berlin at the alliance between Germany, Austria, Russia and Italy,<sup>58</sup> which is looked upon as a guarantee of Peace and a safeguard against the war of Franco-Papal revenge.

The only troubles Germany has to contend with at the present moment are:—

The financial crisis, which is the result of over speculation,—and:—

The quarrel with the Pope which is increasing in violence on both sides and which is not likely to be settled during Bismarck's Life time.—

We were asked to Potsdam on the Crown Prince's birthday to a family party, which was extremely pleasant, both the Prince and Princess being so gracious and cordial.—Since then the Crown Prince asked me to shoot with him at Spandau. He then told me of the

<sup>56</sup> Bernhard Ernst von Bülow (1815-1879) was Prussian secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1873-1879. His eldest son was chancellor of the empire, 1900-1909.

<sup>57</sup> The Count of Chambord's letter to M. Chesnelong, October 27, 1873, was a manifesto which, in the event of a restoration of the Bourbons, insisted upon the white flag instead of the tricolor, with all that the latter implied of constitutional monarchy. This was enough to wreck the monarchist hopes for a restoration, which were high after the fall of Thiers in May and the fusion of Orléanists and Legitimists in August, whereby the Count of Chambord, grandson of Charles X, was acknowledged head of the royal house in return for recognizing the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe, as his heir. The text of the letter may be found in the *Annual Register*, 1873, 157-158.

<sup>58</sup> The "Drei-Kaiser Abkommen" had been signed October 22, 1873, by the German emperor, and earlier by Tsar Alexander and Emperor Franz Joseph. In September, 1873, King Victor Emmanuel of Italy visited both Berlin and Vienna, and it was assumed generally that Italy was a part of the "alliance." Although there was no written agreement involving Italy, Bismarck assured Victor Emmanuel that Germany would at once go to Italy's aid if she were attacked for any reason. *Grosse Politik*, I, 206-207; Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, 88-90; William Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890* (New York, 1931), 35.

success which had attended the visit of the King of Italy to Berlin and of the perfect understanding which has been established between the two Courts.

All the Members of this Embassy are highly delighted at your appointment of Villiers Lister <sup>59</sup> to the Assistant Under Secretaryship, which from Letters received is also very popular at home.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 November 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Things are so quiet in Berlin that I have accepted an invitation of the Duc de Dino to shoot at Günthersdorf in Silesia. I shall be back on Wednesday morning for the opening of Parliament. The Emperor though nearly recovered from his last cold is not to open Parliament in person, and Bismarck declines to come up from the Country for it, so probably the Speech will be read by Eulenburg or Camphausen.<sup>60</sup>

In talking over the copy right Convention with Delbrück he again alluded to the great desire felt in Germany for a reduction of the Spirit duty and observed that the German Gov<sup>t</sup> had given us a friendly free-trade hint by reducing the duty on Iron last year, adding that further reductions were in contemplation which deserved the attention of H. M. Gov—Bearing your instructions on the subject in mind I gave him neither hope or encouragement at which he seemed much disappointed.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 November 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

"Der Kaiser" is pronounced to be much better, but still I notice some anxiety at Court about his frequent headaches which resemble the commencement of the last illness of his brother the late King, and which ended in softening of the brain.—

It is said that Princess Charles has countermanded her "toilettes" for the Court balls which is thought to mean that she thinks there may be none this winter. The Emperor of Russia has commanded the Russian Ambassador to send him a daily telegraphic bulletin of

<sup>59</sup> Thomas Villiers Lister (1832-1902) entered the British foreign office in 1853 and rose gradually until, on October 10, 1878, he was appointed assistant undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, a post which he held until 1894. He was knighted after his long service.

<sup>60</sup> Eulenburg, Prussian minister of the interior, has been identified above, n. 6. Otto Camphausen (1812-1896) was the Prussian minister of finance, 1869-1878, and vice president of the ministry of state, 1878-1878; he resigned in 1878 to go into opposition to Bismarck.

His Majesty's health and the Ambassador has in consequence declined some invitations to shoot. My own impression is that the Emperor will soon be quite himself again.

Prince Gortchakoff passed through Berlin and called, but I missed him. Emily was more fortunate and tells me that he was very "empressé" and praised Lord Augustus Loftus with whom he said he entertained the pleasantest relations. He told Bülow, our new foreign Secretary, that he considered the peace of Europe secured by the alliance of the three Emperors and the King of Italy.—Prince Gortchakoff also expressed great regret at the prolonged absence of Prince Bismarck whom he had expected to meet at Berlin.

Prince Bismarck, though well, declines to come to Berlin simply because he says there is nothing to do at present and so he may as well remain in the Country and seek health in Sport.—

While shooting in Silesia I met many great and small landed proprietors. They spoke freely of their hatred of Bismarck whose radical German policy and persecution of the Clergy was alienating the Prussian Aristocracy from the Throne. The Prussian Aristocracy had ever shed their best blood in the hour of danger for the House of Hohenzollern, but in the day of prosperity Bismarck used his ambitious influence to mislead their old King into treating them as enemies &c. &c.

Most of them said they would not go to Berlin this Winter so as not to mark their dissatisfaction [*sic*] with the Court and Government,—but I suspect also, to save money, for Berlin has become simply ruinous.

Believe me, dear Lord Granville,

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

F. O., Nov. 27/73.

MY DEAR ODO,

I suppose the Germans are like your humble servant satisfied with the turn affairs have taken in France for a time.

It is also satisfactory Germany & ourselves are acting so harmoniously in Spain. I hope that war may be averted between that unhappy Country and the U. S. and we are dealing with the Spanish as lightly as possible, notwithstanding the innumerable provocations they give us in every part of the world.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> The rumor of danger of war between the United States and Spain at this time was due to the *Virginus* affair. The Spanish gunboat *Tornado* had captured the *Virginus*, which was running the blockade to Cuban insurrectionists and flying the American flag, on October 31, 1873, near Jamaica. The prisoners were tried as pirates at Santiago, and at least fifty-three were summarily executed before the Madrid government could intervene. The



It is believed that at Sulu they are exciting the cry of death to the Foreigners, in order to weaken the power of the European Consuls.<sup>62</sup>

I have not the slightest jealousy of the Germans acquiring Colonial possessions—but then I do not share the desire of those who wish us to appropriate Fiji, Arabia, All Western Africa &c &c.

Münster is gone to Ireland, possibly to buy horses, probably to report upon Home Rule, & the contests between Catholics & Protestants there—Cadorna<sup>63</sup> has been doing the same, but a Traveller who does not understand a word of English or Irish must labor under some disadvantages in such an emergency.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 5 December 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your Letter of the 27th November reached me today. In the absence of Prince Bismarck it is not easy to give you any positive information on the policy of the German Govt respecting foreign questions because none of his colleagues appear to know or venture to repeat what he thinks. They are all afraid of him and much embarrassed by his prolonged absence. The Emperor does not yet feel strong enough to attend to business and Government is for the moment at a standstill.

Bülow, who is a most agreeable man to deal with, and a sincere friend of England, appears personally satisfied with the turn affairs have taken in France for the present.—He is a pacific man of progress and earnestly wishes for our cooperation in dealing with Spain and her colonies.—The despatches you sent him about Sulu and your

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dispatches to the London *Times* throughout November indicated intense excitement in America, with cabinet debates, recruiting for the navy, and indignation meetings with a "strong war feeling" (*Times*, Nov. 19, 1873). Ultimately Spain restored the ship and paid an indemnity; further reparation was halted by the belated discovery that the *Virginus* had no right to fly the American flag.

Nineteen British subjects were killed in this affair, and Spain paid an indemnity for them as well, but there were other problems in British-Spanish relations at this time. The civil war in Spain provoked an "explosion" of antipathy toward the British from both the Carthagena insurgents and the Madrid Republicans, as the press noted (*Times*, Nov. 10, 1873, quoting the *Saturday Review*), and appeals for the protection of British merchants and other nationals became frequent.

<sup>62</sup> The Sulu archipelago lies in the southwest Philippine Islands. It belonged at this time to Spain, which was concerned over German activities in that region. A Reuter's dispatch from Madrid on November 4, 1873, reported, "Advices received here from Manila state that a Spanish man-of-war has captured two German merchantmen laden with 2,000 rifles destined for the soldiers of Polo. This news has caused a considerable sensation here, on account of the projects respecting the Philippine Islands attributed by the Spanish Press to the German Government at the beginning of the present year. The Germans now number one-fifth of the white population of the Philippines" (*Times*, Nov. 6, 1873). The ships were returned and an indemnity paid for their cargoes. In 1877 a protocol to establish "the liberty of trade and commerce in the Sulu seas" was arranged between Spain, Germany, and Great Britain.

<sup>63</sup> Carlo Cadorna (1809–1891) was Italian ambassador in London, 1869–1875.

note to Münster about the captured Vessels evidently pleased him very much.—Neither he or Bismarck wish for Colonies,—the Crown Prince does.

An impression is gaining ground at Court that the Emperor Williams powerful constitution is breaking up and that his increasing want of decision will seriously impede the work of administration. His Majesty's sanction to the civil marriage and registration bill cannot be obtained, so reluctant is the Emperor to listen to his Ministers, and no one but Bismarck can venture to *insist* on its necessity.

The Crown Princess, who came last Sunday to spend the evening with Emily, said she wished us to give a ball to the Prince of Wales and a dinner to the Duke of Edinburgh when Their Royal Highness's passed through Berlin on their way either to or from St. Petersburg. We said we should be happy to do everything the Crown Princess wished, but that we had not yet heard whether Their Royal Highness's, passing through Berlin, would make any stay here.—I should be very much obliged to you if you could kindly give us early information of the Princes movements so as to be better able to do honour to Them and to the Crown Princess's wishes, if They will accept invitations to the Embassy.

I have had many invitations to shoot and have had good sport this year.—People are still in the Country and Berlin continues to be rather empty and very quiet, socially and politically,—may it long continue so!

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Xmas 1873.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

This letter will probably reach you on the first day of next year which I hope may be a happy one to you and yours.

The Royal family were immensely gratified at H. M. The Queen sending Lord Otto Fitzgerald to the Queen Dowager's funeral,—which was proved by the Emperor receiving him and Col. Teesdale<sup>64</sup> when His Majesty declined, on the plea of ill health, to receive the Swedish Minister who had his letters of recall to present and who was much offended by it.

The Emperor is suffering still from a bad cough which has greatly weakened him,—but his Doctors say he is in no danger.—The Public, however, think he is, which gives rise to all sorts of exaggerated

<sup>64</sup> The queen dowager, widow of Frederick William IV, had died December 14, 1873. Lord Otto Fitzgerald (1829-1874) was comptroller of Queen Victoria's household, 1868-1874. Sir Christopher Charles Teesdale (1833-1893) had been awarded the Victoria Cross in 1857 and was appointed equerry to the Prince of Wales in 1858 and aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria in 1877.

reports. Of course at 77 there is always cause for apprehension, and doubly so when the infallible Pope has declared his intention of outliving his enemy the Emperor William as he outlived his protector the Emperor Napoleon!

I do not myself believe the Emperor to be in any danger, at present.

The report which spread all over Berlin the other day that the Emperor was dead, was caused by His Majesty having had a sort of fainting fit after a violent attack of coughing, and having become so cold that the doctors found it difficult to reestablish his circulation.

His Majesty, however, was up and transacting business the next day with his Generals.—

I send you by this messenger a "secret" conversation with Bismarck which tends to confirm your view that he is a greater danger to the peace of Europe than France.—He seems to have held similar language to my Colleagues of Austria and Russia, who attribute his increased hostility to France to the profound irritation produced generally at Berlin by the Bazaine trial,<sup>65</sup> which the Prussians fear has disclosed to the world that the German Army is not as invincible as was thought, since it might have met with reverses had Bazaine done his duty.—It is much to be feared that this hostile feeling may be further increased by the Pastorals of the Bishops and the tone of the Press in both Countries.

Prince Bismarck is delighted at Lord Russells Letter to Bowyer,<sup>66</sup> because he thirsts after the moral support of England in waging War against the Pope. He asked me to write and thank Uncle John for his support, which I did.—Lord Russells Letter has produced an outburst of real enthusiasm in the German national Press.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

MY DEAR ODO,

WALMER CASTLE, *Dec. 31. 1873.*

I trust it is not a proof that Germany is going to make war upon every country to which she sends military spies. It is surely a possibility that the French must look at, if they think it worth while to keep up an army at all, that war may break out—but surely such a

<sup>65</sup> Marshal Bazaine was on trial before a military court from October 6 to December 10, 1873, for his surrender of the French Army of the Rhine at Metz in the Franco-Prussian War. The sentence to death and military degradation was finally commuted to twenty years "seclusion," from which he escaped in 1874.

<sup>66</sup> Earl Russell's letter to Sir George Bowyer, December 4, 1873, published in *The Times*, December 15, declared that Lord Russell would not be deterred from presiding at a meeting "at which it will be proposed to express our sympathy with the Emperor of Germany in the declaration he has made in his letter to the Pope," since he approved of the proposal. See also Taffs, 28.

thought does not prove that she will be mad enough to provoke one.

When Bismarck spoke of France seeking for Allies, did he mean the Russians or us?

I have not yet seen the Yellow Book, but from an abstract, I presume the F[rench] G[enerals] like Thiers wish to make as much of their relations with us as possible.

What does Bismarck say of the ostentatious support which Ignatieff<sup>67</sup> gave unceasingly to the French in the Suez Canal although without success.

My own impression is that if things are left to take their course, England, Germany, Austria & Italy will from common interest, and religious sympathies as regards England & Germany act together. But if Germany was to begin a purely aggressive war, I doubt whether anyone could answer for the feeling in this country.<sup>68</sup> The Emperor of Russia is a weak man, & I suspect the Anti-German feeling in Russia to be intense.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 January 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You will see from my official report that I have come to the conclusion that Bismarck's war agitation is not serious,—but simply intended to facilitate the adoption of his Army bill by the new German Parliament next month. I don't mean that he will never go to War again,—but that he does not really wish for war at present.

You ask in your Letter of the 31st ult<sup>o</sup> whether in speaking of France seeking for Allies, he meant the Russians or us?

It is evidently the Russians he does not feel sure of if the Emperor Alexander and Gortchakoff came to die,—the only two Allies Germany has in Russia he thinks. He fully believes in our sincere love of peace and neutrality and thinks common interest will maintain friendship between us in the future.—

Another complication Bismarck fears is the fall of Andrassy, because he does not know who might succeed him and he dreads an Anti-prussian Minister with French sympathies like Beust at Vienna.

The Emperor Francis Joseph is said to be fickle in his political affections.

Bismarck never spoke to me about Ignatieff's ostentatious support of the French in the Suez Canal negotiation,—but I gather from

<sup>67</sup> Count Nicholas Pavlovitch Ignatieff (1832-1908) was Russian minister at Constantinople, 1864-1877, and minister of the interior, 1881-1882.

<sup>68</sup> The last two sentences were printed in Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, II, note 115. For the basis of several of Lord Granville's comments see Taffs, 65, 66.

Radowitz,<sup>69</sup> the Chief of the Oriental Department in the F. O. that he had worked against it at St. Petersburg and that he hated Ignatieff in consequence most cordially. Any support given to France is a public offence in Bismarck's opinion.

It was a great pleasure to see the Duke of Edinburgh here and the happiness of the Crown Princess at having H. R. H. in Berlin for two days after so long an interval. The Duke was looking very well and honoured us with a visit at the Embassy. I went, of course, with all my Staff to the Railway Station to receive him and see him off as usual.—

All the necessary official notifications of the arrival of the Prince and Princess of Wales and suites have already been made by me and the Custom House facilities &c. &c. asked for.—I greatly regret that the Prince of Wales does not stay longer in Berlin than two days and one night.—

The Crown Princes start for St. Petersburg on the 18<sup>th</sup> by Special train after the annual "Ordensfest."—The Emperor has felt much better since his daughter the Grand Duchess of Baden, to whom he is devoted, has been with him.

The Grand Duke of Baden always pays me a long visit whenever he comes to Berlin to talk over the situation. The other day H. R. H. honoured me again with a visit and asked me to call on the Grand Duchess in the evening after dinner at the Palace.—I did so and found them alone with their children and spent a very pleasant evening there. Later the Empress came in and was more than ever gracious and interesting,—but I thought Her Majesty looking ill and careworn.—She expressed a longing desire to visit the Queen some day again in England and deplored that she saw no prospect of so much happiness in store for her.—

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 January 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Emperor, I am happy to say, has resumed his drives, and is said to be well again. It is very gracious of His Majesty to lodge the Dean and Lady Augusta and Lady Emma Osborne who arrive tonight, and Lord Sydney<sup>70</sup> and Suite who pass through Berlin after the Prince and Princess of Wales.

<sup>69</sup> Joseph Maria von Radowitz (1839–1912) entered the diplomatic service in 1860 and spent many years in the foreign office before he became German ambassador at Constantinople, 1882–1892, and at Madrid, 1892–1908. H. Holborn, ed., *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz* (Berlin, 1925).

<sup>70</sup> Arthur Penryn Stanley (1815–1881) had been dean of Westminster since 1863. His wife was Lady Augusta Bruce, daughter of the seventh Earl of Elgin. The dean was en

The Emperor's interest in his Grand niece's marriage to the Duke of Edinburgh is very great and His Majesty has sent me word that he means to give them a very hearty reception when they pass through Berlin on their way home in February next.—We wanted to give a ball on the day of the wedding, but the Court mourning for the Queen Dowager having been prolonged by a royal decree to the 8<sup>th</sup> February I fear it will not be admissable. Count Eulenburg, the Minister of the Interior, with whom we dined last night, says the mourning has been prolonged to enable the Emperor to get through the Carnival and reach Lent without fatigue. Otherwise His Majesty would have to attend the usual Court ceremonies of the Season.

Bismarck told me yesterday that he had been much gratified by Münster's reports on your policy in Tunis,<sup>71</sup> but not having heard from the F. O. on the subject I did not know what he was alluding to,—I suppose French intrigues, for he burst forth about French diplomatists being conspirators and enemies of order and Germany &c., &c.

He seemed particularly anxious for news from Spain,—but I could not make out whether he liked the turn affairs are taking there or not,—he was very guarded.—

Talking of German affairs he said, the Emperor was too much of a particularist and stood in the way of the administrative Unification of Germany and that he was only awaiting His Majesty's death to destroy particularism at a blow.

A rumour has reached me that Lesseps<sup>72</sup> has been here to meet some Russian Agents and interest German Capitalists in the Russo-indian Railway scheme. The Russian Agents are said to have attempted also to interest the Times Correspondent (Dr. Abel) very largely in the undertaking but failed of course. Dr. Abel is very anti-Russian as you know.<sup>73</sup>

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

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route to St. Petersburg to perform the English rites at the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh. Lady Emma Osborne married Sir Charles Stanley Osborne in July, 1873. John R. Townshend, Viscount Sydney (1805-1890), was Queen Victoria's lord chamberlain, 1859-1866, 1868-1874, and lord steward, 1880-1885; created Earl of Sydney, 1874.

<sup>71</sup> On December 29, 1873, *The Times* reported rumors "of ill-advised intrigues at Tunis to induce the Government of that Regency to repudiate the allegiance they owe to the Porte." About this time France succeeded in abrogating the sultan's decree of 1871, which had been designed to put Tunisian foreign relations squarely under the control of Turkey—Georges Hardy, *La Tunisie* (G. Hanotaux and A. Martineau, ed., *Histoire des Colonies Françaises et de l'Expansion de la France dans le Monde* [Paris, 1931], III, 400-401). England followed her traditional policy of supporting Turkey.

<sup>72</sup> Reference is probably to the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805-1894), builder of the Suez Canal and president of the Suez Canal Company.

<sup>73</sup> Dr. Carl Abel, an Egyptologist, was *The Times* correspondent in Berlin, 1865-1879; he was responsible for the news from all northern European countries.

*Private.*

BERLIN, January 17, 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The passage of our Royal wedding guests to Russia<sup>74</sup> has been a great success in every respect and I must say that the Emperor and Empress have exercised a cordial and Imperial hospitality which I am sure has been duly appreciated.—The Emperor and Empress, as you know, quite worship our Queen.

The Empress and the Crown Princess have got wind of Bismarck's War language and have asked me very confidentially what in the name of peace it meant.—They are puzzled and annoyed, but not alarmed because they cannot believe him to be serious.—My Austrian Colleague Count Karolyi quite agrees with me that Bismarck's present object is the Army Bill,—but still one never knows what he may be planning for the future.—General Walker's No. 6 contains a sound argument against the probability of War, namely that the Germans will not encounter the "Chassepot" with the "Zündnadel" again,—they will wait until their new "Mauser" gun is ready.—

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 31 January 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck's policy in regard to France and Belgium and their Bishops is beginning to puzzle even his friends. He seems to be hammering a nail into them on which is to hang a quarrel.

The Empress asked me last night if I could explain his policy to her, which filled her with alarm and dismay,—he avoided her and would not speak to her and She did not feel sure the Emperor himself knew what Bismarck was doing.

I said I thought he was preparing Public opinion for the reception of the unpopular Army bill which could only be passed under a general impression of danger to the Fatherland.—

That is also the impression of most of my Colleagues,—but among the Members of the National party I notice also an impression that Bismarck is paving the way to a future War which will enable him to sweep away the smaller German States and complete the unity of the German Empire. These people believe that he is acting with the full knowledge and consent of the Crown Prince.

I will keep you carefully informed of everything I can discover.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

We are following the elections at home with intense interest.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh (see above, note 41), on January 28, 1874, married the Grand Duchess Marie Alexandrovna, only daughter of Tsar Alexander II of Russia. See *Victoria's Letters*, II, 310-311.

<sup>75</sup> Parliament was dissolved on January 26, 1874, and the elections were over on February 17. The government was defeated by a large majority.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 February 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The election news we receive by the Newspapers fills us with apprehension and sorrow,—feelings you do not share, for I know that you have long wished for your well earned rest,—but to us an interruption of official relations would be a bitter and painful blow. Tomorrows news will I fear be decisive, if telegrams can be trusted.

Lord Sydney and Suite arrived yesterday and went on today. They dined with the Empress.—Her Majesty asked us, but on hearing that we were giving a dinner of 30 ourselves, was graciously pleased to let us off in consideration of our guests.

Lord Sydney's accounts of Russia are most interesting as you will hear. I learnt much that was useful from him about Court matters.

Gontaut Biron is better pleased with Bismarck and the Speech from the Throne and thinks things look more pacific than last week.—Bülow tells me that Münster will speak to you in the same conciliatory sense as he did to me.—I hope the crisis is over for the present and that the German Parliament will occupy Bismarcks attention more than foreign questions.<sup>76</sup>

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 February 1874.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have to thank you for your two Letters and for the great honour of a G. C. B. It really is most kind of you to have thought of me at the last moment and Emily unites with me in grateful thanks.

As matters stand I greatly fear that I must consider this as my last Letter but one to you,—I have not the heart to write the last today.

In leaving office you have the satisfaction to know that you have calmed down Bismarck in regard to France and that all looks pacific and serene here again as you will see from my despatches today and that our relations with Germany were never better, more cordial or more satisfactory than at present.

That Bismarck requires another War to complete Germany I fully believe, but that is more likely to be with Austria than with France and scarcely during the Life time of the Emperor William.

I shall write again by next Messenger.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>76</sup> A garbled version of this last paragraph is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 116. The letter is quoted as being Granville to Russell, and the words of Bülow are assigned to Granville.



*Private.*BERLIN, 24 February 1874.<sup>77</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have just received your last Letter and despatch and with a heavy heart must for the present wish you goodbye. We owe you too much ever to be able to thank you in detail for so much happiness and prosperity,—but Emily and I trust that you will believe how deeply and sincerely grateful we are and how much we feel all I find difficult to express in words. —

The Emperor and Empress expressed to me their deep regret at your retirement from Office accompanied by many warm expressions of their personal regard for you, the last time I saw them. I need scarcely tell you how warmly and sincerely the Crown Prince and Princess spoke in the same sense.

Believe me, dear Lord Granville, ever yours sincerely and gratefully,

ODO RUSSELL.

BRITISH EMBASSY, BERLIN,

23 February 1874.<sup>78</sup>

DEAR MR. GLADSTONE,

I trust you will not think I am taking a great liberty if I venture to write and say how sorry I feel at your present retirement and how grateful I am to you for the great advantages and encouragement I have enjoyed while serving under your great Administration in Rome, in the Foreign Office and at Berlin. It was a cause of much regret to my wife and me that all our attempts to see you last summer failed, but we hope to be luckier next time, when I should be very glad to be allowed to talk over certain questions of the future with you in connexion with the coming struggle between Church and State in Germany.

Yours gratefully,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*W. E. Gladstone to Lord Odo Russell*11 C. H. T. [CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE],<sup>79</sup>

3d March /74.

MY DEAR LD. O. R.

Acknowledges letter of 23 Feb. Thanks O. R. for kindness "among the real losses & privations of quitting office will I must say be that I shall no longer read yr. contributions to the correspondence of the

<sup>77</sup> The letter quoted by Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 117, as of this date is actually an excerpt from the preceding letter, Russell to Granville, February 21, 1874, beginning. "I have not the heart . . . more satisfactory than at present."

<sup>78</sup> Original MS., the Gladstone Papers.

<sup>79</sup> Copy, *ibid.*

Foreign Sec: from wh. I have at all times so much both of profit & of pleasure."

"Bismarck's ideas & methods are not ours; they spring out of other traditions, but my sympathies tho' they do not go with him (& they are not worth a straw) are more with him than against him. I cannot but say that the present doctrines of the Roman church destroy the title of her obedient members to the enjoyment of civil rights. In this country, I shd. object to any infringement of them, but out of reverence for the general principle, not because in the particular case there is an unimpeachable claim."



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**CHAPTER IV**  
**LETTERS, MAY-DECEMBER, 1880**

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## CHAPTER IV

### LETTERS, MAY-DECEMBER, 1880

In the general election of February, 1874, the Liberals were defeated and Gladstone's government was replaced by a Conservative one, with Benjamin Disraeli as prime minister. Dissatisfaction with the Liberals' conduct of foreign affairs was an important cause of their discomfiture at the polls. It was asserted freely that while they were in office Britain had descended to the rank of a third- or fourth-rate power and had lost practically all her influence in the councils of Europe.<sup>1</sup> Disraeli and his lieutenants had elaborated upon this theme both before and during the election; now it became their duty to restore the prestige of Britain, and toward this end they labored mightily.

The six years (1874-1880) of the second Disraeli government were crowded with action in imperial and foreign affairs. The boundaries of the British empire were extended in Africa, Asia, and Oceania; Britain spoke loudly and sometimes threateningly in discussions of Near Eastern problems; she played a leading role at the Congress of Berlin in 1878; returning from that congress her premier, now Earl of Beaconsfield, told an admiring sovereign and a cheering multitude that he brought "peace with honour."

Disraeli was largely responsible for this rebirth of British imperialism. Old and ailing as he was, he determined to regain for Britain the dominant position in international affairs which she had held early in the nineteenth century. On this goal his eyes were firmly fixed; he strove for it with an amazing strength of will and a remarkable fertility of resource. He knew little about international problems and did not receive much aid from the foreign office during the four years (February, 1874-March, 1878) when the irresolute Lord Derby was its head, but the prime minister remained unshaken in his resolve to secure for Britain a leading place in world affairs.<sup>2</sup> On March 29, 1878, Lord Salisbury replaced Derby, and supported by the cool courage and sagacious diplomacy of the new foreign secretary Beaconsfield scored a magnificent triumph over domestic critics and foreign foes. At the brilliant gathering of diplomatists

<sup>1</sup> Wemyss, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier*, II, 296.

<sup>2</sup> W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield* (London, 1910-1920), VI, 362-368.

and statesmen over which Bismarck presided from the 13th of June till the 13th of July, 1878, the Earl of Beaconsfield shone with special luminosity. From the lips of the great German chancellor came the unique tribute, "the old Jew, that is the man."<sup>3</sup>

During the preceding four years these two statesmen had taken each other's measure on several occasions while thrusting and parrying in sharp diplomatic bouts. In 1874 Bismarck seemingly welcomed the change of government in Britain. Gladstone represented forces which made Bismarck uneasy; behind the oriental mask of Disraeli the German perceived a spirit akin to his own—worldly, cynical, not befogged by contemplation of the Beatitudes. But if Bismarck had expected friendliness from the new British government, disillusionment came quickly. A year after Disraeli had taken office Britain combined with Russia in humiliating the German chancellor.<sup>4</sup> Whether in the spring of 1875 he actually contemplated an attack on France is still an interesting topic of academic speculation; the fact remains that the British and Russian governments apparently thought he did and served warning that in such an eventuality they might not be idle bystanders as in 1870. Acclaiming loudly "you got me wrong,"<sup>5</sup> Bismarck saw to it that both the press and the military authorities of Germany ceased their war talk. It was an unpleasant experience for the German chancellor; never again was he put in such an uncomfortable position.

In the late summer of 1875 fate helped arrange a set of international complications which Bismarck could utilize to Germany's advantage. Disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces of European Turkey bordering Austria-Hungary, reopened the Near Eastern question, bringing to the front a multitude of possibilities for conflicts. In the Balkans the interests of Russia supposedly clashed with those of Britain and Austria-Hungary. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and its importance as a highroad to India made Britain more apprehensive about the possibility of a Russian seizure of Constantinople; and Austro-Russian relations waxed more complicated with the growth of pan-Slav agitation in Russia. Slavic peoples held in subjection by Austrian Germans and Magyars as well as those suffering under the misrule of Turkey were encouraged to consider Russia their only hope and salvation.

Bismarck had no sympathy for the sufferings of Balkan Christians. Like Metternich fifty years earlier, he would have been content to let revolts in that quarter burn themselves out beyond the confines

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 311.

<sup>4</sup> *Taffs, Russell*, 85-100; *Sontag*, 120, 121.

<sup>5</sup> Bismarck assured Russell that he worked for peace and that the war rumors had been disseminated by the press and by stock jobbers. Russell to Derby, May 10, 1875. *Taffs, Russell*, 97. See also *Temperley and Penson*, 353.

of civilization, but when the disturbances threatened to create discord between two members of the Three Emperors' League, the third, Germany, had to play the role of peacemaker. Consultations between the chanceries of Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna resulted in the issuance on May 13, 1876, of the Berlin Memorandum, which contained plans to reform Turkey.<sup>6</sup> But Britain, having had no share in formulating the program, refused to put her stamp of approval upon it. Then followed in rapid succession a period of intense diplomatic activity, war between Russia and Turkey, an Anglo-Russian war scare, and in the summer of 1878 the Congress of Berlin.<sup>7</sup>

In 1876 Disraeli was determined to prevent either the Three Emperors' League or an Austro-Russian combination from settling the Turkish question without British participation. Consequently British refusal to bring pressure upon the sultan caused failure of the reform program embodied in the Berlin Memorandum, and when it appeared that Austria and Russia might agree on a solution of the Near Eastern problem Disraeli made overtures to the latter, suggesting Anglo-Russian co-operation for the same purpose.<sup>8</sup> With the breakdown of all joint efforts by the powers to unravel the tangled strands of Balkan affairs, Russia attempted to do it alone. But the results as embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878, were denounced by Britain, who demanded that every article in that treaty should be placed before a congress of the powers.<sup>9</sup> After some tortuous diplomatic maneuvering Russia acquiesced. Thus British diplomacy scored a great victory,<sup>10</sup> a victory which subsequent events proved of the Pyrrhic variety.

Although Bismarck claimed that he was not interested in the Balkans, he watched keenly the developments in that region. He was anxious to prevent both a clash between Austria and Russia and co-operation between Britain and Russia. At various times he hinted at the desirability of Anglo-German collaboration, but when British statesmen tried to pin him down to something definite he acted coy and resorted to vague generalities, evidently fearing that an intimate connection with Britain might embarrass Germany's relations with Russia.<sup>11</sup> In April, 1878, Lord Salisbury sought the good offices of Bismarck in an attempt to find a basis for an Anglo-Russian agreement on Near Eastern issues, but the German was either unable or unwilling to be of any real service. Salisbury then opened direct negotiations with Russia through her ambassador in London, Count

<sup>6</sup> For text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1875-1876 (London, 1883), LXVII, 1231-1233.

<sup>7</sup> E. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe* (New York, 1937), 513-541.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 518, 523.

<sup>9</sup> Temperley and Penson, *Foundations of British Policy*, 374.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 363-380; Cecil, *Salisbury*, II, 239-275.

<sup>11</sup> *Taffs*, 119, 122, 129-134, 150, 153, 156, 158-161; Temperley and Penson, 354-356.



Schouvaloff, and a convention was concluded on May 30, 1878. Other British agreements with Austria and Turkey were largely responsible for the British success at the Congress of Berlin.<sup>12</sup>

During the deliberations of this body Bismarck attempted to act as an honest broker. But the task of convincing both Austria and Russia of his absolute impartiality proved too difficult even for this master of diplomatic artifice. The head of the Russian delegation, Prince Gortchakoff, who was an old rival of the German chancellor, believed that Austria had received special favors from Bismarck; the relations between Germany and Russia became obviously strained.<sup>13</sup> Determined to preclude any possibility of German isolation Bismarck, without definitely committing himself, made in the autumn of 1879 one of his mysterious overtures to Britain, hinting at the possibility of a triple alliance consisting of Austria, Britain, and Germany. Shortly afterwards it was disclosed that he had concluded an alliance with Austria, and he now appeared to be entirely satisfied with an unofficial British assurance that in the event of a Russian attack upon the central powers Britain would be on the latter's side.<sup>14</sup>

Balkan issues afforded Bismarck opportunities to influence or direct the course of events affecting the interests of Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia and the relations of these powers with Germany; similar possibilities involving Britain, France, and Italy were presented by Egypt and Tunis. However, his main objective was, of course, to keep France isolated; for this reason he at times courted even Italy, whom he generally considered only a shade better than the despised Balkan states. In the late 1870's the problems of Egypt rivaled in complexity those of Turkey. The strategic importance of the land of the pharaohs had increased with the opening of the Suez Canal, and its position was greatly complicated by bankruptcy, the establishment of an international debt commission, and a dual Anglo-French control over Egyptian finance.<sup>15</sup> French rulers and statesmen had long regarded Egypt as their special protégé, an attitude much enhanced with the building of the Suez Canal by a French engineer. Moreover, this undertaking was financed largely by French capital; and French investors held a large share of the Egyptian debt.

Only after the completion of the Suez Canal did Britain become vitally interested in Egypt. The new waterway soon proved important as the highroad from Britain to India; as users of the canal British ships outnumbered those of all other nations; and when in 1875 Disraeli purchased nine-twentieths of the shares in the Suez

<sup>12</sup> Cecil, *Salisbury*, II, 244, 250-273.

<sup>13</sup> Langer, *European Alliances*, 141, 172.

<sup>14</sup> Cecil, *Salisbury*, II, 364-373.

<sup>15</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 161-163.

Canal Company, the British government acquired an additional and most potent reason for watching the course of events in Egypt.<sup>16</sup>

Bismarck always said officially that he favored an Anglo-French entente, because he believed it guaranteed European peace, but secretly he urged Britain to seize Egypt, an action which was certain to destroy this entente. It is significant also that in September, 1879, while Lord Salisbury was arranging for an Anglo-French political control over Egypt, the German ambassador, Count Münster, visited Lord Beaconsfield at Hughenden and proposed the triple alliance mentioned above. By then, however, Salisbury and the French foreign minister, M. Waddington, had bound their countries "to take action to any extent that might be found necessary" to keep other powers out of Egypt. Bismarck, who had an excellent secret service, doubtless learned about this agreement very soon after it had been concluded; he then dropped the plan for an Anglo-German alliance and openly courted France.<sup>17</sup>

In Franco-Italian relations Tunis held a key position. France wished to include this country in her North African colonial empire, while Italy regarded it as a legitimate field for Italian colonizing activity. Bismarck feared France, despised Italy, and wanted to keep these two countries apart. At the Congress of Berlin he joined Salisbury in encouraging the French to seize Tunis, which of course would create friction between the two Latin powers. In 1881 France moved into Tunis; Italy then threw herself into the arms of Germany; and the result was the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, and Italy.<sup>18</sup>

The crises in the Balkans and the Levant (1875-1880) made Bismarck arbiter in all international conflicts. In the spring of 1875 Germany had been isolated and the Russian chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, could then with impunity warn Bismarck, "hands off France"; three years later the leading European statesmen sought his advice and aid. By then all roads in diplomacy led to Berlin. The diplomatic pre-eminence of Britain was a mere phantom. Five years of a vigorous foreign policy by the Conservatives had involved her so deeply in international affairs that she had become dependent upon the good will of Bismarck. Nothing could be settled either in the Balkans or in Asia Minor or in Egypt without his co-operation.

Meanwhile, changes within Germany not only strengthened her central government but also led to adoption of policies which made her Britain's rival. Economic depression forced German manufac-

<sup>16</sup> Charles W. Hallberg, *The Suez Canal* (New York, 1931), ch. xv; Harold L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (Philadelphia, 1928), ch. xviii.

<sup>17</sup> Pearl Boring Mitchell, *The Bismarckian Policy of Conciliation with France, 1875-1885* (Philadelphia, 1935), 92.

<sup>18</sup> Langer, *European Alliances*, 219-236.

turers to clamor for a protective tariff. Breaking with old political associates Bismarck then became the champion of aggressive economic interests which considered Britain's free trade policy, her commercial, financial, and industrial supremacy a barrier to German progress. Germany must develop her resources, keep the home market for her industries, and ultimately reach out for the foreign ones, perhaps challenge even mighty Albion. By adopting a protective tariff in 1879 Germany shattered the dream of the Englishmen Richard Cobden and John Bright for a world without tariff barriers, a world in which the nations of the earth would grow great in common. An immediate result of Germany's new tariff policy was to strengthen the position of the central government; a reorganization of the German railroad system had the same effect; and the army bill of 1880 established beyond peradventure her military supremacy among the great powers.<sup>19</sup> In 1880 Bismarck's Germany clearly represented ideals and forces absolutely antithetical to those revived momentarily in Britain (1879-1880) by the burning eloquence and evangelistic fervor of W. E. Gladstone.

In the election of 1880 Liberal spokesmen arraigned the Conservatives for mismanaging both domestic and foreign affairs. They were charged with deserting Balkan Christians, supporting the "unspeakable Turk," and seizing control of territories such as Cyprus and the Transvaal by unfair and dishonorable means. "Abroad," said Gladstone in his election manifesto, "they [the Conservative government] have strained, if they have not endangered, the prerogative by gross misuse, and have weakened the empire by needless wars, unprofitable extensions, and unwise engagements, and have dishonoured it in the eyes of Europe by filching the island of Cyprus from the Porte under a treaty clause distinctly concluded in violation of the treaty of Paris."<sup>20</sup> British voters registered their approval of this and other sweeping and wholesale condemnations of the Conservatives by hurling Lord Beaconsfield and his associates from office and power. Gladstone would, it was believed, lead Britain back to the path of peace, prosperity, and righteousness.

In April, 1880, the second Gladstone government replaced that of Lord Beaconsfield. The Conservatives left a multitude of embarrassing legacies to their Liberal successors, particularly in the fields of imperial and foreign affairs. Afghanistan and South Africa presented knotty problems, but in 1880 these were of little or no consequence in Anglo-German relations; what counted here were issues connected with the Near East and Egypt. The Treaty of Berlin, the Cyprus Convention, the Egyptian financial situation, and the dual

<sup>19</sup> Taffs, *Russell*, 254-264.

<sup>20</sup> Morley, *Gladstone*, II, 607.

Anglo-French control in Egypt created difficulties for a British government whose chief was interested mainly in questions pertaining to the British Isles and whose foreign secretary, Lord Granville, had not adjusted himself to the international situation arising from the advent of Bismarck's Germany. That Gladstone and Bismarck disliked and distrusted each other was no secret, nor had the chances of Anglo-German collaboration been improved by Gladstone's recent vigorous denunciation of Austria, Germany's ally.<sup>21</sup> The German chancellor was, however, unwilling to see established an Anglo-Russian entente, especially since he was worried over the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. Consequently Bismarck professed not to be alarmed by the change of government in Britain, and he convinced the British ambassador, Lord Odo Russell, of the sincerity of his desire for friendly relations between Britain and Germany.

In the judgment of the new British government Turkey should be compelled to fulfill treaty engagements concerning the Montenegrin and Greek frontiers, engagements entered into at Berlin in 1878. For nearly two years the Porte had successfully evaded settling these issues, and it seemed certain that this state of affairs might be continued almost indefinitely unless the powers took resolute action. Britain decided to assume the lead, and at a conference at Berlin in the summer of 1880 the powers discussed ways and means for breaking the deadlock. At this conference Bismarck showed a readiness to co-operate with Britain very pleasing to Lord Odo Russell, but when the time came for coercing the Turk, Bismarck held back. Professing indifference to the Balkan questions and elaborating on the need for following Austria's lead in all Balkan affairs, he played the role of onlooker for a while. Russell was convinced, however, that nothing could be achieved without German support. Hence he insisted that Britain should court Bismarck, and throughout the year 1880 the British government strove hard to please the great man.<sup>22</sup> In the following private letters to his new chief at the foreign office these views of the British ambassador are expressed with marked emphasis.

<sup>21</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 79.

<sup>22</sup> Taffs, *Russell*, 278-291.



*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 May 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Eight years ago you appointed me to Berlin,—and I now welcome you again as my Chief with feelings of heartfelt gratitude for eight years of perfect professional happiness and prosperity for which I am indebted to you.

To your predecessors in office I am indebted for very great kindness, support and encouragement during the anxious period of their important Administration,—and the friendly relations they had established during the Congress with Prince Bismarck has made their retirement from office a subject of much regret at Berlin.

I am glad however to say that Prince Bismarck is now quite happy and reassured since he knows for certain that you have accepted the F. O. and that the foreign policy of England will be entrusted to your hands and care during the coming crisis in Europe.

I think you will find Prince Bismarck all you can wish,—anxious for the most friendly relations with England, and willing to act in concert with Her Majesty's Govt. when asked to do so—He earnestly desires Peace for the welfare of Germany,—and he likes the Anglo-french Alliance, because he looks upon it as “the basis of peace in Europe.”

He dreads a Russo-french Alliance against Germany, and makes up to France to keep her out of Russia's way, and he made the Austro-German defensive Treaty to isolate Russia more completely.

His dread of Russia is founded in the belief that the Panslavists are bent upon driving the Czar into war again to wipe out the humiliation of having had to turn back from the very gates of Constantinople at the dictation of Europe,—and he reckons on his defensive Alliance with Austria to keep the Panslavists in check until the Peace Party returns to Power in Russia, when, according to circumstances, he will be equally willing to reestablish the “Drei-Kaiser-bund” if he can see a guarantee of peace for Germany in it.

Meanwhile Prince Bismarck looks upon England as the leading Peace Power in Europe, and you will therefore find him well disposed to make common cause with Her Majesty's Govt., if you should, at any time, require his services.<sup>23</sup>

The German Parliament is at present occupied with reforms in taxation and is likely to sit till July.

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<sup>23</sup> This letter, to this point, is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 209.

The Emperor is at Wiesbaden, the Empress at Baden, the Crown Princess at Rome and the Crown Prince alone at Berlin.

The all absorbing subjects of conversation in the Berlin political world still continue to be the result of our recent elections and the prospects of our future foreign policy which I assure everybody will be pacific and enlightened.

Ever yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., May 5, 1880.

MY DEAR ODO,

As far as you are concerned I am delighted to be again in official relations with you, as far as I am concerned, I shrink much from the task which is before me.

I look much to your assistance. Such pregnant letters as that which I received yesterday are of the greatest use.

I cannot conceive Turkey not crumbling any day in our hands—Does Bismarck ever let out his views as to what is to be done then? I suppose there is some understanding between him and the Austrians on the matter.

The Cabinet sat so late that there is no time to write to you.

I expect an interview with Lobanoff, and that he will press me to say that we will take strong steps if the Turks refuse to compel the Albanians to cede the territory.

Why did the Plenipotentiaries cede to the Montenegrins a bit of territory with inhabitants so little likely to receive them well? Was it Austria, who did not wish the cession to be made in another direction?

Layard is to have leave of Absence—and Goschen<sup>24</sup> will go on a special Embassy for a time.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 May 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your welcome Letter of the 5th—I am very glad that you are going to insist, in concert with the Powers, on the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, by which means, I believe, the existence of the Ottoman Empire can be prolonged for some years to come.

<sup>24</sup> George Joachim Goschen (1831–1907), British ambassador extraordinary at Constantinople, May, 1880–June, 1881, had been first lord of the admiralty, 1871–1874; he was later chancellor of the exchequer, 1880–1892, and again first lord of the admiralty, 1895–1900. See Arthur D. Elliot, *The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831–1907* (London, 1911).

Before that Treaty was signed Bismarck was willing to support any settlement of the Turkish questions on which the Powers most interested in Eastern Affairs were able to agree, so as to ensure the maintenance of Peace among them.—Since the signature of the Treaty, which he takes a paternal pride in,—he has himself negotiated at Vienna the Austro-German defensive Alliance for the purpose, he says, of being better able to defend the stipulations of his Berlin Treaty against possible Russian encroachments.

Personally, he wishes Austrian influence to prevail in the Balkan Peninsula, because he thinks that a preponderance of Russian influence might endanger the very existence of the Austrian Empire, whose Slav subjects would gravitate towards Russia and the realization of Pan Slavistic aspirations.

He believes that the Berlin Treaty has given the Ottoman Empire a new lease of life,—long enough to allow the European Powers time to reflect and agree upon a pacific solution of the still remaining questions connected with Turkish misgovernment. He will probably, when consulted, encline towards the views and wishes of his Ally Austria in preference to those of Russia, but he can be powerfully influenced at all times by England & France.

Germany, he says, has no direct interest whatever in Eastern affairs,—but the very greatest in the general preservation of peace in regard to Eastern affairs.<sup>25</sup>

You ask why the Plenipotentiaries ceded the Montenegrins a bit of territory with inhabitants so little likely to receive them well?

The Plenipotentiaries at Berlin, at the request of Austria and Turkey combined, had on the contrary to take from the Montenegrins a portion of the large territorial concessions made them by the Russians at San Stefano, and it was asserted by the Austrians that all parties concerned would be satisfied with the diminished concessions.

Here, they suspect that the resistance of the Albanians has been gradually worked up and organized by Italian Agents and by the Turkish local authorities themselves,—and they would gladly see Austria cooperate with the Porte in compelling the Albanians to cede the disputed positions to the Montenegrins, if the Porte cannot do so single handed.—

The Russian Govt. will naturally urge the Austrians to act as the “mandataires de l’Europe” in the matter, so as to establish a precedent for their own occupation of Eastern Roumelia when the Turks proceed to put down the coming Bulgarian national movement in that Province.

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<sup>25</sup> The preceding part of this letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 209-210.



Goschen's Embassy to Constantinople appears to me to be very important as it must of necessity bring the Turkish reform question to a crisis and I look forward with deep interest to coming events.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 May 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I will send you all I can collect about malt & Beer taxes as soon as possible.

Bismarck and Hohenlohe are reserved and reticent at present, but evidently well disposed to support us in the future. Mr. Gladstone's letter to Count Karolyi has produced an excellent impression here and has reassured the German Emperor and his Government in regard to our future relations with their Austrian Ally.<sup>28</sup> The Crown Prince told me so yesterday.

The Russians are making up to Bismarck again and trying to please and ingratiate themselves, and he seems now rather gratified by it than not,—perhaps even more so than the Austrians will quite like when they find it out.

Of course the better the relations become between England and Russia, the better will they become between Germany and Russia, it would not suit Bismarck to be on bad terms, when England is on good terms, with Russia.

I am very glad you are pressing the settlement of the Greek frontier question which will tend to pacify and improve things, and will give us back the influence in the East we have lately been losing on the Bosphorus. Convinced that Mr. Goschen would come via Berlin and see Bismarck, I telegraphed to invite him to the Embassy, and am now surprised to hear from him that he goes to Vienna but not via Berlin to my great regret, because from Bismarck he might have learnt more useful things than from Haymerle.

Bismarck's précis of the European Situation are generally correct, and always instructive. He has a prophetic "coup d'oeil".

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

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<sup>28</sup> Gladstone's letter to Count Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador at London, was an apology for uncomplimentary references to Austria during the Midlothian campaign. The sentence which gave particular offense at Vienna was Gladstone's assertion on March 17, 1880, that "it was impossible to put your finger on one point of the map where Austrian influence had been exerted for good." Parts of the letter and the speech are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 200-206; see also Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 8.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 May 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In reply to your private Query I send you herewith a Memo. by Mr. Crowe<sup>27</sup> on the Beer & Malt Taxes.

If it does not contain all you require pray let me know by telegram and I will get more.—I feel sure that you will find Mr. Crowe very useful in the coming commercial questions, about which he knows more than anybody, being personally on terms of friendship with all the leading Merchants and Manufacturers of Germany and with all the leading authorities in & out of the Reichstag.

The Powers have responded to your invitation to reestablish the European Concert like one man and the prospect of peace, order & concord will be very beneficial to Europe.<sup>28</sup>

Bismarck is so intent on strengthening the Empire internally and carrying his protectionist measures, that he pays less attention than usual to foreign questions, but he is well disposed and will do what is wanted of him. In Eastern Affairs he follows the lead of Austria.

The French Govt. consult him about everything and seem much guided by his views.

With Russia he is getting on good terms again, the new Russian Ambassador Saburoff<sup>29</sup> suits him well.

Italy he still distrusts & dislikes.

I have no further news today.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., May 25/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

Do you believe a story I have been told,—that on the change of Govt. being imminent here, Pce. B[ismarck] tried hard to get France to take the place, which he had hoped England would occupy in the alliance with Austria and Germany, that these advances were coolly received [and] he turned to Russia to resuscitate the triple alliance.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

<sup>27</sup> Sir Joseph Archer Crowe (1825-1896), British consul general at Düsseldorf, on April 5, 1880, was appointed commercial attaché to the British embassies at Berlin and Vienna. The memorandum is not among the Granville Papers.

<sup>28</sup> Arrangements were being made for a special conference of ambassadors on the problem of the Greek frontier, a conference which met at Berlin, June 16 to July 1, 1880. See Taft, *Russell*, 278-282.

<sup>29</sup> Peter Alexandrovitch Saburoff (1835-1918) served as secretary in the Russian legation in London, 1859-1870, minister at Athens, 1870-1879, ambassador in Constantinople, 1879, sent as special envoy to Berlin that same year, was Russian ambassador at Berlin, 1880-1884.

*Private.*BERLIN, 29 May 1880.<sup>30</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You ask me whether I believe a story you have been told that on the change of Government being imminent at home Prince Bismarck tried to get France to take the place which he had hoped England would occupy in the alliance with Austria & Germany, that his advances were coolly received, and that he turned to Russia to resuscitate the Triple Alliance?

To answer your question thoroughly I must enter upon a somewhat lengthy explanation.

Ever since I have been in Berlin Prince Bismarck has shewn an earnest desire for an alliance with England, but his attempts to establish cordial and intimate relations with H. M. Govt., and his repeated offers of cooperation were never met in a corresponding spirit.—Personally, I regretted it, because I believe that we might have derived real and lasting advantages from an intimate understanding with Germany.

Be that as it may, the difficulty I had all along to contend with in keeping up friendly relations with the new Empire was the distrust of Bismarck which prevailed at home,—and the great disappointment felt here by Bismarck that all his attempts and devices to secure the alliance of England led to no practical result. He could not understand why England should not be on terms as intimate and cordial with Germany as with France.

He made a last attempt at realizing his wishes, when he thought that Indian difficulties might lead us into a serious conflict with Russia.—He took the initiative concluded the Austro-German Alliance, isolated Russia and sent us word that he was prepared to cooperate with England in case of need.—

We rejoiced at the good tidings but declined his offer.—Bismarck then gave up all hope of securing the alliance of England and turned to France.

He told the French Govt. that he considered the Anglo-French Alliance as the basis of Peace in Europe, and the Austro-German Alliance as the completion of the "Peace-League" he wished to establish for the safety of Germany, but that since he had observed that England was more inclined to subordinate her foreign policy to her Alliance with France than to cooperate with Germany & Austria for the maintenance of peace, he would endeavour to make friends first of all with France, being quite certain thereby to get the support of England into the bargain.

That is the origin of the story you heard about German advances to France. But instead of receiving Bismarck's advances coolly as

<sup>30</sup> This letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 210-212.

you were told, the French Govt. have on the contrary ever since cultivated the most intimate relations with Germany and consult Bismarck confidentially on every question of foreign policy before moving a step.

Russia felt the blow keenly but Bismarck made no attempt to resuscitate the Triple Alliance,—he waited for Russia to reflect on her isolation and come round to Germany.

Since the change of Government at home, however, he has lent a more favourable ear to Russian advances and promises of submission to German wishes, and if Russia will guarantee a lasting peace to Germany, I have no doubt, Bismarck will be willing to resuscitate the Triple Alliance but only on his own conditions.

Bismarck's persistent preference for England as an Ally for Germany, is founded on his conviction that England is the Power best able through her great moral influence, to maintain the peace of Europe, and since he has created the German Empire he requires peace to consolidate and strengthen his work and promote Germany's material prosperity.

His nightmare has been a Russo-franco Alliance and an invasion of Germany from the North and from the West, which, if it did not break up the German Empire would certainly ruin Germany for years to come. In truth Germany has not yet recovered from the effects of the thirty and the seven years Wars.—

The danger he apprehended last autumn of a Russo-french alliance, he has since removed by his Austro-German defensive Alliance,—by the confidential relations he has established with France, and by the present re-opening of the Turkish question, which will give Russia occupation in the East again for some time to come, out of Germany's way.—

Besides which, when Eastern affairs are again engaging the attention of Europe, Russia will let by gones be by gones and will seek to reestablish the Triple Alliance and wipe out, if possible, the humiliation she feels so deeply of having been compelled to relinquish Constantinople at the bidding of Europe.—She will try to "square" Austria & Germany,—for that contingency we should be prepared.

Bismarck, who has long since given up the Turks, has little faith at present in the success of Mr. Goschen [*sic*] Mission, or of the proposed Berlin Conference,—and he asks what the Powers more immediately interested in the ultimate fate of Turkey will do, when they have once more ascertained that the Porte is impotent to carry out their advice?

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 2, 80.

MY DEAR ODO,

I told Münster to prepare the Chancellor for the communication you will make to him about Montenegro. I hope we see daylight. Lobanoff<sup>21</sup> thinks Russia, Turkey & Montenegro will agree.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 5 June 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

From your Telegram of last night I see that I am to have the honour of representing you in the Greek Frontier Commission and I am very glad of it for I take a deep interest in the question and have all along believed that it is England's true interest to strengthen Greece, for obvious reasons.

My old friend Sir Lintorn Simmons<sup>22</sup> will be welcome,—we first met during the Crimean War, and last at the Berlin Conference in 1878. I hope you will soon send me my instructions that I may have time to reflect over them.

I presume that you will first come to an agreement with the French Govt., as it is essential that my French Colleague and I should be one, and support each other.

Bismarck thinks it due to France, since she proposed the rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier to the Congress, that she should have her own way about it, and he will therefore support France in the coming Conferences.

If we are agreed with France, we are sure of Germany and Austria and probably also of Russia.—Italy's attitude in regard to Greece is still uncertain.

The future difficulty of persuading Turkey to hand over the territory ceded to Greece will be very great.

Your secret proposal about Montenegro is "Daylight"<sup>23</sup> indeed, and I hope it will be adopted and carried out as soon as possible. I am urging it here as much as I can.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>21</sup> Prince Alexis Borisovich Lobanoff-Rostovski (1824-1896), Russian ambassador at Constantinople, 1878-1879, London, 1879-1882, Vienna, 1882-1895, minister of foreign affairs, 1895-1896.

<sup>22</sup> General, later Field Marshal, Sir John Lintorn Arabin Simmons (1821-1903) had been attached to the Beaconsfield-Salisbury mission to Berlin, 1878.

<sup>23</sup> On June 3 Granville dispatched a circular telegram describing a possible new boundary line. See *P. P.*, 1880, LXXXII, c. 2711, no. 238.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 9/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

Did Brincken <sup>24</sup> give all my messages to Bismarck I wonder. They were to the effect that I found France and Austria both looked to him, that the Treaty was his work, and that I was convinced if he put his shoulder to the wheel, all would be right.

We want to give the Greeks the fullest advantage of the principle at Berlin. We have instructed Sir Lintorn to try to come to terms with Laferronaye [*sic*] <sup>25</sup> to secure this. At present the French, to whom we propose to leave the initiative, are ready to give everything to the Greeks.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 June 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I saw Brincken, but he made no allusion to the Message you gave him to Bismarck.—Arco <sup>26</sup> was more communicative and told me that the Great Chancellor had been gratified by your Messages through him. When I see Bismarck I will repeat what you tell me in your Letter of the 9th instant.

I am very glad to hear that you want to give the Greeks the fullest advantage of the principles advocated at Berlin, because I am deeply convinced that it is our advantage as well as theirs that Greece should become stronger and prosperous.

The Powers seem well disposed at the present moment towards Greece and will doubtless give her the best frontier which diplomacy and Science united can agree upon. But the Sultan will reject their advice and will play the Albanian game in Thessaly and Epirus, he is playing in the Villayet of Scutari.—Blood will flow before the year is over, and then the Powers will have to concert means to enforce their decrees.—The appointment of Abbedin Pasha, <sup>27</sup>—a native of Janina,—is an indication of projected resistance on the part of the Sultan.

Bismarck, who always wishes to find occupation for the french in the East, will probably encourage the idea of a french expedition

<sup>24</sup> Baron F. E. von den Brincken was the first secretary of the German embassy in London, 1874-1882, and later minister to Denmark.

<sup>25</sup> Henry Auguste La Ferronays (1842-1902), the French military attaché at London, 1877-1880, was sent to the Berlin conference of 1880 as French technical commissioner. Sir Lintorn Simmons was the British delegate to the technical commission, which sat from June 19 to June 28 and drew up the boundary line accepted by the conference.

<sup>26</sup> Count L. Arco auf Valley was the second secretary of the German embassy at London.

<sup>27</sup> Abbedin Pasha had just been appointed foreign minister of Turkey.

to assist the Greeks, as he has done before. He thinks that if France and Russia can be occupied elsewhere they will not think of joining hands against Germany, which is his daily nightmare since 1875.—For this reason, he will encourage both France and Russia to devote their attention and energies to the settlement of Eastern Affairs on the Berlin basis and he welcomes the present revival of the Oriental question as a favourable opportunity to do so,—and perhaps the more so, as he believes that the impotence of the Porte to carry out practically the advice of the Powers will furnish them with plenty of occupation, out of Germany's way, for some time to come.

I am looking forward with impatience and anxious interest to the arrival of Sir Lintorn Simmons, with my instructions tonight or tomorrow morning.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 16/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

Lintorn will have explained to you our views. I presume the Powers will not be much moved by the protest of the Porte against the extension of the meaning of the word mediation to be found in our dictionaries.

Is it quite certain that the Sultan will resist the recommendation. I think not unless he gets a hint to do so from some of the powers, which is far from impossible.

I hope Bismarck has not, and will not announce publicly again that he is determined not to use force.

I have not the slightest intention to going into Chancery against you, but if I wish to prevent your doing something, I certainly should not announce my non-litigious intentions.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 June 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of 16th. I have ascertained that Prince Bismarck has not and will not announce publicly that he is determined not to use force in Greece,—but he stands committed to a general assertion that Germany having no interests in the East will not sacrifice the life of a Pomeranian Soldier or the value of a "Pfennig" to settle the Turkish question. On the other hand he is willing to give the moral support of Germany and his personal influence to the concerted action of the Powers in the interest of the peace of Europe and the progress of its populations.

If it becomes necessary to enforce the will of Europe in Thessaly and Epirus you will find him quite willing to act morally in Concert with England and the Powers,—perhaps even to take part in a naval demonstration but I do not believe he would consent to join in a military occupation of foreign territory.

I am surprized,—agreeably surprized to find you think the Sultan will not resist our recommendations, and I shall be sincerely glad to find myself mistaken.

Sir Lintorn Simmons has done good work here and I believe will carry all his points with his technical Colleagues. I have worked mine to the best of my powers and am happy to say that they all come to me to smoothe down the inevitable differences which Conferences generate among Plenipotentiaries.

Since writing the above I have been to the second Conference, and Russia has shown her colours! The secret is out,—the mystery disclosed. Russia constitutes herself the Champion of Hellenic aspirations so as to take the winds out of the sails of France England Italy and Austria,—and recommends us to accept the Greek line in preference to the french. We have a majority in favour of the french, and can outvote Russia, who will then claim to have broken a lance in favour of Greece, and will thereby seek to reestablish her protectorate of the Greeks as well as of the Slavs in Turkey.

The Russian game is acute and will pay them well in the end.

Personally I prefer some points in the Greek line and would have gladly recommended them if I had had the chance,—but I am the first to admit that the Concert you have achieved in favour of your line is worth a sacrifice or two.

Bismarck tells me that Brincken delivered your message & that he thanked you for it through Münster.

Before leaving for Ems, the Emperor desired me to tell you how highly he appreciated your policy of promoting the *European Concert*, and how gladly he would give it his whole support.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Pray excuse haste.*

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 23/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

I find all the authorities are on your side and against me. Layard, Lobanoff, & the F. O. think that exercise of force will be necessary to make the Porte yield. I still adhere to my opinion that if the Powers keep up the united front which they seem to show at Berlin,



and none of them play false, we shall succeed not without threats but without actual force.

I admit the "if" is important.

We may have a little difficulty in certain quarters at home, but the Cabinet is decided that it shall not be our fault, if after all this fuss, we allow the Turk to make a fool of us all.

Yrs,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

Did Rowton see the political people when he was at Berlin?<sup>38</sup>

*Private & personal.*

26 June 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You ask whether Rowton saw the political people in Berlin.—

*He did not*, though detained three days before his sister came from Russia he paid no visits except to the members of the Embassy,—our Consul General and the Crown Princess who asked him to tea.—

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 June 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I thought it best to leave the talking to my Colleagues in the Conference and to exert what influence I might have in the interest of Concert and unanimity among Plenipotentiaries so as to present a united front to the East.

Sabouroff, who is very insinuating was labouring to divide us and had already succeeded in detaching Germany & Austria from France and England and gaining them over to concede his compromise, which my geographical Confessor Sir Lintorn would not even allow me to listen to.—

Even Italy was showing symptoms of yielding to the charmer,—but France was as firm as a rock, up to an hour before the meeting of yesterdays Conference, when St. Vallier<sup>39</sup> rushed into my room armed with discretionary powers just received from Freycinet<sup>40</sup> which authorized him to disregard the uncompromising advice of our technical advizers for the sake of securing an unanimous vote.

In the absence of new instructions I declined of course to depart from the old ones represented by Sir Lintorn,—and gradually my french Colleague recovered his former firmness.

<sup>38</sup> Montagu William Lowry Corry, Baron Rowton (1838–1903), was Disraeli's private secretary, 1866–1881.

<sup>39</sup> Charles Raymond Comte de St. Vallier (1833–1886), French ambassador to Berlin, 1877–1881.

<sup>40</sup> Charles Louis Freycinet (1828–1923), French minister of foreign affairs, 1879–1880, 1882, 1885–1886.

Thanks to numberless visits and conciliatory language everywhere, the impending division among us was happily avoided and we achieved a unanimous Vote in favour of our Line, to Sir Lintorn's great satisfaction and to my intense relief.

I must do Sabouroff the justice to say that he behaved well in the end and took his defeat very good humouredly.

There were points in his amendment I personally preferred to our line, and would gladly have conceded,—but I felt that my first duty was to carry out your instructions to the Letter in the Spirit of Sir Lintorn's advice, and I am relieved to find after ten anxious days that we have succeeded.—Indeed all the Plenipos seem agreeably surprised at their own unanimity and my french Colleague deserves great credit for his firmness and skill in the decisive hour.

You tell me that Layard Lobanoff & the F. O. agree with me in thinking that the Porte will resist our advice,—in return I can tell you that Bismarck agrees with you in thinking that the Sultan will yield,—tho' reluctantly, to the United Will of Europe.

I am delighted to hear from you that the Cabinet is decided that it shall not be their fault if the work they have undertaken is not carried out to the end.

It shall not be mine, if Bismarck does not give you all the support you may desire.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

P. S. Copy of a note just received from Sabouroff.

SAMEDI, 26 Juin 1880.

MON CHER COLLEAGUE,

Je viens d'informer le President de la Conference, que mon Gouvernement à approuvé et confirmé définitivement mon vote d'hier. L'accord est ainsi complet.

Mille amitiés de votre tout dévoué.

(sd)/SABOUROFF.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., June 28/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

I must thank you for the great part you have taken in bringing the first step to so successful an end.

Your tact and perseverance must have been of great use.

I send you a despatch which will give you an account of a conversation I had yesterday with Count Münster, some of the subjects of which he thought would interest this Govt.

It is not a phrase to say that I believe Europe owes much to Prince B[ismarck] and Prince H[ohenlohe] in having brought what is only a first, but still an important step to a good issue.

I note with pleasure what you say of the work done by M. de St. Vallier.

I am delighted at hearing that Prince Bismarck is of opinion that the Turks will yield without the menace of force, if Europe remains united. It appears to me to be of great importance that a stop should be put to the Ottoman belief, that they can act independently of the wish of all Europe.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 July 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have conveyed your acknowledgments to Prince Hohenlohe and through him to Prince Bismarck, who has left Berlin. Hohenlohe seemed very much gratified and assured me that Bismarck would value your opinion of his good influence on Europe most highly.

I cannot sufficiently thank you for having selected Sir Lintorn Simmons to assist me, for I had but to go by his excellent advice, and encourage good will and unanimity among my Colleagues.

It must be said that they all seem delighted, and more especially Prince Hohenlohe, with the final result.—he dined with us last night and said that the success of the Conference had far exceeded his expectations and had given immense satisfaction to Prince Bismarck.—I only hope that H. M. Govt. may be equally satisfied with our work.—My chief endeavour was to carry out your instructions to the Letter and not to commit H. M. Govt. unnecessarily.

Your real difficulties will however commence when you proceed to carry out the advice of the Conference, and when that moment comes I think you can get a good deal of moral support from Bismarck if you flatter his colossal vanity by asking occasionally for his advice. He hates being passed over, and never forgives, when things are done without his previous knowledge,—but he revels in being consulted by other Statesmen on European questions, and is ever ready to give a practical opinion in return.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

July 7 1880.

MY DEAR ODO,

We have sent you some well deserved butter. I was sure you would like Sir Lintorn.

Many thanks for the hint about Bismarck. It will be useful.  
Everybody seems to behave well at present. How long will it last?  
The Sporting Tories say that the government legislation does not go well in the market.  
But the budget is a success.  
Yours sinc.,

(sd) G[**RANVILLE**].

*Private.*

**BERLIN, 10 July 1880.**

**DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,**

Thanks for your most welcome Letter of the 7th. Sporting Tories may object to Rabbit Bills,<sup>41</sup>—but your Budget is a success and your foreign policy will be a triumph if you carry out what you have so admirably begun, and settle in the interest of humanity and civilization the Oriental question, which the Treaty of Berlin had peacefully and successfully shelved, but not solved.

Bismarck once told me that there could be no lasting peace in Europe so long as the Oriental question remained unsolved, and that in his opinion its final solution would be the occupation of Constantinople by the Russians.

It is generally believed by German politicians that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would be an advantage to Germany.—Nevertheless we can reckon on Bismarck's support to keep the Russians *out* of Constantinople, but once they are in possession, he will accept the accomplished fact and help them to square Austria.

That is one of the reasons for which I attach so much importance to your present policy and believe that the European Concert, you have established, compels the Powers to behave well & is a guarantee against surprises in the East. Besides which the European Concert is the only force, I believe, through which it will be possible to put a stop to bloodshed and atrocities in Turkey later on.

Yours sincerely,

**ODO RUSSELL.**

*Private.*

**12 July 1880.**

**DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,**

Excuse this hasty line to catch the post and say that if you sh<sup>d</sup> see Mr. Crowe, who wants to go home on private family affairs,—you can accept his statements as correct and founded on reliable sources of information.

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<sup>41</sup> The Ground Game Act of 1880 gave the occupiers of land the right to kill hares and rabbits on it, concurrent with the landlord's sporting rights. It had been introduced June 10, but the debate on the second reading was postponed until July 29. For the alarm raised meanwhile, see the *Annual Register*, 1880, 92.

The Crown Prince is very partial to him and he is on intimate terms with the members of H. I. H's Household, with the German Ministers, and the leading Members of Parliament. "Uncle John" had a high opinion of him and appointed him Consul General at Leipzig.—I have always found him most useful, well informed and reliable and I was delighted when Lord Salisbury appointed him Commercial Attaché to this Embassy.

I think you will find him very useful.

Yrs sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Excuse haste.*

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., July 14, 1880.

MY DEAR ODO,

Please persuade the Germans to send a ship.<sup>42</sup> The French now declare they will do so, if all the others agree. Germany's reluctance may arise from pressure of the King of Greece, who is very nervous about the Montenegrin Affair being settled before the Greek Boundary.

But I have no doubt that one will help the other.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 17 July 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Emily desires to join with me in hearty congratulations to Lady Granville and yourself on the happy event.<sup>43</sup>

I found no difficulty in carrying out your instructions,—pressure was unnecessary,—for Hohenlohe in the name of Bismarck yielded cheerfully to your wishes about sending ships to Dulcigno first and to Greece later on.

As I have repeatedly said, you will always find Bismarck ready & indeed anxious to act in Concert with England & more especially when he is *asked* to do so, because it flatters his "amour propre."

When matters become serious in Turkey I feel sure that you will find Bismarck's moral support very useful, for his personal influence in France and Austria is great and may become so again in Russia later on. An alliance with England has always been his dream for Germany.

<sup>42</sup> For the naval demonstration off the coast of Albania, proposed by Granville to enable Montenegro to take over Dulcigno, see Taffs, *Russell*, 282–283.

<sup>43</sup> The "happy event" was the birth of Lord Granville's second son, William Spencer, on July 11, 1880.

I have no special news today and so will not take up your time uselessly.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

No. 313

*Confidential.*

BERLIN, July 17. 1880.<sup>44</sup>

MY LORD,

In obedience to Your Lordship's instructions I told Prince Hohenlohe today with reference to the Sultan's request for German officials to be employed in reorganizing the Turkish Administration, that Her Majesty's Government would gladly see Germans employed for that purpose, that from no country could come more trustworthy and competent men, and that Her Majesty's Government rejoiced in any step which would show the interest Germany took in reforms which are essential in Turkey.

Prince Hohenlohe replied that he felt gratified by Your Lordship's approval of the proposed measure which he agreed in hoping might prove beneficial to Turkey. With that hope the German Government had not hesitated to comply with the Sultan's urgent request and had sent Councillor Wettendorf,<sup>45</sup> a very able official, to Constantinople to ascertain personally what was wanted before definitively accepting a new post and entering upon new duties in Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government hoped, I said, that the German Government would not, by allowing their officers at this time to take part in the military administration, encourage Turkey in the resistance which the Porte appeared to be preparing to the Berlin Conference Award.

Prince Hohenlohe replied that he did not share this apprehension of Her Majesty's Government. The contingency was one in any case the German Government could have no difficulty in dealing with and guarding against.

After some enquiries respecting the position of Baker Pasha<sup>46</sup> and other Englishmen in the Sultan's service, His Highness went on to

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<sup>44</sup> Dispatches Nos. 313 and 314 are from the foreign office papers at the Public Record Office (F. O. 64: 961). On July 10, 1880, Lord Odo Russell sent to Granville a report from the British military attaché in Berlin, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Methuen, that officers of the German general staff had been asked officially whether they were willing to accept posts as instructors in the Turkish army. Seven days later Methuen informed Russell "that as yet no officers have proceeded officially from Germany to Turkey" because they had been asked to wear Turkish uniforms. *Ibid.* See also Hajo Holborn, *Deutschland und die Türkei 1878-1890* (Berlin, 1926), 10-12.

<sup>45</sup> "Regierungsrat" Wettendorf was in July, 1880, appointed "musteschar" or undersecretary in the Turkish ministry of finance. *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>46</sup> Valentine Baker (1827-1887), a cavalry officer who after dismissal from the British army served in the Turkish army, 1877-1882; later, 1882-1887, he commanded the Egyptian police.

say that the difficulty with German officers was their reluctance to exchange the German Uniform for that of the Turkish Army, so that hitherto none could be sent, and before any volunteers presented themselves, it was probable that the frontier questions in Turkey would have been satisfactorily settled.

I have the honour to be with great truth and respect, My Lord,  
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

The EARL GRANVILLE K. G.

No. 314

*Secret.*

BERLIN, July 17. 1880.

MY LORD,

With reference to my preceding despatches Nos. 302 and 313 on the subject of the Sultan's request for German Officials to be employed in reorganizing the Turkish administration, I have been privately informed on trustworthy Authority that Prince Bismarck's principal motive for complying with His Majesty's wishes, is to get possession of correct and reliable information respecting the secret state of Affairs in Turkey, which it may be useful to him to know hereafter, because he is personally under the impression that the unanimous efforts of Europe to reform the Turkish Empire are hastening on the collapse of the Central Authority at Constantinople.

Prince Bismarck is reported to have somewhat cynically observed to a friend that, since the last attempted race for Constantinople had induced the Powers most interested in it to take up their posts of observation for the future at Sofia, Novi Bazar, and Cyprus, the next race would probably bring them all three still nearer to the winning-post,—when a comfortable seat, secured beforehand, in the Grand Stand, might better enable Germany to judge of their respective chances and make her book accordingly.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, My Lord,  
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

The EARL GRANVILLE, K. G.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 September 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

As all was going on smoothly in Berlin and I had nothing particular to say I did not trouble you with private Letters.

Things may possibly go on less smoothly now that Prince Hohenlohe has gone on leave to see his estates in the Duchy of Posen and in Russia for six or seven weeks,—because he was able to take more responsibility upon himself than his successor ad interim Count Limburg

Stirum," who is a Prussian Minister at Weimar and a Member of the "Landtag."

He was one of my Colleagues at Rome and I know him intimately,—but he will scarcely be able to give an official assurance without previous reference to Prince Bismarck who is at Friederichsruhe. Be that as it may I will do my best to keep up the Concert at Berlin.

Happily the Emperor is much taken with the idea of the *Concert* and His Majesty and the Empress are so gracious that we have plenty of opportunities of putting in a word in case of need, while Bismarck is away on Sick Leave.

Only yesterday we met Their Majesties driving at Potsdam and they were pleased to pull up and ask us to dinner for today at Babelsberg again.

Bismarck is much more engrossed with home than with foreign affairs just at present. He has dismissed the Minister of Commerce and undertaken his duties himself, for the sole purpose of carrying out further protective measures which Herr Hoffmann was not sufficiently enthusiastic about. Bismarck has an unbounded admiration for the American System of protection<sup>48</sup> and is determined to apply it to Germany, and he can do so easily, since the free-traders of Germany are but a small minority at present and generally looked upon as enemies of the Fatherland by the great body of protectionists who believe in Bismarck's infallibility.

I look forward with anxiety to the development of the Montenegro question and shall feel greatly relieved when it is settled.

The Greek frontier cannot alas! be settled this year. The powers of procrastination and resistance of the Porte encouraged by the personal opposition of the "Collective Ambassadors" at Constantinople to the cession of Janina, will prove even too strong for the united powers of Europe, and we shall have to wait for next Spring before the Berlin award can be carried.

The Turk is passed [*sic*] reforming or mending his evil ways, but he can still fight and he prefers fighting to bettering himself.

Hohenlohe thinks Turkey will have ultimately to be administered by a Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 September 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The visit of the Duke of Cambridge is giving universal satisfaction in Berlin. The Emperor and Royal Family F. M. Moltke, the Gen-

<sup>48</sup> Count Frederick William Limburg-Stirum (1825-1912), temporary foreign secretary, 1879-1881, member of the Prussian lower house, 1870-1905.

<sup>49</sup> See appendix to this chapter, report by Crowe of May 28, 1880.



erals, the Ministers, the Household and indeed everyone I meet tells me that everybody is pleased, gratified and flattered at H. R. H. presence at the manoeuvres. I am very glad of it and think that the good feeling he is calling forth will have a lasting effect.

The Duke of Connaught has long been a great favourite in Berlin, and the red Ziethen Husar Uniform H. R. H. wears flatters the national pride of the patriotic German.

I have been much interested by the Duke of Cambridge's account of his conversation with Prince Bismarck which you know.

The Empress & the Crown Prince asked me yesterday whether I could tell them what had passed between Prince Bismarck and Baron Haymerle<sup>49</sup> at Friederichsruhe, but I have not yet found anyone who knew as Bismarck has hitherto been very reticent on the subject.

His Austro-German defensive understanding of Sept. 1879 would not come into play while Russia adheres to the European Concert,—and Russia is bent on regaining the good will of Germany, so I do not expect we need apprehend any surprises for the present.

Some time since Bismarck told a friend of mine that if Austria had from the beginning favoured the Bulgarian movement instead of opposing it, the Bulgarians would now be much less Russian than they are,—and that under present circumstances Austria would find it an advantage to favour the Albanian movement rather than leave Italy to make herself popular in those regions.—I should not be surprised to hear that Bismarck had spoken in this sense also to Haymerle. He wishes both Austria and Russia to be well occupied in Turkey, but he does not wish them to fight.

Dufferin<sup>50</sup> arrived this morning and stays all Monday to my great satisfaction. His accounts of Russia are not only interesting but also I think very satisfactory and I hope the present spirit may long prevail. It is certainly in the interests of Russia and Germany that it should.

Last night the Emperor told me after the "Gala dinner" that he wished to confer some military honours on the Duke of Cambridge,<sup>51</sup> but did not feel sure whether H. R. H. would be pleased to accept them.—the matter, His Majesty said, required reflection.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

<sup>49</sup> Baron Heinrich Karl Haymerle (1828-1881) had held appointments in several capitals before he was appointed Austrian ambassador to Rome in 1877; he served as third Austrian delegate at the Congress of Berlin, and in October, 1879, succeeded Andrássy as chancellor and foreign minister of Austria-Hungary.

<sup>50</sup> Frederick Temple Hamilton-Temple Blackwood, first Marquess of Dufferin and Ava (1826-1902), governor general of Canada, 1872-1878, ambassador to Russia, 1879-1881, to Turkey, 1881-1884, viceroy of India, 1884-1888, ambassador to Italy, 1889-1891, and to France, 1891-1896.

<sup>51</sup> Queen Victoria refused to allow the Duke of Cambridge to accept the colonelcy of a German regiment, and he was then awarded the Grand Collar of the Hohenzollern Order. Granville to Russell, Sept. 17 and 19, 1880.

*No. 455.**Secret.**BERLIN, October 2. 1880.<sup>52</sup>***MY LORD,**

My Colleagues complain of the reserve and reticence of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the consequent difficulty of keeping their respective Governments correctly informed during Prince Hohenlohe's absence, but the fact is that Count Limburg-Stirum, who is only on probation at the Foreign Office, well knows that a single indiscretion might cost him his career.

Prince Bismarck himself is not communicative to his Colleagues or to his subordinates in regard to his foreign policy, and his friends say that his mind is at present engrossed with home questions and commercial policy.

I have, however, been privately informed on reliable authority that, in his last report to the Emperor on foreign Affairs, Prince Bismarck has submitted the following views to His Majesty:—

There is in his opinion no reason to apprehend war, so long as the European concert lasts. The duration and influence of the concert depends on the initiative taken by England, without which it would cease from want of a disinterested Leader.

Russia and Italy having direct national interests to pursue in the East, England can reckon on their support absolutely.

Austria having national dangers and disasters to apprehend in the East, England can only expect a reluctant support, given under protest by a timid Minister, who knows that he is to be replaced by Count Andrassey as soon as he can no longer ward off the threatening crisis.

The attitude of France will depend on the personal policy of the individual Statesmen in office for the time being.

The chief obstacle to the future Leadership of the concert on the part of England, in the event of a policy of action becoming necessary, Prince Bismarck sees in the rapid variations of public opinion in England.

He thinks it not impossible that the public opinion may object to armed interference in Turkey and the concert collapse for want of the Leadership of England.

In that case Russia might be tempted to interfere singly herself again on behalf of the Christian Subjects of the Sultan, a contingency which would impose great prudence and circumspection upon Austria and Germany, so as to restrict the struggle to the narrowest possible limits.

Germany while maintaining a neutral attitude should then use her good offices to harmonize the interests to Austria with those of Russia in Turkey and prevent a conflict between them.

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<sup>52</sup> F. O. 64 : 962.

Prince Bismarck is of opinion that it would be easier to negotiate successfully with Russia during the lifetime of the present Czar, who is personally well disposed to Germany and the German Emperor, than later on when his successor is on the Throne whose tendencies are reported to be panslavistic and anti-German.

The first condition that Germany and Austria should insist upon, should be that the conveyance of troops from Russia to Turkey should take place exclusively by sea, and that under no circumstances should Russian troops be allowed again to pass through Roumania. This condition would tend to localize the war and would be a great relief to Austria as well as to Roumania who should be called upon to share the neutrality of Austria and her ally Germany.

While the conflict lasted, Germany would have nothing to apprehend herself from Russia or from France, who would not risk a war of revenge without an ally.

My informant, who does not wish to be named, had read the report, but was only quoting from memory which must account for the incomplete form in which I submit it to Your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, My Lord, Your Lordship's

most obedient, humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

The EARL GRANVILLE, K. G.  
&c., &c., &c.

*Extends telegram N<sup>o</sup>. 105*

No. 463.

BERLIN, October 7, 1880.<sup>53</sup>

MY LORD,

I told Count Limburg Stirum that both the Italian and Russian Governments had agreed to the proposed occupation of Smyrna, and I asked whether His Excellency had yet received any answer to my recent communication on the subject, from Prince Bismarck.

Court Stirum said that the decision of the German Government would depend on the information received from Vienna and that as far [as] he knew the Austrian Government had not yet come to any decision.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

The EARL GRANVILLE, K. G.  
&c., &c., &c.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Oct. 8/80.

MY DEAR ODO,

I wish you were German Chancellor for the next few days." I should like to be scolded for not going far enough.

We are waiting with great anxiety to hear the German Austrian and French answers.

If they are favourable, all will go right. If they positively object, it will place us in a great difficulty.

If they morally consent, but refuse actively to cooperate, we shall probably go on, though in somewhat shaky company.

Was that very interesting report of B.[ismarck] to the Emperor conveyed to you by a cock or a hen?

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 October 1880.<sup>55</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I should indeed like to be German Chancellor for a day, not to scold as you suggest, but to entreat of you on both knees to leave Smyrna to her figs and sail instead straight to Stamboul and take the Sultan by the Golden Horn and put an end to this very dangerous and humiliating Conflict with the Porte which threatens the peace of Europe and the moral influence of England if we do not strike at the root of the evil rapidly and successfully.

Once our fleet is in the Sea of Marmora all danger of a Conflict ceases and the Concert can join us and work out the problems of reform in peace and security.

The Smyrna demonstration will make no impression on the Porte and simply leads to a second conflict which will not save us in the end from having to go to the Bosphorus, perhaps under humiliating circumstances.

I therefore hope that if Austria, Germany and France decline to go to Smyrna you will think it a sufficient excuse for proposing the Dardanelles instead and going there with or without Allies.—Once we have taken up our position the Powers will follow one by one, because our presence at Constantinople will be a guarantee that the Turkish Empire will be made to last as long, and probably even longer, than it can.

<sup>54</sup> On October 4, 1880, Granville proposed that the powers send their ships which were in the Adriatic to Smyrna, blockade the port, and seize the customs, in order to force Turkey to surrender Dulcigno. See Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 141-144.

<sup>55</sup> This letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 217-218.

I feel so strongly on this question that I cannot help writing strongly because I want *our* policy to be a success and a triumph and I firmly believe that the Key to success is to be found at Constantinople only.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Decypher from Ld. O. Russell, 9 Oct. [1880]*

Private. Prince Bismarck will refrain from giving advice at Paris.

Privately I am told that he thinks the demonstration at Smyrna a half measure which is doomed to failure so that he can get up no interest in it, & he marvels that we do not go at once to the Bosphorus wh: wld: save time & settle the question once for all.

May I venture to add that I quite share this view.

N<sup>o</sup>. 466. *Secret.*

BERLIN, October 9. 1880.

MY LORD,

I have just been privately informed on reliable authority that in reply to a question from the Emperor at Baden Prince Bismarck has advised His Majesty to follow the example of Austria and to decline for Germany also to take part in the proposed naval demonstration at Smyrna, which Count Hatzfeldt<sup>56</sup> telegraphs from Constantinople the Porte will certainly resist by force, and which Prince Bismarck predicts to the Emperor, the Powers must fail in, as at Dulcigno, from want of landing troops.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

The EARL GRANVILLE, K. G.

&c., &c., &c.

[Copy]

*Private.*

Oct. 13/80.<sup>57</sup>

MY DEAR ODO,

I should be glad if you would fully talk out the situation with the Chancellor.

He professes that he & Germany have only a subordinate interest in the Eastern Question.

This I do not admit, as also I think our interest in it is exaggerated.

<sup>56</sup> Count Paul von Hatzfeldt (1831-1901), German minister to Spain, 1874-1878, ambassador to Constantinople, 1878-1881, foreign minister, 1881-1885, ambassador to London, 1885-1901.

<sup>57</sup> This letter, except for the last sentence, is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 218-219.

But it is a position which the Chancellor has a right to assume and which in any case makes him still more clear sighted as a quasi-spectator than even he otherwise could be.

Although generally reticent he has during the last months sometimes given me advice of which I have never failed to profit.

I do not wish to obtain proposals committing Germany, but I should really be glad to have his views.

I cannot of course promise to adopt them but they would undoubtedly have influence upon the future course of the Govt.

The Chancellor has more than once said that the Concert must be maintained and the decisions of the Berlin Congress and Conference carried out.

How does he think this had best be done.

If France had always held the same strong language as she did on Saturday—if all the Powers were prepared to be equally in concert, at all times, there would be no great difficulty. On the other hand England and Russia might—I do not say carry out all the conditions of the Berlin Treaty, but exercise an immense influence on Turkish affairs.

There is a strong suspicion that Gladstone and I are devoted to Russia and the dupes of her policy.

You know whether this true as regards myself. It is perfectly untrue about Gladstone. He is sometimes tempted to use her as an instrument to carry out what appear to him great ends, but I doubt whether there is any statesman at home or abroad, who is more opposed to her having any permanent power at Constple.

The late Govt. used as a means of popularity abuse and "nagging" of Russia. This is inconvenient for the two countries in Asia, and as we think not the best way of meeting her ambitious views in Turkey. We see no weakening of our power to resist what is harmful by being on friendly speaking terms with her, and we are convinced that a working and real understanding between all the Powers, is the best calculated to keep things as we wish them to be for as long as that is possible. What I wish to know is how the Chancellor thinks the problem can best be worked.

We have lately been put forward by all the Powers to take an initiative. With regard to Montenegro and Greece I followed the Chancellor's advice, and consulted Austria about Montenegro and France about Greece.

It is clear that our position might be one which we should not wish to accept if we were told, as we have been "owing to certain circumstances there is less jealousy of you than of most other States. The Treaty of Berlin is to be carried out—we insist upon it. Let England take the initiative," and then when we propose the means

those means are objected to, not as to their merit but because they involve pressure, and instead of counter propositions being made by the objectors, England is asked to suggest some other plan under illogical conditions.

The question is in what order the remaining questions had best be taken & what sort of pressure is likely to have effect with the least chance of pushing us to war.

I only suggest some points of which you will know how to make use.

[No further ending to this letter.]

*Private.*

BERLIN, 16 Oct. 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Only a line to say that on receiving your Letter of the 13th; for which I am very much obliged, I wrote to Prince Bismarck who replied by return of Messenger: "Come when you like, *but* the sooner the better" etc etc.

From the tone of his answer I conclude that he is flattered at being consulted, and I look forward with deep interest to seeing him tomorrow in his den.

Having absolutely nothing to say from Berlin, I will reserve myself until the Great Chancellor has furnished me with his views, which I will then transmit to you from Friederichsruhe by the earliest possible opportunity.

Many thanks for allowing me to go home to fetch wife and children.

Emily goes to Woburn Abbey<sup>ss</sup> on the 19th and waits for me there.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

FRIEDERICHSRUHE, 18 October 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In obedience to your private instructions of the 13th inst. I came here yesterday to talk out the situation with Prince Bismarck and met with a most hearty welcome and cordial reception on the part of His Highness and of his family.—He reminded me that it was just ten years ago since you sent me to him at Versailles, and he proposed that we should take a drive in his great forest of Lauenburg where we could talk as freely, he said, as we had done in the Gardens of Trianon in 1870.

During the drive I told him the substance of your private Letter and begged of him to let me know his views as to how the problem was to be solved of carrying out the Berlin Treaty and Conference, in what order the remaining questions should be taken and what sort

<sup>ss</sup> Country home of Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford.

of pressure was likely to have effect with least chance of culminating into war?

Prince Bismarck who seemed unusually well and cheerful replied that in the primeval woods of Lauenburg he felt sufficiently safe from Blue Books to speak to me as to an old and trusted friend.

He must begin, he said, by declaring his earnest wish to act with Her Majesty's Govt. towards keeping the European Concert together for the purpose of carrying out the Berlin Treaty by moral means and diplomatic pressure *only*, but that public opinion in Germany was so averse to the adoption of coercive measures in regard to Eastern affairs that he would forfeit the confidence of the Nation, if he asked the Federal Council to sanction a policy of coercion—The Dulcigno naval demonstration could not be construed into an act of hostility since it was intended to assist Turkey in carrying out an Article of the Berlin Treaty to which she was a consenting party, and he had therefore gladly placed a German ship at the disposal of H. M. Govt. and of the British Admiral, and he would not withdraw it until the Dulcigno difficulty was settled because he was able to justify the measure from his seat in the Reichstag.

But the proposed seizure of the Port & Custom House of Smyrna was in his opinion a hostile act in itself, which might entail further hostile measures since it was a "de facto" declaration of war to Turkey, just as the seizure by foreign fleets of Havre or Hamburg would be a declaration of war to France or Germany.—

The interests of Germany in the East were not of a nature to necessitate the sacrifice of men or money, and the Confederate Govts. with whom the decision rested would reject the proposal to go to war with Turkey to oblige Europe, if submitted to them. There was reason to expect that the Sultan would consider the seizure of Smyrna a declaration of war and would resist force by force.—A state of war between the Powers and Turkey would render the safety and the lives of foreign residents in the East exceedingly precarious and would increase the difficulty of protecting them.

He had been informed that the Sultan had already written a secret paper or proclamation calling upon the Faithful as Caliph to prepare for the Holy War against the Christians and that His Majesty had given orders that it should be sent to Mecca and distributed among all the pilgrims so as to raise the Standard of the Prophet throughout the Mussulman world.—If this were really true, a state of War between Turkey and concerted Europe might well lead to wholesale massacre of Christians which it would be impossible to prevent even though the Fleets of Europe forced the Dardanelles and took up a permanent position before Constantinople.



These were the considerations which led him to fear that the enforcement of the Berlin Treaty by coercive measures was fraught with dangers, difficult if not impossible to avert or combat, and which might be followed by a general state of disorder, anarchy and fanaticism in the East which might last for months and possibly for years.

At the same time he wished it to be distinctly understood that he was merely stating his private opinion to me confidentially and that he offered no advice and fully admitted that he might be mistaken.

He would therefore raise no objection whatever if England, with or without the other Powers, resolved to carry out the Berlin Treaty by coercive measures, nor would he under any circumstances take the part of Turkey. On the contrary his "prayers and good wishes" for the success of the cause of civilization would accompany the Powers in their enterprize, but he, as German Chancellor could not take the grave responsibility upon himself of committing Germany to measures which might involve her in War with Turkey.

In regard to the problem as to how the Berlin Treaty and Conference were to be carried out, in what order the remaining questions should be taken and what sort of pressure was likely to have effect with the least chance of pushing us into War, he was of opinion that every kind of material pressure would be resisted by the Sultan and would consequently increase the chances of war, whilst diplomatic pressure however slow to take effect would finally in his opinion lead to practical and peaceful results, if persistently applied and steadily kept up by Concerted Europe, because time must of necessity be favourable to the cause advocated by the Powers, and fatal to that of the Porte and the Pashas.

Personally therefore he was against the employment of force and in favour of continuous moral pressure.

The Greek frontier question was probably the first the Powers would wish to press and he for one "would lend his shoulder" to move it on,—but not more.

None of the Powers would probably after serious reflection be enclined [*sic*] to land troops in Greece to fight both the Turks and the Albanians. Besides their own Army the Turks could raise an Albanian contingent of 80,000 men to resist the advance of the Greeks and F. M. Count Moltke was of opinion that the European Powers could make no impression in those mountainous regions with less than 50,000 men to support the Greek Army, which was worthless.

In his opinion the Greek Govt. were wrong to run the risk of defeat,—they ought to be content to continue to appeal to the Powers, and the Powers to continue to press the settlement on the Porte, and leave the rest to time.

He felt sorry for the Greeks, they had been at first encouraged and then abandoned by the French, and their national aspirations would, he suspected be secretly opposed and intrigued against by the Russians whose policy it would be to favour the enlargement of Bulgaria in opposition to that of Greece.

A big Bulgaria was the bugbear of Austria and in his opinion the fears of Austria were unfounded or exaggerated and he had told Baron Haymerle so.

To Germany the size of Bulgaria was a matter of indifference, but of the highest importance that Austria and Russia should not quarrel about it.

In fact the only real indirect interest Germany had in the Eastern question was the preservation of peace among the Powers directly interested in the future of Turkey. If coming events should endanger the safety or independence of Austria, Germany could no longer remain neutral, because the existence of Austria had become a necessity to Germany who would have to protect her Ally against Russian aggression. For this reason it was his policy to exert all his influence to keep the peace between them, and to harmonize, as far as benevolent neutrality in the future fate of Turkey could do so, their respective aspirations, ambitions and interests. The longer therefore the collapse of Turkey, or a conflict about Turkey could be put off, the better for Germany and for the peace of Europe.

If matters came to the worst, Germany had happily no longer much to apprehend even from an alliance between Russia and France, whose combined Armies Count Moltke said Germany could defeat since her present Military organisations enabled her to bring two millions of well armed men into the field.

Russia, under Miliutine's evil influence was capable of any act of folly,—but he did not apprehend any danger from France. The french people wished for peace, and the french Govt. were too weak to be enterprizing, and too much in fear of Germany to do anything that might even give her umbrage. The present State of France was so favourable to Germany that he hoped it might last, internal difficulties being a safeguard against external complications in the present instance.

In regard to Russia, Prince Bismarck said that he fully agreed with H. M. G. in thinking that a friendly understanding and frank exchange of views would be found a far preferable policy to a permanent state of suspicion which could serve no practical purpose. He had himself for years past been Russia's best friend, but since the Congress of Berlin his Russian friends had one and all turned against him with unaccountable ingratitude.

The result of his experience was that Russians were unreliable Allies,—but as their powers of harming Germany were great, he avoided quarrelling with them and adhered to a uniformly friendly policy towards Russia, as Germany's most formidable neighbour. For obvious reasons Germany had no interest in opposing Russia in the East,—and while faithfully protecting Austria's interests against Russian encroachments he would, at the same time, observe a benevolent attitude towards Russia's ambitious views and leave her a large margin in Eastern affairs.—But if Russia attacked Austria he would turn against her without a moment's hesitation.

He could not but frankly and privately confess to me that he was at a loss to understand the very great, and what appeared to him the exaggerated interest England took in the future of Turkey.

Austria and Russia as neighbours had real material interests to contend for, just as England had real material interests to guard in Egypt, which would in his eyes have justified the annexation of Egypt by England. But when I had told him that by using Russia as an instrument England might achieve great ends and exercise an immense influence on Turkish affairs, he could not but think that the great ends achieved by England would be purely moral and philanthropic, whilst all the material advantages would be reaped by her unscrupulous Ally Russia. This was but a private opinion and if H. M. Govt. decided upon joint action with Russia in Turkey he could only repeat that the enterprize would have "his best wishes and prayers."

A working and real understanding between all the Powers would be, as you said, the better mode of proceeding to keep things as desired, but from recent experience it was obvious that unanimity could only be achieved among the Powers for moral, and not for material pressure.

Germany Austria and France did not see any advantage in taking part in the coercive measures England Russia and Italy might agree to apply to Turkey, whilst all the Powers would readily unite in subjecting the Porte to diplomatic moral pressure, which, though I did not agree with him, he, for one, believed would, with time and patience have the desired effect on Turkey without leading to War.

"I have given you as concisely as I could, the substance of the several conversations I had with Prince Bismarck yesterday between luncheon and bedtime.

The impression I have derived from them is, that he is not personally partial to the European Concert, and rather jealous of H. M. Govt. having been put forward by all the Powers to take the lead in Eastern Affairs.—His solution of the problem, when the Turkish Govt. collapses would be the peaceful division of influence in the Balkan

<sup>90</sup> The following, except the last paragraph, is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 225; but it is there incorrectly dated as of January 26, 1881.

peninsula between Austria and Russia, the former to extend to the Aegean, the latter to the Straits,—and Germany—that is, himself,—to mediate between them.

The intervention of England as the Leader of a concert of Powers, stands in the way of his wishes and of the plans he has made for his neighbours, whom he looks upon as the Sultan's natural heirs.

England's interests are in Egypt and Asia as those of France are in Syria and Tunis, and neither England or France, he thinks should busy themselves about the Sultan's European Dominions which do not concern them, as they do Germany's neighbours Austria & Russia.

If I am not greatly mistaken Bismarck's policy will henceforward be to preserve Turkey in status quo for his neighbours, and to promote the collapse of the Concert, in which he apprehends a troublesome Rival to his present exclusive influence in Europe.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Secret.*

BERLIN, SCHILLSTRASSE 11,<sup>80</sup>

Oct. 29 1880.

MY DEAR LORD [ODO RUSSELL],

I showed your Lordship a short time ago a letter from Wettendorf in Constantinople who announced the coming to Germany on leave of General Drigalski Pacha and general *adjutant* of the Sultan. General Drigalski *is here* and his presence led to a rumour that he was commissioned to engage German officers for service in the Turkish army. A few days ago General Drigalski wrote to the Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to beg that these rumours should be contradicted as he was only travelling in Germany on private affairs. Notwithstanding this press denial I have it indirectly but from a certain source that Drigalski is in truth here for no other purpose than to engage six general officers who in the event of a war between Turkey and Russia, would take command of Turkish army corps. Drigalski expressed the opinion that a Russian war in spring in which not only Turkey but Germany would be engaged was inevitable. He described the Sultan as being penetrated with the belief that Germany was his best & surest ally & as having the greatest confidence in the sentiments towards him of the German Emperor & Prince Bismarck.

Will your Lordship communicate this news to Lord Granville & greatly oblige.

Most faithfully yrs,

J. A. CROWE.

<sup>80</sup> This letter was forwarded by Russell, then in London, to Granville on November 5 with the following comment: "The enclosed private note from Crowe is curious, because he is generally very correct. This time however he does not convince me and I must suspend my judgement until I see him again."

*Memo. by Tenterden*<sup>61</sup>*Private.*

10/30, '80.

I asked Ld. O. Russell today what was Pce Bismarck's real opinion of the situation under his usual platitudes about peace.

He said that he understood Pce Bismarck to be afraid of Mr. Gladstone's policy and to distrust him as encouraging Socialist ideas—that he preferred a Conservative Govt. in England and that there was a prevalent opinion abroad that in the autumn session or at all events next February Mr. Gladstone wd be in a minority and would resign office; that then scope would be given to the policy which had been indicated at the Berlin Congress vi the extension of Austria to Salonica (I asked if any understanding to this effect had really been come to. Ld. Odo said no, not precisely, but it was known to be contemplated) and the opening up by this means of a great Eastern trade for Germany which would be incorporated in a Zollverein with Austria. Pce Bismarck thought that his own part was to arrange a compromise in the Balkan Peninsula between Russia and Austria. Russia to be allowed to extend Bulgaria to the Straits, Austria to occupy Serbia & stretch down to Salonica—England France and Italy to be kept out and occupied with Syria Egypt and the Islands. He believed Austria to be needlessly alarmed at the extension of Bulgaria and that he could influence Russia, by menace if necessary, so as to secure enough to satisfy Austria. Pce Bismarck looked to these eventualities and in the meanwhile would not join in any demonstrations or active measures which might force him to follow Mr. Gladstone's lead, though he did not object to diplomatic notes.

I observed that if these were really Pce Bismarck's views he must be very ill informed and must be inspired by Musurus & the Morning Post.

I suspect however that he does not say everything he thinks & that he is probably preparing some more practical project for the future than these visions.

T[ENTERDEN].

Oct. 30, '80.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 November 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have gathered no new impressions in Berlin since my return, beyond noting that the best authorities hold that Prince Bismarck virtually directs the foreign policy of Austria and France, both Powers being actuated by a desire to conciliate him, from fear of the formidable forces at his command.

<sup>61</sup> Charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott, third Baron Tenterden (1834–1882), permanent under-secretary in the foreign office, 1873–1882.

The Emperor has lost the power of passive resistance he once possessed, and yields to every threat of resignation, with which the Chancellor enforces his will at the slightest show of disagreement on the part of the octogenarian monarch.

Having his own wicked way at home Bismarck wants to have it also abroad and he is clearly intriguing to get the Leadership of the European Concert into his own hands, so as to play first fiddle at Constantinople when the Collapse sets in. He hopes, however, to postpone the Collapse as long as possible, so as to have time to bring about a practical understanding between Austria and Russia, and avoid a conflict which might prove seriously inconvenient to Germany if he had to take sides and chuse between them.

He is decidedly favourable to the execution of the Berlin Treaty and Conference and to the maintenance of peace through the European Concert,—but he does not wish to allow the personal influence he has established over the Continental Powers to pass into other hands.

By next Messenger I shall be better able to tell you more about the situation of Affairs in Berlin.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 December 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your Hanley Speech<sup>62</sup> has made the most excellent impression here on Court and Country, and I am told that Prince Bismarck is greatly gratified by what you said about Germany.

A pleasant truth, a well deserved compliment, publicly uttered by an English Statesman has a magic effect on the most conceited Minister of the most sensitive nation in the world,—and I think that Bismarck, having rendered France and Austria subservient to his policy, will wish to be on very intimate terms with H. M. Govt. so as to share with England the laurels which a successful carrying out of the Berlin award must bring to the Powers who solve the Oriental question through Greece and thereby place a barrier to the advance of Russian Panslavism and its consequences.

<sup>62</sup> Granville's speech at Hanley on November 27, dealing principally with Montenegro, included the following reference to Germany: "When I was in Opposition I remarked upon the influential part which Germany had played in settling the Treaty of Berlin, while, conscious of her strength, she had ostensibly minimized the interest she felt and the influence she exercised upon the Eastern Question. Up to this time she has supported the concert of Europe; she has not departed from the assurances she has given that the decisions of the Congress and the Conference of Berlin must be maintained; and if she goes even beyond some others in confidence in the results of moral and diplomatic pressure, that very confidence must contribute materially to the end" (*The Times*, Nov. 29, 1880).

Bismarck is expected here before Christmas. The Crown Prince returns on the 16th and the Empress, who arrived yesterday has asked Emily to drive with her today to Charlottenburg and give her a little English news, in which Her Majesty takes a constant interest.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 December 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Dufferin paid us a very pleasant visit on his way to Russia and gave us all the latest news from home. I had little to give him in return.—Christmas distracts the German mind from every other subject home and foreign,—& Berlin is at present politically dull. Bismarck's and Hatzfeldt's arrival after Christmas will make us more lively and interesting.

Socially the Court alone is active. We have seen Their Majesties repeatedly at the Palace, and the Crown Prince and Princess have come to the Embassy. The Crown Princess announced herself to tea last night and looked well though she complained much of rheumatism.

The Crown Prince seems low and out of spirits.—He is worried I am told at Bismarck's increasing and almost irresponsible power, and at his absolute influence over the aged Emperor. The Emperor was never better and seems to enjoy life as much and as cheerfully as the youngest Lieutenants. The Empress is looking much better than during the manoeuvres in September last.

Their Majestys have been pleased to congratulate us on the Peerage in the most gracious and hearty manner.<sup>63</sup>

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

BERLIN, Christmas 1880.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Happy Christmas to you and yours.—

Count Limburg Stirum has gone home to enjoy his in Silesia with his family, and he has left the F. O. to the care of Councillor Busch. From that gentleman's language I gather that Prince Bismarck has no faith in Arbitration, but thinks it good policy to support any and every proposal the french Govt. initiate so as to gain their confidence at present and acquire their alliance in the future if possible.

<sup>63</sup> Russell was not created Baron Ampthill of Ampthill until March 11, 1881, but there had been a leakage of the intention to confer a peerage on him through Münster.

Busch<sup>64</sup> expects that Turkey will adhere to her concession of the 3rd October and Greece to the Berlin award, and that both will decline the proposed arbitration.

For my part I should be very sorry to see the Powers depart from the well considered line of frontier unanimously accepted by them, and reopen a question they will find it impossible to "re-agree" upon a second time.

A steady and logical adherence to the Berlin basis on which the Concert is founded is more likely to keep it together, than renewed negotiations to find a compromise on which Turkey and Greece will agree.

The french arbitration proposal will however be useful as a means of keeping up the continuity of negotiations, and of clearing the ground for coming events.<sup>65</sup>

Yours sincerely,

(sd) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 600

Secret.

BERLIN, December 31. 1880.<sup>66</sup>

MY LORD,

When I saw Prince Bismarck on the 18<sup>th</sup> of October last at Friedrichsruhe, His Highness told me that it was his earnest wish to act with Her Majesty's Government towards keeping the European Concert together for the purpose of carrying out the Berlin Treaty by moral means and diplomatic pressure only, but that public opinion, in Germany was so averse to coercive measures in regard to Eastern Affairs that he would forfeit the confidence of the nation if he were to propose to Parliament the adoption of a policy of coercion in Turkey. At the same time, His Highness said, he wished it to be distinctly understood that he would raise no objection whatever if England, with or without the other Powers resolved to carry out the Berlin Treaty by coercive measures, nor would he under any circumstances take the part of Turkey, on the contrary, his "prayers and good wishes" for the success of the cause of civilization would accompany the Powers in their enterprises.

My French Colleague, Count de St. Vallier, who saw Prince Bismarck at Friedrichsruhe towards the end of November, tells me that

<sup>64</sup> Moritz Busch (1821-1899) was undersecretary in the Prussian foreign office, which he had entered in 1870. He wrote *Bismarck, Some Secret Pages in His History* (London, 1898).

<sup>65</sup> Lord Lyons reported on December 18 that the French government proposed that the powers act as arbitrators on the Greek frontier question, Turkey and Greece to promise beforehand to submit unreservedly to the decision. This met with absolute refusal by the Greek government, and on January 17 Granville notified the various British embassies that the French had abandoned the proposal. See *P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2799.

<sup>66</sup> *F. O.*, 64 : 963.



His Highness held exactly the same language to him, and equally assured him that, if France preferred to proceed by coercion in Turkey with one or several of the other Powers, he, for one, would not object and would give France his "benediction" but nothing more.

About the middle of December my Russian Colleague, Monsieur de Sabouroff went to Friedrichsruhe before going home on leave to Russia and gave me, on repassing through Berlin, some account of his visit and conversation, from which I gathered that Prince Bismarck had held the same language to him as to Count de St. Vallier and to myself.

Monsieur de Sabouroff, however, described Prince Bismarck as having also said playfully to him, that if Russia were not satisfied with diplomatic pressure only and wished to adopt an active policy in Turkey, why did she not come to some understanding with England in the matter while the Liberals were in office, who were friendly to Russia and well disposed to act in concert with the Powers most interested in Eastern Affairs.

On Monsieur de Sabouroff replying that he was glad to conclude from Prince Bismarck's advice that he did not, as the German Press insinuated, object to an Anglo-Russian Alliance, His Highness had cynically remarked that his only fear was that an Anglo-Russian Alliance would not last as long as he wished himself, because Russia was certain to quarrel with England about Constantinople ere long.

Monsieur de Sabouroff said that he had protested against this humorous insinuation, but that he mentioned the anecdote to me simply to show that Prince Bismarck was more cheerfully disposed in talking over Eastern Affairs than people gave him credit for in Berlin.

He had further explained to Prince Bismarck that Russia was suffering internally too much from financial and social troubles to be individually very enterprising abroad, but would certainly adhere faithfully to the concerted Action of the Powers which she had so often invoked in vain, and was therefore now the more anxious to give her last support to.

Both my Colleagues left Friedrichsruhe under the impression that Prince Bismarck thought so favourably of the institution of the European Concert as a Peace Engine that he would seek to exercise more influence over it himself in the future than he had hitherto done.

In the further conversation I had with my two Colleagues on the subject of their visit to Friedrichsruhe, I also gathered that the Chancellor did not speak with much satisfaction of Baron Haymerle's visit to him in September last, indeed they both observed an undercurrent

of disappointment, which I had also noticed at Friedrichsruhe in Prince Bismarck's judgment of Baron Haymerle, of whom he said that, though a first-rate man of business, he would never become a statesman of an "elevated order" (*d'un ordre élevé*) like his predecessor Count Andrassy.

The cold reception Baron Haymerle gave Prince Bismarck's overtures at Friedrichsruhe in regard to a Customs Union between Germany and Austria seems to have somewhat lowered him in the Chancellor's estimation, who had just undertaken the duties of the Minister of Commerce himself for the purpose of carrying out his favourite scheme personally with Baron Haymerle, who had promised to pay Prince Bismarck a visit on his way home from Norderney to Vienna.

Prince Bismarck told me himself that Baron Haymerle had altogether declined to discuss the future commercial policy of the two Empires with him, giving as an excuse that it could be better done by delegates; an excuse His Highness characterized as "weak and disappointing". Of course Prince Bismarck will not for that give up his commercial scheme, nor is it to be expected that "his disappointment in Baron Haymerle" will alter his policy of promoting the extension of Austrian influence in the East.

The increased personal influence he has lately acquired at Constantinople and at Paris may possibly incline Prince Bismarck to take a more active part in Eastern Affairs in the coming year than he had done in the past.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ODO RUSSELL.

THE EARL GRANVILLE, K. G.

## APPENDIX

Report by J. A. Crowe, British commercial attaché, to the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, included with Russell to Granville No. 44, Commercial, May 29, 1880 (F. O. 64:965).

### *No. 1.*

*Confidential.*

BERLIN, May 28, 1880.

MY LORD,

Prince Bismarck's commercial policy in the last few years has been dependent at different periods on foreign policy, party politics and the necessities of the Treasury. When Prince Bismarck signed the treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which he conceded the most favoured nation treatment to France for ever (Art XI) he was, if anything a free trader. When he negotiated for an Austro-German commercial treaty in 1877, his chief object was to find means to counteract the concessions made at an earlier period to France. In 1873 he foresaw future deficits and endeavoured to raise revenue, by charges on articles of consumption; his plan being to reduce the number of customs duties to a minimum and tax heavily, after the English fashion, tobacco and other goods of *prime necessity*. Hopes were entertained at that time that the German tariff would be brought into easy contrast as regards simplicity with that of Great Britain. But Prince Bismarck was aware when he made this proposal that the liberal party might ask for constitutional guarantees before granting large finance duties, whilst he was equally assured of mingled hostility and opposition "from the 25 governments and various interests and parliaments with which he would have to deal in carrying out his labours of Hercules."

The failure to carry a bill for the taxation of tobacco in 1873 produced the conviction in his mind that a different system might lead to more rapid results. To this period no doubt we may trace the germ of his determination to substitute the system of universal moderate custom, for that of duties numerically small but proportionally high.

Meanwhile the commercial prosperity of Germany which had been gradually disappearing under a depression common to most European States, gave way. The ordinary sources of revenue failed to yield the usual supply. Direct taxation was doubled and trebled throughout the German Empire without covering the chasm of the deficit, and

the necessities of the Treasury created a natural demand for immediate relief.

Under similar circumstances and with similar symptoms Austria in 1876-1877 had begun to discuss the question of tariffs and international commercial relations. She denounced her treaty with England, opened negotiations with Germany and simultaneously began the reform of her customs legislation. She refused to treat with England which "had nothing to concede". She hoped—, with a normal tariff embodying high duties as a weapon in hand—to force concessions from Germany.

But Prince Bismarck was quite aware of the object which Austria had in view. He negotiated during the whole summer of 1877 without any fixed intention as yet formulated in respect of the general tariff of Germany, but with the obvious tendency to keep certain duties in reserve for the purpose of negotiations with European powers. He parleyed at Vienna for liberty as regards the imposition of import duties on the import into the Zollverein—of wine, corn, cattle and other articles, probably with the view to use the wine duties as a lever against France whilst Austria on her part strove to obtain concessions for her manufactures and claimed at the same time to keep her own duties on such a level as would exclude the competition of England.

It was a question under these circumstances which would prevail,—a system of moderate duties more or less protectionist, excluding treaties and founded irrevocably on "autonomous" tariffs. The game of interests became so intricate at Vienna and Berlin that farsighted persons foresaw the failure of negotiations; and, *de facto*, the two powers are still negotiating after incessant renewals of treaties, and are as far from an agreement as ever.

The first interruption of Austro-German negotiations in 1877 produced much ill blood. Naturally enough selfish motives were assigned by public opinion to each of the powers. But German free trade organs in the press committed the mistake of taking up a tone of indignation and Austria was threatened with the prospect of a duty of 25 p. c. on Hungarian corn and wine, and heavier duties on Austrian beer, spirits, hides, skins and fruit and vegetables.

Whoever it was that showed the way, Prince Bismarck came out of the first negotiations with Austria a determined protectionist. There were clear political advantages to be gained. The Prince might hope to win the votes of the conservative landlords of Central and South Germany by proposing to enact a corn law and barter this concession for a reenactment of the iron duties that would give him the support of the manufacturers of the Rhenish provinces and Silesia. He might thus counterbalance the national liberal party whose claim to constitutional guarantees would be neutralized.

The failure of negotiations with Austria was attributed by the official organ of the German government (*Provinzial Correspondenz* of Nov. 7, 1877) to the desire of Germany to obtain an extension of the alleviations of duty conceded by Austria in the Austro-German treaty of 1868, and a wish to equalize the duties in the tariffs on both sides the Austrian tariff having been till then higher than the German. Austria was charged with claiming still higher dues claiming too to impose a duty on German goods originally sent unfinished—& so free of customs' charges—into her territory on their return over her frontier into Germany. (*Appretur Zoll*) Her resolution to take payment of customs in gold ought, it was said, to have made her desist from other demands.

These, though they were not *all* the reasons for the failure were accepted as such by the German public. But business men and manufacturers felt that a crisis was at hand. The German *Handelstag* (Oct. 16, 1877) asked for an imperial commission of inquiry. The Union of ironmasters at Dortmund (Dec. 8, 1877) moved in favour of an "autonomous" tariff [*sic*] with countervailing duties as against Austria; and the Central Union of German Manufacturers met at Leipzig (Dec. 14) with a protectionist tariff [*sic*] drawn up and ready for use. Two days earlier the Würtemberg government had moved the Bundesrath to raise 14 millions of marks of Imperial revenue by increasing the duties on tobacco, coffee, tea, and mineral oils, and some millions more by new taxes on wine and beer. Prince Bismarck (Dec. 7) ordered the suspension of a concession hitherto made to Austria on the strength of old treaty obligations, and forbade the further importation of unbleached linen over the frontier of Silesia between Leabschütz and Seidenberg. In order to test the state of parties he laid a bill before the Bundesrath (Jan. 18-78) increasing the duty & excise on tobacco and raising taxes on stamps and playing cards. There was at this time a deficiency of 70 millions in Imperial revenue to make up. Shortly after (Feb. 20) he submitted to the Bundesrath a resolution for appointing a commission to inquire into the state of the iron trade on the understanding that it was proper to reimpose the iron duties abolished in 1876.

Upon this the constitutional question came to the surface. The Reichstag in due course threw out the tobacco and other money bills—A ministerial crisis ensued (Feb. 1878) and a breach was created between the national liberal party and the Prince Chancellor which has never since been healed.

The history of the gradual development of protectionism in Germany since 1878 need not be given in detail. Broadly stated the course pursued was this. By clever management, the protectionist element was judiciously favoured and brought into prominence; and

the principle of levying duties on everything was consistently carried out. During a debate in the Reichstag in February 1878 Prince Bismarck took occasion to observe that political friendship should never be dependent on commercial questions and he roundly asserted that the tendency of Russia to keep up barriers against Germany could only be put down by raising higher duties on the import into Germany of Russian produce. In April the Provinzial Correspondenz was made to declare that free trade without reciprocity was illogical and *per se* injurious and, if only for the sake of finance duties, it was desirable that Germany should return to protection. On the same day a motion was made in the Bundesrath for a commission of inquiry into the cotton and woolen trades. A few weeks later the Reichstag was dissolved on the question of free trade or protection and a majority of protectionists was elected by the nation.

Then Prince Bismarck came forward with a complete scheme of financial and commercial reform. He called a conference of ministers of the German States at Heidelberg (Aug. 5-7) and there he not only submitted a proposal for revising the tariff [*sic*] which was approved, but he carried resolutions recommending indirect as against direct taxation and advocating measures for raising 230 millions of additional revenue by duties of excise and customs on tobacco, beer, sugar, brandy, coffee, petroleum, tea, colonial wares and wine.

On the 12th of November 1878 the Prince addressed a first letter to the Bundesrath moving for the appointment of an imperial commission to revise the tariff, advocating indirect taxation, calling on the governments to defend the home markets of Germany from the attacks of foreigners and claiming increased protection for manufactures as well as higher duties on articles of consumption. The Prince did not forget to state that it was desirable to gather together materials for the exercise of future pressure upon the commercial legislation of foreign countries.

A longer despatch was addressed to the same body by the Prince on the appointment of the commission on the 15th of Dec. 1878 the gist of the paper being that increased protection was not only desirable in itself but peculiarly suitable for the occasion, and that the true principle to be applied was the principle of imposing duties on all articles crossing the frontier into Germany. With studied moderation the Chancellor put the rate of increase on customs at 5 to 10 percent *ad valorem*, urging that such an increase would scarcely influence home prices at all events at a short distance from the frontier. On the very morning of the publication of this state paper (Dec. 16) a temporary treaty was signed between Germany and Austria, putting an end to the conventional tariff [*sic*] in which Great Britain, in

common with other powers had till then had a share. In the course of the same month, such treaties as embodied conventional tariffs between Germany and foreign powers were denounced: e. g.: Treaty between Germany & Belgium, of May 22, 1865,—between Germany & Switzerland of May 13, 1869. Other treaties of commerce were placed on such a footing as to be terminable at a very short notice.

The tariff which the Bundesrath commission elaborated in 1879 was discussed by a parliamentary committee and by the Reichstag and passed on the 15th of July of that year. It came into force partly on the day of its passing, partly on the 1st of October and partly on the 1st of January 1880. It almost completely realizes the ideal proclaimed by Prince Bismarck and taxes almost everything from articles of prime necessity to articles of the most subtle manufacture. It imposes duties on many articles of consumption and on materials for finished manufacture as well as on the finished manufacture itself. But the whole tariff was voted by large majorities; and there is no reason to think that the nation at large has yet protested against it, although since its passing, the flax duty has been abolished. Papers recently presented to parliament show the increase of the duties imposed on articles already comprised in the Zollverein tariff, and they give the duties on articles hitherto free of those burdens. They enable us to discern that many of the manufactures of Great Britain have been made a special object of attack; and this is peculiarly the case as regards yarns, cotton & woollens and iron. In some cases, for instance in the case of the cheap woollens of Dewsbury & Leeds, the German market has been closed entirely against us. But the prospect of a change in the legislation which brought about this result is most hopeless; and all the movements which the authorities take, prove a steadfast action in the direction of protection; and as such I need only point to a bill lately presented to the Reichstag for controlling the German coasting trade and to a bill for altering the water frontier of the Elbe, both of which, though shelved for the present may become law at a future time.

The efforts made by Prince Bismarck to raise revenue by excise have not been so successful as was anticipated at Heidelberg; and we still await proposals for taxing afresh beer, spirits and sugar. But the plans, though postponed are not given up, and meanwhile the customs duties are calculated to yield an increase of receipts wh. are put at 166,851,000 m.[arks] for 1880-1 as against 106,906,004 in 1877 and 111,585,475 in 1878.

I have etc.,

J. A. CROWE.

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**CHAPTER V**  
**LETTERS, 1881**

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## CHAPTER V

### LETTERS, 1881

New Year, 1881, found the powers still struggling with the problem of compelling the government of Turkey to fulfill obligations assumed at the Congress of Berlin. Jealousies and rivalries prevented anything like a united front; the concert of Europe was a phantom largely because of Bismarck's actions. Perceiving this the wily sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid II, whom Gladstone described as an arch-liar and arch-cheat, sought by tricks and subterfuges to escape obligations of ceding land to Montenegro and Greece and introducing much-needed reforms in his Asiatic possessions. Britain's determination to compel him to yield and her threat to blockade Smyrna had in October, 1880, resulted in a settlement of the Montenegrin boundary dispute, which centered on the surrender of the town of Dulcigno, but this British diplomatic victory had been won by a very narrow margin. Britain had stood virtually alone, with the possibility of an Anglo-Turkish war and a general European conflict looming on the horizon. In the early days of October the position of the Gladstone government had been decidedly uncomfortable, and the aged prime minister heaved a great sigh of relief when the sultan yielded.<sup>1</sup>

With the Montenegrin-Turkish boundary dispute out of the way attention centered on that between Greece and Turkey. Due in the main to French insistence, the Turks at Berlin in 1878 had agreed to cede Epirus and parts of Thessaly to Greece, and this issue had been discussed further at the conference held in the summer of 1880 in the German capital. Although Gladstone was a philhellene he believed it to be the duty of France, who had raised the Greco-Turkish boundary issue, to carry this question to a successful conclusion. He was disappointed. French statesmen equivocated, proved adept at finding excuses. The eyes of France were fixed on Tunis, and her financiers believed that Turkey offered profitable opportunities for investments.<sup>2</sup> In the early months of 1881 it became clear that the French had betrayed Greece. Thus arose a complicated and for the student of history an interesting situation. As in the case of the Montenegrin boundary, it devolved upon Britain to find a solution;

<sup>1</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 139-146.

<sup>2</sup> See Holborn, *Deutschland und die Türkei*, 74-78.

but she dared not risk complete diplomatic isolation and war for the benefit of Greece. Only Bismarck could save the situation. The letters to and from Berlin reveal how the British foreign office implored Bismarck to settle the Greco-Turkish boundary dispute. In February, 1881, the special British ambassador to Constantinople, G. J. Goschen, called on Bismarck and an agreement was reached. But the German ambassador at Constantinople, Count Hatzfeldt, behaved mysteriously; his conduct led Granville and Goschen to suspect that Bismarck was doublecrossing them. The matter dragged and before the "rectification" of the boundary took place various substitutes were suggested for the area which Turkey was to cede; among these were Crete and Cyprus. In theory Gladstone was not averse to transferring Cyprus to Greece.<sup>3</sup> He had repudiated the Cyprus Convention, but to reverse the action whereby Britain had secured control of the island would be politically suicidal for a government which restored the South African Republic and surrendered Candahar to Afghanistan. Finally, with the help of Bismarck, Greece secured some land from Turkey. Actually the German chancellor did not care a fig for the Greek frontier issue, but, as Lord Ampthill repeatedly observed, he was flattered by the attention shown him by Britain and while she sued for his favor she could, of course, not interfere with his effort to re-establish the "Dreikaiserbund," which was accomplished in June, 1881.<sup>4</sup>

Reform in Armenia was the third item on the agenda of Anglo-Turkish complications bequeathed by Beaconsfield and Salisbury to Gladstone and Granville. But a pro-Armenian sentiment did not exist in the capitals of Europe. To make conditions tolerable in Turkish Armenia did not suit the purposes of Russia; instead she would have preferred to take over this entire area. The other powers, except Britain, were courting the Turks, and among leading statesmen Gladstone stood alone in urging tolerable conditions for the Christians of Asiatic Turkey, but single-handed he was powerless. The Armenians were left to their tragic fate.<sup>5</sup>

In March, 1881, France by her occupation of Tunis fulfilled a long-cherished ambition. This step had been urged upon her at the Congress of Berlin by both British and German delegates. Gladstone and Granville disapproved but their hands were tied by actions of their predecessors, nor could they in this case appeal to Bismarck, who had suggested that France take Tunis; the act fitted in with his scheme for the new Europe in which Germany held the key position. Italy, angered and humiliated by the French seizure of Tunis, joined

<sup>3</sup> Temperley and Penson, *Foundations of British Policy*, 398-407; Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 87, 148, 149.

<sup>4</sup> Temperley and Penson, *Foundations of British Policy*, 407-412.

<sup>5</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 151-155.

the German-Austrian combination. The Triple Alliance was established.<sup>6</sup>

At home both Gladstone and Bismarck struggled with issues which tested and at times baffled their skill and strength as statesmen and politicians. The Englishman vainly sought to find a way out of the Irish morass; Bismarck expressed sympathy, and unlike some of his successors he did not try to utilize the Anglo-Irish situation for the benefit of Germany. The German found that to humble the Roman Catholic church was beyond even his massive strength; on this issue his retreat began. One reason for this was that Bismarck espied another foe, Marxian socialism, and with characteristic caution he chose to fight only one enemy at any one time. In this struggle his strategy was to win the workingmen over to the government by a system of social insurance. In 1881 his plan for such a program was well under way. This did not directly concern Britain, but in the judgment of her commercial attaché in Berlin, J. A. Crowe, the indirect results might be incalculable. It will be seen that he warned his superiors of the tremendous increase in power which would come to Bismarck with the accumulation of vast insurance funds immediately under his control.

Late in 1881 Bismarck sent his eldest son, Herbert, to London on a special mission. With almost pathetic eagerness Lord Granville and London society generally lionized the young man, hoping thereby to soften the heart of the grim father. These efforts and their presumed effects are recorded by both Ampthill and Granville. Neither realized that Herbert Bismarck was a Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,<sup>7</sup> hindering instead of promoting the growth of friendly relations between Britain and Germany.

<sup>6</sup> Langer, *European Alliances*, 217-250; Temperley and Penson, *Foundations of British Policy*, 413-415.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of Herbert Bismarck's character and reputation see W. O. Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy* (Philadelphia, 1937), 154-162.



[Copy]

Jan. 12. 81.

MY DEAR ODO,

I believe that the French attempt has failed, & I do not believe in the new proposal having better success.<sup>8</sup> But we do not like to put spokes in the wheel as long as the French think they have any chance of a good result.

If however you will look at the note of the 25th of August at Con—ple you will see in what flagrant contradiction their present language is to it. It appears that B. St. Hillaire [*sic*] consulted nobody.<sup>9</sup>

I hope you will see Prince Bismarck now he is back. He is more likely than anyone else to pull the cart out of the slough, & I shd. be very pleased to learn his views.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 January 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck since his return to Berlin has seen none of my Colleagues,—but I have applied for an interview and am in hourly expectation of his answer.

Nobody seems to believe in the success of the french proposals,—but everybody agrees that the French should be encouraged to take the initiative in trying to effect a settlement of the Greek question. My personal impression is that the flagrant contradiction between the attitude and language of France at Constantinople and Athens now, and in August last is calculated to increase the resistance of the Porte at Constantinople and the War fever of the deluded Greeks at Athens, and I am therefore very glad you have in consequence made timely reservations.—The Berlin award should not be cast aside by the Powers who made it, before they are certain that Turkey and Greece

<sup>8</sup> The French attempt was an effort to settle the question of the Greek frontier by the arbitration of the powers instead of by mediation. On December 31, 1880, however, the prime minister of Greece announced that Greece would refuse arbitration if it were offered. The "new proposal" was made on January 8, 1881, by Count Molly, the French envoy at Athens, asking for a collective and simultaneous representation by the powers to Greece in favor of arbitration. See *P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2799, which contains the correspondence on the Greek question from October, 1880, through January, 1881.

<sup>9</sup> The note of August 25 (*P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2760, no. 179) was a collective note to the Porte, in which the powers insisted that the arrangements of the Berlin Conference must be upheld. Granville refers to a French circular, dated January 7, 1881, which apparently abandoned this stand. For his protest to Lord Lyons, dated January 12, see *P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2799, no. 105. Barthelemy St. Hilaire was French minister of foreign affairs, 1880–1881.

will submit to arbitration, if the Concert is to hold its own in the public opinion of Europe.

In a few days I hope to send you Prince Bismarck's views on the situation. Meanwhile I regret to say that the Emperor has a cold and the "ordensfest" will have to be put off in consequence for 3 or 4 days.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 17 January 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck received me today, and after his usual complaints about the weary work imposed upon him by the obstinacy of his Imperial Master, the incapacity of his Colleagues, the ignorance of Parliament and the imbecility of mankind, he said that he was glad to rest his weary brain by talking over foreign affairs, which constituted the only recreation left him, in his overworked existence.

I said that in the first instance you had requested me in London to thank him for the cordial reception he had given me at Friederichsruhe last October & for the practical views he had then imparted to me,—and in the second instance I wished to tell him that I had received a private letter from you of the 12th inst. telling me how glad you would be to be favoured with his further views on the present condition of Oriental Affairs, because you believed him to be more likely than anyone else to "pull the Cart out of the Slough."

Prince Bismarck replied that he feared you attributed more influence to him than he possessed, that he felt always reluctant to take the responsibility upon himself of giving advice, and that he did not wish to do more than support the Concert in the general interest of peace, which he did most cordially, but that unfortunately he was not a magician (Hexenmeister) and could not settle the Oriental question by a stroke of his wand.

I said that he had over and over again proved himself to be a magician and that at the present moment he exercised a supernatural influence in Austria, France and Turkey, while other Powers would gladly follow his lead, if by a stroke of his wand he would point out the way to a pacific settlement of the Turco-Greek problem.

Prince Bismarck observed modestly that the little influence he possessed was due to the fact that he represented a disinterested Power in Eastern Affairs.

I asked whether as the representative of a disinterested Power he could explain to me why, after the perfect harmony and unanimity which had prevailed at the Berlin Conference in regard to Greece, the french Govt. now held language in flagrant contradiction to the

note they had addressed, in concert with the Powers, to the Porte on the 25th of August last?

Yes, he replied, he could. The french Govt. having discovered that french public opinion cared more for Turkish "Coupons" than for Greek aggrandizement now wished to recover their lost position with the Porte so as to exercise more influence on financial questions at Constantinople later on. This, he thought, explained the two diplomatic currents issuing at present from France,—one which directly threatened Greece with isolation if she did not yield to french advice, and the other indirectly encouraged Turkey to further resistance by boasting at Constantinople of the threats uttered at Athens.

Why, I asked, did he then support France in a policy which would defeat itself, and undo the work of unanimous Europe at Berlin?

Because, he replied, the support of Germany had the effect of flattering the vanity of the French and of taking their attention off the Rhine,—an effect, he would honestly confess to me he attached so much importance to in the interest of Germany and of the peace of Europe that he would go to great lengths to promote and prolong it.

Would he not, I said, prolong the peace of Europe, by promoting a pacific settlement of the Greek question?

Prince Bismarck replied that he thought I overrated the danger to Europe of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. For his part he saw less danger in that conflict than in pressing too strongly on the Greek Govt. to resist national aspirations. If the King of Greece and his Ministers yielded to the prudent advice of the Powers and knocked under to Turkey, the King would become the mandatory of Europe and his government the Ministers of Europe & they would cease to be the King and Ministers of Greece. They would lose all hold over the nation and be driven away. This would cause greater embarrassment to Europe than a Turco-Greek War,—because it would be very difficult to find among the younger Princes of Europe as good a Candidate for the Throne of Greece as King George had already proved himself to be. If on the other hand he yielded to their national aspirations and led the Greeks to war he would strengthen his position, and the Greeks themselves after a defeat or two would be more willing to listen to the prudent advice of the Powers.

Was I to understand, I asked, that he would not endeavour to prevent a War between Turkey and Greece?

"Prevent it, no," he replied, "for the reasons just stated," but advise against it at Athens to the very last.

How would he deal with the Turks, I asked, when they had overrun Greece and occupied Athens?



The Turks, Prince Bismarck replied, should be warned at the outset that Europe cannot admit the destruction of Greece,—that they may defend their own against the Greeks if attacked,—but that the Piraeus and the Greek Ports would be closed to the Turkish fleet, by the presence of the ships of the Maritime Powers. By this means the war would be localized and after a first defeat, Europe might offer her good offices again to Greece.

On what principle, I asked, should the renewed offer of good offices or mediation be based in his opinion?

Prince Bismarck replied that if the Greeks were victorious & the Albanian population of Thessaly and Epirus willing to be annexed by them, which appeared unlikely, Greece might make her own conditions, if on the other hand, which was more probable, the Turks were victorious,—the defeated Greeks would be obliged to accept whatever conditions Europe might be able to obtain for them.—In the first instance he held that Greece should accept the territory the Porte had already declared themselves willing to cede to her. For those portions of the Berlin award the Sultan desired to retain, to satisfy the Albanian influence which was all powerful at Court, His Majesty should be told that he must compensate Greece elsewhere.—

Where? I asked.—“Would I be *shocked*” Prince Bismarck replied if he thought that Crete should be ceded to Greece by way of compensation?

That, I said, must of course depend on the wishes of the people of Crete, and on the consent of Her Majesty’s Government.

Of course, Prince Bismarck said, England and the Powers must consent. At present Greece would object that the compensation is inadequate, but when she finds that Europe will not undertake to fight the Albanians for her, and that she cannot vanquish them herself, she will submit to accepting what she can get.—The Sultan, who does not attach much importance to Crete, will be glad to pacify his Albanian Advizers, whose power for evil he dreads, and the Albanians will be glad to retain Janina in exchange for Crete, which they do not care about.

But this state of feeling, Prince Bismarck went on to say, could not be produced by diplomatic negotiations since neither Greece or [*sic*] Turkey would listen to reason. And as none of the Powers were inclined to employ force, events must take their natural course until war ensued between Greece and Turkey, and war would induce the Powers to resort to measures for the settlement of the question, which they otherwise shrank from in times of peace. These were, Prince Bismarck said, his *views* in regard to the future. Advice he must respectfully decline to give, beyond recommending for the present the acceptance of the new Turkish proposal to seek once more

a pacific solution in conversation with the Representatives of the Powers at Constantinople. If it failed, it would at least in the absence of any better proposal, tide over the next few weeks and give Greece time for further reflection. I asked whether his views were known to, and shared by any of the other Powers?

He replied that not intending to give advice he had not enquired, but he thought it probable that Austria and Russia would think as he did. Of course if the Powers had any practical proposals to make he would always be ready to support the European Concert which he attached great importance to.

Prince Bismarck then enquired about home affairs and spoke with very deep interest and feeling about the State of Ireland, which he hoped might soon be all Her Majesty's Government desired. Incidentally he mentioned that one of his ancestors had fought and bled in the battle of the Boyne.

I thanked and took my leave. The impression I derive from Prince Bismarck's observations and admissions is:

1st. that he does not believe that Turco-Greek question can be settled by diplomatic negotiation.

2nd. that war is not only inevitable, but in his opinion rather desirable than not in the interest of the King of Greece.

3rd. that he has secretly agreed with Austria and Russia, after war has rendered Turkey and Greece amenable to mediation, to step in and propose to settle the question by leaving Janina and Metzovo to Turkey and claiming Crete for Greece in exchange.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

18 C. H. T. [CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE],

*Private.*

*Jan. 19 1881.*

MY DEAR ODO,

I was glad to get your prompt answer from the Chancellor.

Münster was sure that he would make no proposal. I thought it possible that he would do so:—

1st from being anxious to promote the business.—2nd because he might like the splash of being the principal actor.

I am curious to know what answer he will give you to the telegraphic question which I am about to send you.

After asking his advice we wish to avoid running counter to it.

If he is going on with the affair pray ask him privately whether he thinks the affair might be oiled by money payments from the Greek to the Turk. The latter want cash, and for the former to pay, instead of to fight, would be as the old parody says "Much more economical when all the bills are paid."

The King of Greece always admitted that this might be done and financial people would be much more willing to advance money for pacific than for warlike purposes.

Our Embassy at Constantinople has no relations with the Palace, but I was told the other day on good authority of an undiplomatic character, that the intimate circle round the Sultan are convinced that much as he will object and refuse, he has such a fear of another war that at the last moment he would yield even to unaided Greek action.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) G[**RANVILLE**].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 23rd January 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of the 19th. Count Münster was right in thinking that Prince Bismarck would decline to make a proposal. Nevertheless I agree with you that Prince Bismarck would like the "splash of being principal actor" if he thought the question ripe enough to be plucked for his own personal glory. But when he has got all the wires into his own hand and feels sure of success, he will step in and propose to leave Janina and Metzovo to Turkey and to compensate Greece with the Island of Crete. This solution has already I believe been agreed to between him, Austria and Russia,—but I do not feel so sure that Haymerle shares Bismarck's wish to let Greece & Turkey fight first so as to facilitate the mediation or intervention of the Powers afterwards.

Sir Henry Elliot and Lord Dufferin will be able to say how matters stand.

I have myself such a horror of war that I devoutly hoped the European Concert would have had the courage of its opinion and stepped in to prevent it, but alas! I fear it is too late since France has openly thrown over Greece and encouraged Turkey to further resistance.

It now remains to be seen whether the Concert will, in the eleventh hour, have the courage of its opinion or not?

I fear, not.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Jan. 26/81.

MY DEAR ODO,

Thanks for your very clever interesting, but not quite satisfactory letter—I am sorry to see that Prince B.[ismarck] is so little averse to a Greek Turkish war. It may be localized, but there is no certainty of its being so.

The Austrians certainly do not view the chance of its occurring with the same equanimity.

A short time ago Alfred Rothschild<sup>10</sup> told me he had received a letter from his Agent (the banker whom you mentioned to me) and then gave me the contents, which had nothing new.

I answered that I was always glad to get such information, and added that I was always glad to have so valuable an opinion as that of Prince Bismarck whose influence and judgment were great.

He asked me whether he could send any message to Prince B. through his agent.

I said I had no message to send, but that if he chose to be indiscreet as to what I had told him he was perfectly at liberty to be so.

The result was that he came back, and read me a long letter from Bleichröder recounting a conversation he had had with Bismarck—It was to the same effect as his conversation with you, but more prudent and guarded. It is possible that he may write again, you had perhaps better not mention to P. B. that I have mentioned this, of course I shall let you know anything that reaches me in this way, but I do not mean to encourage it.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 29 January 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of the 26th inst. Bleichröder, who, as our Consul General is always most anxious to make himself useful to H. M. Govt., told me of his conversation with Prince Bismarck, and I noticed as you did that the Chancellor's language had been more prudent and guarded to him than to me,—and also that he had not mentioned the cession of Crete to Greece. Bismarck's indifference to the prospects of a Turco-Greek War greatly alarmed Bleichröder who, as a Banker, is a man of Peace.

Bleichröder reports very fully to the Rothschilds both in London and at Paris and I dare say tells them what he would not always venture to tell us in Berlin.

I cannot therefore but think that if you encouraged Alfred Rothschild's communications you might get at some useful information from Berlin, which I, for one, should be very glad to know.—One can never have too many irons in the fire as regards sources of information.

I have ventured to suggest that Mr. Goschen might take Berlin on his way to Constantinople if you saw no objection to it, because I

<sup>10</sup> Alfred Charles de Rothschild (1842-1918) was associated with his brother, Nathan Meyer, who was the head of the London house of the family. Alfred was also interested in art and society.

think he would find it useful to talk over the situation with Prince Bismarck whose influence with the Porte is greater than that of either Austria or Russia at present.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 31 January 1881.

DEAR LORD GRAINVILLE,

Thanks for your acknowledgement of my "disagreeable Letter" of the 26th just received.—More will follow I fear because we have entered upon a disagreeable phase of the question.

Count Stirum confided to me that Prince Bismarck thinks it so disagreeable that he positively refuses to talk about it and says he has other far more important home questions to think about at present.

The massacre of the Berlin award, now called in Diplomacy "*La St Barthélemy de St. Hilaire*,"—the hot haste with which Germany Austria and Russia accepted the Turkish proposal to reopen a discussion the European Concert had closed for ever on the 25th of August last, and Bismarck's proposal, before even that discussion had commenced, to discuss the localization of the very war it is intended to prevent, are disagreeable symptoms for the future. We must be prepared for surprises.

"A friend" has confided to me that Bismarck had told the Emperor that the European Powers acting in Concert had proved themselves to be useful as a deliberative Body,—but impotent as an executive Body having only agreed to the *Dulcigno* Demonstration on condition that no shot be fired and no sailor landed,—and had rejected the *Smyrna* Demonstration because it implied coercion. Now, he for one, would not go in for coercion, even though he had now come round to the conviction that the Greek question could not be settled without coercion,—and the less so, he explained, since the Turks felt confirmed in their belief by the attitude of France, that they could keep the Concert in check by procrastination and passive resistance until a change of Government in England, relieved them of the pressure of Mr. Gladstone's Oriental policy.

If therefore, he said, the coming discussions at Constantinople still left the frontier question unsettled, the Powers adhering to their "non-coercion" principle, and moral means having failed, then, he thought, coercion would ensue between Greece & Turkey in the shape of War, and the measures to localize it the Powers would of necessity be compelled to resort to in the general interest of peace would bring about the settlement, moral means alone had failed to effect.

Meanwhile, he thought, that the attempt should be made to pacify and satisfy Greece by persuading the Sultan to compensate her, for the modifications of the Berlin award, by the cession of Crete.

That is all I have been able to learn since my last private letter to you.

Sincerely yours,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*Feb. 12. 81.*

MY DEAR ODO,

Münster has just told me that he has a messenger tonight for Berlin. Goschen wrote me no despatch, but a long & satisfactory account in a private letter of his interview with Prince B. with whom he was delighted. He seems to have passed under the wand of the magician. Haymerle seems rather to kick against beginning with Greece, & objects to the cession of Crete, but I presume these objections have not much backbone. I am sanguine (but that is my nature) that now B. has put his shoulder to the wheel, success will be attained. It will be an important event if this be the case.

The Govt. appeared to be shaky before beginning of Parlt. It is now strong. There is some truth in what Beaconsfield said the other day "You have troubles, but they are come too soon—they do you no harm & do us no harm. If they had come two years later, they wld have enabled us to turn you out." In the meanwhile he is going to give us a tremendous licking in the H. of Lds. on Candahar,<sup>11</sup> which will do us no harm at all. I cannot help thinking that it is intended to take off the edge of the appetite of the Peers before they have to deal with Bills, which he may think it better not to hunt. I expect a very long private letter from you by the next Messenger.

Yrs,

(sd) G[GRANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 February 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In my last private Letter of the 31st ult. I said that we must be prepared for surprises. The first has come in the shape of Bismarck's "new departure."

<sup>11</sup> The Gladstone government announced in the speech from the throne that British troops would be withdrawn from Candahar, which meant from Afghanistan. This was vigorously opposed by the queen (*Letters*, 2d Ser., III, 180-182) and by Lord Beaconsfield, whose speech on March 4 (*Hansard*, 3rd. Ser., CCLIX, 289-300) was followed in the house of lords by a vote of censure, carried 165-79; the government, however, rallied support in the house of commons with a large majority. See Sir Frederick Ponsonby, *Sidelights on Queen Victoria* (New York, 1930), 183-212; Philip Guedalla, *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone* (London, 1933), 35; *Annual Register*, 1881, 158-174.

Seized with a sudden interest in a question he would scarcely listen to before, and breaking through his past reserve, he takes the lead overnight, and initiates a proposal which will necessitate the use of a fleet and may involve contingent coercion.<sup>12</sup>

My colleagues are surprized and startled and quite at a loss to explain the change come over the Chancellor.

To my mind it is evident that he has been immensely flattered by your wish, intimated by me, repeated by Mr. Goschen, and urged by us both, that he should take the initiative and "enjoy the splash of being principal actor," as you anticipated in your Letter to me of the 19th January.

If H. M. G. can give Prince Bismarck's proposal a cordial and sustained support, knowing as I do the tenacity of purpose and love of success in his character, I feel convinced that we may look forward to the settlement of the Greek frontier question before the Session of Parliament at home is over.

Hitherto he would not make a proposal or take a leading part because he did not believe in the European Concert as an executive Body and he did not like to associate his name with failure.

Although he knew that Austria and Russia would follow his lead, he did not feel so sure of the support of England and France and he knew that Italy would always adhere to England. But the relative position of the Powers to each other is altered since France has taken upon herself to denounce their Berlin policy, to bully Greece and to encourage Turkish resistance, and above all since England herself has come forward and invited Germany to make a proposal and take the lead. At this juncture therefore the visit of Mr. Goschen had the effect I had anticipated of deciding Prince Bismarck to accept your invitation and try his hand at a settlement, because the earnestly and openly proffered support of England, implying that of Italy, added to the already secured support of his Allies Austria and Russia, places elements of success at his disposal he did not think he could reckon on with certainty while France hampered the action of the Powers by her vacillating policy.—Those are, I believe the motives that have determined his "new departure."<sup>13</sup> Mr. Goschen read me his Letter to you giving an admirable account of his con-

<sup>12</sup> On February 7 Goschen reported that Bismarck had agreed to take the initiative and that his proposal to the other powers would be that the ambassadors at Constantinople should agree on a new frontier line, giving Greece as much territory as she had been awarded by the Berlin Conference but substituting Crete for Epirus to avoid trouble over the Albanians. The assent of Greece was to be obtained first, and then she would be given assurances of moral support against Turkey. Bismarck admitted that he was thinking of more than moral support but declined to be specific (*P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2915, no. 76). Bismarck's letter to Münster on February 8 expounded this proposal, with which he was sending Hatzfeldt on to Constantinople (*Gr. Pol.* IV, 22-24). See also *Goschen*, I, 211-215; *Granville*, II, 226-227; *Langer*, 203-204.

<sup>13</sup> This letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 227-228, to this point.

versations with Prince Bismarck.—As an Ex-Cabinet Minister and Member of Parliament coming straight from you, with an accurate knowledge of the intentions of H. M. Govt., he was able to speak with the authority Prince Bismarck required to induce him to alter his course.

You will, I trust, agree that the results achieved have justified my wish and suggestion that Mr. Goschen should come to Berlin.

I did my very best to prepare a cordial reception for Mr. Goschen by the Emperor, the Empress, the Crown Prince and Prince Bismarck during his short stay, so as to prove to the public that notwithstanding the present hostility of the Press, the visit of a Special Envoy from Her Majesty's Government was welcome to the Court and Government of Germany.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 February 1881.<sup>14</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Yours of the 12th instant reached me through Münster's Messenger. I am as sanguine of success as you are, that is, if H. M. Govt. can give Bismarck's leadership the confidence and sustained support necessary to keep his vanity up to the mark till success ensues.

For ten years I have preached confidence in Bismarck as a means of success in foreign policy,—but in vain!—I never could overcome the deep rooted distrust his wish for a cordial understanding with England inspired at home.—The coming settlement of the Greek question in Concert with Germany will, I trust, remove that feeling of distrust for the future.—

In regard to Haymerle's hesitations, Bismarck says that he is a Statesman who never can take in a new idea at first sight, and adds significantly—"Hitherto I have only explained my proposal to him *once*!"

The Powers will doubtless follow Bismarck's lead so long as he proceeds by moral means only, and if the Constantinople "Pourparlers" result in a pacific agreement between Turkey and Greece, well and good.

But that is unlikely because the Turk won't give in, and the Greek can't give in, so that when the "Pourparlers" have served their present purpose, the Powers will have either to enforce their new frontier line resulting from the "Pourparlers" or to let Turkey and Greece fight and then proceed to localize the War.—Both these measures will require the employment of Ships, and will therefore put the Unity of action of the Concert to the test.

<sup>14</sup> Except for the first paragraph, this letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 228.



Bismarck did not seem to expect that all the Powers would be willing to join in the necessary naval measures, but said that in his opinion the cooperation of all was not necessary to ensure success.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[The situation at Constantinople was described in the following letter from Goschen to Granville. Note in Goschen's handwriting:]

"Please send copy of this. I write it at the last moment."

*Secret.* BRITISH EMBASSY, CONSTANTINOPLE, 25 Feby. [1881].

MY DEAR GRANVILLE,

I don't know whether my despatches have alarmed you, either in the direction of the other Ambassadors being too timid or in my taking a different tone from them, but I foresaw the possibility of our being *obliged* to make a stand.

Now I want once more to ask you a startling question. Is it out of the question to do something with Cyprus?

Suppose at the last moment Turkey and Greece cannot be brought to agree or, if the Turks will not give enough even to satisfy the Powers, if there is a deadlock, would it not be a fine coup de Theatre, much finer than Dizzy's in seizing it, if we were to throw in Cyprus to avoid a European war. You in England must know whether the country would stand it, but I have a strong opinion that if they would a powerful plea can be made for the course. In the first place we should place Europe under a great obligation & give the most striking proof of our disinterestedness. Still more we should undo in the minds of the Turks the immense harm that was done by the acquisition. Since then our motives have been always doubted & our sincerity questioned. Again, we should, not in a shabby way, but in a brilliant way, get rid of a most embarrassing Convention, the embarrassments of which have only begun. What are we to do in Armenia? What an immense advantage if we could get off from our separate line, more or less imposed by the Convention, & only have the responsibility with the other Powers. The difficulty of finding the means of carrying out the reforms in Armenia is growing to such an extent that it will almost justify us from openly retiring from the task of separately intervening then, when we see we do as much harm as good.

Pray think all this over. It was one of my motives in sending you a messenger today, to be able to throw out this hint to you in an absolutely secret manner so that no one should know it had even been mooted, if you do not approve of it or think it possible. I had intended to develop the idea at much greater length & to state the reasons in its favour very fully, but my time has run short. Gladstone, I should think, would like the idea.

It would be a tremendously strong point if we could tell the constituencies that we had assisted in doing justice to Greeks [*sic*], avoided an European war by repairing an error wh we all denounced at our election.

I am obliged to be rather strong in my language before my colleagues, to keep them fairly up to the mark. For instance when they said that the naval demonstration had not done much good at Cattaro. I reminded them of the Sultan's saying that ironclads could not go up mountains, but that did not apply to the Greek question, & I am continually asking them whether their Governmts would stand the Turks at Athens. You must pull me up if you want a different attitude taken, but I strongly deprecate any change of tone. I do all I can, & I think not without success, to compel Hatzfeldt to come out.

Yours very truly,

GEORGE GOSCHEN.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*March 2/81.<sup>15</sup>*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

It is not without a pang that I give up the old name.<sup>16</sup> I remember Clarendon<sup>17</sup> showing me a letter which I had brought him from a Russian who had known him as George Villiers, attached to the Embassy at St. Petersburg.

It began "My dear Williams, I know you have changed your name, but to me you will always remain the same dear "Williams" of my youth."

You will see by Goschen's despatches<sup>18</sup> that the Ambassadors do not appear to be as docile as I had hoped, and Hatzfeldt seems either apathetic, or cautious. You can assure Bismarck that he may depend upon our support and that we shall be most glad to hear from him as to any manner of helping him to carry out his views.

Every one here as you may suppose, is much depressed by the South African news. The general opinion is that Colley who was a very clever fellow, was deplorably rash.

He told Lytton in India that a Brigade was sufficient to march through Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The first two paragraphs of this letter are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 232.

<sup>16</sup> Russell was created Baron Ampthill on March 11, 1881.

<sup>17</sup> The fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800-1870), who succeeded to the title in 1838, had been attaché at St. Petersburg, 1820-1823. See Sir Herbert Maxwell, *The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon* (London, 1913).

<sup>18</sup> See *P. P.*, 1881, XCVIII, c. 2915, for almost daily dispatches from Goschen at this time.

<sup>19</sup> The news was of the defeat of the British at Majuba Hill, February 27, 1881, where Sir George Pomeroy Colley had lost his life. Colley had been in India as military secretary and then private secretary to the Earl of Lytton (see above, "1873," n. 52), who was viceroy, 1876-1880. In April, 1880, Colley had succeeded Sir Garnet Wolseley as high commissioner for southeastern Africa. See Sir W. F. Butler, *The Life of Sir George Pomeroy Colley, 1835-1881* (London, 1899).

There is some suspicion which I hope will not turn out to be true, that he was anxious to anticipate any peace negotiations and the partnership of Wood in the victory.<sup>20</sup>

We are to have a night's debate on Candahar and a good beating, but we attach more importance to the victory in Cumberland.<sup>21</sup>

We have been alarmed by an account of Mrs. Bobsy Meade<sup>22</sup> being ill today with much fever. She was confined about a week ago—But they can find nothing really wrong about her.

Gladstone's has been a wonderful recovery.<sup>23</sup>

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Telegram to Lord Amthill*

*Private.*

*March 5, 1881.*

Musurus'<sup>24</sup> language is to the effect that the Powers are making a mistake to ask the Turks to make proposals. They naturally are afraid to state how far they will go in concessions. He thinks we should make proposals to them.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, 5 March 1881.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

A thousand thanks for your congratulations. Grateful as I am for the honour conferred upon me, I *do* feel the pang you describe at giving up my good old name, and cannot yet make up my mind to sign the new one,—besides which my German friends will call me "*Herr Baron*" which I rather resent!

The presence of our Princes has been most pleasant and the Wedding festivities brilliant and wonderfully successful,<sup>25</sup> but so absorb-

<sup>20</sup> Sir Evelyn Wood (1838-1919) had been appointed second in command to Colley and had arrived at Cape Town February 7. He was in direct communication with Colley ten days later but was sent back to expedite provisions and so was not present at the disaster. He subsequently negotiated the settlement with the Boers, went to Egypt (1882-1886), commanded at Colchester and then at Aldershot (1886-1893); he entered the war office as quartermaster general in 1893, became adjutant-general in 1897, and in 1903 was raised to the rank of field marshal. His memoirs were published under the title *From Midshipman to Field Marshal* (New York, 1906).

<sup>21</sup> At a by-election in East Cumberland on February 26 a seat formerly in the hands of the Conservatives was won by a Liberal by the narrow margin of 3,071 to 3,041.

<sup>22</sup> Mrs. Robert Henry Meade, the former Caroline Grenfell, died on March 5. Her husband, second son of the Earl of Clanwilliam, had been Granville's private secretary, 1864-1866 and 1868-1871, and then became assistant undersecretary of state for the colonies; he was permanent undersecretary in the colonial office 1892-1897.

<sup>23</sup> When alighting from his carriage at Downing Street on February 23, Gladstone slipped and struck his head a severe blow against the curb. He recovered slowly but steadily, a matter of relief in view of his serious illness the preceding summer. See Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 566, and the *Annual Register*, 1881, Chronicle, 14-15.

<sup>24</sup> Constantine Musurus Pasha (1807-1891) had been the Turkish envoy in London since 1851, holding the rank of ambassador, 1856-1885.

<sup>25</sup> On February 27 Prince William of Prussia, later Emperor William II (1859-1941), eldest son of the crown prince and grandson of Queen Victoria, married Princess Augusta Victoria (1858-1921), daughter of the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein.

ing that I have not found a moment to write to you.—Bismarck is now every day in the "Reichstag" fighting his Colleagues and has no time for foreign affairs so that I cannot answer your last despatches by today's Messenger. He certainly expected the Ambassadors would have followed Hatzfeldt's<sup>28</sup> lead and subordinated their opinion to his and he is clearly vexed at their not at once adopting his very simple and practical suggestion of drawing a line, getting Greece to accept it and then, and then only putting pressure on the Porte.

To negotiate first with the Porte, as the Ambassadors prefer to do, will "land their Excellencies in interminable delays" as Mr. Goschen truly predicts, and that is why Bismarck declines all responsibility for a mode of proceeding he protests against as impotent, and he will tell Hatzfeldt to rest on his oars until the Ambassadors come round to his Leadership and agree with Greece before they settle with Turkey.

The Prince of Wales told me that he had been well satisfied with his visit to Bismarck and glad to hear from him that he would stand by the King of Greece in his coming troubles.

In a day or two I shall be able to answer your last telegrams.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

*Telegram from LORD O. RUSSELL*

*Private.*

*March 6. 1881.*

Your private tel. of yesterday. Musurus Pacha's view corresponds with those of P. Bismarck. He also thinks the Powers shd make proposals to the Porte, after first agreeing with Greek Govt. as to new line of frontier Greece wd accept. He thinks that without a previous agreement among each other & with Greece, the Amb<sup>rs</sup> will achieve nothing by the present negotiations with the Porte beyond interminable delays. He says that he agrees with Mr Goschen to instruct Count Hatzfeldt in that sense, but that other Ambassadors at Constantinople have practically declined to support Count Hatzfeldt and are following a line of their own. He believes that if the Amb<sup>rs</sup>. wd support Ct. Hatzfeldt and act on suggestions of Mr. Goschen agreed to at Berlin, some programme might be made. But so long as the Amb<sup>rs</sup> are not united in Constple. the Turks will not believe in the unity of the Powers and will take advantage of [the lack of] it.

<sup>28</sup> The ambassadors appeared intent on getting Turkish consent first instead of last. See Taffs, *Russell*, 298.

*Private.*

7 March 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Mr. Crowe, who has access to the lobbies of the Reichstag, has written me the enclosed private Letter on the "Situation in Berlin" which I think will interest you.

Yours sincerely,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Copy]

*Confidential.*

BERLIN, March 7 1881.

MY DEAR LORD ODO

I do not think it will be without interest to you to get in a condensed form what I have been able to gather in my political circle as to the present state of parties and the currents which run at the present moment in Berlin. The situation seems to me to be sufficiently grave to warrant some special attention to it, particularly as changes in some high offices of state now appear to be dependent on certain changes in the relations of parties to each other, and the policy of Prince Bismarck must necessarily be affected and shaped by the circumstances which present themselves to his view.

I have often heard conservatives say that the time was coming when their party would resume the sway which it lost 30 years ago. Yet nothing seemed to justify these opinions even within these few weeks past when we saw Prince Bismarck sacrifice one of the most decided conservatives who still clung to the Prussian administration. But the fact appears to be that Prince Bismarck, whilst he is obviously inclined to reestablish an alliance with the conservative party, also wishes to do so on the express condition that the men whom he selects from that party shall be pliant and willing instruments of his home policy. Count Eulenburg<sup>27</sup> was one of the few men left in office who ventured to have a will of his own. Amongst the measures which the Chancellor had at heart was one for incorporating for purposes of customs into the territory of the Empire, the district of Wandsbeck. Your Lordship is aware that a motion for carrying out this proposal has just been made by Prince B. in the Bundesrath. One of the Chancellor's most active agents in the neighbourhood of Wandsbeck was the Landrath, whose devotion to him was increased by a considerable share in the hospitality of Friederichsrue. As the Landrath was an aged man he asked Prince B. to use his all powerful influence to transfer his office to a son, & Prince B. consented & told Count Eulenburg of his purpose to that effect. Count

<sup>27</sup> Count Botho Eulenburg (1831-1912) minister of the interior 1878-1881, when he became president of Hesse-Nassau; again minister of the interior and Prussian minister-president, 1892-1894.

Eulenburg declared that the appointment of a Landrath so far as it lay in the hands of the Ministry & not in that of the local authorities was his business. That the patronage was his & not Prince Bismarck's. He refused the Chancellor's candidate and appointed one of his own. From that moment his fall was a mere question of time. The Conservatives were not so attached to Count Eulenburg as to sacrifice themselves for his sake. They let him go without a murmur. But they did so because they saw or thought they saw that their time had come. Rumours had been abroad that the Chancellor was again negotiating with the Roman curia. It was difficult to ascertain whether this was true. But suddenly it appeared in print that the Chapter of Paderborn was about to do what it had hitherto refused, that is to proceed to the election of a capitular vicar in the room of the Bishop who recently died leaving the see vacant. Doubts were expressed as to whether the news was true. But surely enough the Chapter of Paderborn had taken the step I have mentioned and elected Kaspar Drove a member of the Paderborn chapter. It was therefore clear that something was going on, or that something was being done to secure some sort of *modus vivendi* between the Roman Catholics and Prince Bismarck.<sup>28</sup> Subsequent or concomitant circumstances show that there is some probability that the conservatives and ultramontanes are now in league with the Chancellor to produce or create a new parliamentary party. The National Liberals, several of whom I have met lately are convinced that this league exists and they already foresee that it will be of serious consequence to themselves and to the Empire. I shall try to describe some of the symptoms which indicate the existence of the crisis I have mentioned. When Count Eulenburg resigned it was settled that von Puttkammer<sup>29</sup> should have the refusal of the ministry of the Interior, and that his under-secretary Mr. von Gossler<sup>30</sup> should take the ministry of public worship. But as circumstances appeared to point to an understanding with the ultramontane party von Puttkammer expressed a wish to keep his present office and measures were taken to satisfy this natural desire; by entrusting the interim of the ministry of the Interior to the finance Minister Bitter<sup>31</sup> preparatory to further change by which Bitter

<sup>28</sup> In July, 1880, the "May laws" had been modified and relations between church and state were improving rapidly. The late bishop of Paderborn, Conrad Martin, had been a leader in the earlier struggle against Bismarck. See Tafts, *Russell*, 23, 275-277.

<sup>29</sup> Robert von Puttkammer (1828-1900) was minister of public worship, 1879-1881, and of the interior, June, 1881-1888; president of Pomerania, 1891-1899.

<sup>30</sup> Gustav von Gossler (1838-1902), assistant in the ministry of the interior, 1874-1879, undersecretary for public worship, 1879-June, 1881, when he succeeded von Puttkammer; as "Kultus" minister, 1881-1891, he carried through Bismarck's policies.

<sup>31</sup> Karl Herman Bitter (1813-1885), minister of finance, 1879-1882, had been under-secretary of the interior, 1877-1879.

shd. get the Interior permanently & under Secretary Scholz<sup>22</sup> finance. Meanwhile however the political situation underwent a further change. If a conservative-ultramontane party or coalition could be attained, it seemed to Prince B. a very desirable combination; & if such a combination were attainable, a colourless minister like Mr. Bitter might make room for a more decided partisan. The interim of the Interior was therefore withheld at the last moment from Mr. Bitter whose removal at no very remote date is now apparent. Scholz was secretly designated to take Mr. Bitter's place when it shd be thought necessary to make the change, & Prince Bismarck sent for Mr. von Wolff now president of the government at Trèves, & an ardent conservative and offered him the Interior. Ostensibly the ground for choosing Wolff is that he is a noble, & there is a tradition that the Prussian Home Office should be in the hands of a Prussian Edelmänn. In truth Wolff is one of the trusty chiefs of the Conservative party. The question that remained was. Would Wolff take office; for it is apparent that office under Prince B. is of precarious tenure. Till late last night that question remained undecided, in so far as Wolff continued to refuse the offer made to him on the ground that his wife was of delicate health & unable to bear the fatigues of society.<sup>23</sup> The Emperor & Prince Bismarck still hope to persuade him to yield. If their efforts shd be unsuccessful they will fall back on the earlier combination I have sketched. Puttkammer will again be asked to take the home office. Von Gossler who has shown energy on the Government side as President of the Reichstag, to which he was recently elected by the conservatives and ultramontanes will remain under secretary & search will be made for some tractable man as minister of public worship. We are therefore as the French would say "en pleine réaction" and what Germany has to expect is a purification of liberal elements & a run of measures combining conservatism with a judicious mixture of flattery to the working man. Every speech which Prince Bismarck has lately made, every measure which he has drafted is to captivate the working man whose life is to be insured agt. accidents, whose burden of taxation is to be lightened, whose school fees are to be paid by the State. None of these measures have a chance of passing in their present form unless they are carried by a coalition of the ultramontanes with the conservatives. But I observe that the National Liberals are convinced at this moment that the coalition will take place & that the measures may therefore pass. The national Liberal party has been weakened by the secession from its

<sup>22</sup> Adolf von Scholz (1833-1924) entered the ministry of finance in 1871, became head of the treasury in 1879, minister of state in 1880, and minister of finance, 1882-1890. See his *Erlebnisse und gespräche mit Bismarck*, edited by Wilhelm von Scholz (Stuttgart, 1922).

<sup>23</sup> von Wolff became president of Saxe.

ranks last autumn of the more advanced members who inclined to the progressionists. Their weakness is increased by the fact that most of them conscientiously believe that Prince Bismarck is a statesman whose services are indispensable to Germany in a crisis of foreign affairs. Now as they think this crisis imminent because they believe that France is on the eve of striking and that Eastern Affairs must lead inevitably to war, they are placed in this dilemma, that they feel bound for the sake of Germany to preserve a minister whose home measures they abhor, & whose immorality in changing friends is abominable, and they do not know how to combine a staunch support of Ct Bismarck as Foreign Minister with an equally staunch opposition of Prince Bismarck as home minister. Yet there is every reason for them, if they can to save Germany from a dangerous reaction. I shall only recapitulate three things which might or ought to decide them if they preferred the constitutional welfare of Germany to the glory of her position amongst European states.

Prince Bismarck has presented to the Reichstag a bill which for two years past he vainly strove to pass—a bill for increasing the duration of the Prussian parliament & making its sessions & consequently the financial budgets biennial—The national liberals hate the bill which curtails the constitutional privileges slight as they are of the Prussian parliament.

Prince Bismarck proposes to recognize the old guilds and deprive all "masters" who refuse to accept their constraint of the right of engaging apprentices. This bill involves a change in the constitution, a change which established fifteen years ago freedom of motion & action to the working classes. The national liberals would oppose this enactment if they could by all the means in their power.

Prince Bismarck has a bill before the Bundesrath which will be presented to the Reichstag before Easter. It enacts that all workmen's lives are to be insured agt. accidents in an insurance department to be administered by the state. It is calculated that the number of persons who will be constrained to insure will not be less than 4 millions. Actuaries say that the joint contributions of these 4 million people will in less than 15 years give a capital of 300 millions whilst they estimate that the payments in the same space of time will hardly exceed 25 millions. The national liberals are aghast at the notion that this sum of 300 millions should be in the hands of a single minister. Prince Bismarck now can lay his hands at once, in the event of war, on 120,000,000 stored in gold in the fortress of Spandau. People say that he would find no difficulty in laying hands on the 500,000,000 invested & put out to interest for the payment of pensions to military invalids. They think that a minister who should be able to use these sums, would likewise be able to divert to uses



not contemplated at the time the further sum of 300,000,000 M[arks] & that it is dangerous to put the temptation of handling 920,000,000 of public money into the hands of one administration. It is not for me to say whether the national liberals are right or wrong. But I can understand with what feelings they look upon the passing of measures to facilitate this state of things & I know that they as well as the progressists look very anxiously into the future. It may be that their fears are excessive. War may not be imminent. France may not stir. Peace may be preserved in the East. But not the less shall we have in Germany a reaction which must lead to agitation, & agitation based on questions of such moment as I have sketched is not a thing to be looked at with indifferent eyes.

I have the honour to be my Lord,

Most truly yours,

(sd) J. A. CROWE.

[Copy]

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

F. O., *March 9/81.*

Corti <sup>24</sup> told his Govt. that he only supported the deviation from the Bismarck plan when Hatzfeldt consented to do so. The French remark upon Hatzfeldt's half & half attitude that it looks as if the Chancellor was not serious in wishing to avoid the war between Greece and Turkey.

Münster on the other hand says that the Chancellor thinks the French are at the bottom of the whole opposition.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

18 C. H. T. [CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE],

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

*March 9/81.*

I am very glad to get your last letter & telegrams. It looks as if Bismarck was in earnest—about which much doubt was suggested.

The French explain Hatzfeldt's attitude to the fact that Bismarck does not wish to prevent the war.

Tissot <sup>25</sup> says there is one Ambassador and a half against 4 and a ½ at Constantinople.

<sup>24</sup> Count Luigi Corti (1823-1888) the Italian ambassador at Constantinople represented Italy at Stockholm, 1864-1867, Madrid, 1867-1869, Washington, 1870-1875, Constantinople, 1875-1885, and London, 1886-1887.

<sup>25</sup> Charles Joseph Tissot (1828-1884), the French ambassador at Constantinople, 1880-February, 1882, had been secretary at the London embassy, 1869-1871, minister to Morocco, 1871-1876, and to Greece, 1876-1880; he was ambassador at London, 1882-1883.

I remember Lobanoff telling me that Hatzfeldt was not so clever as was supposed, but a singularly cautious man, who never goes beyond his instructions which made him so acceptable to his chief.

The great thing to impress on Bismarck is that we sincerely wish for success, that we wish to back him up, or to take the lead in any particular matter just as he thinks most judicious.

For somewhat similar reasons we have probably the most power in Greece—He in Turkey.

As to the Powers he has much more power than we have in Austria and France, not so much in Italy. Russia would not like to go against either of us.

You might suggest that it would be rather humiliating, if when Germany and England are working thoroughly together under his advice, we should prove to be impotent.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 March 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I was much obliged for your encouraging Message to Bismarck in your Letter of the 9th inst. for he wanted a fillip to remove the impression produced on his suspicious mind by Tissot and Corti's attitude at Constantinople. It now appears that on Hatzfeldt's reporting that his French and Italian Colleagues were taking an independent line of their own, and Hohenlohe reporting that the French Govt. were about to make a Loan of a Milliard, Bismarck concluded that France was preparing for the war, foreshadowed in Barthelmy St. Hilaire's celebrated despatches, and he instructed Hatzfeldt to watch events in silence. Your message, and renewed assurances on the part of my French and Italian Colleagues here, that Tissot and Corti had been instructed from Paris and Rome to support Hatzfeldt and Goschen, have happily set matters right again and revived Bismarck's confidence in the European Concert.

Busch<sup>\*\*</sup> told me privately that Bismarck had said to him that in a fortnight or so the Ambassadors at Constantinople would find out that "the Turks are leading them by the nose" and would then consent to draw the line themselves, they still fondly hoped the Turks would draw for them. When the Ambassadors have drawn the line and the Powers have approved of it, then would be the time to press it upon Greece, and when accepted by Greece, then would be the time

<sup>\*\*</sup> Dr. Moritz Busch was undersecretary in charge of eastern affairs at the foreign office. His diary on the frontier issue from May, 1880, to June, 1881, was published in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, CXLVII (May, 1911), 224-247.

to warn Turkey of the serious consequences which further procrastination must produce.

I do not share the french view you mention, and believe for my part that Bismarck earnestly wishes for a pacific settlement of the Greek Question, because it is in Germany's interest that peace should be preserved, and Greece strengthened, and if the Greeks and Turks should fight after all, which is quite on the cards, then I believe you will find Bismarck earnestly desirous to reestablish peace as soon as possible.

Lobanoff's estimated of Hatzfeldt's [*sic*] character you mention is, I believe, quite correct.—He is a shrewd cautious man, without convictions, who does what he is told intelligently and diligently and that is what Bismarck likes in his Agents.—Any attempt at independence or initiative he stamps out at once.

Princess Bismarck told me last night at the Court Concert that the Prince was laid up with a cold and had lost his voice and would not be visible for some days.

The Emperor, who was in great force and spirits, appeared quite delighted at being allowed to give Lord Torrington <sup>87</sup> an order.

Yours gratefully,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 March 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck is suffering from a bad attack of influenza, to which I attribute his present apathy, & of which even the Emperor has been complaining. By steadily supporting Mr Goschen against Count Hatzfeldt I hope to bring him round to acknowledge that Hatzfeldt's proposal to be satisfied with the line of the 3rd of October is inadmissible if peace is to be preserved. Bismarck must be disappointed at Hatzfeldt's mismanagement of his Colleagues at Constantinople, but probably feels bound to stand by him nevertheless.

Hatzfeldt's instructions were to concert with Goschen on the Berlin basis, to agree upon a line with his Colleagues and to avoid Conferences with the Turks.—Instead of doing as he was bid, he has isolated Goschen for adhering faithfully to Bismarck's programme, disagreed with his Colleagues but supported their advice against his better convictions and he has gone out of his way to establish the interminable Conferences with the Turks he was above all to discourage! You said truly to Count Münster that the Ambassadors are evidently much influenced by the atmosphere they live in at Constantinople.

<sup>87</sup> George, seventh Viscount Torrington (1812–1884), was lord-in-waiting to Queen Victoria.

A steady support given to Goschen will, I trust, set matters right again and induce them all to rally round Bismarck's first proposal which he has steadily adhered to & Hatzfeldt has forgotten.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

F. O., *March 16/81.*

We are all horrified at the assassination,<sup>38</sup> but as is natural people are beginning to speculate as to the result.

Pray send me all the information you can.

I presume there is no doubt that the Czar [Alexander III] has a will, and that he is not clever. That he personally dislikes the Germans; and that his inclination is Panslavism.

How far will this influence his political course.

I suppose not much if he takes Melikoff,<sup>39</sup> Abaza<sup>40</sup> & Lobanoff as his principal Ministers.

Will his Panslavism, or his wife's Philhellenism,<sup>41</sup> have the most effect on the Greek Frontier question.

I send you an extract from a private letter of Goschen. Please make as much use of it as you can, without appearing to complain of Hatzfeldt.

The Prince and Princess of Wales will probably go to the funeral, but you will know this before this letter arrives. If by any chance he does not go, it should not be known that there was the intention.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

In the following letter the British envoy to Constantinople sums up the situation in the Turkish capital and records his estimate of fellow ambassadors.

BRITISH EMBASSY, CONSTANTINOPLE,

*March 17. 1881.*

MY DEAR GRANVILLE,

The Messenger does not go until tomorrow and things may change again in twenty four hours, especially as we have a meeting with the Turkish delegates this afternoon, but to gain time I write this morning to tell you privately about the present attitude of those engaged in the negotiations.

<sup>38</sup> Tsar Alexander II had been assassinated in the streets of St. Petersburg on March 13.

<sup>39</sup> General Loris Melikoff (1826-1888), minister of the interior, had been in charge of the commission set up in St. Petersburg to protect the life of Alexander II and lived in retirement after the assassination.

<sup>40</sup> Ara Abaza was president of the Russian ministry of finance until his downfall in May, 1881.

<sup>41</sup> Tsar Alexander III had married Dagmar, princess of Denmark (1847-1928), whose brother William was King George I of Greece, 1863-1913.

The Sultan. I am told he is entirely broken down by the news of the Emperor of Russia's fate. Nervous as he always is about assassination the news made a horrible impression on him. How it may affect his policy it is too early yet to say. On the one hand I learn that he fears a change of policy in Russia, a development of Pan-slavism: on the other hand that he is afraid of his subjects if he yields territory. There has been a change for the worse visible at the two last meetings of the Delegates. It seems the Sultan had got it into his head that he would get off with the cession of Crete alone, that he had declared this conviction to his Ministers, that Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, had expressed the contrary opinion very strongly and had almost been dismissed in consequence a little time ago; that the Delegates were instructed to force this on us and when they failed on Monday and reported that we would not accept Crete and the strip of four Kilometres, the Sultan was in a fearful rage; told the Council he would rather make war than "pull out all the hairs of his beard" which he would be doing if he gave up Larissa, Metzovo, Prevesa & Yanina, and denounced his Ministers as "pigs" and worse. Said Pasha, however, rubbed his hands with delight when alone with his colleagues, with an "I told you so" of intense satisfaction. This scene, and the scolding they got had, not unnaturally, a very great influence on the Ottoman delegates. Their tone was one of profound depression on the next day. They had promised to bring us a mainland line, but did not bring it. Server Pasha could hardly speak from nervousness. You will remember they asked us over again whether we would accept Crete with a rather broader strip and they were not authorized to propose anything on the mainland. I mean any amplification of their original offer of the Peneus.

The Ambassadors—Tissot and Corti now take very little part indeed. You know they have both instructions to follow Hatzfeld [*sic*] and me almost blindly. Tissot has settled down to this very comfortably. He is quite ready now to do what he would not have done without stringent instructions, namely, join in recommending a line without the consent of the Turks. He asked Barthelemy St. Hilaire whether he should "make reservations" in giving his vote, as it would probably be contrary to his conviction, but he was informed in reply that it was not necessary. He was very much irritated at first, but, as I told you in my last letter I smoothed him down without any difficulty.

Count Corti is still very sore. He says he has had an Anglo-German snub. As you know he likes taking an important part. He had gone in, head over ears, for the policy that we could not and must not recommend a line without knowing that it would be accepted. Now he is quite silent, except insisting that we are at all hazards to return

at once to the programme, breaking off with the Turks at the very first opportunity. This is not prudent. As we have gone so far, it is better to extract what we can, especially as it is certain that the less the Turks propose, the less will the bulk of the Ambassadors recommend.

M. Novikoff. No one astonishes me more than he does. Of all the Ambassadors he is now the most timid, I should say the most frightened. I told you in my last letter that he seemed only to care about Crete and not about securing anything on the mainland. His instructions are vaguer than those of any of the others, but the main thing he is to bear in mind is to secure a peaceable solution. He is always afraid of our breaking off too soon with the Turks and least firm in stating that there is a minimum which we must insist on. He has been in a state of lachrymose excitement in consequence of my holding him responsible for the smaller line.

I got him into a corner at one of the meetings and said "I thought you were instructed to vote for whatever line was most favorable to the Greeks and now you have led to the rejection of a larger line. Your vote turned the scale. Hatzfeld [*sic*] has telegraphed to Bismarck that the Austrian, *Russian*, and French Ambassadors are strongly in favour of accepting the 3d of October line and Crete." Novikoff protested most wildly that he had not given such a vote: his opinion was provisional; he had never thought his action would be reported. I said very coolly to him "But it has been reported and the fact that the Russian Ambassador took such a view had no doubt influenced Bismarck greatly." He declared he could not bear such a responsibility and so forth. I told him he must bear the responsibility,—he could not get out of it. He then declared he wished to go in all things with me, but what would happen to the Greeks if the Turks did not accept our line. The Greeks would be smashed and there was a Russian Princess on the throne. I said "Then I suppose you will send ships to prevent such a smash." "We have no ships," he said, "we can do nothing to prevent the Turks in such an event." I tell you all this because this attitude on the part of a Russian Ambassador at Constantinople strikes me as little less than extraordinary. He speaks as if all Europe and Russia included were entirely at the mercy of the Turks.

He explains, but lamely, that this is the result of last years experience. It had been shown that none of the Powers would do anything. They would not follow as to programme.

Baron Calice.<sup>42</sup>—has been taking a moderate and sensible view throughout, but is, not unnaturally, not hearty about Crete. While Novikoff is always glad if things look a little like a Crete solution,

<sup>42</sup> Baron Heinrich von Calice was the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople, 1880-1906.

Calice is glad if it seems that there is more chance of success on the mainland.

About Count Hatzfeldt I need say no more than I have said before. He is keeping more to his instructions, but is not acting with any decision at all. In a word he seems always anxious to hide behind the other Ambassadors. As, on the other hand, most of the other Ambassadors have now peremptory orders to follow him, comical scenes ensue.

Since I began this letter I have received yours of the 10th Instant. You say Bismarck says it is the French who made the opposition. That is really not true. Tissot personally was opposed to parts of the programme, but his influence has not been sufficient, under the peculiar circumstances, to do more than his own share of harm.

As to the French version that Bismarck does not wish to avert war, that seems to me incorrect also. Hatzfeldt's half and half attitude is based on his own conviction that to ask too much of the Turks would bring on war.

Hatzfeldt is deeply compromised, I think, by his previous rôle of the pet of the Turks: and he is so far consistent that, from the first moment, he declared that the Turks would resist all serious concessions demanded by the Berlin Conference. He thinks as now they will fight if pushed. I had a long talk with him the other day to find out what combinations on the mainland he would like, Prevesa etc. Would he recommend this or that? But I could not get on much. He would not compromise himself apparently. He said, we cannot judge till we know what the Turks will finally propose. But that is all nonsense; what he would not do was to show me his hand.

Baron Testa—the German 1st Dragonman has become very Turkish. He is very clever, very Machiavelian etc. Yesterday Sandison brought a story from the Palace that they had heard the German Ambassador did not approve the English line and had telegraphed instructions, that Testa had been 3 hours with the Sultan and a lot more foolish stuff.

I brought this out before all the Ambassadors, who while laughing at the folly and exaggeration, did not laugh at the idea that a difference of opinion of which they did not know much themselves had penetrated to the Palace. Such things are very uncomfortable for one who is not a diplomatist. Hatzfeldt denied that Testa had seen the Sultan, at least I thought so but Corti said he didn't.—In fact Corti has told me since he had information to the same effect as mine. What is curious is that Artin Effendi has now been named Commissioner too late for the fair. Artin Effendi is reported grossly untruthful and utterly unreliable.

You will get so many despatches by this messenger that I must not tell you any more about our Ambassadorial meetings though there is much that might interest you.

Believe me.

Yours very truly,

GEORGE GOSCHEN.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 March 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The feelings of horror and apprehension increase as the circumstances of the Petersburg crime become better known.

In reply to your query I can only say that of the new Czar it is asserted that he is a good husband and father and that he disapproves of the corruption around him. He has lately given much attention to his own education which he felt had been hitherto neglected.

He is supposed to be a panslavist with antigerman and pro-french tendencies, but as he has always been very reserved his true feelings are not known with any degree of certainty.

Bismarck entertains the greatest apprehensions as to his future policy and anxiously awaits the choice of his Ministers, on whom the new Czar's political course must greatly depend. Bismarck also dreads too much intimacy between Russia and France if the new Czar should not care to keep up the traditional intimacy of his predecessors with Germany and will, in consequence, go great lengths to be on the most friendly terms with the new Czar and to prevent His Majesty being so with France.

Bismarck's mind is also disturbed by the great french Loan, which he suspects to be a War Loan.

The Public generally and Military men in particular talk of War with Russia as "*inevitable*" but without being able to give any reason for it. I believe a continued Alliance with Russia as heretofore, to be certain because neither Power has anything to gain by War, and much to achieve through Peace.

I will not fail to send you all the information I can gather about Russia.

With regard to Greece we shall not get Bismarck to move until the Ambassadors have made the line which is to be recommended to the Greeks. Meanwhile I will make use of Goschen's private Letter and telegrams with prudence and caution as you desire.

Goschen says that he wishes he had "a perfectly satisfactory clue to what Hatzfeldt really means and what he wants and what Bismarck wants"?

It appears to me that Hatzfeldt being a cautious Agent acting for an irascible Chief, *means* not to commit himself or his Chief prema-



turely, and what he and his Chief *want* is that the Powers more interested in Eastern Affairs should make themselves responsible in the first instance for the line of frontier they may have to enforce, when they realize that the Turks are befooling them.

This clue is not a perfectly satisfactory one I admit, but unhappily in diplomacy one has more diplomatizing Colleagues to deal with, than straightforward ones like Goschen himself.

We shall make no progress in Berlin until the Ambassadors furnish the Powers with a line to recommend to Greece, and as matters now stand it might be drawn up, agreed to, and sent to Athens in another week or ten days.

The Prince and Princess of Wales are announced here for Tuesday night. The Crown Prince will proceed to Russia with their Royal Highnesses. Opinion in Berlin is *very adverse* to the Crown Prince going at all,—but the Emperor wishes it,—and would go himself, if he could.—

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

March 23/81.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I do not understand Bismarck not having kept Hatzfeldt more up to the mark. It makes it appear likely that Goschen may prove right in fearing lest he may fail us, when it comes to pressure upon Turkey as well as upon Greece. How does he propose that we shall press the line, if any is agreed upon, on the Greeks. He is quite right to take only one step at a time, but will he take them at all?

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 March 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck's extreme German susceptibility about the Ambassadors not having followed Hatzfeldt's lead as submissively and blindly at the outset as he thought himself entitled to expect, is tedious and time wasting and unworthy of so great a Statesman, and I fear with you and Goschen that he may fail us, if we venture to differ from him as to the mode of pressure best suited for Turkey and Greece, when the Ambassadors have agreed upon the line to be pressed for.

Radowitz is said to have considerable personal influence at Athens if Bismarck will let him exert it, when the proper time comes.

The diplomatic Body dined with Bismarck on the Emperor's birthday and my Colleagues tell me that he confided to them privately

that he thought it prudent, for the sake of peace, to put the drag or skid ("enrayer") on Goschen who was going ahead too fast. Bismarck said nothing of the kind to me, but he did tell me that while he felt confidence in Russia, he found France to be unreliable and double-tongued,—and Austria weak undecided and enclined to shy at everything like a horse without blinkers. He would be glad to see Haymerle "who was a fool," make room for Andrassy who was a sensible practical man,—but he saw no chance of that just yet.

Bismarck's present Standpoint is clear and precise—Crete, the basis or "Sine qua non" to the settlement, and any other line, 3rd of Oct. or Peneus, the Porte will consent to, or the Ambassadors can agree upon, so long as it offers a peaceful solution.

Send me please an instruction about the mode of pressure on Greece and I will cautiously consult Bismarck. We had better reserve the subsequent pressure on the Porte, as a future step, so as not to mix subjects of discussion.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 April 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck is so offended at his advice not having been acted upon that he will give no more,—and Hatzfeldt, it appears, took offence at Goschen having taken the lead at Constantinople with true British energy and ability into his own hands, instead of leaving it to him (Hatzfeldt) to work out his Chief's programme with Prussian prudence and Germanic slowness and circumspection.

Neither Bismarck or Hatzfeldt will now take any initiative, and I would therefore venture to suggest that you should take it into your own hands and ask his support instead of asking his advice.

Bismarck does not believe that the Ambassador's line<sup>48</sup> can be carried out without coercive measures and as he does not intend to take part in any, he prefers to let those Powers who will, say what they are themselves prepared to undertake and carry out.

It is much to be regretted that the Ambassadors could not agree among themselves to carry out Bismarck's programme, because if they had, we should be in a much better position in regard to Greece than we are now,—and united pressure on Turkey alone, would have been much easier than divided pressure on Turkey and Greece, without which the Ambassador's line cannot be carried into effect.

<sup>48</sup> The ambassadors met during March and by the end of the month had agreed on a line which left Turkey with Janina, Prevesa, and Metzovo and was therefore less favorable to Greece than the line suggested by the Berlin Conference. This line was incorporated into Article I of the convention signed between the Porte and the powers on May 24—see *P. P.* 1881, XCVIII, c. 2940. *Taffs, Russell*, 299-301.

Bismarck expects the French Govt. will object to any kind of pressure, because they wish to keep the Greek question unsettled to please Turkey.

The Prince of Wales and Duke of Edinburgh have arrived safely I am happy to say and I am going to devote myself to them while they are here. The Duchess of Manchester has come on a visit to her relations for a week.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER, April 13 1881.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

It is too bad of Bismarck encouraging Russia to propose what he knows will be refused.<sup>44</sup>

Bismarck knows enough of this country to be aware that any such proposal is sure to be refused, and the proposal and the refusal can only do harm to the object he has in view.

Pray remind him of the Congress of Vienna and every subsequent act of the English Govt. in this matter.

The instances most present to my mind are the pressure in 1851-2 about Athens<sup>45</sup> and being turned out under Palmerston by a coalition of Derby, Dizzy, Gladstone and Bright after the Orsini attempt.<sup>46</sup>

B. is not ignorant of this feeling, which is common to other nations. We believe our own laws to be sufficient and we do not like to alter them at the instigation of Foreigners.<sup>47</sup>

The only objection to our action about Most was the assertion that it was done at foreign instigation.

Bismarck's real object must be to create a sore between us and Russia.

Yours,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 April 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You say truly in your telegram of the 11th that our refusal to attend a Conference for the prevention of regicide will appear unintelligible

<sup>44</sup> This is defined in the following letter as a proposal for a conference for the prevention of regicide.

<sup>45</sup> See the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 330-331, for the Don Pacifico affair, and *ibid.*, 596 *et seq.* for further Graeco-British relations.

<sup>46</sup> See Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, II, 180-183. Granville was lord president of the council and ministerial leader in the house of lords in the Palmerston government, which fell in 1858 on a motion of censure for failure to stand up to offensive French protests arising out of the fact that the Orsini plot to kill Napoleon III had been hatched by refugees in England.

<sup>47</sup> Except for the first sentence this much of the letter is printed in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 230-231.

in Germany. We can scarcely realize at home how strongly people feel on the subject in Germany and our unintelligible attitude will be thought unfriendly, not to say hostile.

Bismarck, who seemed dreadfully upset at the prospect of our refusal to attend the Conference said that he would exert his influence with the Russian Govt to draw up a Circular the wording of which would be so careful and unobjectionable that we could not possibly refuse. The Circular should merely invite the Powers to an exchange of ideas on the best means of preventing regicide and nothing else. International Law did not keep pace with the progress of explosive Science, and while any Apothecary's boy could construct a bomb with which to blow up Dynastys [*sic*], Cabinets and Parliaments, International Law was powerless to deal with the growing evil of the progress of Chemistry.

Prince Bismarck hoped that H. M. Govt would not object to take part in a mere exchange of ideas, which could in no way interfere with the internal legislation of England.

I hear that Prince Orloff, who past [*sic*] through Berlin on his way to Paris, was of opinion that the French Govt. would accept the Russian invitation, and that Count de St Vallier is urging his Govt. to do all that Bismarck wishes who, in return promises his moral support for anything France may wish to do in Turkey.

Bismarck will go great lengths to get France well occupied in Africa, out of Germany's way.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

BERLIN, 16 April 1881.

*Private.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have done my best to bring about a postponement of the Russian invitation to the Conference on regicide, in private conversation with Sabouroff, and I have also privately suggested to my Colleagues to warn their Governments not to accept it in haste on Bismarck's recommendation, before they have heard what England and France have to say on the subject—If you can get the French Govt to let Bismarck and Giers know that they will decline the invitation in concert with us,—then I have every hope that it will be withheld for the present. But the feeling in favour of international measures against regicide is so strong in Germany that sooner or later the subject will have to be submitted by Bismarck to the Continental Powers.

Prince Bismarck is as anxious as we are to make the Greek settlement complete and satisfactory with as little delay as possible and there is now a fair prospect of success if the Powers will put the necessary pressure on Turkey. He thinks they will as usual hesitate

to act and that all we have gained will be lost again, if one or two Powers do not undertake the pressure in the name of all the rest.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private & Personal.*

BERLIN, 18 April 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

It may be useful for you to know for your private & personal information that the Prince of Wales and Princess Christian<sup>48</sup> during their recent stay at Berlin exerted all their influence to get Count Münster recalled and General von Schweinitz appointed to London.

The Crown Prince and Princess, who have hitherto protected Münster have had their faith in him shaken thereby, and have broached the subject with Bismarck, who replied that he had appointed Münster to please their Imp. & Royal Highnesses and that he should remain in London just as long or just as little as they pleased.

I do not however anticipate that a change is likely just yet, even though the Crown Prince is anxious to meet the wishes of the Prince of Wales and of Princess Helena.

From other sources I learn that Münster is out of favour with Bismarck because he thinks him too English and too liberal.

I should have thought Schweinitz too Prussian for London, but I may be mistaken.

Dufferin would know best.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

May 4, 81.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Münster is very unpopular with the Royalties here. They object to him as a Hanoverian renegade & he is not remarkable for tact. I do not much mind being bored by him, & it is something being quite at my ease with him. I fancied that he was a great Tory, & that he was not quite truthful in his Anglomania, but if Bismarck thinks him too English I must have been wrong. The Prince of Wales will be the sovereign of all of us who may live long enough, but it is humiliating that any public affairs shd be in the slightest degree influenced by Princess Xtian, whose opinion I wd. not take upon the shape of a pin. One hint to her elder sister, that the superior intellect shd. not be influenced by the inferior, wd. I shd. think settle her hash. I am not sure I understand what yr. objection is to Schweinitz. Is it that he is too Prussian socially or politically. Use yr. influence,

<sup>48</sup> The Princess Christian was the prince of Wales' sister Helena (1846-1923), the third daughter of Queen Victoria and the wife of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein.

please, in the sense you think best for me. Dufferin praises his late colleague. How stupid of the Russians to persist about the Conference after all our warning. Bismarck may have other objects.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 May 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your Letter of the 4th gave me great pleasure, because it proved that you had recovered from your recent indisposition. I have no objection to Schweinitz whatever, and everybody likes him, but as a Prussian Tory he may not like us, which would be a drawback. Münster, though decidedly a bore, has good qualities and I for one hope he may remain as long in London as I may be in Berlin. }

If allowed to chuse his successor I should select Perponcher, whom you knew as Secretary years ago, but Bismarck would object I fear to his reentering diplomacy.

As regards the Nihilist Conference you have successfully nipped it in the bud.—France and Italy will hold with us and Bismarck will advise Russia to make the most of the french offer to negotiate new extradition Treaties. I doubt his caring for a Conference "a trois" as matters now stand.

The settlement of the Greek frontier question will be a great triumph for H. M. Govt. and I most heartily congratulate you on the success of your policy. The cession of a beautiful Province like Thessaly by one Country to the other without coercion, bloodshed or loss of life, and by the sole power of moral persuasion is a novel & unique achievement and does the greatest honour to the concerted diplomacy of Europe, inaugurated and led by H. M. Govt. with so much ability, tact and patience.

I have been somewhat seedy myself and should like a change of air, whenever you can conveniently allow me to come home, *during the Session*, to take the Seat I feel so pleased and proud to owe to your personal intervention on my behalf.

Gratefully yours,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 May 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I am very much obliged to you for granting me leave to go to Carlsbad. My old enemy, the Liver, is renewing hostilities, and knowing as I do by experience that a Carlsbad Cure will give me Comfort for a couple of years to come, I am naturally anxious to go there at once.

As I told you in my last the Regicide Conference question has resolved itself into a re-negotiation of more stringent Extradition Treaties offered by France both to Russia & to Germany,—a proposal which will satisfy Bismarck as it will enable him to ask Parliament for increased powers to deal with revolutionists of all colours.

He is in great spirits since the French have gone into the Tunis trap, which he baited for them during the Congress, and chuckles over the security Germany will enjoy from a diminished Army in France with increased occupation in Africa. The Bulgarian imbroglio show that Prince Alexander must have received encouragement both here and at St. Petersburg, otherwise he need not have pressed his Reform<sup>\*</sup> bill on the Bulgarians before the Greek question was settled,—I must hasten to get well, for I foresee much interesting work dawning in the future.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 Aug. 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Berlin is as empty as London in this season and I have found no one yet who could tell me anything worth writing to you. By next Messenger I hope I may have something to say.

Meanwhile I am happy to learn that the Emperor has recovered from his slight cold and will be able to attend the September manoeuvres.

Bismarck has gone to Varzin to prepare himself and the Country for the coming elections in October on which the success of his home policy will depend, i. e. protection, indirect taxation, tobacco monopoly, State Railways, Workmens Life Insurance fund, centralization etc etc all about which I will write to you in due course.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 September 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Baron Schlözer's<sup>49</sup> secret mission to Rome, which I mentioned to you while in London, to pave the way to an understanding between Bismarck and the Pope in regard to the appointment of Bishops to the Vacant Sees of Germany, has now been made known to the public through the semiofficial Press, and it is also said that he will return to Rome to continue the work he commenced in June last, and which has already led to the appointment of Bishop Korum to Treves. Some of

<sup>49</sup> Baron Kurd von Schlözer (1822-1894) was German minister to Mexico, 1867-1871, at Washington, 1871-1882, and at the Vatican, 1882-1892.

the papers already assume and take it for granted that Baron Schlözer will be transferred from Washington to Rome,—but the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican must depend, I take it, on the nature of the future concessions the Chancellor may claim for and the Pope be willing to grant to Germany.

Prince Bismarck's present object is clearly to neutralize the Catholic opposition led by his enemy Windthorst in the German Parliament and there can scarcely be a doubt that the Rhenish Provinces would support Bismarck and drop Windthorst, if through the former's intervention, the vacant see of Cologne could be filled by some popular Bishop, such as Canon Camphausen, the Secretary of the banished Arch-Bishop Melchers, who might then be made a Cardinal and Bishop in partibus to make room for his Successor.<sup>50</sup> Prince Bismarck no doubt, would go great lengths to secure a working majority in the coming Reichstag. He always considered Lord Palmerston's offer to protect the Pope,<sup>51</sup> as a clever move on the European chessboard and if the Italians were unable to protect the living prisoner of the Vatican, as they were unable to protect the dead body of Pius IX against insult,—the wily Chancellor might some fine morning be induced to offer Fulda as an Asylum to Leo XIII as Malta was offered to Pio Nono by Lord Palmerston.

Berlin is now emptier than ever, since the Emperor, the Court & the Military authorities have started for Hanover and Holstein.

My Russian Colleague Saburoff has, however, returned to his post, and he tells me, privately, that Ignatieff<sup>52</sup> is getting a firm hold over the indolent mind of the Czar and is likely to last longer than he, Saburoff, quite likes or calculated upon. Saburoff is namely a partizan of Lobanoff's and reckoned on succeeding him in London if he had succeeded Gortchakow as was at one time expected.

Ignatieff's plan is to keep Giers at the F. O. while Gortchakow lives, and when he dies to send Giers to Constantinople and then to claim the F. O. for himself from his Imperial Master, and so pave his way to the Chancellorship.

In Berlin we are completely becalmed since everybody has left for the manoeuvres so I will trouble you no further by this Messenger.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>50</sup> The see of Cologne remained vacant until 1884. See Taffs, *Russell*, 276-277.

<sup>51</sup> Palmerston's offer of Malta as asylum to the pope was made by a letter October 25, 1862, from Earl Russell, the foreign secretary, to Odo Russel, then a British legation secretary resident in Rome. See *P. P.*, 1863, LXXV, c. 3080, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Nicholas Pavlovitch Ignatieff (1832-1908), Russian minister and ambassador at Constantinople, 1864-1877. He negotiated the Treaty of San Stefano, March, 1872, retired from public life in May of that year, but returned in 1881 and held for a brief period portfolio as minister of interior.



*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 September 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

My Russian Colleague M. de Saburoff returned this afternoon from Varzin and called to tell me about the meeting of the Emperors at Dantzic,<sup>53</sup> the success of which has elated the Prussians and Russians of the Conservative party.

The bulk of the German nation, as you know, are not fond of the Russian Alliance, and perhaps the less so, when its sensational renewal takes Press and Public by surprize, after having been lulled into the belief since 1879 that Bismarck had broken for ever with Russia to ally Germany and Austria against her. For my part I always said that Bismarck's quarrel was not with Russia, but with Gortchakow, and that he would renew the "Dreikaiserbund" on his own conditions as soon as his rival Gortchakow no longer stood in the way of his undivided Leadership in the tripartite alliance.

According to Saburoff, the desire to relieve himself of the general accusation of Antigerman and pro-panslavic tendencies and to keep up the ties and traditions which have hitherto united the Royal Houses of Russia and Germany, originated with the Czar, and his wishes were most cordially welcomed by the German Emperor and Prince Bismarck.

The place and time of meeting has to be kept secret as long as possible from fear of Nihilists and Dynamite.—All minor details were settled at Hanover by the Imperial Aide de Camps Prince Dolgourouky and General von Werder<sup>54</sup> and the subsequent meeting on board the Yachts at Dantzic went off to everybody's entire satisfaction.

The Germans were anxious the Russians should not land at all, so as to avoid the dangers they might encounter on shore,—but the Czar insisted upon paying Dantzic a visit,—and to meet His Majesty's wishes the naval cooks with their half-cooked dishes had to be hurried in royal boats and carriages from the Yachts to the Town Hall to complete their labours in less than two hours.—a feat which is said to have been a marvel of Prussian organization.

At dinner the Emperors toasted each other and drank to Bismarck's health, who acknowledged the high honour in a Bumper of Cliquot.

After dinner Crosses, Stars and Ribbons were exchanged, and the Czar gave young Herbert Bismarck, the Chancellor's eldest son, the

<sup>53</sup> The "Dreikaiserbund" had been formally renewed by treaty in June, 1881, and the relation of this meeting to it, or the purpose behind the meeting, is not clear. There is no reference to it in the *Gr. Pol.*, but the French ambassador to Germany heard that the conference had been to discuss revolutionary movements and the internal reorganization of Russia, *D. D. F.*, IV, 119-120.

<sup>54</sup> General von Werder was German military plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg, 1871-1881, reporting directly to the German emperor, a circumstance which annoyed Bismarck—*Reflections and Reminiscences*, III, 153, 150. Prince Nicholas Dolgourouky held a similar post for Russia in Germany.

order of St. Andrew in diamonds, which will go far to enlist the fond father's sympathies for the new reign in Russia.

Bismarck was also much gratified by the Czar's desire to consult his opinion generally and by the great deference & homage paid him by Monsieur de Giers.

Everybody present, appears to be enthusiastic about the success of the meeting and talk of it as if it were the beginning of a new Era.

When the Emperors had departed, Prince Bismarck asked the Russian Ambassador to come and stay a few days with him at Varzin, observing to him: *que ça fera jaser les journaux encore plus.*"

Telegrams were received from Vienna to say that the Austrian Emperor and Bn Haymerle welcomed this "new departure" as an additional guarantee of peace, etc etc etc.

Politics, Sabouroff [*sic*] says, were not discussed in detail either at Varzin or at Dantzic, but general assurances of good will and of moral support in the interest of peace and progress befitting the occasion were naturally exchanged. This may or may not be the case,—Sabouroff would not of course disclose secrets if any were entrusted to him,—and that must therefore remain a question for future investigation when Berlin society returns to town and well informed sources become accessible.

The alliance with Austria with Haymerle at the F. O. has proved a disappointment to Bismarck while Gambetta's speeches continue to encourage his apprehensions in regard to the war of revenge,—so that it is not unnatural that he should seek to isolate France and strengthen his Austro-German alliance by adding Russia to it,—at what price—(?)—that is the question.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*Sept. 14, 81.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Cairo has given us anxiety, though there seems to be a better turn for the moment.

You will see by the telegrams that we mean to act cordially with France in a calming & pacifying sense,<sup>55</sup> as long as she acts fairly, & we think she has too much on her hands to allow her to play tricks at this moment. Malet had no instructions when at Constantinople.<sup>56</sup> We are more inclined to use the Turks diplomatically than the French

<sup>55</sup> *P. P.*, 1882, LXXXII, c. 8161, contains the correspondence during September and October, 1881, on the Egyptian problem.

<sup>56</sup> Sir Edward Baldwin Malet (1837-1908), the British agent and consul general in Egypt, had entered the diplomatic service in 1854 and had been appointed secretary of legation at Athens, 1872, Rome, 1875, and Constantinople, 1878. In October, 1879, he took up his post in Egypt, where he remained until September, 1883. He was envoy to Belgium, 1883-1884, and succeeded Lord Ampthill at Berlin, 1884-1895.

are, but we agree with them in thinking a Turkish army in Egypt wd. be an evil.

We do not propose to take any formal decision till we have a full report from Malet, who arrives at Cairo on Sat.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 17 September 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have privately communicated the substance of your private Letter of the 14th inst. about Egypt to Prince Bismarck through Busch, and I have added that personally I should be obliged to him for his private opinion on the Egyptian Crisis.—I did so, to enlist his sympathies on our side by flattering his huge personal vanity before my French Colleague St. Vallier comes next week from Paris and Baden to Berlin for the same purpose.

When we declined Prince Bismarck's proffered support to take possession of Egypt and went in for a joint protectorate with France he told me that he regretted it, because a joint protectorate of Egypt in his opinion must inevitably lead to war between England and France.

Bismarck is so suspicious of Gambetta and so eager to push France into foreign complications out of Germany's way, that I feel it is essential to keep on good terms with him, and the more so since he is not particularly partial to the Liberal party in England, the example of which, on his liberal enemies in Germany, he does not like at all, since he has himself turned against Freetrade and Parliamentary Government and has gone in for personal Government and protection.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

WALMER, Sept. 21 1881.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I am glad you were civil to Bismarck about Egypt and you seem to have been so in the most judicious manner as from yourself.

It would not do for us to admit that he was to be consulted by us on Egyptian matters.

He might however cause some trouble if he were adversely inclined. Malet is rather anxious in case of need for Turkish assistance. I do not like this.

Yr

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 September 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Egyptian trouble is happily postponed, but I quite share the dislike you express in your Letter of the 21 inst to Turkish assistance by way of a solution, because it would throw Egypt back into darkness for an unknown number of years.

What I fear in regard to Bismarck's policy is, that, having once succeeded in leading France into trouble, he may be tempted to do so again, by shewing her the road to glory in Egypt, and thereby get rid, during his own lifetime, of a threatening neighbour, who stands between him and his rest, and whom the Germans dread and distrust more than words can tell.

The temptation will be great,—because it would not only make him Master of the European situation, but it would also increase his popularity and consequent power in Germany to a degree which would render possible the realization of all those measures he has so deeply at heart and which he believes will consolidate and perpetuate the great work of his Life.

I cannot say how anxious these not-impossible dangers make me feel since Egypt threatens to become the question of the day and that the "Dreikaiserbund" has been reestablished under the Protectorate of Prince Bismarck.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Sanderson has sent me the extract from Dufferin's private Letter of the 20th September about the frequent communications going on between the Sultan, the German Embassy and the Porte and in reply to your query on the subject I can say for the present and before I make further confidential enquiries, that I have heard the frequent applications on the part of the Sultan and the Porte at Constantinople for advice from the German Embassy, Count Hatzfeldt and Prince Bismarck, complained of as incessant and troublesome at the Berlin F. O., ever since the Sultan wrote to the German Emperor last year appealing for His Majesty's advice and support as the most disinterested of his Protectors. I have often been assured that these appeals are left unanswered, until Prince Bismarck has ascertained the views of England and France, to which he then gives his support at Constantinople. Of course since the reestablishment of the "Dreikaiserbund" Bismarck may become more inclined to support the views of his Allies Austria and Russia, than of the Western Powers, at Constan-

tinople,—but as a rule he prefers to give no advice in detail, and to support only general principles conducive to general peace.

The project for a colonizing Railway to Bagdad Dufferin alludes to, is a financial speculation of Strousberg's<sup>57</sup> and has neither the support of Bismarck or [*sic*] of the respectable Berlin Bankers.

I will send you more precise information as soon as "people who know" what is going on return to town,—at present Berlin is empty and there is no one to ask.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

Mem :

*Extract from Ld. Dufferin's letter.*

THERAPIA, Sep. 20, 81.

"glad if Ampthill cd find out what Germans are doing at C-ple. Constant commns. going on between German Dragoman, German Ch. D'aff. & Porte. Tissot tells me same kind of frequent intercourse between Hatzfeldt & Sultan. . . . Can it be Bismarck's project for a colonizing Railway to Bagdad to prevent emigration of Germans to America is being revived?"

Above sent to Ld. A.[mpthill] Ld. G.[ranville] glad to know anything he can find out resp: what passing between G. Emby. & the Porte.

Sep. 27/81.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck has again collapsed into a reticent and reserved attitude, and Busch professes complete ignorance as to his Master's views in regard to Eastern Affairs. The coming general elections, are said to absorb all his thoughts at present, and the Emperor who requested to be furnished with a Memo. about his conversation with Giers at Dantzic has not yet received it, and probably never will!

From Colleagues and private sources however I gather that Bismarck, Giers and Haymerle would not oppose the Sultan's wish to interfere in Egypt, if circumstances rendered interference on the part of other Powers necessary later on.

An English, a French or an Anglo-french occupation of Egypt would exclude interference on the part of Austria, Russia and Germany whilst a Turkish occupation would leave the door open to collective European interference which the three Allied Powers would prefer.

Bismarck has taken "one of his great personal dislikes" to Tissot, to whose influence he and Hatzfeldt attribute Goschen's departure

<sup>57</sup> Bethel Henry Strousberg (1823-1884) was an industrial and railway financier. See Emden, *Money Powers*, 108-111.

from Bismarck's plan, agreed upon at Berlin, for the settlement of the Greek frontier, and although Goschen's settlement has proved to be a perfect success, Bismarck still regrets that his advice about Crete did not prevail.

We must in consequence be prepared to see the German Embassy at Constantinople intrigue against Tissot so long as he holds the French Embassy there.

France and Turkey opposing each other in Tunis, Tripoli and possibly also in Egypt would be "*nuts*" to Bismarck!

Sir Edward Thornton<sup>88</sup> arrived yesterday and goes on tonight. I have presented Saburoff to him, there being no one else in Berlin he cared to know.

Yours ever,

AMPTHILL.

- *Private.*

POTSDAM, 15 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

A cold and cough detain me at Potsdam today,—but I was in Berlin yesterday and the day before to see Busch and others, and enquire into Gambetta's mysterious movements through Germany, towards Varzin.

Busch, of course, said he knew nothing but what was in the papers, and thought the reporters might have been the victims of some enterprising wag.

My Colleagues shook their heads and thought more likely than not that Gambetta had met Bismarck somewhere,—Ministers and Officials knew nothing, but hoped it might be true, as a meeting between them must be conducive to peace.

The Crown Prince, whom I asked, absolutely disbelieved in anything the papers had said on the subject and treated it simply as a hoax. The official Papers hitherto have been silent and have not yet even noticed Blowitz's<sup>89</sup> disclosures that Bismarck, Hohenlohe and Holstein<sup>90</sup> charged him in 1878 with a message to Gambetta to bring about a meeting at Kissingen.

So many other people have been at work ever since to make Gambetta and Bismarck meet that I shall not be surprized to learn in due course that they *did* actually meet somewhere the other day, notwithstanding the assertions to the contrary of the french press.

<sup>88</sup> Sir Edward Thornton (see above, "1872," n. 49) in May, 1881, had been named to succeed Dufferin as British ambassador to Russia, and was en route to St. Petersburg, where he remained until 1884.

<sup>89</sup> Henri Stephan Oppen de Blowitz (1825-1903) was Paris correspondent of *The Times*, 1873-1902.

<sup>90</sup> Friedrich von Holstein (1837-1909) was an influential adviser in the Prussian ministry of foreign affairs, 1880-1906, and is reputed to have been a great power behind the scenes.

As regards Egypt I perceive from the telegrams that Mallet [*sic*] and Colvin<sup>61</sup> are favourable to the intervention of the Porte in preference to that of any other Powers. Bismarck is said to be of that opinion too, and to disagree with the French in their very determined objection to Turkish intervention in Egypt.

Yours ever,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Busch tells the diplomatists who ask him that the report of Gambetta's visit to Bismarck is to be contradicted in the Official Gazette,—but hitherto neither the official or [*sic*] the officious papers have taken any notice whatever of the Report, so we are still at liberty to think as we please, but I imagine that Lord Lyons will be better able than I am to tell you the real truth about it. Personally I believe, the interview did take place.

Hatzfeldt has at last taken the place of Busch who goes on leave next week.—Hatzfeldt does not seem much pleased with the change from Constantinople to Berlin, and steadily refuses to resign the Embassy until he has tried whether he can stand the F. O. or not.

I have had some general conversation with him at dinner at the Crown Prince's last night, but of no special interest.

He spoke chiefly of his regrets at leaving Constantinople and of his pleasant relations with Layard and Goschen. He congratulated Goschen as well as himself on the success of the Greek frontier question, but gave, I regret to say, but little hope of a similar success in settling the Armenian question, in regard to which the Porte, he said, was better able to evade the pressure of the Powers.

On his asking me about Egypt, I thought it as well to say that as the Governments of England and France were agreed on that subject and that their concerted policy was being settled in London and Paris, I knew but little about it in Berlin, and should in consequence be obliged for any *private* news he could give me on the subject for my *personal* information.—Hatzfeldt understood the hint and assured me that he would be happy to do so.—He began at once by saying that he was personally acquainted with the Turkish Commissioners who had just left Egypt and knew them to be sensible and moderate men and that according to the news he had received their mission had had a calming effect on public opinion.

<sup>61</sup> Sir Auckland Colvin (1838–1908) after twenty years of routine service in India was sent in May, 1878, to Egypt as British commissioner of the debt; in June, 1880, he became British controller of Egyptian finance and was acting consul general during Malet's absence in September, 1881, when mutiny broke out. After the British occupation of Egypt, Colvin was financial adviser to the khedive until 1883, when he returned to India.

The Crown Prince is going away for a week to Breslau to shoot over the Imperial preserves for the Emperor who has been obliged to give it up in consequence of a cold. His Majesty is however expected in Berlin towards the end of this month.

A very favourable impression has been generally produced by the measures lately adopted by H. M. Govt. for the reestablishment of Law and Order in Ireland.

Continental politicians mistook the patience of the Government for weakness and dreaded the encouragement which unrestricted lawlessness in Ireland might give to the enemies of law and order in Europe. The suppression of the Land league has given a sensation of relief and security to the educated classes throughout Germany.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

POTSDAM, 24 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I avail myself of Sir John Walsham's<sup>62</sup> departure for England to send you by him these few lines, which ought to reach you on the day of the general elections in Germany, Thursday 27th inst. I need scarcely tell you that secret voting based on universal suffrage renders every calculation problematical in regard to the result of Bismarck's present appeal to the country,—but the common impression is that the new Parliament will be much the same as the old,—that is, a liberal Left and a Conservative Right, balanced, controlled or neutralized by a Catholic Centre.

So long as Bismarck cannot secure the vote of the Catholic centre he cannot reckon on a working majority in the Reichstag,—but whether he secures one or not he will remain with or without a majority, in office, and seek while he lives and reigns, by threats to the Right and threats to the Left and concessions to the Centre, to squeeze his measures through whatever Reichstags the country may return to his appeals. On the other hand Universal Suffrage lends itself to administrative management, and it is not impossible that the immense efforts made by Bismarck to influence the Electors by every dodge and device in his power may induce them to elect on Thursday next, a majority of members who will vote as he wishes.

On all this I shall have more positive information to give by next messenger.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>62</sup> Sir John Walsham (1830-1905) was secretary of the British embassy at Berlin, 1878-1883, when he was transferred to Paris with the titular rank of minister plenipotentiary; he was British envoy at Peking, 1885-1892, and at Bucharest, 1892-1894.



*Private.*

BERLIN, 29 October 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Hatzfeldt has asked me to tell you privately in regard to what passed in July 1880 respecting the Sultan's request for German financiers and military instructors that His Majesty, who was allowed the former, but was denied the latter at your suggestion, has now reminded the German Govt. that the objections then made to his wishes having ceased to exist, he is most anxious to be allowed to enlist the services of some German Military Instructors for the improvement of his Army.—Count Hatzfeldt says that Prince Bismarck is willing to meet the Sultan's wishes, but would first like to know whether you see any objection to it.

There are at present four German financiers doing good & useful work at Constantinople and he would be glad to add as many officers to them, if he can find any who will volunteer for the Turkish service. Please let me know what I am to answer?

As we are not in the habit of making any communication to other Powers when British Officers are permitted to enter the Turkish service, the message and query appears to me intended to be very civil on the part of Prince Bismarck and I hope in consequence that you will be able to comply with Hatzfeldt's wish to oblige the Sultan.

The general result of the elections is not yet known. In Berlin they have gone against Bismarck and all the advanced Liberals have been elected.—The Conservatives are however pleased to find that their nine thousand votes of 1878 have increased to forty seven thousand votes in Berlin on the present occasion, an increase they declare to be beyond their expectations and which fills them with confident hopes for the next election.<sup>63</sup>

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Telegram from Lord Ampthill**Personal.*

Nov. 4, 1881.

My last private letter of the 29th October. Count Hatzfeldt has again asked me privately whether you still object to the sending of German army instructors to the Sultan, as Prince Bismarck is anxious to meet His Majesty's wishes if you do not object.

<sup>63</sup> The German elections had begun on October 27. *The Times* on October 31 carried a dispatch from its German correspondent which reported 229 out of 397 precincts and prophesied that the firm adherents of Bismarck would not number any more than one third of the whole and that the balance of power would rest with the Clericals. In the end, the Conservatives and Free Conservatives together lost twenty-four of their 106 seats.

*Telegram to Lord Amphill*

*Personal.*

*Nov. 5. 1881.*

Please tell Count Hatzfeldt that we are very sensible of consideration shewn by the German Govt. in consulting us, but have now no grounds on which we could seek to interfere with their discretion as to sending officers to Turkey. We hope that if they decide to comply with the request, they will press on the Turkish Govt. the importance of making the army less costly as well as more efficient.

*Telegram from Lord Amphill*

*Decypher.*

*Nov. 6, 81.*

*Personal.* Your Lordship's telegram of yesterday. I have spoken privately to Count Hatzfeldt in the sense of Lord Dufferin's wishes in regard to getting Moukhtar Pasha<sup>64</sup> sent to Armenia.

Count Hatzfeldt told me that he personally agreed with Lord Dufferin and would privately do what he could, although he could not act officially in the matter.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, 5 November 1881.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I received your "personal" telegram yesterday telling me to do what was the most judicious respecting Dufferin's wish to ask Prince Bismarck to help in getting Moukhtar Pasha sent to Armenia.

Bismarck is at Varzin fuming against the Electors of the German Empire who have voted against him and his son, and not in a temper to think of Turkish Pashas and Armenian Reforms,—so I went to Count Hatzfeldt and talked it over privately with him and found him well disposed and indeed personally anxious to assist.

He said he fully agreed with Lord Dufferin and would endeavour privately to promote his advice at Constantinople,—but, he confessed in a whisper, that this was not the moment to entertain the Great Chancellor on Oriental Affairs.

I shall return to the subject as often as necessary to make him act in the sense recommended by Dufferin and I do not anticipate much difficulty because he really seemed impressed with the desirability of promoting Armenian interests even though he does not believe that much can be achieved.

He asked me again whether you would object to the sending of military instructors to the Sultan, which Prince Bismarck was now anx-

<sup>64</sup> Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha (1832-1919) won his title by driving back the Russians on the Caucasian front in 1877, restored order in Crete in 1878, and served as Turkish commissioner on the Greek frontier, 1879-1885. Later he was Turkish high commissioner in Egypt, 1885-1906, vice president of the Ottoman senate, 1908-1911, president of the senate, 1911-1912, Grand vizir, 1912, and a member of the senate until 1918. See *Encyclopedie d'Islam* (Leiden, 1936).

ious to do, since the former objections had been removed and the Sultan was pressing for an answer to his oft repeated request.

From his impatience for an answer I conclude that the Officers are in reality already selected and ready to start,—but he does not wish to let them go without making “the previous communication” on the subject you asked Count Münster for on July 24th 1880.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 November 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your “personal” telegram of the 5th respecting German Army Instructors which I communicated to Count Hatzfeldt together with your message about lessening the cost & increasing the efficiency of the Sultan’s Army.

Count Hatzfeldt begged me to convey his thanks to you for your prompt and welcome reply, which relieved him, he said, of the un-interrupted pressure put upon him by the Sultan for German Army Instructors.

Hatzfeldt, who said he had no news, asked me if I had any to give him,—the Berlin F. O. he observed had never been quieter or less occupied than at present.—Like all Prussian officials he is very reserved on the subject of the general elections, which are at present agitating the Press to the exclusion of every other subject.—The fact is that no one, from the Emperor downwards, has any idea as to how Prince Bismarck intends to deal with the opposition his economic policy meets with in the Country. No one believes,—not even his own sons, that he seriously contemplates resigning, however much he may threaten to do so.

On the other hand there can be no doubt that the embarrassment his resignation would create, would be the greatest personal triumph he could indulge in.—He will probably prefer to try to create a majority by concessions to the Catholic “Centre,”—but it is impossible until he comes to Berlin and Parliament meets to foretell with any certainty what his fertile brain will suggest to spite his enemies and carry his measures through the Reichstag. His resignation would be both logical and dignified, and would prove to the ungrateful Fatherland that he cannot be replaced, and if he were as well inspired in the present as in the past he would resign and take his seat on the Opposition benches of the German Parliament.

The Emperor has not been well, and had to give up shooting at Lehrte this week. His Majesty fainted after dinner and great alarm was felt until he recovered.—Today he is quite well again and has resumed his usual occupations.

The illness of the Grand Duke of Baden is at present a cause of anxiety to the Royal Family. He is a very liberal and very popular Prince and his death would be a national calamity. The accounts received today at the Baden Legation are more reassuring than yesterdays I am happy to say.

The Crown Prince and Princess, Prince Henry and Princess Victoria <sup>65</sup> were pleased to signify their wish to celebrate the Prince of Wales' birthday at the Embassy with us and all our Staff, and we were much gratified to see them looking so happy and cheerful and well disposed towards H. M. Govt. at home. I was glad to see by your Speech at the Lord Mayors <sup>66</sup> [banquet] that you are quite well again.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, Nov. 16/81.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

The Bismarck & Gambetta theatrical performances are full of interest. I presume the Chancellor will retain power, but how he is to carry his internal schemes is a puzzle for us, who move along narrow grooves in this country.

Hartington <sup>67</sup> asked me last week how we were getting on with B. I said that I was not aware of any important difference in Foreign affairs, but that I presumed he detested us as Free-Traders, & liberals, belonging to a country whose press was so hostile to his domestic policy.

What are his relations with the Heir to the Throne?

I am rather superstitiously alarmed at the great lull in For: affrs which has lately existed.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

I am glad the Duchess [of Bedford] remains at Court. But I advise you not to touch on the subject with your brother.

<sup>65</sup> Prince Henry (1862-1929) and Princess Victoria (1866-1929) were children of the Crown Prince and Princess Frederick.

<sup>66</sup> For a report of Granville's speech on November 9, 1881, see *The Times* of the following day.

<sup>67</sup> Spencer Compton Cavendish (1833-1908), afterwards eighth Duke of Devonshire, was Marquess of Hartington, 1858-1891. In 1866 he was secretary of state for war; 1868-1870, postmaster-general with a seat in the cabinet; 1870-1874, chief secretary for Ireland; 1875, leader of the Liberal party after Gladstone's resignation; 1880-1882, secretary of state for India; 1882-1885, again at the war office; and 1895-1903, lord president of the council.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 November 1881.<sup>68</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You say truly that lulls in foreign affairs are as a rule alarming, because they generally precede "l'imprévu" in politics, but the present one is, I think, likely to last since it is clearly due to the reassuring effects of your foreign policy. You have carried out and are carrying out the Berlin Treaty, which the Powers accepted in 1878 as the basis of peace, order and concerted action in Europe, and the natural result is general confidence and faith in the Berlin agreement, practically and powerfully supported by H. M. Govt. as regards foreign affairs,—and welcome leisure to attend to home affairs by the Powers thus tranquillized and rendered confident in the duration of peace.

When the next breeze springs up it will probably be due to the individual ambitions of the coming Statesmen of the future.

Gambetta in France, Ignatieff in Russia and the rising generation of Ministers in Austria, Italy, Turkey and Egypt may seek to raise questions for the sake of raising themselves, but otherwise the peoples of Europe have no hostile ambitions at present and will bless the lull which enables them to live for industry and commerce and the accumulation of wealth.

I quite agree in all you said to Lord Hartington in regard to our relations with Bismarck, with whom we are on excellent terms and can at any given moment be on the very best if required, for he has always earnestly wished for the good of Germany to establish a practical alliance with England, like that which existed between France and England during the late Empire, but has never been able to inspire the required confidence at home to achieve it.

It is true that he disapproves of Parliamentary Government, liberal principles and free trade for Germany and "deplores their effects on England," and that he had far greater confidence in and sympathy for Lord Beaconsfield's policy than he has for the policy of the liberal Party, but that will not prevent his acting cordially with H. M. Govt. for the promotion of peace in Europe, when invited to do so.

Bismarck will for the present retain power by propounding numberless subterfuges for not giving it up before the new Parliament has re-discussed and rejected his measures and before he has re-dissolved and re-appealed to the Constituencies for the re-consideration of his policy.

Besides which he can drop his measures dismiss his Colleagues and form other Administrations while his octogenarian Master lives and lets him have his own wicked way with the Constitution.

<sup>68</sup> Sections of this letter, *i. e.*, the first part of the fourth, and the fifth paragraphs, appear in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 282-283.

When the dear old Emperor dies,—and I regret to say that he has lately shown the first symptoms of failing health,—then Bismarck's irresponsible power ought to come to an end,—that is, if the Crown Prince has the moral strength to compel his Chancellor to submit to the Constitution of the Empire and accept the accidents of a parliamentary system based on universal suffrage, which at present, Bismarck absolutely refuses to do.

I am delighted to hear from you that the Mistress of the Robes has withdrawn her resignation, the motives for which I never could understand.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Telegram from Lord Ampthill*

*Personal, private & secret.*

20 Nov. 81.

I am told that P. Bismarck has decided to send his eldest son as Second Secretary to the German Embassy in London and privately and personally hopes and flatters himself that it may be looked upon as a compliment by your Lordship and by H. M. Govt. and also as an earnest desire to wipe out the painful impression made by the scandal which unfortunately occurred last summer at the German Embassy.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 November 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

On the 20th inst. I telegraphed to you that Prince Bismarck had sent me a private personal and secret message through Bleichröder, his Secret Agent, to say that he had decided to send his eldest son as second Secretary to London and privately and personally hoped and flattered himself that it might be looked upon as a compliment and as an earnest desire to wipe out the painful impression made by the scandal which unfortunately occurred last summer at the German Embassy in London.<sup>69</sup>

On the 24th Prince Bismarck wrote me a private Letter asking me as a personal favour to recommend his son Herbert "*to Lord Granville's benevolence*,"—to which your telegram already received enables me to give a prompt and welcome answer.

Prince Bismarck adores this son, who is a remarkably clever youth, and hopes to make a great Statesman of him.—He has often told me in confidence that Herbert, young as he is, would already make an abler Ambassador than all the Members of the German Dip. Body taken together!

<sup>69</sup> No information available on this scandal.

In your last private Letter you ask me what Bismarck's relations with the Heir to the throne are? At present, they are as good as they can be. According to the traditions of the House of Hohenzollern, the Emperor never communicates with his Heir on State Affairs,—and when the Crown Prince wants to know what is going on, he calls on the Chancellor, who tells him as much or as little as he chuses.

The Crown Prince has liberal aspirations and disapproves of the arbitrary manner in which the Emperor and the Chancellor deal with the Constitution,—but the Chancellor's powers of persuasion are so great, that he generally comes round to Prince Bismarck's views and policy after hearing him explain them.

On the other hand the Crown Princess, who is a sound liberal and a convinced Constitutionalist, is not so easily talked over and holds up England and the liberal party to the Crown Prince as the models Germany must copy to become prosperous and free. So long as the dear old Emperor lives the differences of opinion are of no real consequence,—but when H. M. dies, they may lead to complications between the new Emperor and the Chancellor.

The Emperor's present illness,—an attack of gravel from which he had not suffered for many years, does not appear to alarm his Doctors or his family,—but at his age, I cannot but fear that acute pain, only relieved by injections of morphine must leave lasting traces on his general health.

The German "Reichstag" will now be told to vote the Budget, and will then be prorogued till Spring, while the Prussian "Landtag" meets to do the same for Prussia,—so that Bismarck is again "Master of the Situation" and likely to remain so while he lives.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 December 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Emperor is well again, the Empress has returned to Berlin, Princess Sophie<sup>70</sup> is up and about, and our recent anxieties are happily now things of the past.

Prince Bismarck has given Parliament a bit of his mind and Members have been made to understand that submission or dissolution is the Alternative they have to reflect upon during the recess.

Hatzfeldt, who is already sick of Berlin, and longing for the Bosphorus seems more occupied with getting up Lawn Tennis, than with getting up his work at the F. O. of which he professes to be still ignorant and little inclined to be bothered with.

<sup>70</sup> Princess Sophie Dorothea (1870–1932), the third daughter of the crown prince and princess, in 1889 married Constantine (1868–1923), later king of Greece.

The only diplomatic excitement we have to look forward to is the visit of Kalnoky <sup>71</sup> to Bismarck, before entering upon the succession of Haymerle at Vienna.

St. Vallier, who has arrived from Paris to remain here till Christmas before presenting his Letters of Recall, does not think that Gambetta will long enjoy his present popularity and power, and predicts a rapid "degringolade" of the Gambetta Administration.

I am surprized, for I had imagined that Gambetta's Reign, like Bismarck's, would last as long as he lived.

There is no news in Berlin to give you.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 December 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Kalnocky called on me on his way to Vienna, and we had a pleasant talk on past recollections and present difficulties, but of future contingencies he would not speak, being superstitiously apprehensive about the gale that may follow the present lull. He regrets his Embassy and fears that as matters stand in Austria, he will be politically used up and set aside without the consolation of being allowed, like Beust, to appoint himself to another Embassy, and altogether does not enjoy the prospects his present elevation forbode.

Kalnocky is personally fond of England, grateful for kindnesses received there, and to all appearance, free from those prejudices and apprehensions about the liberal party in England, which Continental Statesmen are so often subject to. Poor Haymerle's views on England were deplorable, but Kalnocky knows us from personal experience and can do us justice if he is allowed to think and act for himself. He clings to the alliance with Bismarck and to the "Dreikaiserbund" and is favourable to Italy, but distrusts Gambetta quite as much as Bismarck does.

In regard to Roumania and the Danube, he said, that King Carol's <sup>72</sup> speech had given offence at Vienna and could not be past [*sic*] over in silence, but he did not expect the present estrangement would lead to any more serious consequences since the German Emperor fully agreed that his Kinsman had overshot the mark,—and approved of the attitude Austria had assumed in consequence, towards Roumania.

The object, I fancy, of the Austrian Govt. is to turn out the Roumanian Ministry and compel King Carol to select advizers as sub-

<sup>71</sup> Count Gustav von Kalnoky (1832-1908) in November, 1881, succeeded Haymerle as head of the Austrian foreign office, after a diplomatic career in which he had seen service at Munich, London, and Rome, as minister at Copenhagen, 1874-1880, and ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1880-1881. He remained in the foreign office until 1895.

<sup>72</sup> Carol, prince of Rumania since 1866, took the title of king in 1881.



missive to Austria as the Ministers of the Prince of Servia with whom they have every reason to be satisfied at Vienna.

Kalnocky's language about H. M. Govt. was most satisfactory and I hope you may find him equally so, at the head of the Austrian F. O.

I did my best to carry out Dufferin's recommendations and your instructions about Armenia,—and Hatzfeldt promised to give us the moral support we ask for,—but on the whole I cannot see that Hatzfeldt takes any more interest in the Armenian question than Bismarck does, and, I suspect, that he really cares personally more for the favour of the Sultan, than for the welfare of Armenia.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER, Dec. 14/81.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

You will approve of my hoping to take Herbert Bismarck out to-morrow to hunt the hare. I took him to another amusement yesterday—the meeting in Westminster Abbey <sup>73</sup> where the Pr. of Wales was civil to him & where I introduced him to several notabilities. All this non obstante an extract from a Berlin letter, sent to me by the Queen, describing him in very black colours.

I am sorry to hear that Hatzfeldt is so lukewarm. Pray keep him up to the mark if you can.

These German employés will obtain great influence if they go out with orders to toady the Sultan.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 17 December 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince and Princess Bismarck are deeply touched (tief gerührt) by the very great kindness you are showing their son Herbert, and I feel convinced that you will reap the benefit of it politically in the future. The Letter you allude to describing him in very black colours was anticipated by the astute Father, who knowing full well that he and his family are not in ordeur [*sic*] of sanctity in high quarters, kept Herberts visit to England a secret at the Palace from all excepting the Emperor, until the Newspapers betrayed his arrival and called forth the Letter communicated to you, after you had already been civil to him. Herbert is a very clever and very hard-working young fellow. He has had a love affair with a divorced Princess

<sup>73</sup> A meeting to consider a memorial for Dean Stanley; see *The Times*, Dec. 14, 1881.

Carolath, who lives at Venice, and wanted to marry her. His parents hope that England may cure him of his infatuation, enlarge his mind and educate him for an independent post, they flatter themselves the Emperor will appoint him to on his return from England.

The more I keep Hatzfeldt up to the mark the more I perceive that he cares but little for reforms in Turkey, but very much for his personal influence with the Sultan which is a feather in his cap and a merit in Bismarck's eyes.

Bismarck has certainly never sought influence in Turkey,—but since the Sultan persistently forces it upon him he is yielding to His Majesty's importunities and no longer rejects the offer which he is beginning to think may after all have its advantages to Germany in the future.

Hatzfeldt is a pleasant, clever, somewhat cynical man of the world, more French than Prussian, fond of pleasure, loathing work and gifted with the power of making himself agreeable to everyone he deals with, even to the Crown Princess, who hated him before she knew him, because of his morals and divorce.—Bismarck says of him that he "is the best horse he has in his stables."

Hatzfeldt thinks Berlin a bore and longs to get back to Stamboul to enjoy the Sunshine of the Sultan's favour. His devotion to Bismarck alone, enables him to bear the work of the F. O. he would otherwise fly from to return to the more congenial duties of his Embassy on the Bosphorus. You say truly that the coming distribution of German Orders at Constantinople in return for the Turkish ones Ali Nizami<sup>74</sup> brought to Berlin will increase German influence at the Porte. Reshid Bey,<sup>75</sup> the Sultan's favourite is said to have accompanied Ali Nizami solely to get the red Eagle from the German Emperor.

Yours sincerely,

AMPHILL.

*Telegram Dec 21, 1881. Reply to Prince Bismarck's thanks*

*Private to Lord Ampthill.*

Ack. in suitable terms the message from the Chancellor.

Respect for him and the Princess made us anxious to show attention to Count Herbert, but the duty became a pleasure when we found how clever, well-informed, bright and easy to please he is.

Endorsed: To Lord Ampthill.

Te. Dec. 21, 1881.

<sup>74</sup> Ali Nizami was a Turkish general.

<sup>75</sup> Reshid Bey was the personal secretary of the sultan.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, Dec. 21/81.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I have sent you a telegram. It represents the impression which H. B. made on us. It was impossible to be more genial and easily pleased. From your account of Hatzfeldt, he will do very well as his sub, but is not likely to prove a great successor.

Is he the son of the former wife, (née Castellane) of the German Minister at Paris.

The Newspapers announce today more interviews between the Turks and the Chancellor.

Yrs.

(sd) G[*RANVILLE*].*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 December 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Happy Christmas! Your telegram about Herbert Bismarck has made his Father and Mother so happy that the Father in his delight over it confided to me that his son was so gifted and hardworking that he would make a better Ambassador than Münster if he were not too young for the Emperor to appoint him to so important a post just yet,—meanwhile your most kind reception of him encouraged the Prince to appoint him first Secretary in London whenever Stumm could be promoted to an independent Post.—He was profuse in thanks to you and Lady Granville and said that Herbert wrote that “you were the most amiable and fascinating Hosts he had ever met in his Life”—I quote his own words.

You will see from my Despatches that the Sultan, assisted by Hatzfeldt, Ali Nizami and Reshid are [*sic*] getting round Bismarck and that he is likely to take more interest in Turkey than heretofore,—not a bad thing if we can get him to support Dufferin more effectually than he has hitherto done.—German influence will now become very great at Constantinople.

Hatzfeldt is not the son of the widow Hatzfeldt née Castellane, who married the Duc de Sagan et Valencay,—but a Cousin once or twice removed.

We dined with the Emperor and Empress the other day and thought their Majestys [*sic*] looking wonderfully well.

Happy Christmas!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER, Dec. 28/1881.

MY DEAR AMPHILL,

We heartily reciprocate your good wishes. I am glad that H. Bismarck is to stay here. Unless he is uncivilly treated at Court, it will make him more favourable to England, though not perhaps to the present Government.

The Dips living in London Society get very much more conservative than even they naturally would do.

Bismarck's attitude will make Dufferin's part much more difficult. Pressure becomes useless if 3 or 4 other Powers encourage the Porte to resist.

The Germans may be of great use to the Turk unless they persuade him to spend more money on his army and fleet. I imagine better men will be sent than our Hobarts & Bakers.<sup>76</sup>

Yours,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 31 Dec. 1881.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your good wishes of the 28th. I do not expect that Bismarck intends to lend the Sultan men of the Stamp and Standing of Hobart and Baker Pasha.—He will probably select men like Wetendorf and the others already sent to Constantinople,—humble hardworking German officials, obscure and unwashed, who will work for him and the Sultan, and not for themselves, and who will be content "pour tout potage" with a red Eagle round their neck and a medjidje on their breast.

Bismarck's present attitude will make Dufferin's part more difficult as you say, but Dufferin is so able and full of resource that he will find means of counteracting Bismarck's "*benevolent indifference*" to reforms in Turkey.

The idol Bismarck worships is "*Authority*" and he has taken it into his head, under Hatzfeldt's influence, that our pressure on the Sultan is likely to weaken the authority of the Fez in the Turkish Empire. The same idea takes possession of foreign Dips in London who become more conservative than they would naturally be elsewhere, as you say in your Letter of the 28th, because they are misled by London Society to believe that we Liberals attach less importance

<sup>76</sup> Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden (1822-1886) became naval adviser to the sultan in 1867; as Hobart Pasha he commanded the Black Sea Fleet in the Russo-Turkish war, 1877-1878; in 1881 he was created *muchir* for his services in the reduction of Crete. For Baker see *Letters*, 1880, n. 46.

to the absolute authority of the Crown than to the dictates of philanthropic public opinion, and that the encouragement thereby given to the Peoples, weakens the authority of established Governments" all over the world. It is a common error among foreigners and one I am incessantly endeavouring to dispel, because it is one of the principal causes of our unpopularity on the Continent.

Prince Bismarck has informed me privately that he has instructed his son Herbert, if you should question him on the subject, to explain to you as he did to me what his views on Eastern Affairs are. If he should say more than he did to me I should be much obliged if you would let me know for my guidance.

Herbert, who is enthusiastic about his visit to Walmer, leaves on Wednesday or Thursday next for England. Prince Bismarck, who is ambitious for his son's advancement, is especially gratified by your condescension in talking politics with so young a man. Great Statesmen abroad will not often indulge young men in serious conversation on Current questions, and Prince Bismarck appreciates highly the compliment you paid his son by asking him what his Father thought about Egyptian Affairs. I think you may find Herbert a useful channel to convey correct impressions to his Father with whom he is in daily correspondence.

Happy New Year!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

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<sup>17</sup> In Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 233, n. 2, this is quoted in a garbled version as from a letter of October 28, 1881.

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**CHAPTER VI**  
**LETTERS, 1882**

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**243**



## CHAPTER VI

### LETTERS, 1882

In 1882 British diplomacy centered on Egypt. At first Britain followed French leadership there, but Gambetta, who favored an aggressive Anglo-French policy in Egypt, fell from power at the end of January, and his successor, M. Freycinet, was handicapped by a divided public opinion and hesitant to decide on a course of action. The result of this change in French policy was that Britain, much against the wishes of the prime minister, now had to take the lead. Then followed in rapid succession the sending of a British squadron to Alexandria, the bombardment and occupation of that city, the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Egypt, the defeat of the Egyptian army on September 13, and British military occupation of the country.<sup>1</sup> These actions by the British government put an end to the Anglo-French entente, an eventuality not desired by the British government but made inevitable by the vacillations of French diplomacy.

The letters from Lord Ampthill show that M. Freycinet, who early in February succeeded Gambetta as prime minister and foreign secretary, seemingly preferred an entente with Germany to one with Britain, and since Bismarck was anxious to keep Gambetta out of office, he and Freycinet had certain common objectives.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the revival of the Three Emperors' League had indirectly drawn Germany into the affairs of the Levant. Her two partners in the

<sup>1</sup> For a survey of the Egyptian question based largely upon Gladstone-Granville correspondence, see Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 161-194.

<sup>2</sup> On June 20, 1882, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons, wrote privately to Lord Granville:

"Bismarck's great object appears to be to keep Freycinet in and he fears, not without some reason, that when the first Turkish Soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet will fall at Paris.

"The Freycinet Ministry would probably be succeeded by a Cabinet in which Gambetta would not actually have a seat, but over which he would exercise very great influence. Bismarck very probably exaggerates the strength of that influence and looks for more direct hostility to Germany than it would really provoke . . . it would be impossible for Germany to feel as much at her ease as she does now, if Gambetta were the virtual director of French Policy."

Original MSS., the Granville Papers.

Ten days later Lyons wrote:

"France is paralysed at this moment; first by the unappeased quarrel between the Chamber of Deputies and Gambetta; secondly by the internal dissensions in the Cabinet; and thirdly by the timidity which has come over the Nation. . . . [Freycinet] takes his cue from Berlin, for Bismarck does his best to keep him in, for fear his successor should be Gambetta."

*Ibid.*



league, Austria-Hungary and Russia, were deeply interested in the fate of the Turkish empire to which Egypt belonged, but they had no common program for settling or dividing the estate of the so-called "Sick Man." Hence Bismarck had to keep a weather eye in that direction, and this combination of the French courtship of Bismarck and his duties as co-ordinator of the affairs of the "Dreikaiserbund" made the German chancellor immensely powerful in all negotiations pertaining to Egypt. Consequently Ampthill was forced to maintain a constant watch in Berlin of actions by colleagues and the moods of Bismarck. His observations were recorded in the private letters to his chief who on his part was most anxiously striving to please the powerful German chancellor.

[Copy]

WALMER, Jan. 11/82.

MY DEAR AMPHILL,

I have sent you in a confidential despatch what I had some thoughts of doing in a private letter. It looks as if our identic note<sup>3</sup> will do harm rather than good. If France shows any ambitious views in Egypt, we at once part with her. This has not yet been the case & we wish therefore to act cordially. Before agreeing to Gambetta's note I consulted Malet, on whose judgement I have great confidence, & he approved.

But the Chancellor must have other things to think of than Egypt just now. Can the Crown Prince approve of the recent rescript?<sup>4</sup> I am curious to hear your account of the question.

We adjourned yesterday till the 25th when Cabinets are to begin again. The opening will be lively.

Yrs. sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 Jan 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of the 11th. The Confidential Despatch you announce in it, was not in the Bag, so I suppose it will come next time.

Bismarck believes that France has ambitious views in Egypt which he proposes to neutralize by giving his moral support to the Sultan's Suzerainty over Egypt in the event of a foreign occupation becoming necessary.—I confess to not liking the prospect of a Turkish garrison at Cairo but if things come to the worst, it will be difficult to find any other solution to which the Allied Northern Powers would not object.

Bismarck assured the Crown Prince the other day that to resist French ambition and support the Sultan's Suzerainty in Egypt was to render England a signal service in his opinion.

<sup>3</sup> England and France presented an identic note to the khedive of Egypt on January 8 to convey the assurance of the two powers that they would support his government. See Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 169–171, and Earl Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (New York, 1908), I, 214–235.

<sup>4</sup> A royal rescript, countersigned by Bismarck and addressed to the Prussian ministry, was published January 7 in the Prussian Official Gazette. The last paragraph declared that the sovereign expected all officials to refrain from agitation against the government even at elections, inasmuch as "the duty which, in their oath of office, they swore to perform, extends to supporting the policy of the Government even at elections." *Annual Register*, 1882, 238.

The Press is trying to give a sensational character to the Imperial Rescript which it does not deserve.—It is merely a paternal admonition to Prussian officials to be good boys and not go again and vote for naughty Liberals who want Parliament to replace the King's time honoured authority.

The Crown Prince is a true Hohenzollern and holds to family traditions,—the Crown Princess of course disapproves but when it has once been mentioned in Parliament, we shall hear no more about it.—The Berliners on the whole thought it quite natural and all right, and marvelled greatly at the importance attached to it by foreign newspapers.

While Bismarck lives, parliamentary Government cannot flourish in Germany—after his death, the next Emperor will have to "let it grow up of itself."

The Empress told me the other day at dinner that she had been somewhat dismayed at reading in the French papers that her former French Reader Monsieur Gerard has been appointed "Chef du Cabinet" of M. Gambetta.<sup>5</sup>

Some years ago, Her Majesty's old French Reader having died, she applied to Morier,<sup>6</sup> then H. M. Minister at Munich to find her another. Morier applied to M. Bersôt, "Chef de lécole Normale" at Paris, who recommended Monsieur Gerard with whom she had been very well satisfied.

Last year, however, Monsieur Gerard said he wished to return to France, where he had been offered a suitable appointment and Her Majesty parted with him in consequence but not without regret.

On seeing him take office under Gambetta, she made inquiries, and then only discovered that M. Bersôt was Gambetta's friend and had been requested by him to place Gerard as Reader with Her Majesty.

Monsieur Gerard now writes to his friends in Berlin that he hopes ere long to obtain from Gambetta the Post of Ambassador at Berlin.

M. Gerard's successor was a Monsieur Pigeon whom she has now very civilly and quietly got rid of, having discovered that he was also recommended by Gambetta to Gerard.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>5</sup> Auguste Gérard (1852–1922), second secretary of the French embassy at Washington, 1880–1881, was recalled by Gambetta to become *chef du cabinet* at the ministry of foreign affairs on December 18, 1881; later he served in the legations at Madrid, 1882–1883, Berne, 1883–1886, Rome, 1886–1889, and then was minister plenipotentiary in Montenegro, 1889–1891, Brazil, 1891–1893, China, 1893–1897, Belgium, 1897–1906, and ambassador to Japan, 1907–1914.

<sup>6</sup> Morier was now British minister at Madrid. See above, "1872," n. 26.

[Copy]

*Private.*18 C. H. T., *Jan. 13/82.*

MY DEAR AMPHILL,

Münster called on me yesterday—and in his light and airy manner asked me whether I had not said that we should not intervene in Egypt.

I answered “no, what I said was that M. Gambetta has never proposed, nor we agreed to use force.”

It is just possible that he may have forwarded this answer to Bismarck and equally possible that the latter may think it inconsistent with my having told his son that we felt strong objections to all the modes of intervention.

You are aware that this is true—and that we are not likely to act contrary to this opinion.

But besides the general principle of not sacrificing one's liberty of action with regard to future contingencies, there is the present reason against doing so, viz: that the notables & the soldiers if perfectly relieved from fear, would be ready to go far.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Personal.*

BERLIN, 19 Jan. 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck desires me to tell you privately and for your personal information only, that Herr Sonneman, Editor of the Francfort Journal, who made a large fortune in France during the late Empire and now opposes the German Govt. in the Reichstag as M. P. for Francfort, has applied to the Berlin Foreign Office for Letters of Introduction (Soup Tickets) to the German Representatives in Egypt and Turkey,—which leads Prince Bismarck to suspect that he is going there to intrigue,—for whom?—he does not know, but he wishes you to know that it is not for the German Govt. with whom Herr Sonneman is and ever will be, at daggers drawn.

Prince Bismarck thinks it not impossible that Herr Sonneman may be in the employment of the French Govt. and will therefore keep an eye on him during his trip to Cairo and Constantinople.

Prince Bismarck expressed a hope that you might recognize in his denunciation of a German Brother, the immense value he attaches to a close & intimate understanding with H. M. Govt.!

Yours sincerely,

AMPHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 Jan. 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of 18th [13?]-I will carefully inform Prince Bismarck of our "Standpoint," if Münster or Herbert should perchance mislead him into thinking us inconsistent,—but I see no danger of it,—Bismarck understands and appreciates our interests in Egypt and has always done justice to them. He has, as you know, strong convictions of his own on the subject and only yesterday he was telling me that he regretted more than ever that we had thought it necessary to share them with France, because he was more than ever convinced that France must quarrel with us about Egypt, and a quarrel between France & England might affect all Europe. He also regretted that the Notables<sup>1</sup> had been summoned to advise the Khedive, because ignorant and open to bribery as they were, their advice, influenced by foreign intrigue & money must be bad and become an additional source of trouble. When trouble came, if his advice were sought, he would certainly recommend that the Sultan, as legitimate Suzerain should do his duty and keep order among his Egyptian subjects with Turkish troops, and he felt convinced that no more peaceful solution could be found in the general interests of all concerned.

The Sultan, Prince Bismarck said, was a decided bore with his apprehensions about Egypt and his appeals to the Northern Powers not to "*leave him alone*" with the Western Powers, and Hirschfeld the German Chargé d' Affairs was in despair about it from Constantinople.

An official Note from the Sultan on the subject, was now announced, but had not yet reached Berlin so that he could not tell how the text of it might be drawn up.

As soon as I recover from my severe cold in the chest, which still keeps me at home, I will carry out your instructions and go to Arolsen to discuss the preliminaries of Prince Leopold's marriage Treaty with Baron Stockhausen, who is to be the Prince of Waldeck and Pyrmont's Plenipotentiary.<sup>2</sup>

Ever yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>1</sup> The Egyptian chamber of notables, created in 1866, was opened by the khedive on December 26, 1881. The Joint Note early in January provoked it to demand some control over the budget. See Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, I, 68, 187, 224, 237, *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> The marriage of Prince Leopold, Duke of Albany, fourth son of Queen Victoria (1853-1884), to Princess Hélène of Waldeck Pyrmont (1861-1922) was solemnized at Windsor on April 27, 1882. Arolsen was the capital of the principality of Waldeck.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 February 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The lull is over and gentle breezes are springing up in Bosnia and Egypt which call for careful navigation.<sup>9</sup>

Egypt worries me.—If we do nothing, the Sultan as mandatory of the Northern Powers, will occupy Egypt and our influence will be diminished. If we send Fleets to Alexandria and Suez, Christian massacres may ensue, [which] we cannot prevent.

The safer course of forestalling others by taking the initiative of calling upon the Sultan as Suzerain to keep order in Egypt, would not satisfy public opinion at home.

I wonder how you will deal with this dangerous question and look forward anxiously for news about it?

Mr. Goschen is here to my great delight, for I always learn much in conversation with him about home affairs.—He has called on Bismarck, Hatzfeldt and other leading Members of Parliament to get up the situation in Germany. Bismarck has taken advantage of his presence to consult him on the silver question and bimetallism. From here he goes to Paris to study the state of France.

He tells me that Bismarck & Hatzfeldt steadily avoided the subject of Egypt. The fact is, as I have said before, that both these Statesmen want Egyptian Affairs to be regulated by the European Concert and hope to neutralize the exclusive influence of England and France by letting the Sultan occupy Egypt with Turkish Troops.—

In this Austria and Russia will support them and we must be prepared for a sudden move in that direction when things grow worse in Egypt.

As regards the Bosnian insurrection Bismarck appears to think that it may take uncomfortably large proportions when fine weather sets in, and the fighting season commences in those regions.

Arolsen is a long way off,—but I was well rewarded by making the acquaintance of Prince Leopold's Bride, Princess Hélène of Waldeck, who is quite charming and who will become a universal favourite at home. Without being strictly speaking a beauty, she has something so fascinating in her general appearance and pleasing manners that I can well appreciate Prince Leopold's selection and

<sup>9</sup> A serious insurrection began in Bosnia January 16, 1882, and order was not completely restored until June. In Egypt trouble over the budget caused the downfall of the Egyptian ministry on February 5. A significant development in the Egyptian affair was the presentation of a note to the sultan on February 2 from Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy, demanding to be consulted before any changes were made in Egyptian arrangements. See Knaplund, *op. cit.*, 172-173; Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, I, 259; Langer, *European Alliances*, 267-268.

most sincerely congratulate him on his choice. The Reigning Prince of Waldeck is amiable and cheerful but at times rather shy. The Princess decidedly clever and agreeable. Both are very popular in the Country, and of the married Princesses one hears none but good and gratifying accounts. They are much esteemed and loved by their many friends and are a most united family to each other.

It is very sad to think that the accident to his knee will prevent Prince Leopold's immediate return to England, but at least he has the consolation of the Society of Princess Hélène who seems deeply devoted to him.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Feb 8/82.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I do not know how to answer your statements as to the difficulties of dealing with the Egyptian question—you will see how we are trying to do so.

It is possible that the French Govt. have already anticipated us in telling the Germans what we have settled. In that case you might take advantage of some favourable opportunity of mentioning confidentially that it was on the 30th ult. that I wrote to ask the French to consider whether we should consult the other Powers—that they gave no answer and then encouraged by the character of the answer of the Powers to the Turk, we made a formal proposal to do so, which with some reserves has been accepted.

Do not however make any mischief unless it is necessary, a most unnecessary caution to give you.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 Feb. 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Your private Letter of the 8th and your Despatches just received and Speeches just read, have fully answered my queries and dispelled my doubts as to the nature of our future Egyptian policy, which, with Gambetta was maintaining an exclusively Anglo-French character, but with Freycinet will become European.<sup>10</sup>

Freycinet, as you may remember is more inclined to inspire himself with Bismarck's views than Gambetta was, and he has already I believe sounded Bismarck through Hohenlohe, as to the best means of

<sup>10</sup> The Gambetta ministry was defeated in the chamber of deputies on January 26 and resigned immediately. Freycinet's cabinet, formed on January 30, lasted until July 29, 1882.

keeping the peace in Europe about Egypt and Bismarck has recommended the European Concert, so we are all agreed & can await coming events in Egypt without the apprehension of a European complication.

Your, and Mr. Gladstone's speeches<sup>11</sup> have given the greatest satisfaction here and I have convinced the Germans that we are not, as the Newspapers intimate, pressing selfish interests only, but really wish for peace and progress in Egypt.

Hatzfeld has been ill and in bed for the last few days, & Bismarck complains of neuralgia and is invisible.

The Court receptions and balls are going on as usual and both the Emperor and Empress are well and unusually cheerful.—No news.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 Feb. 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The joint communication of the Anglo-french Despatch<sup>12</sup> about Egypt has made an excellent impression on Prince Bismarck and everybody concerned here in Berlin, and my Colleagues of Austria Russia and Italy tell me that their respective governments are equally gratified by the "new departure" which renews and continues the action of the European Concert, so happily established and worked by yourself and Mr. Gladstone for Greece and Montenegro, which no longer trouble the rest of Europe since they have become things of the past.

Although Bismarck likes the compliment of being asked to put his finger in the pie, he will not send the celebrated Pomeranians to Egypt, if intervention is called for,—but you will, I feel sure, find his moral support useful in promoting peaceful solutions to coming difficulties in the future.

Baron de Courcel,<sup>13</sup> the new french Ambassador is making a favourable impression at Court and in the F. O. and he is eloquent to me in his assurances in regard to his faith in, and adherence to the Anglo-french alliance.

As I have had occasion to say before, M. de Freycinet has always shewn a tendency to seek favour in Bismarck's eyes,—which very possibly explains the hot haste in which he communicated by telegraph the joint note about Egypt to the Great Chancellor before

<sup>11</sup> These were speeches in the debate on the Address from the Throne at the opening of parliament on February 7. See *Hansard*, 3rd Ser., CCLXVI, 32-37 for Granville and 162-167 for Gladstone.

<sup>12</sup> The circular of February 11 (*P. P.*, 1882, LXXXII, c. 3249, no. 17) had been given to the German government on February 14.

<sup>13</sup> Alphonse Chodron, Baron de Courcel (1835-1919), French ambassador to Germany, 1882-1886, and to Great Britain, 1894-1898.



it could reach anybody else.—No harm has been done thereby, beyond showing up his little game with Bismarck.

The Crown Princess has gone to see Prince Leopold and Princess Hélène at Arolsen and returns tonight. The Carneval Season which closes on Tuesday next has been gay,—and when dancing is over the Empress intends to give some Concerts during Lent.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 25 Feb 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We are so quiet and uninteresting at present in Berlin that I hesitate to trouble you with a private letter when you have so much to take up your attention at home.—I will therefore merely say that Bismarck is pleased with our Egyptian policy and delighted at the happy letters he receives from his son Herbert from London who avows that he has never been made so much of before.

My ex-french Colleague, St. Vallier, whose judgment on french affairs I have generally found to be very correct, writes to me from Paris that he fears Gambetta will be able to upset the Freycinet Ministry in less than a year, and that the next man to try his hand at forming a government will probably be the President of the Chamber, M. Brisson, who is likely to become the most powerful opponent Gambetta will have to contend with.—St. Vallier has himself always been in opposition to Gambetta and declares him to be overrated as a Statesman, though a very able journalist and orator.

Freycinet is so subservient to Bismarck, that he will be regretted here, when he follows his predecessors into opposition.

Baron Courcel the new french Ambassador is as great a success in Berlin as St. Vallier was before him. I like what I have seen of him very much.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 4 March 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Early yesterday morning the Emperor, the Empress and the Crown Princess sent me their telegrams giving an account of the atrocious attempt on the Queen <sup>14</sup> which filled us all with indignation,—and with gratitude at Her Majesty's Providential preservation. The

<sup>14</sup> On March 2, as Queen Victoria was entering her carriage at Windsor station, she was fired upon by Roderick Maclean but escaped unhurt. *The Times*, March 3; *Letters*, 2d Ser., III, 265–267.

demonstrations of sympathy and thankfulness which followed were most gratifying.—From morning till late at night the members of the Royal Family, the great Dignatories of the Court, the Members of the Government, of the Society, of the Diplomatic Body, Ladies and Gentlemen, old and young called at the Embassy to leave cards and express their sympathy for the Queen and their thankfulness for Her Majesty's safety.

The popularity of our beloved Queen is unbounded throughout Germany and the world. We now anxiously await details from home, and only hope the reaction after the shock may not affect Her Majesty's health.

I cannot say more today having been asked to go down to Potsdam with my wife, by Her Majesty's Grandson, Prince William to see the Princess, who is not allowed under present circumstances to travel by Rail to Berlin before next May.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O. *March 8. 82.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

We are still in pourparlers with the French about the despatch which we propose to send to you & the other Ambassadors.

It is not a very forcible attempt, but it may keep things going, if Bismarck really tries to back us up with Europe and with the Turk.

It would be an immense triumph to avoid recourse to force.

Will B. really help us or not?

I have thoughts of another conversation with Herbert Bismarck—People are very civil to him. He is the only Secy. of Embassy who has ever dined with the Queen at Windsor.

I do not think the Chancellor need have much fear about his son's heart being irrevocably fixed upon an old love—excepting on old Lady Melbourne's<sup>15</sup> principle, that she always knew when a man was really in love, by the immense relief he showed when the object had left the room.

Yrs,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 March 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of the 8th instant—I am very curious to see the Dispatch you announce, and without knowing its contents I feel sure

<sup>15</sup> Elizabeth, Viscountess Melbourne (1752-1818), whose son William was prime minister of England and whose daughter Emily was the wife of Lord Palmerston. Her correspondence with her daughter is the basis of Lady Airlie's *In Whig Society* (London, 1921).

that Bismarck will back up your policy if he thinks it conducive to general peace.

Another conversation with Herbert Bismarck can only do good, because it will flatter the paternal vanity of the German Dictator whose power is at its Zenith. Herbert's doting mother confided to me the other night at the Palace Concert that her beloved boy wrote three distinct series of incomparable Letters,—political to his father, social to his Mother and gossiping to his brother and sister, and that he described himself as happier and more interested than ever before in his life.

Everything you say to him will go straight to his father and will be read with more loving interest than anything coming from Münster or me.

Hatzfeldt has left on sick leave and has gone first to his Estates on the Rhine and then to Pegli near Genoa to see his wife, to whom he is quite devoted since they are divorced.

The excitement produced by Scobelieff's [*sic*] speeches<sup>16</sup> and consequent rumours of war for Pan Slavistic purposes have misled the Press into asserting that Bismarck is preparing to fight Russia.—Nothing could be more contrary to truth.—Bismarck wants peace and wants to prevent war and would be glad therefore if the Czar dismissed both Scobelieff and Ignatieff whom he looks upon as dangerous to the Romanoff dynasty—but he won't quarrel with the Czar and his Govt. so long as they don't quarrel with him.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

March 15, 1882.

A despatch will be sent in a day or two from the two Govts. to the Powers, suggesting the limits which should be placed upon the attributes of the notables, so as to prevent clashing with the international agreements.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> General Michael Dmitrievitch Skobelev (1843–1882) was a hero of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 and he had fought brilliantly in Central Asia in 1881. A Pan-Slavist and Germanophobe, he arrived in Paris early in 1882. An informal speech denouncing Germany as the enemy of both Russia and the Slav was reported in the press (*The Times*, Feb. 18) and provoked violent repercussions throughout Europe (*The Times*, Feb. 20–24). En route to St. Petersburg after being recalled, he offered a toast in Warsaw which was also deemed inflammatory (*The Times*, Mar. 6). He was finally reported as having been reprimanded by the tsar (*The Times*, Mar. 11). There is a good account in Langer, *European Alliances*, 240–242.

<sup>17</sup> A circular was sent out on March 17, but it was not published in the *Parliamentary Papers*. Dufferin's account was that "confidential discussions took place (as a result of favorable replies to the circular of February 11) as to the extension which could be given to the powers of the Chamber of Notables without risk of interference with international engagements and interests. But further action in the matter was delayed in consequence of information received from Sir E. Malet that the position of the Government in Egypt was insecure, and that it would be better to wait the course of events before entering upon negotiation with them"—*P. P.*, 1882, LXXXII, c. 3258, p. 5.

I entirely mistrust Freycinet, who I suspect dislikes us, all the more for his conduct to us about Greece. But we are determined to act loyally with him, as long as there is no flagrant breach of faith.

The French are violently opposed to any Turkish intervention, political or military.<sup>18</sup> The former might be of great use.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 25, March 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We dined with Bismarck on the Emperor's birthday and did not think him looking as ill as he says he feels. He again asked me to thank you and Lady Granville for your "immense kindness" to Herbert,—who is coming home on leave for his Father and Mother's birthdays (first and eleventh of April) and he said he could never be sufficiently grateful for the reception his son had met with in England.

Bismarck is all right in regard to Egypt and I think more inclined to your view than to that of France, who is dead against the employment of Turkish influence or force in Egypt, however judiciously applied to coming complications.

My new french Colleague is nervously alarmed at Bismarck's preference for Turkish rather than for Christian interference at Cairo and is constantly arguing against it in Freycinet's as well as in his own name.

Courcel is a charming Colleague,—but decidedly more of an alarmist than his predecessor St. Vallier.—He sees prospects of war, where I can see none, and believes that Bismarck is bringing on a quarrel with Russia, while I am convinced that he is determined to prevent one.

Courcel is new to Berlin, and comes with Paris impressions and has still to learn for himself that Bismarck who wanted war to make his German Empire, now wants peace to consolidate his work and make it strong and prosperous.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., March 29/82.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Herbert Bismarck goes tomorrow and there is a rumour that he is likely not to return at all, or at all events only for a short time.

This in my opinion is a mistake.

<sup>18</sup> The French attitude toward Turkish intervention in Egypt is discussed in Langer, *European Alliances*, 271-272.

English political and social life is very complicated. Bismarck shows great interest, and is energetic in making acquaintance with all classes of people. But as you know it requires some time to get hold of the kernel.

He has made himself exceedingly popular, & there are many, certainly including Lady G. and me, who would be very sorry to lose him.

He has been successful in circles, where success was not absolutely to be reckoned upon. If there still be any reason to desire that his mind should not dwell upon the past, I cannot conceive a better antidote than the rather tiring whirl of the last 3 or 4 months.

He is likely to play a considerable part in the politics of his own Country—one of the obstacles to the better understanding of the two nations has been the want of knowledge of each which some politicians display.

You will be the best judge whether to give the Chancellor a hint of my opinion, statement of any of the reasons I have mentioned.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 April 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Today is Bismarck's 68th birthday, and he has gone to spend it at Friederichsruhe with his family.—I wrote to wish him "many happy returns" and at the same time "committed an indiscretion" and sent him extracts from your private letter of the 29th ulto. about Herbert, which will give him more paternal pleasure than any of the thousand letters, telegrams, poems, flowers, and delicacies with which he will be overwhelmed today. I left out the delicate allusion to Herbert's fat fair and forty love.—because Bismarck wishes the incident to be dismissed as what he calls "ein überwundener Standpunkt" and buried in oblivion.

Your letter ought to produce the desired effect and will in any case promote the cordial relations your much appreciated kindness to his son has already established, and about which Princess Bismarck never ceases to talk in eloquent and grateful language.

Busch told me that the Coronation question<sup>19</sup> had not yet been alluded to by the Chancellor, so I asked the Crown Prince, who told me that he had privately asked Bismarck not to advise the Emperor to send him or his son Prince William, as neither wished to go to Moscow,—but to recommend either the appointment of a special Am-

<sup>19</sup> The coronation of Tsar Alexander III, despite preparations and expectations throughout 1882, was postponed until May 27, 1883. The secrecy concerning the actual date provoked *The Times* to a long essay on September 23, 1882.

bassador or of the resident Ambassador, General von Schweinitz, which Bismarck had promised to do.

On the other hand Prince Dolgorouky, the Emperor's Russian Aide de Camp,<sup>20</sup> tells me that the Czar will probably express a wish to see Prince William at the Coronation, in which case the Emperor will send his grandson, whether the Crown Prince wishes it or not.

Many people here seem to think that the Coronation will have to be postponed "sine die" from fear of the Nihilists, who are stronger than ever,—they say.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 April 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The effect of your private letter about Herbert Bismarck manifests itself in his appointment as Chargé d'Affaires during Münster's absence,—otherwise Stumm<sup>21</sup> would, I believe, have been ordered back to his post when Münster left. If you are able to indulge Herbert in conversations which he can officially report you will gratify his Father because the Emperor's attention could thereby be naturally drawn to Herbert's abilities by his paternal Chief.

Hatzfeldt has returned to the F. O. refreshed by his visit to Geneva, Genoa and Florence in company with divorced wife! His friends expect that he will soon pop the question & marry her a second time.—Others say that the Divorce must have been a mere farce to facilitate payment of his debts and his appointment to the F. O.

By a circular to the Dip. Body he has now limited his days of reception at the F. O. to one a week,—but privately he has told me to write him whenever I want to see him.

Baron de Courcel, who had gone to spend the Easter Holidays at Paris, has now returned and alludes frequently now to the advantages of a change of Khedive and to the disadvantages of Turkish interference in Egypt.

Bismarck, Hatzfeldt and Busch would personally prefer, as you know, Turkish interference to any other, if ever needed. For the present Khedive, at the time he was selected and approved by the Powers, Hatzfeldt had personally no sympathy but he would not, for

<sup>20</sup> Prince Nicholas Dolgorouki was on the staff of the Russian embassy in Berlin as colonel and aide-de-camp and was attached to the person of the Emperor William, 1879-1884.

<sup>21</sup> Baron Ferdinand von Stumm (1843-1925), the first secretary of the German embassy at London, 1881-1883, served as first secretary in the embassy at St. Petersburg, 1878-1881, was sent as minister to Darmstadt in 1883, to Copenhagen in 1885, and as minister and later as ambassador to Madrid, 1887-1892.

[all] that, encourage Freycinet's wish for a new Khedive, so that Courcel's views about Egypt will not meet with much favour in Berlin I think.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 April 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

My french Colleague is much troubled about Egypt.—He says that Freycinet has a vague feeling that something ought to be done to satisfy Public opinion in France,—but that he cannot make up his mind as to what could be done that would not aggravate the Situation. He is convinced that France would not stand Turkish intervention and he is afraid that Bismarck would promote it, if intervention became necessary. Freycinet appears to think that the selection and appointment of a new Khedive under French influence, who could be presented to France as her Candidate, would flatter and satisfy Opinion for the time being.

Courcel does not appear to share this opinion himself, but talks of it privately in Freycinet's name and is rather alarmed to find that Hatzfeldt does not object to it as strongly as England does,—because, he justly suspects that Hatzfeldt would support the Sultan's candidate, if he has one, rather than Freycinet's, when he finds one to suit France.

Freycinet fears that while France and England are agreeing on the best course to follow in the event of a crisis, Bismarck will step in and take the lead by urging Turkey to occupy Egypt with the moral support of Germany, Austria, Russia and possibly Italy,—when France and England would have to make "bonne face à mauvais Jeu."

I told Courcel that so long as France and England were really united in spirit and action, in purpose & policy, I did not think Bismarck would attempt to step in between us in Egypt.

Sincerely yours,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 29 April 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We celebrated Prince Leopold's wedding on the 27th by giving a ball at the Embassy. All the members of the Imperial Family did us the honour of coming, with the exception of the Emperor and Empress who are at Wiesbaden. The Emperor returns to Berlin next week, the Empress goes to Baden.

The Grand Duke Wladimir's visit to Wiesbaden is said to have been purely complimentary and has given great satisfaction as a proof of cordial relations.

Princess Dolgorouki, the late Czar's widow, passed through Berlin on her way to Paris, and having sent for the Emperor's Aide de Camp Prince Radziwill, told him that she wanted to see His Majesty and present her four children to him.<sup>22</sup>

The Emperor William was embarrassed, not wishing to offend her or anyone else, but as he was about to start for Wiesbaden, he asked my Russian Colleague Sabouroff [*sic*] to call on her and explain that he would not be able to receive her before starting.

Sabouroff tells me that she seemed much agitated and upset at not being received, but after calming down a little she said she had a favour to ask:—She had brought the late Czar's favourite dog with her, who absolutely refused to wear a muzzle without which no dog is allowed to go out in Berlin, and she solicited permission to take him out walking in the Thiergarten without a muzzle. Sabouroff applied to the Minister of Police, who granted the required permission and appointed two police Agents in plain clothes to follow Princess Dolgorouki and the late Czar's dog whenever they went out, so as to protect the latter from the official dogcatchers whose duty it is to arrest and imprison every unmuzzled dog they meet with in Berlin.

Prince Bismarck is expected to return to Berlin next week to make a speech on the Tobacco Monopoly bill, which the Imperial Parliament is determined to throw out.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

May 3/82.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Münster tells me that Bismarck has given no opinion on the 3 generals plan,<sup>23</sup> but will support anything to wh. England & France agree. I do not know what Freycinet will do. He is much afraid of the universal feeling in France against the possible chance of a Turkish armed intervention.

You will have read with interest our statements [in re Ireland] in Parliament.<sup>24</sup> The abuse will be tremendous & we shall be men or mice in 2 months. I sanguine [*sic*] believe in the former. But

<sup>22</sup> Princess Katherina Michaelowna Dolgourouki (1846-1922), themorganatic wife of Alexander II, left Russia after his death in 1881 and eventually established herself at Cannes.

<sup>23</sup> In April it was suggested that three generals, one each from England, France, and Turkey, should be sent to deal with the Egyptian army and its officers. See Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 179.

<sup>24</sup> For the crisis on Ireland, see *Hansard*, 3rd Series, CCLXVII, *passim*.



there is a risk. I am rather afraid that Forster's resignation<sup>25</sup> will unsettle the head of your house.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

BERLIN, 6 May 1882.

You say truly that I must have read with interest your statements in Parliament,—I never read any with greater, or with a more anxious desire for your complete success.

Influenced perhaps by my personal recollections of continental revolutions I have never believed that Order could be re-established in a country like Ireland, worked by Secret Societies with American money, by any measures short of State of Siege and Martial Law.

Concessions, before Authority has again mastered the Situation, encourage I think, Secret Societies to prolong the struggle for more, and the risk is great, as you say, of a policy of concession before Order has been re-established, because it shows those societies and their Abetors [*sic*] how to get what they want.

Judging from this distance it appears to me that Public Opinion at home has become gradually less favourable to coercion than a year ago, and that the advanced Opinion of the country no longer repudiates Home Rule as an impossible solution.

Am I mistaken in thinking that the turn the Struggle is now taking among all parties at work to pacify Ireland, may lead from concession to concession until some sort of Home Rule is conceded to Ireland?

Count Münster says truly that Bismarck reserves his opinion on the 3 General plan until it has been agreed upon by England and France.—As matters now stand Freycinet couples it with a hope for guarantees against a Turkish armed intervention and a change of Khedive, and Hatzfeldt asks what the 3 Generals of Turkey, France and England will do, if the Egyptian Army declines to obey them?

Bismarck has not yet returned to Berlin, but when he does I have no doubt that we can reckon on his support even though he is personally favourable to the exercise of the Sultan's Sovereign Rights over Egypt.

Looking forward with deep & anxious hope to the triumphant success of your policy.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>25</sup> William Edward Forster (1818–1886), chief secretary for Ireland, 1880–1882. His resignation was announced by Gladstone on May 3.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 May 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The atrocious & heartrending event of the 6th<sup>26</sup> has filled us all here with horror and indignation. The Emperor with whom we dined yesterday at Radziwills' expressed his feelings about it to me with warmth and sympathy and said he ardently hoped that the measures H. M. Govt. had now submitted to Parliament would have the desired effect and that he made "*des vœux bien sincères pour le succès des mesures du Gouvernement de la Reine.*"

From measures in Ireland the Emperor wandered to measures in Russia and said that the appointment of Giers<sup>27</sup> and Princess Kotshoubey [Kotzebue] (*grande maitresse*) had given him great contentment because both were real friends of his Family and he hoped some day to hear that Ignatieff had been replaced by a real friend of Germany,—Prince Alexander of Bulgaria had gone to Petersburg, His Majesty said, to ask the Czar to remove his agents in Bulgaria, whose panslavistic intrigues impeded the peaceful & rational development of the Country, and the Czar, he felt sure would grant his request, the Czar being personally sincerely desirous of peace & cordiality with his neighbours, but unfortunately not yet independent enough to distinguish and dismiss the Black Sheep among his Advisers.

I asked the Emperor what he thought of the crisis between the Khedive and his Government<sup>28</sup> and what measures His Majesty thought might become necessary in Egypt?—

The Emperor said that Prince Bismarck was for supporting any measures taken by England and France, but that he greatly deplored the strong objections entertained by France to a Turkish armed intervention, which appeared to him to be the most legitimate and the least likely to create a European question in regard to Egypt.

I said that His Majesty might easily prevent civil [war] in Egypt and do good in Armenia by exercising the great influence he had acquired over the Sultan, in favour of the measures H. M. Govt. advocated for the regulation of Egyptian Affairs & the improvement of Armenian Administration.

<sup>26</sup> The murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish, the new secretary for Ireland, and Thomas Burke, the permanent undersecretary, in Phoenix Park, Dublin. See Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 66-68.

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas Karlovich de Giers (1820-1890) succeeded Gortchakoff as Russian foreign minister in April, 1882, and served in that capacity until 1894.

<sup>28</sup> The crisis arose over the sentence of about forty Circassian army officers to exile for life in the Sudan. On May 9 the khedive, acting upon identic English and French instructions, commuted the sentence against the wishes of his nationalist ministers. The chamber of notables was convoked without consulting the khedive on May 10, and relations were soon broken completely. Cromer, *Egypt*, I, 262-265.

The Emperor smiled and said: "Don't call it my influence,—call it Hatzfeldt's influence, who managed somehow to fascinate the Sultan and inspire him with unlimited confidence while at Constantinople!"

In that case, I said, I hoped His Majesty would exercise his influence over Hatzfeldt.

The Emperor, who was in high spirits having had good news about his Great-grandson, and been four hours on horseback reviewing his Guards, laughed a good deal and said he would exercise it for peace and improvement in Turkey at all times.

Hatzfeldt, as I have said before, is so proud and jealous of his personal influence with the Sultan that he would far rather leave Turkey unimproved, than diminish his influence by giving the Sultan advice, His Majesty might not like to listen to.

Hatzfeldt is very pleasant but follows Talleyrand's advice to diplomatists—talking much and saying little,—so that it is difficult to get any practical opinion out of him.

In regard to Egypt, I believe, he would personally be in favour of letting his friend the Sultan have his own way,—which would also increase Germany's influence in those regions while Turkish troops, instructed by Germans, occupied the Delta.—Officially, Hatzfeldt tells my Colleagues that Germany looks upon England and France as the "Mandatarys" [*sic*] of Europe and is content to leave the settlement of the Egyptian difficulty to them.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 20 May 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

As I told you in my letter of the 12th Hatzfeldt is so afraid of diminishing his personal influence with the Sultan that he shrinks from giving His Majesty unpalatable advice, and Bismarck being ill and away in the country, he has managed to back out of backing us up at Constantinople.

Hatzfeldt as you know is not personally partial to the European Concert and prefers reserved and reticent [*sic*] independence for Germany. Courcel and I did our best to persuade him and supported each other vigorously but without success. Courcel is very low about it, having reckoned with certainty on German support at Constantinople.

Kalnocky and Giers were offended at not having been previously consulted about our naval demonstration,<sup>29</sup> and Bismarck who is

<sup>29</sup> An Anglo-French joint squadron was ordered to Alexandria to demonstrate the support of the powers for the khedive in the crisis with the nationalist ministry.

tortured by neuralgia and unable to leave his bed, was easily persuaded not to forsake his allies who merely asked for inaction.

Their attitude reminds me of our own in 1875 when Lord Derby rejected the Berlin Memorandum, because we had not been previously consulted, and thereby left Russia free to reconquer Bessarabia and Austria to occupy Bosnia & Herzegovina etc. etc. etc.

I hope we may proceed to settle the Egyptian question without them.<sup>30</sup>

They will probably intrigue to bring about a Turkish occupation which would give them indirectly, through the Sultan, the increased influence in Egypt they aspire to, but so long as France is true, and does not throw us over, as about Greece, we have nothing to fear from the "Dreikaiserbund" in Egypt.

Since writing the above Dr. Busch tells me *privately* and *confidentially* that Bismarck while adhering to the attitude adopted by his Allies Austria and Russia at Constantinople has instructed him to speak privately in the sense you desire to the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin,—for which I have expressed acknowledgment and thanks.

I am rejoiced to see from Dufferin's telegrams<sup>31</sup> just received that the Sultan is taking up a friendly & conciliatory attitude.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

MAY 24, 1882.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I told Münster today, on condition that he considered it as personal for himself & for Prince Bismarck, that we have asked the French to join with us in asking the Powers to request the Porte, to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions.

From all I hear the Prince appears to have been behaving well to us.

The French have a hostile Chauvinistic feeling to deal with, but they are throwing away the whole advantage of the agreement by this abortive attempt to keep it secret.

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 May 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for yours of the 24th. My french Colleague has not alluded to the Secret you told Münster that you have asked the French

<sup>30</sup> An excerpt from this letter, beginning "Courcel is very low," to this point is quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 264.

<sup>31</sup> Dufferin was British ambassador at Constantinople, 1881-1884.

to join with us in asking the Powers to request the Porte to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions.

Like Tissot<sup>22</sup> his [*sic*] is personally opposed to Turkish intervention and thinks Freycinet could not agree to it without the greatest risk to his own position.

As matters now stand I suppose that Turkish intervention is becoming inevitable, which I personally regret, because it throws open Egypt to the intrigues of the "Dreikaiserbund."

Bismarck, as you see, has behaved very well to us, and will continue so I think. He will be useful to us also in restraining the eagerness of Austria and Russia to have a finger in the Egyptian Pie.—Dr. Busch who is a great Orientalist and is delighted at the prospect of Turkish intervention, which he and Hatzfeldt have always advocated, says that two thousand Turkish soldiers are more than enough to keep all Egypt in order.

He has heard from Münster of the "Secret" and agrees with you that the French are throwing away the whole advantage of the agreement by their attempt to keep it secret,—whilst the publication of it alone, might be sufficient to bring Arabi and his Band to reason.

He says that my French Colleague Courcel evidently does not know of it yet, because he is still as bitter as ever if Turkish intervention in Egypt is alluded to.

The Queen's birthday was splendidly and heartily celebrated by the Emperor, the Crown Prince and Princess at the Neue Palais Potsdam on Wednesday last.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3rd June 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I rise from reading the telegrams just received with a painful impression that the Egyptian question has entered into a most distressing phase. Arabi defies us all. Freycinet is more anxious for majorities at home than for measures in Egypt.—Kalnocky Giers and Hatzfeldt feel more interested in humouring the Sultan than in supporting England and France. The Sultan is bent on deceiving Everybody, and our very disinterested efforts are practically unsupported by the Concert, whose interests we really represent.

The very settlement of the present difficulty through Turkish intervention which the Northern Powers are indirectly forcing upon us, in spite of Freycinet, contains the germ of a new Egyptian question in itself, which will crop up in the future.

<sup>22</sup> Tissot, the new French ambassador in London, left Constantinople in February, 1882.

At present I hope much from the Conference if the Sultan will allow it to be assembled at Constantinople, which Hatzfeldt does not feel sure about, altho' he says that if he were the Sultan he would "saisir la proposition à deux mains."—He was not prepared to give an official answer today but seemed personally favourable to a Conference.<sup>33</sup>

The Royal Family are much occupied with preparations for the Christening of the Imperial Great Grandchild on the 11th instant at Potsdam<sup>34</sup> to which the Emperors, Sovereigns and Reigning Princes related to the House of Hohenzollern, are bidden.—If *all* come, the Newspapers will believe in a Congress of Sovereigns for the settlement of the Affairs of the Universe!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

June 7, 1882.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I agree with you that Turkish intervention is a great evil, but I adhere to the opinion I have always held that it is less objectionable than any other. I shall be delighted however if Dervish Pasha's instructions,<sup>35</sup> and his execution of them, are sufficient to do all that we desired without the employment of force. The conference has certainly had the effect of bringing the Sultan on his haunches. It is immensely in his interest to settle the matter at once.

I hope we shall all press him to consent to the conference in order that this stimulus may continue. But, unlike the French, I care only for the end, I do not in the least object to the Conference, which is only a means, becoming unnecessary. But we must take care that the arrangement is one that is perfectly satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

Herbert B. tells me that he is to leave us in a fortnight, to resume the duty of private secretary to his father.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 June 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Having entered upon the pathway of Turkish intervention the thing is to make it as useful to ourselves and as perfect as possible in regard to future contingencies and in that we can reckon on Bis-

<sup>33</sup> The Sultan delayed the proposed conference of ambassadors at Constantinople until June 23. The conference was suspended on August 14 and was never formally closed. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, I, 291, 312-313, and Langer, *European Alliances*, 272.

<sup>34</sup> Prince William, eldest son of the later Emperor William II, was born on May 6, 1882.

<sup>35</sup> Dervish Pasha was a Turkish general sent by the sultan from Constantinople on June 4 as special commissioner in Egypt to restore the authority of the khedive, etc. His instructions are given in Cromer, *Egypt*, I, 285.

marck's support who prefers Turkish intervention to any other from his German "Standpoint." Hatzfeldt says that Bismarck agrees with him that our Conference policy should be supported in the general interest of the European Concert, and not for the sake of any arguments in favour of the Conference itself, which has failed to convince him of its practical utility, a view he expresses by saying that he will attend the Conference not because he believes in its efficacy, but notwithstanding that he doesn't,—"*pas parceque, mais quoi que.*"

He and Bismarck believe that Dervisch Pasha representing the Sultan and "*Caliph*" alone, will be better able to calm down the excitement and enforce obedience and order, than if he comes in the name of the European Concert to Egypt backed by a Conference at Constantinople which would increase the hostility to foreign interference and add fuel to the Egyptian national and religious fire. He asks what more the Conference can do to assist the Sultan in maintaining the "Status quo" than the Sultan can do for himself, and he does not see how the Sultan can be forced to accept the Conference if he won't have it?

I do not agree with Hatzfeldt, the mere proposal of a Conference has already frightened the Sultan into sending Dervisch Pasha to Egypt and this Sword of Damocles will serve to keep him to the mark until it meets or does not meet according to the requirements of the situation.

I am all for pressing for a Conference at Constantinople,—Hatzfeldt is all for leaving the Sultan alone to settle the question by himself and then making His Majesty responsible for order and the "Status quo" in Egypt for the future.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Telegram from Lord Ampthill*

*Private and personal.*

[June 16, 1882.]

My French Colleague tells me privately & for yr. Ldps. infmt. only that P. Bismarck sent for him an hour ago and told him that in his opinion there were only two ways of settling the Egyptian question.

First by the united action of France & England which has become impossible because they distrust each other, and secondly through the Sultan alone & unassisted & without the interference of the Powers who shd leave him absolute liberty to settle it his own way and as he pleases.

P. Bismarck is favourable to a Conference but doubts the Sultan accepting.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *June 17, 1882.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Baron de Courcel called on me in a state of very great agitation to tell me "privately and personally for your information only, and not for the printed telegraphic sheets of which he had heard in Paris," that he had been sent for by Prince Bismarck and told that in his opinion there were only two ways of settling the Egyptian question:

1st. by the united action of France and England which had become impossible because they distrusted each other, and

2nd. through the Sultan alone and unassisted without the interference of the Powers who should leave him absolute liberty to settle it his own way & as he pleased.

Prince Bismarck, my French Colleague said, spoke favourably of the Conference, but doubted the Sultan giving his consent to it.

That is all he told me, but I suspect that much more passed between them, which he did not tell me.—The motive of the interview, I guess, was to talk over the proposal we made to ask the Sultan to send troops to Egypt under strict control, which had not met with the support on the part of the French Govt. we had expected. Freycinet, as I have often said, is always in search of a special "rapprochement" to Bismarck whom he confidentially consults about everything through Hohenlohe in Paris.—Meanwhile the consent of the French Govt. to the employment of Turkish troops may be expected any moment, which will set matters right again.

I am to see Bismarck tomorrow evening and am curious to hear what surprise he has in store about Egypt?

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *30 June 1882.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The attitude of the Concert is, to my mind, very disappointing.

The Powers listen eagerly for discordant notes in the Anglo-french duet, instead of joining in an unanimous chorus to bring the Sultan to his senses and Arabi to trial. The least they could do on being internationally invited to cooperate in keeping the peace in Egypt was to present a united front to the Porte at Constantinople and insist like one man on the reestablishment of the "Status quo." Instead of that they sanction and strengthen Arabi's military dictatorship, humour the Sultan's caprices, and ask each other *what* "Status quo" we mean?

Bismarck who was always convinced that England and France could never agree about Egypt, is now convinced that our reluctance to quarrel with France paralyzes our action,—so he steps in and



initiates a "modus vivendi" in Egypt which suits the Sultan and flatters the international jealousies of Germany, and leaves the Powers in Conference assembled to find a better solution if they can.—His policy appears to me, both selfish and cynical!

If the Sultan declines to carry out the suggestions of the Conference and that we are finally compelled to protect our own interests ourselves, then he will side with us, because his sympathies are always on the side of force. If Herbert Bismarck, who is full of gratitude for your kindness to him, speaks to his Father as he does to me, he will do good, for his Father listens to him and believes in his judgment of men and things.

Hatzfeldt who professes to know the Sultan "*like his pocket*" says we must be prepared for his refusal to accept the Suggestions of the Conference, because he mistakes the friendly advice of the Powers for dictation which lowers him in the eyes of his subjects.

Hatzfeldt received on two occasions the Millionaire Mr. E. Cazalet (of 9 Spring Gardens),—who came about the Euphrates Valley Railway Concessions he takes interest in,—and he was also very graciously received by the Crown Prince.

I ventured to give him a letter to you thinking that his accounts of Petersburg and Potsdam might interest you.

I propose, when the messenger is off, to go and pay a visit to my poor lonely wife at Schlangenbad,—and have asked Sir John Walsam to telegraph for me when I am wanted.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*July 12/82.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I have asked Münster to obtain the Chancellor's views as to what means are to be used if the Sultan refuses or delays.

Münster feels sure that his chief will be reticent.

A bombardment<sup>36</sup> is a horrible thing, but it will clear the air & accelerate a solution of some sort or other.

It is well also for a country whose strength is maritime, that naval demonstrations shd not be thought to be absolutely without a sting.

I am as decided as ever against a dual armed and political intervention of the English & French. One great objection is that if you differ you immediately come to a deadlock.<sup>37</sup>

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

I am sorry to hear that Lady Ampthill is suffering.

<sup>36</sup> The British bombardment of Alexandria, July 11, 1882. Cromer, *Egypt*, I, 296–297.

<sup>37</sup> The last two paragraphs of this letter are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 287.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 July 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Let me congratulate you most sincerely and heartily on having so tactfully steered out of the inextricable complications of "entangling alliances" into the independent prosecution of a truly British national policy. Everybody I meet seems overjoyed that we are asserting our right to protect our own interests and have taken the lead of the Concert into our own hands.

Everybody congratulates me on your policy, with the exception of my french Colleague, who is quite broken down with disappointment at Freycinet's weakness and the absence of National pride in the French Chambers.

Münster is probably right in thinking that Bismarck will now be reticent and reserved.

Hatzfeldt tells me that Bismarck becomes simply furious at the mere mention of the Egyptian question and will scarcely even read what is sent to him on the subject. "Let the Powers interested settle it as they please" he writes to Hatzfeldt "but don't ask me *how*, for I neither know or care!"

The fact is that the defeat of his Tobacco & Taxation policy<sup>38</sup> has compelled him to dismiss his Minister of Finance and take his Department into his own hands, and he is exclusively absorbed in the Country with commercial studies which are to shew him how to get the money he wants for the Empire and vanquish his enemies in the German Parliament.

He was so angry with Count Saurma for interfering with our Admiral's measures at Alexandria that he wanted to recall him there and then, but Hatzfeldt interceded and he was "blown up" ("*un savon soigné*") instead and told to mind his own business for the future.<sup>39</sup>

Although Hatzfeldt does not say so, I can see that he is disappointed at the duplicity and absence of practical sense in the Sultan, on whose professed confidence in Germany, he had probably reckoned too much.

Bismarck, I think, will support any action we take, but will refrain from advice, however much he may wish England to go ahead and settle the question as you think best for Europe.

<sup>38</sup> Bismarck's tobacco and taxation bill, designed to give the imperial government a revenue independent of contributions by the states, was defeated on its second reading, June 14, 1882.

<sup>39</sup> Count Anton Saurma-Jeltsch was the German consul general at Cairo in 1882. On July 10 Granville reported to Sir John Walsham: "The German Ambassador called on me this morning and told me that Prince Bismarck had informed him that the German Consul General had never had any orders to take any measures to interfere with our action at Alexandria; that his only duty was to protect German subjects."

"Count Münster added that strict orders had now been sent to the German Consul General to abstain from interference of a character which would at all impede our action." P. P., 1882, LXXXIII, c. 3391, no. 209.

In regard to advice he has never got over or forgiven Goschen's departure from the advice he was asked to give in the Greek question. Dr. Busch confided to me one day that if Bismarck had ever known that Münster took upon himself to authorize the publication of Goschen's confidential despatches from Berlin in our Blue Book on Greece, he would have instantaneously dismissed Münster from the Imperial Service. Happily, Dr. Busch says, Bismarck was at Kissingen and had given orders that nothing should be sent to him while he was attending to his cure, so that the F. O. had been able to keep the official publication of Goschen's conversations from him, at the time they were laid before Parliament, and the official Press was told by Hatzfeldt to pass them over in silence. It is astonishing how cordially Bismarck *hates* our Blue Books and how little they are commented on by the German Press. The Underlings are so afraid of Bismarck's outbursts of fury that they try to conceal from him everything likely to provoke them, which they can of course only do when he shuts himself up in the country and forbids them to bother him with business of any kind, which he does not ask for himself.

The Crown Prince and Princess, with whom I dined last night, told me incidentally that Bismarck being at present dissatisfied with the Pope, is now growing unusually fond of the Italian Govt., which they said was new and highly satisfactory to themselves, for they are both full of sympathy with Italy and would be glad to see Italian troops join in the occupation of Egypt, if the Sultan's refusal should render a foreign or mixed occupation desirable. I. I. and R. H.'s leave Potsdam for two or three months on Monday, on a visit to Dresden, Vienna and the Italian Lakes.

Bismarck being inaccessible at this moment and Sir John Walsham being an intimate friend of Hatzfeldt's, who was his Colleague in Spain, I have again asked your leave to return to my poor wife at Schlangenbad to take her to St. Moritz. She is suffering from permanent neuralgic headache of the worst kind, and requires the greatest care. I shall come back to my post as soon as wanted and greatly regret at this interesting moment to have to leave it at all.

I cannot sufficiently recommend to you to abstain from publishing any of my Despatches about Bismarck in the Blue Books, for if once he takes offence at anything we publish he will take his revenge by making himself as disagreeable as possible to us for the rest of his days.<sup>40</sup>

Most sincerely yours,

AMPTHILL.

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\* Portions of this letter are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 268-269, and 366-367.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 September 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I returned to my post on the 3rd inst. full of gratitude to you for granting me leave to accompany my wife, whose health I am rejoiced to think has been improved by the two cures she underwent at Schlangenbad and St. Moritz. In my last letter I ventured to congratulate you on the truly national policy you are pursuing,—allow me now to congratulate you most sincerely and heartily on the great success you have already achieved.—You have got the Great Powers well in hand and Bismarck full of sympathy for the vigorous policy you have adopted, which he appreciates and respects and will support, should differences arise in the future.

The Crown Princess, who left on Tuesday with the whole of the Royal Family for Silesia, told me that the Prince of Wales had sent friendly messages to Prince Bismarck through the Crown Prince, which had been well received by the Great Chancellor in his den at Varzin. He told the Bavarian painter Lembach, who is staying with him there, that your policy delighted him and that he wished England every success in Egypt.

The Empress, I regret to say, is alone at Babelsberg and suffering acutely from her recent fall, but the Doctors hope that she will be able to go to Baden about the 25th of this month.

Berlin is very empty and all the Ambassadors and Ministers have left their Embassies and Missions to "Chargés ad interim."

At St. Moritz I met my old friend and Colleague Schouvaloff and had many interesting talks with him. He says that he is completely out of favour with the present Czar and his Govt. that he knows little of what they intend, but he rejoices to think that they cannot at present undertake another Oriental War from want of men, means and money.

He does however fear that Giers, as a Non-Slave, to maintain himself in Office will have to concede much to the Panslavists who surround the Czar and who urge His Majesty to keep the direction of foreign Affairs entirely in his own hands,—a fact Schouvaloff deplores, because he doubts whether the Czar has already acquired all the knowledge and experience necessary for the undertaking.

The temporary withdrawal of Onon from the Constantinople Conference for instance, he said, was ordered by the Czar against the advice of Giers, who had to submit until His Majesty thought better of it and cancelled the order.—

He thinks that Nelidoff<sup>41</sup> who signed the Treaty of San Stefano, may give trouble in secretly undermining the Treaty of Berlin.

<sup>41</sup> Count Alexander Nelidoff (1835-1910) was accredited Russian ambassador at Constantinople in August, 1882; he served there until transferred to Rome in 1897 and was ambassador at Paris, 1903-1910.

Schouvaloff is no doubt soured by the unpopularity of his Berlin policy in Russia but he has always shewn himself friendly to England and favourable to peace and is the only Russian in whom Bismarck has implicit confidence.—

Busch, who has much experience of Constple., is of opinion that the Sultan will avoid concluding the Military Convention so long as he thinks H. M. Govt. wish for it,—and will only sign when he suspects that you can do without it and are willing to give it up.—

Sincerely yours,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 16 September 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Empress was pleased to telegraph from Babelsberg the good news to me of the occupation of Cairo, surrender of Arabi and end of the War,<sup>42</sup> which she had received from the Queen, and great was our joy at the triumph of Her Majesty's Army and the success of your policy:—

At the same time I received your Dispatch no 390 of the 11th recounting the very satisfactory messages Count Herbert had brought to you at Walmer from his father at Varzin. Bismarck's moral support will be useful at Vienna and St. Petersburg where his word is Gospel as well as at Paris and Rome where his sayings inspire respect and his silence apprehension. At Constantinople he is losing ground since Hatzfeldt is no longer there to fascinate the Sultan.

The Crown Princess, who returned yesterday from Breslau, and called on my wife, spoke highly of the Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria<sup>43</sup> and said that in the course of conversation he had given it as his personal opinion that the Russians were intriguing both in Persia and in Armenia and would give England trouble ere long, and that they sought to conciliate Austria by hinting that they would not object to the extension of an Austrian protectorate to Salonica.—

I mention this, but without attaching undue importance to the ArchDuke Rudolf's enunciations.—

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 30 September 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Tenterden's<sup>44</sup> sudden death distresses and grieves me more than I can say,—he will be long and sincerely regretted by us all.—

<sup>42</sup> The battle of Tel-el-Kebir on September 13 was followed by the collapse of the Egyptian army, the capture of Arabi, and the occupation of Cairo by British troops. Cromer, *Egypt*, I, 323.

<sup>43</sup> Crown Prince Rudolf (1858–1889), son of the Emperor Franz Joseph. See J. Czepe, ed., *Kronprinz Rudolf, Politische Briefe an einen Freund, 1882–1889* (Vienna, 1922).

<sup>44</sup> Charles Stuart Aubrey, Abbott, third Baron Tenterden (1834–1882), permanent under-secretary of the foreign office since 1873, died on September 22.

Count Münster passed through Berlin coming from Varzin, but I unfortunately missed him to my regret. Meanwhile Busch tells me that Bismarck after obtaining the Emperor's approval of his views and policy regarding England and Egypt has instructed Münster to renew the friendly assurances already conveyed to you through Count Herbert at Walmer.

The "Times" leader of the 26th inst explaining "why we should not allow the not too disinterested advice of Germany to prejudice our long standing friendship with France" has caused some surprize and irritation in Berlin because the public do not believe that Bismarck has given England any advice, and if he has, why it should be denounced by the "Times." It is assumed that the French Govt. must have bribed Blowitz,—which is a very Germanic view of international Press proceedings!

I have never known Bismarck to be opposed to, or jealous of the Anglo-French Alliance, which he has on the contrary always looked upon as an element of peace and order in Europe and a guarantee against a Franco-Russian Alliance, which would be a threat to Germany in his opinion.

In regard to Eastern Affairs, Bismarck has never concealed his anxious desire to see Austria occupy Bosnia,—France occupy Tunis, and England occupy Egypt and now that those wishes have been realized his next wish is that the occupations may last and thereby diminish the ever recurring danger to Europe of another Oriental crisis and all its consequences. In his opinion a *gradual dismemberment* of the Turkish Empire is the only pacific solution to the Oriental question.<sup>45</sup>

Your sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 October 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Münster's message from Bismarck recorded in your Desp. no 412 of 30th ulto is most satisfactory and gave me the greatest possible pleasure.

Your kindness to Herbert has softened the fierce fond Father and taught him that Liberals are not as bad as he thought,—so much so indeed that he not only gives you his support, but also sends you back his son, as first Secretary, as soon as Stumm can be promoted to a Mission.

Personally I am extremely curious to know what you are going to do in Egypt,—but to all comers and Colleagues who ask, I say "Read Mr. Gladstone's Declarations, they are the basis of our policy,"—and

<sup>45</sup> This paragraph is quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 273.

all go their way relieved of the Incubus an envious and mendacious Press inflicts upon its readers.

The Russian Govt. have sounded the German Govt. to know whether they would not join in asking that a limit should be asked for, beyond which the English occupation of Egypt should not last,—but they met with no encouragement as you may well suppose.

There is nothing whatever going on here, and Berlin is as empty as in Summer,—so I will not take up your time any longer.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

How admirably Dufferin is doing at Constple.!

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER, Oct. 11/82.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Please let Bismarck know confidentially the substance of the correspondence between us and the French Govt. respecting the return of Colvin, and say that I propose to have some further communication with them as to particular questions which have been matters of agreement between the two Govts., and that I shall be glad to keep him en courant of anything important that passes.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Telegram to Lord Ampthill, Oct. 12 1882*

Do not act upon my private letter of yesterday as Herbert Bismarck comes here on Saturday.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 October 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I was delighted to receive a private letter from you by last Messenger and should have had great pleasure in carrying out your instructions, had not your private telegram announced Herbert Bismarck's visit to Walmer, which will greatly facilitate direct communication with his Father, who is still at Varzin. You will find that Prince Bismarck fully shares your doubts as to the expediency of maintaining the Control which he never liked, because he thought from the beginning that it contained the seeds of future differences between the Governments of England and France, which he prophesied would blossom into a quarrel. He will, I feel sure, support any measure you may recommend in preference, and will be flattered at your talking the matter over with his son, whose private reports are sweeter to him than all Münster's despatches.

Bismarck "dearly loves" to know what is going on, and the more you communicate to him the more will he be disposed to agree with you.—He hates surprises and resents them for ever.—

Prince Bismarck has been alarmed at the dangers of idleness during leave of absence his son has been exposed to by the efforts of his old love to cast her nets over him & drag him back to Venice,—and the Family Council have now come to the conclusion that he is safer in England than at home.—Prince Bismarck himself may move from Varzin to Friederichsruhe but he is not coming to Berlin to meet the Emperor as the Papers say.

The Emperor has been obliged to put off his departure from Baden in consequence of the Empress' continued state of weakness & depression, but His Majesty has accepted the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin's invitation to shoot in November.

Count Hatzfeldt is expected after the 20th, but will put off his return if possible, Berlin being unusually quiet & empty at present.

Prince and Princess Christian, who are at Potsdam intend to return to England immediately after the Crown Prince's birthday on the 18th inst.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, October 28 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Out shooting with the Crown Prince, he asked me why we did not keep Egypt, as France kept Tunis and Austria kept Bosnia?

I gave him the various arguments against it, and said that H. M. Govt. wished to maintain the authority of the Khedive, establish a state of things which would guarantee us against a recurrence of late events and promote progress and prosperity in Egypt as well as satisfy Europe as to the free navigation of the Canal.

The Crown Prince said that he understood that the French Govt. intended to take advantage of the situation to annex Tunis and occupy Tripoli.

• I said that Prince Bismarck having given the French Govt. every encouragement to annex Tunis, they would probably act on his advice, but since he had so strongly warned them not to take Tripoli, I did not believe they would venture to disregard his advice. The Crown Prince asked whether "*poor Italy*" was to have nothing?—

I said: certainly not. Italy had enough to occupy her for years to come and not a shadow of excuse to disturb the peace of Europe by wanting more.

The Crown Prince said, he regretted England would not annex Egypt, which would in his opinion have been the most satisfactory



and most lasting solution to the question,—and we talked of other things.

Hatzfeldt has gone to Varzin before taking possession of the F. O.,—but Busch thinks he will be here next week.

The elections to the Prussian Chamber are taking a rather more conservative turn than was anticipated,—so Bismarck will be pleased.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Personal and Confidential.*

*November 1st, 1882.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I had a confidential convsn. with H. Bismarck announcing to him what we were going to commcate. to the French, which however was subsequently somewhat modified.

I afterwards told more to Stumm asking him to send it privately to Herbert Bismarck.

The Corps diplomatique here know what has passed between us and the French Govt.

I cannot tell whether this is an indiscretion at Berlin or at Paris, I am inclined to think the latter, but the République Française complains of our previous communications with other Powers.

How far is the Chancellor to be trusted about these confidential communications.

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, 4 November 1882.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your letter of the 1st and Memo to Stumm on communications to French Govt.—Bismarck can, I believe, be trusted, and is not likely to reveal your confid. conversations with his son. Hatzfeldt and Busch well know that the Chancellor never forgives an indiscretion, and I am not aware that anyone in the Berlin Dipl. Body, not even my own Secretaries, know of your communications through Herbert to Varzin.

Bismarck has not seen any foreign diplomatists since the 18th of June last, and of his own, he has only seen Münster and Hohenlohe, but Hohenlohe has not returned to Paris since he was at Varzin, so that the indiscretion you mention is not likely to come from Berlin.

My French Colleagues, St. Vallier and Courcel have often complained to me of the indiscretion of their own Ministers in Paris from all being more or less connected with the Press.

I saw Hatzfeldt yesterday, whose conversation is always pleasant and playful, but whose official reticence and reserve about public Affairs is irksome and drives my Colleagues wild with disappointment.—He

would not even pronounce himself on Dufferin's appointment, which I know from other sources he highly approves of.—It was a happy thought sending Dufferin to Egypt, where his success is certain.

Hatzfeldt shares the Chancellor's profound hatred of our Blue Books, and if he cannot avoid committing himself to an opinion, prefaces his communication by a frank avowal of his terror of the "Blue Spectre" and implores me to guarantee him against being blue-booked!

Your "thanks to the Army" speech gave me and Emily so much pleasure that we cannot resist thanking you for it.<sup>46</sup>

Sincerely yours,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 November 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Hohenlohe has gone to Varzin again before returning to Paris, and his instructions will no doubt be to let the French have their own way about Tunis, so as to promote friendly relations, and create no difficulties to the Ministers in office, who suit Bismarck better than a Gambetta administration, which he fancies might become more independent of Germany than he would like.

Hohenlohe is personally on very friendly terms with Gambetta and does not share Bismarck's apprehensions about his future policy if he should ever get into office again.—

Be that as it may, Bismarck is satisfied with the present state of France and wishes things to remain as they are. He will in consequence humour any of her wishes, which do not happen to interfere with German interests.

Münster dined with us on Sunday last and was very interesting on Home Affairs about which one can never hear enough abroad.—On the Prince of Wales' birthday the Crown Princess honoured us with her presence and announced her sudden departure for England to see the Duke of Connaught and the entrance of the troops. She seemed very happy at the prospect of seeing the Queen and her family and only regretted having to be back here on the 21st for her own birthday. The Emperor and Crown Prince are shooting in Silesia,—the Empress makes but little progress at Baden I regret to hear.

Great preparations are being made for the celebration of the Crown Prince and Princess's Silver Wedding on the 25th of January next.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

<sup>46</sup> On October 26, 1882, Granville moved resolutions to convey thanks to the naval and military forces serving in the expedition to Egypt. *Hansard*, 3rd Ser., CCLXXIV, 138-141.

[Copy]

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Nov. 15th, 1882.

I am to have the honor of meeting the Crown Princess this evening, eating Münster's bad dinner in his ill-lighted room.

The French promise an early answer but do not send it. We think it better not to press them too much. I am afraid the result will be more soreness than is desirable. But that cannot be helped.

There is a good deal of illness about. Childers is far from well. Northcote is ordered abroad immediately and I am afraid he is more ill than people are aware of. He has much to try him.<sup>47</sup>

Münster does not give a very good account of Herbert Bismarck. I hope Lady Ampthill is all right again.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 18 November 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Münster's language in Berlin about Herbert was almost as bad as his dinners in London,—and if the Chancellor gets wind of the imprudent criticisms uttered at Potsdam to gratify their Imperial Highness's objections to all the Bismarck family Münster will be made to rue it in retirement at Derneburg some fine morning. He is ridiculously jealous of his successful Secretary instead of glorying at having the great Chancellor's son to wear in his Cap.

Herbert, who speaks in the nicest way possible of Münster, came from England with a bad cold in his lungs,—but now, I hear that he is much better and enjoying himself at Varzin.

Münster, who prides himself on being a grumbling Tory in London,—is thought in Berlin to be an advanced Liberal suffering from Anglomania,—I must say that among German Dips, I do not know a more convinced & sincere friend of England than Münster, even though he does indulge in grumbling occasionally.

By dint of crossquestioning Hatzfeldt I make out that his reports from Paris attribute the present attitude of France to a desire to make political capital out of their resistance to England's wishes, and to a hope that by taking advantage of our difficulties in Egypt they may obtain concessions elsewhere which will make up in French public opinion for their loss of influence in Egypt. His partiality for Turkey and his wish to preserve his personal influence in Constantinople evi-

<sup>47</sup> Hugh C. E. Childers (1827–1896) was secretary of state for war, 1880–December, 1882, and then chancellor of the exchequer until 1885, and home secretary, 1886. Spencer Childers, *The Life and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Hugh C. E. Childers, 1827–1896* (London, 1901).

Sir Stafford Northcote (1818–1887), Disraeli's chancellor of the exchequer, 1874–1880, was leader of the Conservative party in the house of commons, 1876–1885. Andrew Lang, *Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First Earl of Iddlesleigh* (Edinburgh, 1890).

dently make him rather side with the Sultan about the nomination of the new Bey of Tunis and the appointment of a Commissioner in Egypt, but I feel sure Bismarck will not let him commit Germany to any opinion "pro or con" at Constantinople or at Paris.—Besides which he is far too prudent ever to commit himself to any opinion on public affairs if he can possibly help it.

I have pressed him twenty times to make up his mind about the new protocol respecting the Sovereignty of Spain over Sulu,<sup>48</sup> and altho' he has never objected to the proposed arrangement he has always found some excuse for putting off its final settlement. The last time I pressed him he promised me faithfully to write to Münster about it as soon as the Chancellor authorized him to do so. I shall steadily remind him of his promise whenever I see him.

On Tuesday next we are asked to meet Giers, fresh from Varzin, at the Russian Embassy. He is to see the Emperor before going on to Italy next week.—My Russian Colleague is at pains to explain that he has no mission and is only travelling to see his daughter who is ill at Pisa.

I am very sorry to hear that Mr. Childers is far from well and that the accounts of Sir Stafford Northcote are so unsatisfactory—no wonder, after so much to tire Mr. Childers and try Sir Stafford.

Emily desires me to thank you for your kind enquiries,—she has been much benefited by her two cures, and is now preparing for her Winter Duties as Doyenne which are both tiring and trying, and which, I am proud to think, she has carried on for eleven years so peacefully and successfully.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 25 November 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Crown Princess has returned to us delighted with her visit to England, and the Crown Prince tells me that his [*sic*] also is delighted to hear from the Princess that she met with none but friendly feelings towards Germany notwithstanding the envious and critical tone of the German liberal Press during the War in Egypt. His Imperial and Royal Highness is, I find, informed that the Cologne Gazette, who used to be England's best friend in Germany when poor Max Schlesinger was Correspondent in London and Dr. Kruse Editor in Cologne, has lately been inherited by young and corrupt hands in French pay!

<sup>48</sup> A protocol dealing with Sulu was signed in 1877. Correspondence covering the years 1878-1881 is contained in *P. P.*, 1882, LXXXI, c. 3108. The next protocol appears to have been signed at Madrid in March, 1885—*P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVII, c. 4390.

M. de Giers with his courteous manners and pacific assurances made a favourable impression here, which will help to wipe out the unfavourable impressions produced last year by Ignatieff's attitude and Scobeleff's speeches.—I send you an official account of his visit by today's Messenger.

Mohrenheim,<sup>49</sup> who passed through Berlin to fetch his family in Denmark told my Russian Colleague Sabouroff that he had been "tres touché" by the reception he had met with in London.

Courcel, my French Colleague returned yesterday from Paris and called at once to ask me about the general situation of things in Berlin. Being a devoted adherent of the Anglo-French Alliance, he is profoundly unhappy at the course pursued by his Govt. and makes "des vœux" for a speedy return to the cordial & intimate understanding of the past. All French Dips seem to me to be miserable at the present state and future prospects of France, over which Bismarck is chuckling at Varzin.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 December 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Hatzfeldt's professed love of lazy leisure and Lawn Tennis [*sic*], horror of work and dread of responsibility encline him to indulge in procrastination and cigarettes, as long as a decision can be postponed,—and when at last pressure leaves him no escape he takes a negative decision calculated to save him from all further responsibility,—“En un mot” he is a safe man, in Bismarck's estimation, and reminds one of the Statesman of whom Lord Beaconsfield said that being a Philosopher he looked upon all human action as a mistake and therefore the sum of human wisdom was to do nothing at all.

I asked Busch to tell me privately why Hatzfeldt hesitated to sign the Spanish Sulu Sovereignty protocol, which we had long since all three agreed upon, and he confided to me that the hesitation was due to a mistake of Münster's which had to be rectified before the matter could be settled.

My Spanish Colleague Benomar<sup>50</sup> has also been puzzled by Hatzfeldt's hesitation having been led to believe that Germany agreed to the Anglo-Spanish proposal. I am inclined to suspect that Hatzfeldt is waiting until the Spaniards have made up their minds to sign

<sup>49</sup> Baron Arthur Mohrenheim (1824–1906), Russian ambassador at London, 1882–1884, and at Paris, 1884–1898.

<sup>50</sup> Count Benomar was the Spanish minister at Berlin, 1875–1888, and ambassador in Rome, 1890–1893, 1895–1901.

the Commercial Treaty with Germany, which ought to be before the 15th instant.—We shall know the truth in about a fortnight.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 23rd Dec. 1882.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Happy Xmas to you and yours!—You have made me and mine happy by renewing my appointment to Berlin.—I already owe to you, over eleven years of great official prosperity and private happiness, (free from debt thanks to Hastings) in this deeply interesting Post, for which I am, and ever shall be, most sincerely grateful to you.

It appears that the recent newspaper "Scare" in Berlin and Vienna which had absolutely no "raison d'être" was in reality due to Speculation and Stock Exchange intrigues.

While calling on Bleichröder I saw a telegram come in from the Paris Rothschilds asking for immediate news of the true state of the Emperor's health, who has a slight cold,—and I asked Bleichröder what effect French Financiers expected from the Emperor's death upon the Paris Bourse.

"A general "baisse" of from ten to fifteen percent" he replied.—Why? I asked. "Because" he said "of the uncertainty of Bismarck's tenure of office under a new reign." (———? ———). Happily the Emperor is in robust health and the Empress is no worse, though still unable to walk, and both Their Majesties take an active interest in the preparations for the Silver Wedding on the 25th of January next.

Prince Bismarck, I am told, in conversation with Prince William the other day, took great credit to himself for his support of England's policy, and his success in keeping Russia and Austria in order, who were always urging him to interfere in Egypt and elsewhere,—he said.—

Ever yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.



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**CHAPTER VII**  
**LETTERS, 1883**

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## CHAPTER VII

### LETTERS, 1883

During 1883 Lord Ampthill was away from his post a good deal because of failing health. It will also be noticed that he apparently had none of the long confidential interviews with Bismarck in which the latter delivered monologues on the general state of affairs, the stupidity of colleagues, and the stubbornness of his imperial master. Since cordial relations still existed between Bismarck and Ampthill, the absence of these conversations may have been due to a feeling that no serious problem needed to be talked over tête-a-tête and that Bismarck was less nervous about the position of himself and Germany; in his own mind the two had become practically synonymous.

Bismarck in 1883 had reason to feel secure. At home his economic policy was safely launched and seemed to work out in accordance with his plans; the emperor was docile, and the crown prince willing to act as Bismarck's diplomatic emissary to Italy and Spain. It is significant that Britain was uneasy about the Spanish flirtation, and it will be seen that Downing Street considered this so serious that Queen Victoria was induced to intervene with a personal appeal to her son-in-law not to visit Spain (telegram, Nov. 8). Indeed, this British royal opposition may have been responsible for the emperor's reluctance to sanction the Spanish visit (letter, Dec. 22).

Abroad the position of Germany was impregnable. The British intervention in Egypt had destroyed the Anglo-French entente. Bismarck had been generous with platitudinous phrases about the importance of an Anglo-French alliance, but it is evident from his advice to Britain to seize Egypt that he plotted its destruction. And by 1883 the alliance was a thing of the past. Moreover, the death of Gambetta on December 31, 1882, removed from the political scene in France the strongest advocate of revenge against Germany. Ampthill's letter of January 7 bears testimony to the German feeling on this point. The successors of Gambetta fell in with Bismarck's views concerning the desirability of French colonial expansion—it kept her occupied, dispersed her strength, and aroused a certain resentment in Britain, where public opinion was opposed to a territorial despoilment of China and the destruction of the independence of Madagas-

car.<sup>1</sup> This French subservience and the renewal of the Three Emperors' League had to a certain extent relieved Bismarck of the fear of a Franco-Russian alliance. The "Dreikaiserbund" had, however, not produced a German-Slav union of hearts. Ampthill records his impression (Sept. 15) that hatred of Russia and the Slavs was on the increase in Germany.

Outwardly the relations between Britain and Germany remained friendly. Diplomatically the former had become isolated and therefore quite harmless in the eyes of Bismarck. But in both South Africa and in Australia anxiety was felt over the activities of German traders and other forerunners of colonial expansion.<sup>2</sup> Vainly colonists urged the home government to take aggressive action. The stage was being set for an Anglo-German clash.

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick L. Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York, 1931), 107-109; E. V. G. Kiernan, *British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1895* (Cambridge, 1939), 98-99, 127-129; Herbert J. Wood, *England, France and Madagascar, 1880-1895*, unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Wisconsin Library.

<sup>2</sup> Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy*, 11-16, 27-36; R. I. Lovell, *The Struggle for South Africa, 1875-1899* (New York, 1934), 81-89; *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VII, part I, 354-358

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 January 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks to Bismarck the official Press has been correct and civil about Gambetta's death,<sup>a</sup> otherwise the Public mind would have given vent to what my French Colleague bitterly describes as — "une joie féroce et peu intelligente."

It is scarcely to be wondered at when one considers that to the German mind "Gambetta" and "Revenge" were synonymous and that the prospect of War is as distasteful to the Germans as it is to the French.

The Court and Conservative circles, where the example of a Republic so near Germany is not as much appreciated as it is by Bismarck the idea of a Monarchical restoration is already being freely discussed, and a preference is generally given to the Bonapartists over the Orleanists as more likely to be peaceful neighbours.

Bismarck's preference for the Republican form of Government in France is due to his belief, recorded in his despatches to Arnim that a Republic is more likely to remain weak, and be subservient to Germany than a Monarchy. No doubt, the French Republic is already on an inclined plane, but the prospect of a Monarchical restoration is still out of sight, so that Bismarck is more likely to have what he wants in France, than the Emperor, who makes no secret of his dislike to Republics, because of the bad example they give the people of Europe.

The Crown Prince, I am told, inclines more to his Father's than to Bismarck's views in regard to the Republic in France.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 20 January 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I was gratified to see by your Desp. No. 25<sup>a</sup> of the 13th that Herbert Bismarck had confirmed to you my often repeated conviction that his Father would give us his full diplomatic support, and that he would regret an interruption of our friendly relations with France. The contrary is generally believed, even by serious Statesmen,—who might know better if they would but consider that the Key to Bismarck's policy is to be sought in the true interests of

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<sup>a</sup> Gambetta died on December 31, 1882.

Germany and that those interests require the maintenance of the Anglo-French Alliance and of intimate relations between England and Germany.

The late Lord Derby's construction of the value of a guarantee in the case of Luxemburg<sup>4</sup> is an old grievance of Bismarck's, which he often harps upon when talking of guarantees in general. In the present case he probably wants an excuse for avoiding guarantees, so as to preserve his neutrality or liberty of action in the East in the event of unforeseen complications.

Last night there was a Court Concert where I met all the Ministers, but learnt no news to send you by this Messenger.

The Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh were present both looking very well. Their Royal Highness's remain here about ten days.

Yours sincerely,

Amphill.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 January 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The octogenarian Emperor felt the somewhat sudden death of his younger brother most acutely,—but this morning he is said to be recovering from the shock and almost himself again.<sup>5</sup>

Tomorrow Their Majestys give a dinner to the Duke & Duchess of Edinburgh, Lord Sackville, General Du Plat & Sir Howard Elphinstone<sup>6</sup> to which we are also bidden. Prince Charles was not a very popular Prince in his own family, but he was much beloved by his Household, by Artists and Antiquarians, and by the people and garrison of Potsdam, who owed him the free enjoyment of his beautiful gardens, and of hunting the Glienecke Hounds, of which he was the Master.

His death has put an end to the Silver Wedding festivities, which are now fixed for the 28th of February, Midlent.

Count Münster was among the many guests, who came for a wedding and found a funeral. He was to have an audience of the Emperor and dine with the Chancellor today and then leave for Derenburg so that I shall not see him before he returns to London to my

<sup>4</sup> See Temperley and Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*, 309–314, and *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 14–15. The reference is to a treaty of 1867. Lord Derby, then prime minister, interpreted the collective guarantee as one under which each power had the liberty but not the obligation to consider violation a *casus belli*.

<sup>5</sup> Prince Charles of Prussia (1801–1883) had died on January 21.

<sup>6</sup> Mortimer Sackville West (1820–1888), created Baron Sackville in 1876, was lord-in-waiting to Queen Victoria. Sir Charles Taylor Du Plat (1822–1901) was equerry to Queen Victoria after the death of the prince consort, whom he had also served. Sir Howard Elphinstone (1829–1890), appointed aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria in 1877, was treasurer and comptroller of the household of Prince Arthur, 1871–1890.

regret.—He drank tea with us last night and rejoiced us with London gossip, which is a treat, when one lives so long out of it!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 February 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Bismarck sent me word the other day that Herbert wrote him happy and very interesting Letters and that your kindness to him was greater than ever.

Never was your kindness politically better invested, and I chuckle in my sleeve when I hear people marvel at Bismarck's growing preference for England and steady faith in the foreign policy of Her Majesty's liberal advizers.—He is again ill in bed with rheumatism, whilst the Emperor is confined to his room with a slight cold.

Hatzfeldt and Busch are astounded at Münster's not caring to have a Danubian Specialist attached to his Embassy during your Conferences and they expect that he will change his mind and ask for one later on. They also expect that the Conference<sup>7</sup> will be prolonged by Russian manoeuvres to get Russian Rights on the Kilia Channel<sup>8</sup> acknowledged or reserved,—but they do not seem inclined themselves to do more than follow and support Austria.

Nothing new.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 February 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I had some conversation with the Emperor yesterday and the day before and thought him better and more cheerful than ever. His mind is at present engrossed with the organization of the deferred festivities for the Silver Wedding on the 28th which are to be a surprize for the Crown Prince and Princess.—His Majesty says with a smile that he did not get half as many presents and ovations on his silver and golden weddings as "his children" do, and seems pleased and gratified at the great popularity they enjoy.—

<sup>7</sup> A Danube conference met in London February 8-March 10, 1883, to discuss the prolongation of the Danube Commission, which was originally set up in 1856 to remove obstacles to navigation at the mouths of the river and was subsequently renewed several times. Correspondence leading up to it is contained in *P. P.*, 1883, LXXXII, c. 3525, the Protocols, *ibid.*, c. 3526, and Granville's summary, *ibid.*, 3527.

<sup>8</sup> In order to obtain the consent of Russia to prolong the life of the Danube Commission for twenty-one more years, it was necessary for the conference to promise to remove the Kilia branch of the Danube delta from the commission's control. Russia had obtained territorial control of all the Kilia mouths except that of Stary-Stamboul at the Congress of Berlin.

On Thursday evening I sat by the Empress at a Court Concert and found Her Majesty much improved in looks and even cheerful in conversation.

On the other hand Princess Bismarck has given me a very unsatisfactory account of the Chancellor.—She says that he is unable to walk from the pain in his leg and unable to talk from the pain in his cheek,—and that business has become exceedingly irksome to him,—Indeed he would gladly resign, she said, and retire altogether to Varzin if the Emperor had not made him promise to remain at his post, while His Majesty lived.—But if he outlived the Emperor, she added, he was quite determined not to remain with failing strength and spirits in office, under a new Reign.

I was surprized at Princess Bismarck's assertion, because Bismarck's friends and supporters firmly believe that he will remain in harness as long as he lives, and that inaction would be more likely to kill him than work.

Happily the question is of no importance, the dear old Emperor's strength and health being a guarantee against the occurrence for years to come.

Like many nervous individualities Prince Bismarck thinks himself ill when he has no important questions to occupy his mind,—and revives under the excitement of threatening complications. The present political lull in Germany is therefore not favourable to his recovery.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3 March 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Silver Wedding festivities have gone off most successfully and were of extraordinary splendor and magnificence. The Crown Prince and Crown Princess were never more popular than at the present moment throughout Germany.

Emily has been literally overwhelmed with thanks and gracious attentions by the Emperor, the Empress, the Crown Prince and Princess for the Quadrille she organized for Princess Victoria,<sup>9</sup> and which all say was the success of the evening. I am very glad for her sake for she had a great deal of trouble and hard work to make it all run smooth.

As regards a Special Representative for the Coronation at Moscow, nothing has yet been settled,—but I have been promised the earliest possible information.

<sup>9</sup> Princess Victoria was the daughter of the crown prince and princess. A detailed account of the festivities, including Lady Ampthill's quadrille, may be found in *The Times*.

The Crown Prince does not wish Prince William to go to Russia,—the Emperor does, but will probably not insist. The Crown Prince would wish the resident Ambassador to be specially appointed to the Coronation. The Emperor thinks a Prince or special Ambassador should be sent.—Prince Albrecht,<sup>10</sup> I hear, would like to go.

Hatzfeldt told me last night he thought the Emperor would consider the question next week and would then take a final decision.

The Duke of Edinburgh desired me to tell you that as he must go to the Coronation anyhow with the Duchess, he was going to offer himself as Special Representative,—which H. R. H. thought might be convenient and would save the expense of a special Embassy besides.

From my Russian Colleague Saburoff I hear that Mohrenheim is giving a good deal of unnecessary trouble in the Danube Conference from "Over zeal." Today he read me in strict confidence a private letter from Giers complaining in sharp and angry terms of the mess Mohrenheim was making of the Kilia question, which he, Giers, had settled so easily and clearly with Kalnocky at Vienna.

I hear Mohrenheim generally talked of in Diplomatic circles as a "disappointment" and "a failure" and not likely to last.

The Prince of Wales<sup>11</sup> has asked us to give a dinner today to the Officers of his new Regiment the Blücher Hussars,—which the Crown Prince and Princess and Princess Victoria have announced their intention to honour with their presence. There is also to be dancing after dinner for the young Princesses of Hesse Darmstadt and Sleswig Holstein etc. etc.

The Prince of Wales has made himself even more popular in Berlin than everywhere else and his visits gratify both the Royal Family and the People and go far to cement the good feeling between the two Countries.

His Royal Highness paid a long visit on Thursday to Prince Bismarck,—and I heard afterwards from Princess Bismarck that the Chancellor, ill as he is, had notwithstanding been again quite charmed by the Prince's conversation and "fascinating manners."

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 March 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Prince of Wales has requested me to tell you that in the course of the conversation he had with Prince Bismarck His Highness expressed an earnest hope that H. M. Govt. would not withdraw the

<sup>10</sup> Prince Albrecht of Prussia (1837-1906), nephew of the Emperor William I, was later regent of the Duchy of Brunswick.

<sup>11</sup> The Prince of Wales was in Berlin, February 25-March 7.



troops from Egypt before safety and stability could be guaranteed by England to Europe.

In regard to France Prince Bismarck said that as in the past France has always attacked Germany when she felt strong enough to do so,—Germany must be excused for very naturally wishing that France should remain as weak as she is now in the future.

H. R. H. will reach England as soon as this Letter and will be better able than I can to tell you his impressions about the great Chancellor.

For my part I can only repeat what I said the other day, namely that the impression produced by the Prince in Berlin has been more than ever pleasing and favourable, that everyone seems flattered and gratified to see him here and that his visits increase every time the good feeling existing between the two Courts and Countries.

The Prince of Wales also requested me to tell you that he agrees with the Duke of Edinburgh in thinking that his selection as "Special Representative" for the Coronation at Moscow would be "convenient and economical."

In confirmation of what I told you in my last about Mohrenheim I can add that my Austrian Colleague showed me today privately a confidential report from the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Wolkenstein, to his Government stating that M. de Giers and the Russian Government generally were much disappointed in M. de Mohrenheim's attitude in the Conference, and regretted that he had ever been appointed to London.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O. March 7, 1883.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

The Duke of Edinburgh's offer has been accepted. We as good as settled everything today. I think we have settled everything excepting the Roumanian question. The R. R. behaved well. Mohrenheim is well intentioned, but tiresome and a prig.

Münster was evidently told to follow Austria, to be civil to me, & to agree in everything which Russia & England agreed in.

Gladstone is come back as strong as a horse.<sup>12</sup>

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 March 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

It gave me great pleasure to receive your letter of the 7th, many thanks for writing.—I congratulate you on having so successfully

<sup>12</sup> Gladstone had just returned to London from the south of France, where he had been in January. See Morley, *Gladstone*, II, 567.

closed the Danube Conference.—If Roumania gives trouble it is her neighbour, Austria's business to bring her to reason and if you have anything to propose to rectify Roumanian errors, I feel sure that you will have Bismarck's cordial support, because he is irritated at Stourdza's vagaries, and not afraid of grappling with Roumania, as Hatzfeldt seems to be.

We have entered upon a small military crisis which may or may not become serious—according to Bismarck's mode of dealing with it.—The Emperor has dismissed the War Minister Gen. von Kamecke for not forcing Parliament to approve of certain privileges he wants to bestow on the Army, and if the new War Minister General Bronsart von Schellendorf <sup>13</sup> is not more successful than his predecessor, then the Emperor may wish to dismiss Parliament rather than give up the measures he has so much at heart.—An appeal to the Country would probably call forth more agitation than would suit Prince Bismarck at present, but there is no saying what he may not do later on.

The Crown Prince is believed by the Liberals to side more with Parliament than with the Emperor in the present instance but they may be misinformed.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 24 March 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Colonel Swaine <sup>14</sup> has got some curious information I sent you today about two Americans, who have arrived in Berlin, one of whom is an Expert and the other a "would-be" Student in the Science of Explosives, and both suspected of being in some way connected with the American Fenians.—He is earnestly anxious to keep his discovery secret until he can ascertain whether any valuable information can be privately obtained through them.

Prince Bismarck was of opinion as I wrote to you at the time that the Dynamite madness which has befallen a portion of humanity will have to be met like every other dangerous madness by improved legislation. The progress of Science, he says, is more rapid than the progress of Law, which has not at present the power to cope with the dangerous discoveries of modern chemistry. Any Apothecary's boy, he says, can now make dynamite enough to blow up a Dynasty, a Parliament or a Minister, and there is no Law to meet, control or

<sup>13</sup> General Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf (1832-1891), minister of war, 1883-1889.

<sup>14</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Leopold Victor Swaine (1840-1931), the British military attaché in Berlin, 1883-1889, had been a member of the European commission to supervise the cession of Thessaly to Greece in 1881 and military secretary of the expeditionary force in Egypt, 1882.

prevent the new evils to which society is exposed by the misuse of scientific discovery.

I dined with Prince Bismarck on the 17th. His voice was very weak and he complained occasionally of the discomforts of old age, but otherwise he was as cheerful and cordial as usual. He said he looked forward with the greatest pleasure to the honour of receiving the Prince of Wales at Varzin, whenever H. R. H. goes to inspect his Regiment of Pomeranian Blucher Hussars, who quartered close by at Stolpe.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 April 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Herbert Bismarck has returned to Berlin more enthusiastic about London and English Society than ever. He came via Paris by his Father's wish to see Challemeil Lacour<sup>15</sup> and the other leading French Ministers and tells me that, among them, Waldeck Rousseau<sup>16</sup> impressed him as a strong and rising man.

Here he found his Father somewhat improved in health and able to leave his room though seldom free from face-ache, and generally inclined to be very low about himself. Herbert returns to London about the middle of the month.

Notwithstanding a general impression to the contrary I cannot but think that the Military Pensions Bill and the increasing demands for the Army will meet with more serious opposition in the "Reichstag" than heretofore.—The first attempt to pass the Bill has already led to the resignation of two ministers and several under-secretaries. To avoid a future conflict between Parliament and the Crown, either the Emperor or the Opposition must give way,—and I see no inclination on either side to do so. A conflict would necessarily lead to dissolution, and an appeal to the Country would lead to an increase of the numbers of the Opposition. It will be interesting to watch the devices Bismarck's fertile brain will generate in dealing with a difficulty, which might in course of time assume the shape of a question before the Country as to whom the Army & Navy are subject in Germany,—to Parliament or to the Crown.

If Bismarck secured the Catholic vote of the Central Party by large concessions to the Vatican, he might get a majority, but he shrinks before the humiliation, as he says himself, "of going to Canossa."

<sup>15</sup> Paul Armand Challemeil-Lacour (1827-1896), the French minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Jules Ferry in 1883, had been French ambassador to Great Britain, 1880-1882.

<sup>16</sup> Pierre Marie Rene Waldeck Rousseau (1846-1904), the minister of the interior under Gambetta, 1881-1882, and Ferry, 1883-1885, and later premier, 1900-1902.

The power of the Pope is curiously illustrated by the fact that he virtually stands at this moment between the Emperor and his Parliament in regard to the Administration of the German Army.

The recall of my Turkish Colleague Sadoullah, and the appointment of Said Pasha<sup>17</sup> as Ambassador here, looks like a renewed attempt of the Sultan to establish the most intimate relations possible with Germany, and altho' he will not obtain an offensive and defensive Alliance,—he will find Hatzfeldt more than willing to promote German Enterprize and Emigration in Turkey in return for lucrative concessions to German subjects. He attaches great importance to the completion of the Railways of European Turkey, more especially to that of Salonica.

The Crown Princess has had a bad attack of neuralgia, and has been recommended change of air.

The Emperor and Empress are advized to go to Wiesbaden and Baden, while the cold winds of April prevail in Berlin.

Emily and I would like to go home in May, if you see no objection to it.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Granville replied characteristically on April 11: "I am delighted that Herbert continues to gush."

"Please add to the attractions of London society for him by bringing over Lady Ampthill in May."]

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 April 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The rapid passage through both Houses of Parliament of the Explosive Substances Bill has filled the Emperor with admiration and Bismarck with envy.<sup>18</sup>

The Emperor asked Puttkammer, the Minister of the Interior on Thursday night whether he could not pass a similar Bill through the German Parliament,—and Puttkammer replied that he feared the patriotism of German M. P.'s was not as intelligent and tactful as that of the English. Bismarck has made the officious [*sic*] Press express its admiration of the measure and remind the M. P.'s to

<sup>17</sup> Said Pasha, Turkish ambassador at Berlin, 1883-1885, and minister of foreign affairs, 1885-1895.

<sup>18</sup> *The Times* on April 6 reported the arrest of a number of persons in London on the previous day for unlawful possession of high explosives and the discovery of a plot to manufacture the explosives at Birmingham; the American dynamite party was suspected, and another Mansion House incident feared. On April 6 notice of a bill on explosive substances was given, and on April 9 the bill passed through all stages in both houses of parliament, receiving the royal assent the next day. *Hansard*, 3rd Ser., CCLXXVII, 1802-1811, 1841-1864.

their shame that the Anti-socialist Bill in 1878 could only be carried by a small majority after a dissolution & appeal to the Country.

The Crown Prince and the Grand Duke of Baden have asked me *quite privately* whether I thought the moment favourable for the negotiation of some international measure or extradition clause against the "Dynamite Party," which they said all the reigning Houses of Germany ardently desired.

I explained to them that such a measure could not be considered at present, and that I hoped it might not be necessary in the future,—at which they expressed great regret.

The Crown Prince said he meant to sound Prince Bismarck through Count Hatzfeldt on the subject;—but I doubt his getting any comfort out of Hatzfeldt whose fanaticism for inaction is increasing daily!

Thanks for the Leave you have granted me.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 May 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I venture to call your special attention to my despatch no 156 of the 9th May about German Claims in the Fiji Islands.<sup>19</sup>

Bismarck is said to feel strongly in the matter and to intend to press those claims steadily so as to shew Germany that he can protect German interests all over the world.

It might save future trouble if they could be dealt with gracefully and speedily so as to leave him no time to get up an agitation about them.<sup>20</sup>

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 September 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We returned here on Monday night greatly benefited by Carlsbad Water and Swiss air,—and on the following morning received an invitation to dinner from the Crown Prince and Princess to meet the Emperor, the Duke and Duchess of Connaught and the Crown Prince of Portugal at the Neue Palais, Potsdam.—The Emperor, who was looking very well I am happy to say,—expressed in the most cordial manner all the pleasure he anticipated at "counting all the Sons of

<sup>19</sup> For Bismarck's crucial dispatch of May 5, see *P. P.*, 1883, XLVI, c. 3815, p. 3, *Gr. Pol.*, IV, no. 738 or Dugdale, I, 170–171. Discussions may be found in Langer, *European Alliances*, 288–289, 292–293, and Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 155–157.

<sup>20</sup> This letter is quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 338.

Queen Victoria" among his guests at the coming manoeuvres, and also dwelt on the great satisfaction he had derived from seeing Prince Leopold Duke of Albany at last, for the first time, at Berlin this year.<sup>21</sup> His Majesty hoped their Royal Highnesses would soon be tempted to return again.

On public affairs the Emperor did not touch, beyond expressing regret at the difficulties the Prince of Bulgaria had now to contend with, and the hope that all would end satisfactorily for Prince Alexander.<sup>22</sup>

The Emperor has since left for Merseburg, the Crown Prince for Wittenberg to attend the Luther festival<sup>23</sup> and the Crown Princess leaves on Tuesday next for Homburg & the Manoeuvres.—

The Empress is at Homburg and is going to Baden.

Prince Bismarck and Count Hatzfeldt are on Leave and Dr. Busch is in charge of the F. O.—From his official language you will see that the German Govt. profess indifference in regard to the Bulgarian difficulty and are content to let Russia take it in hand.

• *Privately* Busch thinks that the indifference shewn by Austria to the bold manner in which Russia is taking root in Bulgaria must be explained by the great reluctance felt at Vienna, as indeed it is also felt at Berlin, to raise any question without absolute necessity, which might possibly lead to serious differences with Russia, and which would be eagerly taken up by the Austrian, German and Russian Press to fan the fire and inflame the international passions and hatred of Teutons and Panslavists.

The hatred of Russia and of the Slave [*sic*] is certainly on the increase in Germany. Moltke says it is the hatred of Races, thirsting to contend for supremacy,—and Schouvaloff, whom I met at Carlsbad, told me that the one thing which alarmed him most in Russia, was the steady growth of the hatred of Germany and the Germans in Panslavia.—

Be that as it may, Russia is taking advantage of her neighbour's indifference to secure another stepping stone into Stamboul and the Bosphorus, and Russian Supremacy in Bulgaria will one of these days necessitate a revision of the Treaty of Berlin, as the Treaty of San Stefano necessitated a revision of the Treaty of Paris.

At Carlsbad I gave Dr. Hochberger your Messages, which quite delighted him & he begged to be gratefully & respectfully remembered to you.—He is now 80, but unchanged in looks and habits, and

<sup>21</sup> See "1882," n. 8.

<sup>22</sup> For the troubles of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, see Langer, *European Alliances*, 340-343.

<sup>23</sup> The four hundredth anniversary of Luther's birth on November 10 was widely celebrated in Germany. Plans and festivities were reported in *The Times* from August through November.

continues to shoot and dance in winter as he did half a century ago, when he first began his useful and successful career at Carlsbad.

Sir Andrew Clark <sup>24</sup> was quite right to insist on my going to Carlsbad for I have thoroughly recovered from my severe liver attack thanks to his excellent advice.

Emily desires to be gratefully remembered to Lady Granville & yourself.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 20 October 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I send you today the Duke Ujest's offer to sell this Embassy House,—out and out the best in Berlin,—to her Majesty's Govt.<sup>25</sup> Personally I am in no way interested in the purchase so long as the Lease is renewed while I have the honour to serve H. M. Govt., but in the interest of Economy, the Public service and my Successors the purchase would be in every respect advantageous and desirable. We might have saved a lot of money if we had purchased it 8 years ago, as I recommended at the time.

Our Treasury, as a rule, is not partial to the purchase of Embassy Houses, while the German, French and Russian Govts. consider Freeholds more economical than Leases in the long run and have bought Houses in the principal European Posts.

The acquisition of an Embassy by H. M. Govt. would, I believe, gratify the Imperial Family as well as the German Govt. to judge by their frequent queries on the Subject, but the Treasury will probably object to the price.—

The present Lease expires in June 1886.

Busch and Said Pasha declare that Muktar had no political mission at Berlin,—but the "Nord Deutsche Allgemeine" of the 18th, as you will see, admits that he repeated the views already expressed by the Porte to the Powers on the subject of Egypt, Armenia & Bulgaria, and the "Nord Deutsche" proceeds to support the Turkish view of our Armenian policy, which I regret, because it will only increase the obstinacy of the Porte and consequently leave Armenia in its present deplorable condition.

Bismarck would greatly prefer Russia to interfere in Armenia than in the Balkan peninsula,—the former in no way concerns Germany, while the latter might call for Austro-German resistance.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL

<sup>24</sup> Sir Andrew Clark (1826–1893) was a famous London physician and had attended Gladstone since 1866.

<sup>25</sup> The Duke of Ujest was Hugo, prince of Hohenlohe-Öhringen (1816–1897). His offer to sell the embassy building to Great Britain was not accepted—see below, June 21, 1884.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 27 Oct. 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have read with interest and returned with thanks Mr. MacDonalds[*sic*] <sup>26</sup> Desp. no. 87 of the 2nd Oct. on the subject of the influences of the Religious policy of Prussia on the School question in Bavaria, which you sent me for perusal. The moral of it all is that even the Allpowerful Bismarck, whose "Culturkampf" is backed by twenty seven millions of Free-thinkers, cannot root up, out of the soil of enlightened Germany, the errors of Popery, notwithstanding old Catholicism, Luther festivals and German Philosophy. After waging war for ten years on the Pope, Dr. Falk who led the attack in May 1873 has been sent in disgrace to Ham in Hanover as "Oberappellationsgerichts president" to reflect over his defeat, while Prince Bismarck has renewed diplomatic relations with the Vatican to offer large concessions and beg of the Pope in return to allow the Catholic Opposition Majority in the German Parliament to pass his Social Measures and Tobacco monopoly for the benefit of the German Fatherland. Politically he is on the high road to Canossa.—

In 1873, I ventured, in reply to a query of Prince Bismarck's, to say that after fourteen years residence under the shadow of the Vatican I had convinced myself that the most powerful weapon the State could employ against the errors of Popery was religious and political freedom such as we enjoyed in Great Britain, a proposition he energetically and absolutely rejected at the time.

Since then I have heard him assert with equal energy and conviction that Falk was a fool and that he had always thought so.

Prince Bismarck has been trying Dr. Schwenigen's improved and scientific Banting Cure, and is said to have lost 42 lb of his weight, which will do him good, because he had been suffering from what Germans call a "Bierbauch."

The Emperor has returned to Berlin in excellent health and has gone to shoot with Count Stollberg at Wernigerode in the Harz.

Yours sincerely

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 November 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Crown Prince's visit to the King of Spain via Italy and the Mediterranean in three German Men of War, avoiding France and the Land route, is intended to pay off France for insulting the German "Uhlan" uniform, and to commit Spain to Germany's Austro-Italian Anti-franco-Russian Peace League, and will no doubt lend additional lustre to Bismarck's triumphal car.

<sup>26</sup> H. G. MacDonell was British chargé d'affaires in Bavaria, 1882-1885.



It will probably irritate both the french and the Russian Press,—which will be nuts to the great Chancellor!

The visit of the Austrian Archduke and Archduchess<sup>27</sup> to Prince and Princess William was private and intimate and intended to strengthen the ties of friendship between the youthful Heirs of the two Empires. It is said to have been very successful.

Germany is now waxing strong in moral power and in material prosperity too, to judge from the astounding development of arts and manufactures throughout the Empire.

Mr. Mackenzie Wallace<sup>28</sup> passed through Berlin some days ago and told me that the "Times" was sending him as Correspondent to the Balkan peninsula, where "some excitement" was expected next Spring.

The present excitement in Bulgaria and Servia may certainly lead to complications,—but the German Govt. do not appear to apprehend that they will be serious ones, unless Austria were to intervene in Servia, which is not at all likely.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Cypher. Teleg. to Mr. Jocelyn. Darmstadt*

F. O., 11 am, Nov. 8/83.

Send by messenger to Wiesbaden the following tel. from the Queen to the Crown Prince of Germany.

"Think more than ever that considering the delicate relations existing between France & Spain, it wd. be more prudent to postpone visit especially as the King is unwell. I hope friendly terms are immediately to be renewed—It wd. be a pity to imperil this."

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 December 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Very many thanks for your Note of the 5th—Notwithstanding Prince Hohenlohe's warning, Madame Adam has published a third Article in the "Nouvelle Revue" of 1st. December which is, this time, rather more political than personal.<sup>29</sup>—

<sup>27</sup> The Archduke Rudolf and his wife, Stephanie, the daughter of Leopold II of Belgium, visited Prince and Princess William early in November, 1883. Rudolf, *Politische Briefe*, 66.

<sup>28</sup> Donald Mackenzie Wallace (1841-1919), *The Times* correspondent at St. Petersburg, 1877-1878, at the Congress of Berlin, 1878, at Constantinople, Egypt, etc., 1878-1884; private secretary to Dufferin in India 1884-1888; knighted, 1887; headed *The Times* foreign department, 1891-1899; author of several works arising out of his observations, such as *Russia* (New York, 1881).

<sup>29</sup> Madame Juliette Adam (1836-1936) in 1879 founded the *Nouvelle Revue*, which she edited for eight years and controlled to some extent until 1899. She constantly attacked Bismarck and maintained a salon which was frequented by Gambetta and other Republican leaders. See Winifred Stephens, *Madame Adam (Juliette Lamder), La Grand Française, from Louis Philippe until 1917* (New York, 1917).

"The fire to the smoke" as I have said, is that they are written by some one who is intimately acquainted with Berlin Court Life and Society, and everyone attacked, seeks for the Traitor in his next-door neighbour.—These articles have hitherto been kept from the Emperor and Empress,—but the Grand Duchess of Baden and Princess Charlotte have read them, and the Crown Princess has heard of them but not read them.

H. I. & R. H. arrived on Tuesday from Wiesbaden and called on my Lady the next day and in the course of conversation alluded to, and enquired about these Articles, but Emily advised her not to read them, which the Crown Princess assured her she had no wish to do.

The Crown Princess is looking very well and is impatiently awaiting the Crown Prince's return from Spain about the 18th or 20th inst. for Christmas.

Sir Robert Morier's dismal view of the Prince's visit to Spain, you sent for my perusal, forms a curious contrast with the rose-colored delight of public opinion in Germany, where the Prince's brilliant reception in Spain, is looked upon as a proof of international appreciation, friendship and good will.

Otherwise there is really no news and Berlin continues to be pleasantly quiet.

Prince Bismarck has made up his mind to reinstate the Bishop of Limburg,—one of the four Bishops suspended in virtue of the Falk Laws.—This measure being a sop to the Pope to facilitate the much desired "modus vivendi" will be denounced as another step towards Canossa by the Prussian Antipopery party.

Yours sincerely

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 22 December 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Among my reports of today you will find all I know about Hatzfeldt's mysterious reluctance to settle the Sulu-Spanish-Sovereignty question,—which is not much, as I cannot account for his very marked objection to talk the matter over,—but I have a suspicion which I cannot prove, that he was jealous of Münster's initiative from the beginning, because, having lived so long at Madrid he thinks Spanish Affairs appertain exclusively to himself, and that he might have got some return out of the Spanish Govt for Germany's recognition of Spanish Sovereignty over Sulu, if Münster had not interfered without previously consulting him.

Be that as it may, Hatzfeldt having an excuse for delay will refuse to entertain the subject until he receives the "formal request" from

the Spanish Govt., concerning which there is no reason why you should not speak with the Spanish Minister in London.

Possibly you may discover some intrigue at the bottom of it all,—which is not impossible after the political flirtation Germany has been carrying on with Spain since the Homburg Autumn Manœuvres.

We dined on Wednesday last at the Palace, and the Empress, beside whom I had the honour to sit, was pleased to confide to me that the Crown Prince's visit to Madrid, Rome and the Vatican was initiated and pressed upon the reluctant Emperor by Prince Bismarck in the general interest of Germany's foreign relations.

The Crown Prince's Spanish and Italian journeys are immensely popular in Germany, but his visit to the Pope has alarmed the National party, who misrepresent it as a reactionary symptom fraught with danger to "Anti-religious Freedom" in Germany!

Happy Christmas!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 29 December 1883.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Colonel Swaine has given me the enclosed confidential Memo. which is interesting as a matter of history. If I am not mistaken the occupation of Iskanderoon, among other places, was contemplated by your predecessors & reported against by Sir Linthorn Simmons, before the occupation of Cyprus was decided upon by Lord Beaconsfield.

If the Sultan's refusal,—tolerated by Bismarck,—to give an enlightened Governor to Armenia,—serves Russia as an excuse for intervention, then some practical knowledge of the road to Iskanderoon might be of use to her, but as matters stand the Panslavists care more for Bulgaria at present than for Armenia as the recent appointment of General Kantacusenos to the Bulgarian War Office sufficiently proves.—It is to be hoped that he will strengthen the hands of Prince Alexander whose position is becoming very precarious,—and chiefly so now through want of funds.

Prince Alexander as you know is a charming Prince and the Imperial Family here, take the greatest interest in his success present and future,—but without money, and a great deal of money he will not be able to hold his own against Russian & Turkish intrigues.

Happy New Year!

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Memorandum by Colonel Swaine**Confidential.*

It may seem rather late in the day to lay the following information before Your Excellency; but as Russian Agents are never weary of work & as they have more or less the instinct to know what suits & pleases their Government, or even what policy it wishes to pursue, I may be excused for mentioning it so long after the time of its occurrence, although the facts may at any moment prove interesting.

During the last three months of 1882 (& he may have been going on ever since) General Lautz, the Russian Military Attaché in London was buying up every map & every published description of the Country—its produce, its roads & its obstacles—that lies between the Russian Frontier in Asia & the Bay of Iskanderoon (Alexandretta).

Indeed he did it so systematically so persistently & so wholesale that my informant's attention was drawn to it.

I believe it is generally considered a possible alternative for Russia, failing a permanent location on the Banks of the Bosphorus, to gain a portion of her ends by seizing at the first opportunity a port on the Mediterranean; with that idea Alexandretta was usually combined.

It is also a fact I think that at no time since the Russo-Turkish War has Russia had so considerable a body of troops quartered in the Caucasus District as at the present.

To oppose this force Turkey has next to none available. Her 4th Corps. Hd Qrs at Erzeroum counting 25 Battalions on paper could not place more than 1000 Infantry—if so many—into the Field; and the Cavalry & Artillery were in a still more neglected condition when I left Constantinople 18 months ago, nor do I fancy they are likely to have improved since my day.

Russia holds the Black Sea with her Fleet, & a few ironclads at the mouth of the Dardanelles would block that road also. Turkey would be compelled to send all her men & material to Erzeroum & the Eastern Frontier by land. Could she collect an Army there in three months to stop a Russian Advance? Would Russia wait so long?

There may be no immediate intention on the part of Russia to commence hostilities in Asia Minor with Turkey; & it is not with a fear of such a pressing danger that I mention to your Excellency what General Lautz's chief occupation was a good year ago. But having received information from a most reliable source I did not wish to bury it in oblivion.

Berlin, 27 December 1883.

(sd) L. V. SWAINE, *Lt. Col.,*  
*Military Attaché.*



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**CHAPTER VIII**  
**LETTERS, JANUARY-AUGUST, 1884**

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## CHAPTER VIII

### LETTERS, JANUARY-AUGUST, 1884

The closing months of Lord Ampthill's life were clouded by the quarrels between Britain and Germany. German economic interests grew more insistent in their demand for colonies, and Bismarck, whose position at home was anything but comfortable, seized upon the opportunity of getting support from these vigorous and aggressive groups by adopting a policy of colonial expansion. Lord Ampthill, who had maintained friendly and even intimate relations with Bismarck since his arrival in Berlin, felt convinced (see letter of August 2) that Bismarck acted against "his better conviction" when he supported the "colonialists" and that he did it as a means of gaining popularity.<sup>1</sup> But, as was his wont, he meant to and did succeed in getting what he desired, in this case colonies for Germany.

British opinion at home and in the colonies was hostile to German colonial expansion, but the government was unable to implement an anti-German policy because the precariousness of the British position in Egypt made Britain absolutely dependent upon the support of Bismarck. The land of the pharaohs stood urgently in need of financial reforms. Britain as its *de facto* mistress must perforce bring these about, but since Egypt belonged *de jure* to the Turkish empire and had had its financial affairs regulated by international agreements and commissions, no fundamental reform could be achieved without the consent of the powers. Throughout the year 1884 Lord Granville sought desperately to obtain this consent; he prepared plans and arranged an Egyptian financial conference. The Ampthill-Granville correspondence dealt chiefly with Egyptian problems and bears witness to Bismarck's use of Britain's Egyptian difficulties as a means for breaking down her opposition to German colonial expansion.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This runs counter to the thesis, propounded by Dr. Mary E. Townsend, that Bismarck was an advocate of German colonial expansion. See her book *Origins of Modern German Colonialism* (New York, 1921), 156-169. Lord Ampthill's letter explains what Professor Langer finds inexplicable (*European Alliances*, 296), namely, why the British foreign office did not think Germany was in earnest about colonies.

<sup>2</sup> The most exhaustive survey of events in the early stages of the Anglo-German colonial conflict is Aydelotte's *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy*. Gladstone's attitude toward German colonization is discussed in Knaplund's *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy* (London, 1927), 155-157, and in *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 110-114, 124-129. The problems of Egypt are treated in *ibid.*, 194-200. The old standard works on this topic are Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, and Milner, *England in Egypt*, *op. cit.*





*Private.*

BERLIN, 5 January 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We dined with the Crown Prince and Princess on Wednesday last and heard some interesting accounts of his most successful journey to Spain and Italy, though nothing absolutely new or of importance beyond the fact told me in strict confidence that the Duc de Montpensier had been requested by the Comte de Paris<sup>3</sup> to assure the Crown Prince privately and personally that if ever his party should call him to rule over France his first aim and object would be an Alliance with Germany.

The Crown Prince, who naturally prefers a monarchial to a republican form of Government has been greatly gratified by the Comte de Paris' secret and friendly message. Prince Bismarck, as you know, exceptionally prefers a republican Govt. in France, because he thinks its weakness advantageous to Germany, and any change of Government in France dangerous to peace and order in Europe.

A change of Govt. does not appear to me at all likely in France, since the great majority of the Constituencies are clearly in favour of the Republic, or at least of "no change" for the present, so that Bismarck, as usual, is more likely to see his own wishes realized than the Crown Prince.

The Grand Duke & Duchess of Baden see a great deal, in a quiet way, of Prince Victor Bonaparte<sup>4</sup> and think the Bonapartes are more likely to succeed than the Orleans Princes in France.

The Crown Prince and the Gentlemen who accompanied him were all very favourably impressed by their visit to the Pope, whom they thought dignified, benevolent and extremely courteous.

The Crown Prince told me that he had no instructions whatever from the Emperor, and that politics and "Modus Vivendi" were not alluded to by himself.

Prince Bismarck is now anxious to make peace with the Pope, so as to get the Catholic Opposition in Parliament to vote for his social and financial measures.

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<sup>3</sup> Antoine Marie Philippe Louis d'Orleans (1824-1890), Duke of Montpensier, fifth son of Louis Philippe, married Marie Louise Fernande de Bourbon, sister of Isabella II of Spain. Their daughter was the wife of the Comte de Paris, Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleans (1838-1894), grandson of Louis Philippe. The Comte de Paris became head of the French royal house in August, 1883, on the death of the Comte de Chambord, under the agreement concluded in 1873—see above, "1873," n. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Prince Victor Bonaparte (1862-1926), grandson of Jerome Bonaparte and son of the Prince Napoleon (1822-1891), was chief of the Bonapartists in France after the death of the prince imperial in 1879. In 1884 Victor publicly separated from his father and was followed by many of the party.

The Pope, I believe, intends writing a letter to the Crown Prince, to put on paper what he was not [able] to say at the interview.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 12 Jan. 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I hear with great regret that Herbert Bismarck is to go to St. Petersburg to replace Plessen.<sup>5</sup> It appears that the Chancellor wants his son to learn something about Russia and replace Gen. von Schweinitz as "Chargé" when he goes on leave to see his wife and children at Wiesbaden. Herbert's post at London is not to be filled up for the present so that he will be able to return there if Russia does not suit him.

Bismarck's object, I fancy, is to give Herbert an opportunity of distinguishing himself in the eyes of the Emperor, so that his promotion may suggest itself to his Majesty, which the Father, much as he wishes to obtain an independent post for Herbert, does not think right to solicit for his son himself.

Bismarck is not expected to leave Friederichsruhe for Berlin for some time to come. He is said to be absorbed by social questions and his new "Workingmens Insurance against Accidents bill" has been better received by the Press than was expected. He says himself that his greatest work will be the elaboration of Workingmen's Insurance Laws, which will diminish pauperism by the legal enforcement of thrift.

The Crown Prince Princess and Princess Victoria, attended by a very numerous suite did us the honour of dining at the Embassy on Thursday last, with Hatzfeldt, Sagans, Schleinitz, Albedylls and many other guests. Everybody noticed how well and cheerful the Crown Princess seemed, and all were much struck with the Crown Prince's improved looks since his journey to Spain & Italy.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private No. 2.*

BERLIN, 12 January 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Since writing to you today, Herbert Bismarck has arrived from Friederichsruhe with a message from his Father to say that his appointment to St. Petersburg is only temporary and that he retains his London Post and hopes to send him back for the middle of the season.—Herbert added that he would be miserable if he thought

<sup>5</sup> Baron Ludwig von Plessen, first secretary of the Germany embassy at St. Petersburg, 1883-1884, and at London, 1884-1888, and later minister to Greece, 1894-1902.

that he was not to return to England, where everybody's kindness has completely spoilt him for any other Post or Country.

Prince Bismarck also desired him to say for your private information, that he hoped by sending his Son to Russia to please the Court, Government and Society of St. Petersburg and revive the friendly relations he desired to encourage with the Russian Govt., which Schweinitz appeared unable to rekindle, partly from increasing laziness, and partly from having taken a dislike to the climate of St. Petersburg which disagreed with his wife and children.

I expressed all the regret I felt sure you would feel, even at his temporary absence, and the hope that he would return and remain in England where he was universally appreciated and esteemed.

He leaves on Monday next.

Pray excuse haste for Messenger.

Yours sincerely

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 January 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Madame Adam's most abominable Articles of the "Nouvelle Revue" on Berlin Society have been published separately in one volume, the sale of which has been forbidden by the Police in Berlin,—so that Everybody and his Wife has read them, and Berlin Society complains of nothing else for the present from night till morning.

On Thursday last the first Reception and Concert of the Season called; "Grosse Schleppen Cour" took place at the Palace,—but the Emperor having caught cold the day before could not appear and the presentations had all to be made to the Empress alone.—Emily had a great many to make as "*Doyenne*," including a handsome Princess Ghika, whom the Empress requested Emily to present in due form, although Her Majesty had known her previously at the Augusta Stift of Charlottenburg.

After the presentations the Empress retired and the Crown Prince and Princess took their Majesties' place at the Concert.

The Crown Princess all in white with a silver train looked wonderfully well and youthful. Although the Emperor is well again the Opera Ball has been put off for ten days,—to the 5th February,—so as to enable His Majesty to be present as in former years. I, for one, am very glad of it, for the absence of the Emperor or Empress from any Court Festivity casts an indescribable gloom over all their devoted guests & adherents.

Experienced Members of Parliament assert that Prince Bismarck's amended Social and Financial Bills have better prospects of success this year than last, but the temper of the Reichstag will not be really known before March, when Bismarck returns to Berlin.

Meanwhile the "Home and Foreign" political situation is peaceful and prosperous in Germany.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 9 February 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I am very glad to see from your 23<sup>d</sup> of 25 ult<sup>o</sup> that you spoke in the first instance to Münster about the coming inevitable modifications in the Law of Liquidation<sup>6</sup> because Bismarck's views on the subject will greatly influence the other Powers concerned.

Hatzfeldt is well disposed towards us in regard to Eastern Affairs as you have seen from his advice to Turkey reported by Lord Dufferin.

We can reckon on Bismarck's support absolutely as regards Egypt I believe.—

The growing faith of our Press in a British Protectorate of Egypt is astounding to me, when I recall the scorn and suspicion with which Bismarck's wish that we should "take Egypt" was received in England but a short time ago.

"Taking Egypt" would be giving a bad example to the Powers who look upon themselves as the Sultan's Heirs, and those Powers would "jump for joy" if England "took Egypt";—but our Press does not seem to take *those* consequences into consideration when it clamours for a departure from the declared policy of H. M. Govt.

On the other hand I apprehend that it will be as difficult for us to get out of Egypt as it was for France to get out of Rome, from 1849 to 1870.<sup>7</sup>—

We are without news of any kind here and in deep mourning for Princess George of Saxony.<sup>8</sup>

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 March 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Carneval festivities are over and the last Shrove Tuesday Ball was rendered particularly brilliant by the presence of the Russian St. George Deputation composed of the Grand Duke Michel, General Gourko, Prince Obolenski, Count Schouvaloff etc-etc-etc—

<sup>6</sup> The Law of Liquidation was proposed by an international commission as a means to straighten out Egyptian finance and was signed by the khedive on July 17, 1880. See Langer, *op. cit.*, 262, and Cromer, *Egypt*, I, 172-173. On April 19, 1884, Granville sent out a circular dispatch proposing a conference to consider alterations. *P. P.*, 1884, LXXXIX, c. 4000.

<sup>7</sup> The three preceding paragraphs are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 324.

<sup>8</sup> Princess George of Saxony, born Marie Anna, infanta of Portugal, in 1843, died on February 5, 1884.

all Knights of St. George, in their new picturesque uniforms which have been given a National Slav character so as to illustrate the pan-slavistic aspirations of Russia.

The "rapprochement" of Russia to Germany does not delight my french colleague and the presence of General Gourko in the Deputation fills him with suspicion,—nor does he like the appointment of Prince Orloff to Berlin, but Baron de Courcel is naturally an alarmist and apprehends anti-french combinations everywhere. Prince Orloff is to present his credentials about the 20th of March, so as to appear for the first time as Russian Ambassador at Court on the Emperor's birthday, 22nd inst., a compliment which is highly appreciated by his Majesty, who is devoted to Prince Orloff.

I am very sorry that my late Russian Colleague here, M. de Sabouroff does not succeed Baron Mohrenheim,—both he and his wife would have suited you and London Society so very well. In fact I do not know any "Russian and his Wife" better suited for the post of London.

Count Hatzfeldt has been invisible for the last fortnight in consequence of a severe cold. He seems to feel the change of climate from Constantinople and Madrid to Berlin very much, and cannot get accustomed to a northern winter.

Prince Bismarck is reported to [be] well and thinking of coming to Berlin after the opening of Parliament on the 6th inst.—He has been much irritated by the American vote of censure on his home policy sent him by Mr. Sargent in the disguise of a resolution of condolence on Lasker's death, and he says that the time has come to teach the Yankees manners in foreign policy.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

P. S. The Emperor has just announced himself to dinner at the Embassy on Wednesday next, through Count Perponcher.

BERLIN, 8 March 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Emperor dined with us on Wednesday last and was even more than usually well and gracious. On the 22nd inst. he will be 87! On Thursday there was a Court Concert and I thought the Empress also looking better and more cheerful than last year.—The Crown Prince and Princess both had very bad colds, and did not appear to enjoy the music, which was good. Princess Christian told us that she would return to England on Friday next.

The last accounts from Friederichsruhe are less favourable,—Prince Bismarck said he felt "*too nervous*" to return to Berlin just yet. He told Bleichröder, who went to see him about his private money con-

cerns,—that he suspected H. M. G. would have to take the Egyptian liquidation question into consideration, and that he would not stand in our way, but that he thought it likely we would meet with some difficulties on the part of the other Powers.

Bleichröder asked me if I knew anything about it, and I told him that I did not.

Bismarck told Bleichröder that he felt so weary of work that he was thinking of asking the Emperor to relieve him of all the Ministries he still held provisionally, with the exception of the Foreign Office, which he could carry from Friederichsruhe without much fatigue to himself. Bleichröder thinks he will recover his working powers, when his nerves are in a more normal condition.

Your sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

F.O., March 12. 84.

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

Thanks for your letter, but most for your news, as to Bismarck's knowing that we should have trouble with other countries respecting the Law of Liquidation.

We shall have to go at it.

The Emperor of Russia is angry at the Queen's objection (very confidentially communicated) to Baroness Uxkull<sup>9</sup> as a diplomatic representative of virtue.

I suppose any suggestion from us of a person would do more harm than good.

I should have no objection to Sabouroff. You will be the best judge whether any indiscreet hint from yourself to Sabouroff himself, or to Orloff, would help or not.

I had a pleasant political man dinner yesterday at your elder brother's.

Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

BERLIN, 14 March 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Thanks for your letter of the 12th. I had already heard from all my Colleagues here that Uxkull was not acceptable at home,—whilst my candidate, Sabouroff, they tell me is out of favour in Russia with Giers who has set the Czar against him so that he will be kept "en disponibilité" till the cloud blows over.

Sabouroff is therefore quite out of the running.

<sup>9</sup> Baron Uxkull was the Russian ambassador at Rome, 1876-1890.

My next candidate would be Prince Nikolas Dolgorouki, at present Russian Aide de Camp to the German Emperor (as Schweinitz was to the Czar) and who is often talked of as a future Ambassador in consequence of the high favour he stands in with the present Emperor of Russia. He is unmarried and would be most suitable in every respect.

It is however thought here that the London post will be left open until the first impressions of the annexation of Merv<sup>10</sup> have blown over in London, and then M. de Staal,<sup>11</sup> now Minister at Stuttgart will be proposed to you. I do not personally know him, but I remember his wife, when she was Mad<sup>11a</sup>. de Gortchakow and she was lady-like, though not exactly good looking.

As regards the Law of Liquidation I cannot too strongly recommend that Bismarck should be the *first* to know what you propose, because his influence on the other Powers is sure to be more favourable to us, than it would be if his first impressions came from Paris or elsewhere.

Yours sincerely,

AMPHILL.

*Teleg. to Lord Ampthill, March 16, 84.*

*Stahl* [*sic*] proposed as Russn. Ambassador here & will no doubt be accepted.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 15 March 1884.<sup>12</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In a private letter I wrote to you on the 9th of last May I ventured to point out that "a graceful and speedy settlement of the German claims in the Fiji Islands would save future trouble as Bismarck was determined to press them steadily so as to shew Germany that he can protect German interests all over the world."

Your subsequent note on the subject to Count Herbert Bismarck of the 23rd July 1883 seemed to me to be so civil and satisfactory that I learnt it by heart and repeated it to Count Hatzfeldt whenever he alluded to the unsettled portion of those claims.

<sup>10</sup> The news that the Russians had accepted the allegiance of the tribesmen of Merv, with its implied threat to Afghanistan, reached England by the middle of February. Langer, *European Alliances*, 310.

<sup>11</sup> Georges Frédéric Charles de Staal (1822-1907), later baron, after service in minor diplomatic posts in Constantinople, Athens, and Bucharest, became Russian minister at Stuttgart, 1871-1883, and ambassador in London, 1884-1902. See A. Meyendorff, ed., *Correspondence Diplomatique de M. de Staal 1884-1900* (Paris, 1929).

<sup>12</sup> The last two paragraphs of this letter and other excerpts are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 338-339.



He now tells me however that Count Münster has been instructed to renew the suggestion of the German Govt. for a mixed Commission to investigate the remaining claims, to which Prince Bismarck attaches so much importance that he had also requested him, to ask me privately, to beg of you if you possibly can, to grant the appointment of the mixed Commission otherwise he will get into very serious trouble with the shipping interests and commercial classes of Germany who are but too readily inclined to agitate and irritate the Country against him on the subject, and the more so, since they know him to be absolutely opposed to their ardent desire for the acquisition of Colonies by Germany.

I said that I would do so with pleasure but that I could not hold out much hope of the mixed Commission being granted, since a reference to the Correspondence would shew that all admissible claims had been equitably settled and that the very few remaining ones were proved to be unfounded.

Count Hatzfeldt replied that he was far from uttering even the whisper of a complaint, and that the German Government were convinced of the justice and impartiality of the Authorities who had reported upon the claims, but that the Claimants and their powerful and influential friends would found their agitation on the refusal of H. M. G. to grant,—and on Prince Bismarck's failure to obtain the mixed Commission they asked for.

Count Hatzfeldt added confidentially that Bismarck did not of course expect that the mixed Commission would reverse the verdict of so impartial a tribunal as that which had already dealt with the claims, but he asked for a mixed tribunal as a means to calm down the angry feelings Public Opinion would give way to, if Germans were not themselves permitted to investigate their claims in concert with the English and Colonial authorities. The attitude assumed by the Australian authorities, he said, in regard to the annexation of New Guinea and of other Islands, contrary to the views and advice expressed by Lord Derby, was stirring up the envy & cupidity of Germans in favour of the possession of Colonies by Germany,—and Prince Bismarck, while determined to combat & oppose their growing influence, wished on the other hand to shew that through the friendly relations he had sought to establish with England, he could obtain from H. M. G. the most impartial attention to his wishes in regard to German claims in foreign Colonies.

Count Hatzfeldt then, with visible embarrassment and hesitation added that the Chancellor had specially requested him to remind me that he thought himself fairly entitled to some reciprocity of good offices on the part of H. M. Govt. in consideration of the strictly

friendly attitude, I knew, he had maintained and flattered himself he had contributed to induce other Powers to maintain in regard to the Eastern policy of H. M. Govt. To mention one example only among many, the present desire of the Sultan to act in concert with England was more due to his advice than to that of other Powers as Lord Dufferin must have reported to H. M. Govt., and he earnestly desired to lend all the moral influence he possessed in Europe to facilitate the difficult and beneficial task H. M. Govt. had undertaken, but he should like at the same time to prove to his countrymen that his friendliness was also conducive to their interests in those parts of the world where he had no influence and was dependent on the good offices of his friends.

I assured Count Hatzfeldt that H. M. Govt. appreciated and cherished Prince Bismarck's friendship, and that I knew from a conversation with you last Summer in the House of Lords how earnestly you desired to carry out his wishes in regard to the Fiji claims, and I therefore hoped that every allowance would be made if H. M. Govt. should still find it impossible to grant the appointment of a mixed Commission.

I conclude from this very earnest appeal that Prince Bismarck's interest in the matter is increased by the prospect of a General Election this autumn in which the Opposition may raise the popular cry of "*Colonies for Germany*" on the Hustings, which might tend to diminish the number of his supporters.

Be that as it may, if you cannot give him his mixed Commission, we must make up our minds to a phase of ill humour on the part of the Great Chancellor, whose sensitiveness has become proverbial.

Yours sincerely

AMPTHILL.

*Private & Personal.*

29 March 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Tuesday 1st April is Prince Bismarck's birthday, when he loves to receive many telegrams. One from you would gratify him very much I think, if you saw no objection to sending him one.

Yrs ever,

AMPTHILL.

*Teleg. to Ld. Ampthill sent April 1/84 "en clair" (Bismarck's birthday)*

*Private.*

Offer my congratulations to Prince Bismarck in suitable terms.

*Teleg. "en clair"*

*Private.*

L<sup>d</sup> AMPHILL, }  
                   D.11 } *am*  
                   R.11.40 }  
                   April 3/84.

Your private tel: of 1st inst. Chancellor requests me to thank you for your message on his birthday & to convey to you his grateful assurances of the high value he attaches to the friendly sentiments I communicated to him on your behalf.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 3rd April 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In reply to your birthday good wishes Prince Bismarck requested me to "convey to you his grateful assurance of the high value he attaches to the friendly sentiments I communicated to him on your behalf."

Rantzau,<sup>13</sup> his son in law, told me that he had been very much pleased and gratified by your message, so I am glad you sent it.

The Emperor has been in bed for the last two days with a cold and indigestion having driven in an open carriage without his fur cloak, and eaten new potatoes, pluviers eggs and fresh cherries [*sic*].—His Doctors say it is nothing serious & he will be up & about again in a day or two.

"The well informed person" mentioned in my despatch of the 3rd inst. who confirmed Count Münster's statement to you on the 22nd March (no. 66A.) that the Russians are inciting the Porte to interfere in Egypt,—is the Grand Duke of Baden, who had it from his brother-in-law the Grand Duke Michael.<sup>14</sup>

The Grand Duke of Baden thinks that the "rapprochement" so suddenly and sensationally sought by Russia, meant that Russia wants something of Germany, but what that may be, he does not know.

Orloff, before returning to Paris and Brussels for the Easter Holidays told a Russian friend that he had devoted four whole days to the laying down of the foundation of the new Alliance with Germany.

Bismarck and Hatzfeldt say there are none, beyond "assurances of eternal friendship and good will tendered by Russia and re-echoed by Germany."

Yours sincerely,

AMPHILL.

<sup>13</sup> Count Kuno Rantzau (1843–1917) in 1878 married Bismarck's daughter Marie (1848–1926) and later served as German ambassador at the Hague, 1891–1895.

<sup>14</sup> Grand Duke Michael of Russia (1832–1909), uncle of Alexander III, in 1859 married Princess Cecile of Baden, whose brother Frederick was Grand Duke of Baden, 1858–1907.

*Private.**April 6. 84.*

My DEAR AMPHILL,

Although Germany is not concerned in the Caisse,<sup>15</sup> the friendly advice & support which the Chancellor has given H. M.'s Govt. in Egyptian affairs make me desirous of communicating to him as early as possible what we propose to do on financial matters in that country.

The Cabinet have decided that an application should be made to the Powers to consider the Law of Liquidation.

I am about to submit the draft of a circular for that purpose, which however may be much altered by my colleagues before I can submit it to the Queen.

It invites the careful attention of the Great Powers to the condition of Egyptian Finance, both in virtue of their important though not uniform participation in the particular engagements, and on account of their common concern in the welfare of Egypt as a portion of the Turkish Empire.

It mentions the causes of the embarrassment which exists, enclosing a mem. on the financial position, showing that the finances of Egypt can only be placed on a sound footing by authority being given to the Egyptian Govt. to borrow about £8,000,000, & to reduce by above £500,000 their annual administrative expenditure.

It suggests that to meet the charges necessary for the good Govt. of the country and to meet the engagements already incurred by the Egyptian Exchequer some changes in the Law of Liquidation is necessary.

It proposes a conference to determine whether such a change is necessary & what should be its exact nature.

It refers to a mem. by the late Controllers, commd. to the Powers on Sept. 1st, 1882.

You will give the substance of this note confidentially to the Chancellor, and you will lay yourself open to any suggestions which he may be inclined to make.

Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

*Telegram from Lord Ampthill**D*  
*R* 10 April 1884.

Your private letter dated 6th inst. Prince Bismarck thanks for your communication. He thinks proposed circular and conference good.

<sup>15</sup> The Egyptian Public Debt Commission (*Caisse de la Dette Publique*) was established by the khedive in 1876 after a collapse in Egyptian finances. It consisted of one commissioner each from Great Britain, France, Austria, and Italy; German and Russian representatives were added in 1885. The commission had extensive powers of financial control, including a veto on any proposal to contract a loan, until 1904. See Cromer, *Egypt*, II, 304-310; Langer, *European Alliances*, 258.

He thinks proposal for conference should come from H. M.'s Govt. and not from Turkey as Russia is now urging at Paris. He will support H. M.'s Govt. as far as he can, but he must defer to Austrian objections if any are raised, which he thinks unlikely.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 10 April 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I called on Prince Bismarck today & gave him confidentially the substance of your private letter of the 6th about Egyptian finance.

He was pleased at being consulted and responded cordially to my request for private suggestions. He said he had really no objections to make because he thought the proposed Circular and Conference good, and that he would give H. M. Govt. all the support in his power, but that he would have to defer to Austrian objections if any were made, which, however, he thought unlikely.

The Sultan, he said, was appealing to the Powers, to let him share with England in the settlement of Egyptian Affairs, and he had advised His Majesty to trust exclusively to H. M. Govt. and cling at all times to the most friendly understanding with England,—but Russia rather encouraged the Sultan's wishes and was urging their acceptance at Paris.

He thought that the proposal for the Conference on the Law of Liquidation should come from H. M. Govt. and not from Turkey as the Russian Government recommended.

He did not think the French Govt. would listen much to Russian blandishments at present and would not seek to give H. M.'s Govt. any trouble. In fact the French Govt. were more concerned about their own existence at home than about creating European complications.

Of Italy he did not feel so sure,—she wished to play a part in Eastern Affairs,—but the questions she might raise would not be insurmountable in the end.

Germany's financial interest in the "Caisse" did not exceed a miserable million of Marks, and German Shipping in the Canal was below the Mark, so that conflicting commercial interests between England and Germany were happily not to be apprehended in Egypt, as for instance on the Congo, the West Coast or Fiji where German claims stood sorely in need of equitable consideration by H. M. Govt.

He ended by saying that he begged you would always reckon on his most earnest desire to cooperate morally with H. M. Govt. for peace & progress in Egypt as well as in Europe generally.

Prince Bismarck then said that speaking quite privately as a friend, he wished to remind me that he had been found fault with in England and by English statesmen for advising Lord Beaconsfield to "*take Egypt*", but he saw as yet no reason to alter his opinion. He still

thought that if England had undertaken the protectorate of Egypt *then* Egypt would *now* be enjoying the good Government, peace order and commercial confidence, which England knows so well how to bestow on all her vast Oriental possessions, and he still persisted in thinking the blessings of a permanent protectorate preferable to a transitory state of things, pending an uncertain issue, and likely to hatch unforeseen complications.

He begged I would consider what he was saying as a strictly private expression of personal opinion, not intended to be repeated to anyone about matters which did not concern him, and about which H. M. Govt. knew what was best for the interests of Great Britain, his standpoint being simply that of a European Spectator.

I then explained to him the policy of H. M. Govt. by quoting your Speeches and those of Mr. Gladstone as well as official documents but without carrying conviction to his mind I fear,—until we parted with mutual assurances of international good will.

The general impression left on my mind by to-days conversation is that Bismarck's views on Egypt have been influenced by the "Times," "Pall Mall" & other English newspapers, that his sympathy for the Sultan has increased,—that his fear of France has decreased, thanks to her Colonial Ventures which add to the safety of Germany,—and that his suspicions of the Russian Govt. have been considerably softened down by their adhesion to the European Peace League,—and perhaps also by their civilities to his son, who is in charge of the German Embassy at St. Petersburg.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 13 April 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

By my private letter of the 10th inst. you will have noticed that Prince Bismarck alluded again to the subject of my private letter of the 15th of March last about the great importance he attaches to a Settlement of the German claims in the Fiji Islands, submitted to you some time since by Count Münster.

He said that he had always had implicit faith in the equitable spirit of H. M. Govt. in dealing with foreign Claims,—but that he now received many complaints of a less equitable spirit in our Colonial Authorities,—complaints he would not be able to disregard since they involved great and growing interests of vast importance to Germany, and for the equitable adjustment of which he reckoned on your assistance.

Prince Bismarck also alluded to important German interests on the West Coast of Africa and on the Congo, which the great commercial

communities of Bremen and Hamburgh were pressing him to protect and which might require the friendly cooperation, he valued so highly, of H. M. Govt.

Prince Bismarck's civil tone and manner sounded to me rather like a warning that he is about to ask us for more than we can grant.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14 April 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I think you will read the enclosed private note from Colonel Swaine with interest and satisfaction.

I have known Prince William ever since he was born, & have always found him devoted to everything English and above all to the Queen whom he calls "Grandmama of England."

He has always sought the most intimate & cordial relations with this Embassy and manifests the greatest indignation at being suspected of any but the most friendly feelings towards England and the English.

Yours sincerely

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Private note from Col. Swaine.*

*Private.*

BERLIN, 14.4. 84.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In a letter received a few days ago Prince William complains that a report had been spread in England that H. R. H. was inimical & unfriendly disposed to us, that he had made disparaging remarks about our Military Institutions & had ridiculed our Military Institutions & had ridiculed our recent Campaigns. These reports he says have given offence in England.

The Prince is evidently very much annoyed. He declares them to be absolutely without foundation, they entirely misrepresent him & his feelings, & desires me at every opportunity & in the strongest terms to refute them.

I shall certainly with pleasure comply with the Prince's request, for as far as I have been able to judge since my arrival in Berlin he has shown every possible interest in all matters concerning us. He has studied with care the difficulties we have had to encounter in our late Campaigns, & more than once has expressed his admiration at the bravery our troops when so ferociously attacks [*sic*] by the hordes of savage Arabs in the two battles near Souakim.

Believe me, dear Lord Ampthill [*sic*]

yours very truly,

(sd) V. SWAINE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 19 April 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I asked Prince Bismarck the other day whether he thought a breeze was springing up in Bulgaria and Roumelia, or whether he expected this first attempt at a Union of the two Provinces would blow over?

He replied that it would blow over,—because the Russian Govt. were sincerely intent on postponing a movement they thought premature,—and they had already instructed their Agents to nip it in the bud.—The Russians had been disappointed in Prince Alexander because he would not play into their hands,—and they wished to replace Aleko Pasha by a more congenial Governor before they put the Flywheel of a Bulgarian-Unity-Movement in motion. I asked what he thought of Prince Alexander's prospects?

"They were good" he replied so long as the Prince kept quiet and did not quarrel with M. de Zankow and his Parliament.<sup>16</sup> He had personally taken a great interest in Prince Alexander of Battenberg, as indeed he did in every promising Prussian officer,—but unfortunately when as Prince of Bulgaria he went up for his examination in Statesmanship he had not come out of it as well as had been expected by his friends and masters.—Instead of strengthening his position by economy, the steady developement of Bulgarian home interests and the cultivation of intimate relations with his Suzerain; Prince Alexander had organized a larger army than the country could afford, built a more extensive and expensive Palace than was needed, instituted an Order without his Suzerain's sanction, undertaken a political pilgrimage to Greece of doubtful taste, and made a "coup d' état" that had not increased his popularity in Bulgaria. In fact the Prince had proved himself to be more daring and enterprising than constitutional and reliable—and was now repenting his youthful imprudences. On the other hand he was so full of good and amiable qualities that Everyone wishes him well.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Telegram from Lord Ampthill**Private.*BERLIN, D 11.20 am, 21 April 84.  
R 12.55 pm,

My private letter of 13th instant. Count Münster who dined with Prince Bismarck last night tells me that he is distressed at the exaggerated importance the Chancellor attaches to the settlement of the Fiji Claims for Germany.

<sup>16</sup> Dragan de Zankow (1828-1911) was president of the council in Bulgaria, September, 1883-July, 1884. He participated in the intrigues which preceded the abdication of Prince Alexander in 1886 and later fled to Constantinople.



[Copy]

*Private.**April 23. 84.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I hope to send you a despatch to-day which will open the way to an arrangement about the German Fiji claims. I have never had a more arduous fight. The difficulty being that the Colonial Office had a very strong case, which they had already put in writing, and their opinion was strongly backed by the Lord Chancellor.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private.**F. O. April 26/84.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

I was not able to send the Fiji despatch to you by the last Messenger.<sup>17</sup>

We are awaiting some details from the Col: Office which are essential for describing the position, and which we shall not get for a few days.

This will not affect the character of the despatch, as opening the way to a satisfactory arrangement.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.**BERLIN, 24 April 1884.<sup>18</sup>*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Münster called on me here on the 21st and told me that he had dined with Prince Bismarck the day before and had felt distressed at the exaggerated importance the Chancellor seemed to attach to the settlement of the German Fiji Claims,—so I thought it as well to telegraph you as Count Münster's impressions confirmed mine, when I last wrote to you on the subject, on the 13th April.

As you will have seen Count Münster long before this letter reaches you, you will have heard his impressions from himself and I need not repeat them here.

I also telegraphed to you that the Queen wished us to come this week to Darmstadt, but since then General Ponsonby<sup>19</sup> has written to put us off till Monday 28th instant, when we are to remain at Darmstadt for the wedding on the 30th and return to Berlin on the 1st of May.

<sup>17</sup> On April 8, 1884, Germany had requested the British government to reconsider the claims of German subjects to land in Fiji. Granville sent a preliminary reply on May 9, after prodding the colonial office, which did not issue its complete memorandum until June 24. See *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LIII, c. 4433, 10-25.

<sup>18</sup> The last two paragraphs of this letter are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 330.

<sup>19</sup> Sir Henry Frederick Ponsonby (1825-1895) had been Queen Victoria's private secretary since 1870 and keeper of the privy purse since 1878.

Count Hatzfeldt to whom I communicated the Egyptian Liquidation Circular, on receiving it on Wednesday last,<sup>20</sup> was more reserved than ever, and would not commit himself to any opinion before he had spoken to Bismarck.

Our Egyptian policy has gradually become unpopular in Germany thanks to the "Times," the "Pall Mall" & Other English Papers from which German Journalists take their inspirations and I greatly fear that our new Conference Circular will not find much favour in German Public Opinion.

I often wonder whether Editors of Liberal Papers are aware of the harm they do their own cause abroad by not supporting their own liberal Government in difficult, delicate or dangerous questions of foreign policy.—Liberals abroad are always more inclined to believe in the Newspapers than in Blue Books,—and as everybody reads the "Times" and nobody opens a Blue Book abroad, public opinion hears but one side of the question in Germany,—which is much to be regretted.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 17 May 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have had a painful attack of inflammation in the Liver,—but am quite well again now.

To-day's semi-official Gazette contradicts the rumour in the Press of a marriage between the Prince of Bulgaria and Princess Victoria of Prussia,<sup>21</sup>—Prince Alexander is said to have got but small comfort out of Prince Bismarck, when he saw the Chancellor the other day before returning to Darmstadt.

Prince Bismarck told him that if he could not maintain himself in Bulgaria and keep on good terms with his People, his Suzerain, and the Czar, he must not reckon on more protection from Germany than is promised him by the Powers generally in the Treaty of Berlin.

On Prince Alexander asking what was to become of him, if from want of protection on the part of the Powers, he was compelled to relinquish his Principality, Prince Bismarck replied that he would under such circumstances find a practical advantage in not having quarrelled with Russia,—because he could then fairly claim a pension for past services as first Prince of Bulgaria from the Czar.

Hatzfeldt professes indifference in regard to french intrigues in Morocco, and says Germany has not interests there to protect.

<sup>20</sup> Granville's circular of April 19, 1884, proposing changes in the Law of Liquidation, may be found in *P. P.*, 1884, LXXXIX, c. 4000.

<sup>21</sup> Bismarck was firmly opposed to such a marriage in order to avoid estranging Russia and managed to convince the crown prince and the emperor. Alexander was therefore discouraged when he came to Berlin in May, 1884. See Langer, *European Alliances*, 343.

Your Fiji claim despatch appeared to me to be a most admirable solution of a very delicate difficulty and I was delighted with it,—but Hatzfeldt has not yet alluded in conversation with me to the subject.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Draft]

*Private telegram to Ld. Ampthill, sent in Cypher*

4.40 p. m., May 19. 84.

Inform the Chancellor most confidentially that the Fr. Govt. & ourselves have as he is aware been in communication on certain points which they desired to clear up before entering into the conference—I shall take the earliest opportunity of consulting Prince Bismarck as soon as relieved from the secrecy which the French wished to be observed. [*Marginal Note by Gladstone; inserted*] as to their proposals until a certain amount of progress had been made and to which we agreed. I believe that it was the desire of Germany & even of the Powers that we should if possible come to terms with France in the first instance. In the meanwhile give following memorandum describing our views as to the financial arrangements we shall suggest—& request complete secrecy, both on political & on stock-jobbing grounds.

(Add memo. by H. Childers enclosed in dispatch to Lord Lyons no 437 May 15. 84.) Memo added in Cypher. *Note by Gladstone:* Might not this go as dispatch rather than telegram? W. E. G. May 19.

[The following letter from Childers to Gladstone is endorsed]  
“keep with teleg. to Lord Ampthill. May 19 '84.”

117 PICCADILLY,  
19th. May 1884.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,

I send you the enclosed from Ld Granville, which reached me late last night. I have some little doubt whether we ought to mention the Financial terms before France answers the last confidential communication to M. Waddington; still, as we say nothing about the proposed understanding with her, perhaps Prince Bismarck might know them confidentially

I hope this will reach you in time.

Yours very truly,

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS.

[In Gladstone's writing.] I agree to inclosure—but please see my notes.

W. G., May 19, 84.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 20 May 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck having gone to Friederichsruhe for the benefit of his health I was obliged to communicate with Hatzfeldt on the subject of your private telegram of last night. He promised to send both your private message, and secret Egyptian financial Memorandum to the Chancellor this evening, and said that His Highness would be much interested in any further information you could impart before the Conference met in regard to french pretensions. As far as he had learnt M. Jules Ferry was sincerely anxious for a cordial agreement with England, but said that if it could not be completely established before the Conference met, he would prefer to decline the Conference altogether and await events.

Count Hatzfeldt asked whether we apprehended any further trouble from Turkey?

I said that we did not, because we knew how well advised the Sultan was at all times by Prince Bismarck.

I will write again as soon as I hear from Prince Bismarck.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 31 May 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Herbert Bismarck called yesterday on his way from St. Petersburg to Friederichsruhe, and told me that he ardently hoped to be in England for Ascot.

I availed myself of his visit to read him your Congo despatch.<sup>22</sup> and begged he would tell his Father at Friederichsruhe since I could not see him myself, while I communicated officially through Hatzfeldt at Berlin.

Great good will come I expect, both from your Congo and your Fiji Despatches, because they will enable Bismarck to calm down the anti-english agitation of the German colonial party, who denounce England for intriguing to prevent the acquisition of Colonies by Germany all over the world.

Bismarck has tried to allay the irritation of the Colonial Party against us and himself about Angra Pequenna by sending Dr. Nachtigall on board a Man of War to report on the West Coast of Africa

<sup>22</sup> P. P., 1884-1885, LV, c. 4205, no. 1. Granville's dispatch to Ampthill, May 26, 1884, was intended to find out, before an Anglo-Portuguese treaty signed February 26 was ratified, whether Germany would appoint a delegate to an International Commission for the Congo, which Great Britain would propose to amend the treaty. Bismarck replied on June 7 that the German government could not recognize the treaty in any form, and Granville then abandoned it. On Germany's invitation, however, the West Africa Conference was held at Berlin, November 15, 1884-February 26, 1885.

generally, pending your answer about the Claim of the Cape Authorities over that district.<sup>23</sup>

Hatzfeldt, contrary to his habits of reserve and indifference, shows marked interest and anxiety about your negotiations with Waddington in regard to the Egyptian Conference.—I assure him that you will tell Münster all about it, as soon as an agreement has been come to and before the Conference meets.

The Emperor has marvellously recovered from his recent indisposition and appeared on horseback at the Parades on Thursday & Friday, as young and cheerful as ever.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

[Copy]

*Teleg. to Ld. Ampthill, Cypher*

*Private.*

F. O., June 6, 7.25 p. m.

Communicate personally and confidentially to Prince Bismarck in anticipation of the communication which is likely soon to be made to the Powers.

The following agreement has been come to between the Govts. of England and France subject to the success of the financial arrangements which will be proposed by H. M's Govt. to the Conference and on the understanding that while H. M's Govt. consider themselves bound to carry it out it is not impossible there may be a hostile vote on the subject in the H. of Commons.

The French Govt. entirely renounce the idea of the 'condominium' and are prepared to agree to a formal engagement with H. M's Govt. that on the departure of England from Egypt France will not enter and further that France will engage for the future not to do so except with the consent of England.

H. M's Govt. are willing to declare their intention of withdrawing the British Troops at the beginning of the year 1888, if in the opinion of the other Powers it could be done without risk to peace and order in Egypt.

Within a year of an alteration of the Law of Liquidation being brought into force the powers of the Caisse de la Dette publique to be extended so as to give the Commissioners a restraining power over any excess of expenditure beyond the provisions of the normal budget which would be exhibited to the Conference.

The Commissioners to be consulted when the Budget for each year is in course of preparation. The Budget, as far as possible, to be

<sup>23</sup> See Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy*, ch. V.

based on the Normal Budget exhibited to the Conference, due allowance being made for any altered circumstances of the Country. The Budget having been so prepared in consultation with the Commissioners, the latter would during the year be empowered to disallow any proposed excesses of charge excepting expenditure arising from sudden emergencies.

After withdrawal of British troops the Caisse to have a consultative voice in the settlement of the Budget and the power (except in cases of emergency) to negative expenditure in excess of the Budget. The Caisse to have the power of revenue inspection so as to ensure that Revenue really reached the Treasury instead of being diverted on its way.

The President of the Caisse to be an Englishman.

England reserves to herself if she thinks fit to propose to the Powers a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt whenever the English occupation ceases and to make propositions with regard to the Suez Canal in conformity with those contained in Lord Granville's circular of Jan. 3. 1883.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 7 June 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

As I have said on previous occasions we must expect a phase of ill humour on the part of Prince Bismarck if we are unable to meet his wishes in Colonial questions and give him the means at the Eve of a general Election of effectually calming down the growing storm of indignation against himself and us, for standing between the German Colonial Party and the distant objects of their passionate desire!

The agitation is becoming a very serious one, and will have great influence on the coming Elections next Autumn, so that Bismarck must adopt a popular national attitude to secure a majority in the new Parliament.

If he cannot shew that he has protected German interests everywhere,—the most popular thing he can do, will be to throw the blame on England, and leave the Press to do the rest.

Personally, after so many years of pleasant relations, I deeply regret the prospect of angry international abuse in the Press,—which it always takes a long time to live down, however good the official relations between the Governments may remain, while the crisis in the Newspapers lasts.—Our Press has much to answer for, in regard to the *wrong impressions* about our Egyptian policy, they have popularized on the continent.

I shall be glad to know what you have answered Münster about Angra Pequena, as Bismarck may speak to me about it when he comes to town.

I should be very much obliged for a telegram.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Teleg. Decypher. Lord Ampthill*

*Private.*

BERLIN, *D 4.55*  
*R 5.40 pm, 9 June 84.*

Your private telegram of 6th instant.

Prince Bismarck says at first sight he is favourably impressed by your agreement with France, but that he must study it at leisure. He begs you will let him know as soon as possible when he may be at liberty to consult Austria and other Powers about it.

*Lord Ampthill, Teleg. Cypher*

*Private.*

*12:25 p. m., June 10/84.*

Much pleased to hear Bismarck approves of financial plan. If he agrees that it will be best that Conference should only ratify previous agreement request him to consult confidentially Austria and Italy on it.

I hope to have a full discussion with Herbert Bismarck on Angra-Pequena question.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, 10 June 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Prince Bismarck was not in Berlin, when I received your private telegram of the 6th about the proposed arrangement with France respecting Egypt,—but he arrived on the 8th and received me on the following day immediately after the Ceremony of the Laying of the Foundation Stone of the new Reichstag. He still had his enormous cavalry boots on and was refreshing himself with bavarian beer which he drank out of a Silver Tankard and seemed in high spirits at the success of the ceremony. He listened with interest to your communication, thanked warmly for it, said that at first sight it impressed him favourably, but he must study it at leisure before he could pronounce a final opinion,—begged to be as soon as possible allowed to consult with Austria and other Powers, and wondered whether a hostile vote on the subject would not be more likely in the French Chambers than in the English House of Commons.

The financial arrangements, he said, created greater interest in Southern Germany than he had anticipated, and he had been surprised to receive petitions from Francfort Financiers assuring him that

more than one hundred millions of marks of German money were invested in Egyptian securities. What seemed to please him most was that the British troops would not be withdrawn before the year 1888, and then only with the Consent of the Powers

After reading your telegram of the 6th carefully over again he said that up to the paragraph ending "*peace and order in Egypt*" he felt sure he could assume that the proposed arrangement would have the Emperor's support with the Powers, and that his Majesty would instruct his Representative at the Conference to support it absolutely.

As regarded [*sic*] the financial part beginning with the words "*within a year*" he could not form a definitive opinion from my communication alone, and he felt that it would be necessary for him to know the exact nature of the proposed "*alteration of the Law of Liquidation*" as well as of the "*Normal Budget*" which was to be submitted to the Conference, before he could do so and decide whether the proposed measures could have his support or not.

Your second telegram of this morning reached me too late today to be given to the Chancellor personally, but I wrote him the substance in a private and personal note and have no doubt he will like your suggestion and support it.

I am very glad to learn that you propose to have a full discussion with Herbert Bismarck on the Angra Pequena question, which is a burning one, and calculated to give us much trouble with Germany.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Teleg. Decypher. Lord Ampthill*

*Private.*

BERLIN, *D 12.31*  
*R 1.30 pm, 14 June 84.*

Prince Bismarck desires me to [tell] you the debate begins today in Parliament in which he may be asked about Angra Pequena question.

He fears that deep & lasting disappointment will be felt by public opinion in Germany if H. M. Govt. cannot suggest a satisfactory settlement of the question.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *14 June 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have just seen Prince Bismarck who begged of me to tell you that the Debate begins today in Parliament in which he may be asked about the Angra Pequena question. He fears that deep and lasting disappointment will be felt by Public Opinion in Germany if H. M. G. cannot suggest a satisfactory settlement of the question. He talked over the various phases of the negotiations in London between Count Münster and H. M. Govt. in a very earnest but always courteous



spirit,—deplored the delay in answering his questions, which he said had been respectfully and loyally put to H. M. G. and feared that Public Opinion in Germany would deeply resent the fact that after six months delay the Cape Govt. had been “wedged in” between German Aspirations and interests and Angra Pequena. His own feeling of friendship towards England would never change,—but the National feeling of Germany would, he anticipated, become less cordial than heretofore and would seek to influence his foreign policy. He ended by requesting me to telegraph to you and beg of you for the sake of international good will to give Count Münster an answer which he could communicate to the German Reichstag without adding fuel to the fire.

I replied in the sense of your Communications on the subject, but saw that he was evidently very seriously troubled in his mind as to the evil effects a failure on his part to satisfy German Public Opinion in the matter, may have on his relations with England, and on the result of the coming general Elections.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 June 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

From the Enclosures in your Dispatch no 155 of 31st May I perceive that all my eloquence and logic in regard to buying or building an Embassy House in Berlin have been wasted on the Board of Works and the Treasury, since the former suspect me of pleading a personal cause,—and the latter advise you to do the very thing I warned them against. After that, you will, I am sure excuse me if I respectfully decline any share of personal responsibility in what they propose to do, “Grand bien leur fasse, je m’en lave les mains”!

I have been deeply interested in your Despatches recording your delicate and difficult negotiations with Waddington, and I feel convinced that your success must silence the unpatriotic and unintelligent lamentations of the Press about the policy of H. M. Govt. in Egypt which have been so misleading to Public Opinion at home and abroad—I am now impatiently awaiting the result of Mr. Gladstone’s statement to the House on Monday next and I cannot but believe that a large Majority will support your policy, the advantages of which are all on England’s side.

German Financiers, who imagine that a reduction of interest will be proposed only on the “unified” and not on the “privileged” Debt, as they call it here, have petitioned Prince Bismarck to insist on an equal reduction of interest on both.

I hope you have found means to pacify the Chancellor about the Angra Pequena question, which Public Opinion is taking quite as much to heart in Germany, as Bismarck himself?

Wishing you, and us all, success on Monday.

Ever yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 21 June 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have just received the enclosed from Col. Swaine about the Russian Military Attaché's doings in London which may interest you.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

Saturday, 21. 6. 84.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I forgot yesterday to mention that I hear General Lautz, Russian Military Attaché in London, is credited with having assisted in arranging the new Russian Staff map of Central Asia which takes in Merv & the new Russian—Afghan frontier.

Baron Huene, who mentioned to me some time ago, & which I at the time reported to your Excellency, that, while he was Military Attaché in London, Genl Lautz was purchasing every map & every book he could find respecting Armenia, Khurdistan, & the Bay of Iscanderoon, now informs me that at the same time (quite 2 years ago) Genl. Lautz was also buying up every map & book about the regions in Central Asia, comprising Merv & the Persian & Afghan Frontier Districts. Baron Huene reported it officially to Berlin at the time. I send your Excellency these lines as I don't wish to disturb you personally at this moment when you must be busy with the Messenger.

Believe me, dear Lord Ampthill

Yrs very truly,

(sd) V. SWAINE.

[The following note in the hand of Lord Kimberley is also kept with the foregoing letters]

"I found that General de Lauz [*sic*] was constantly poking about at India Office & asking the Clerks etc. for information. I desired that he should be referred to Sir O. Bearn the head of our political Dept. who has orders to tell him 'nothing'

K[imberley] June 23".

*Tele. to Lord Ampthill sent in cypher**Private.**June 25/84.*

Herbert Bismarck speaks of a long interview you had with his father in which he went into all the points of the Angra Pequena [*sic*] question. We have received no report of it.

G[ranville].

*Telg. Decypher. Lord Ampthill**Private.*

D 12.55  
BERLIN R 1.40 pm, 26 June 84.

My private letter and Telegram of 14th instant contain the report of Prince Bismarck's conversation alluded to by Count Herbert Bismarck.

Prince Bismarck is very grateful to you for your final settlement of the question which has produced a most excellent impression throughout Germany and has really done immense good.

*Private.*BERLIN, 28 June 1884.<sup>24</sup>

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I answered your private telegram of the 25th as follows:

"My private letter & telegram of 14th instant contain the report of Prince Bismarck's conversation alluded to by Count Herbert Bismarck.—

Prince Bismarck is very grateful to you for your final settlement of the question which has produced the most excellent impression throughout Germany and has really done immense good."—

It was the first time that he even mentioned the subject of Angra Pequena to me and he recounted what had passed between yourself and Count Münster and then appealed for an answer he could communicate to the Reichstag which would not add "fuel to the fire."

The second time he mentioned the subject to me was to say how grateful he was for your answer which he had received just in time to bowl over his enemies Bamberger and Richter etc etc in the Budget Commission, and he seemed overjoyed at the impression it had produced and the consequent relief he felt himself at having been enabled to dispel the storm which threatened him in the Press and at the coming general elections.

The Press is all praise at the fairness, justice and friendliness of your decision, and I hear from all sides that it has done immense good to our international relations, for the Germans had set their hearts on the protection of Herr Lüderitz enterprise at Angra Pequena.

<sup>24</sup> Parts of this letter are quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 355.

The Crown Prince who shared the National Craving, but dreaded the irritation and anger it was producing against England in Public Opinion, now shares the national delight at your decision, which reestablishes the good feeling between England and Germany we all attach so much importance to.

The Crown Princess, who dined with us last night, was also beyond measure happy at the general contentment and altered tone of the Press.

In reply to my previous correspondence after Hatzfeldt had first broached the subject to me in Prince Bismarck's absence, three weeks ago, you telegraphed that "you hoped to have a full discussion with Herbert Bismarck on the Angra Pequena question"—and I should not under the circumstances have interfered again if Prince Bismarck had not pressed me so earnestly to implore of you to send him an answer before the question came on in the German Parliament.

For my part I feel immensely relieved at your having dispelled this threatening Incubus.

I am also glad you have consented to appoint a mixed Commission of two, to look into the Fiji claims,—a concession Prince Bismarck was earnestly anxious to obtain.

It is a remarkable fact that Prince Bismarck, contrary to his convictions and to his will, has been driven by Public Opinion into the inauguration of a Colonial policy he has hitherto denounced as detrimental to the Concentration of German strength & power.

Hastings writes to say that Lord Cork wants me to come over and vote on the Second reading of the Franchise Bill on the 7th of July.—I am, of course at your Orders,—but should feel very much obliged if you did not require my presence and would allow me to remain at my Post until the Session is over at home, and Egyptian Affairs over abroad, when I propose to ask you for Leave to come to England in September.

Perhaps you will kindly let Sanderson write me your wishes, that I may act accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 5 July 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Many thanks for the latitude your private telegram of last night gives me. I see that you do not consider my presence on Tuesday as obligatory but only optional which is a great relief to me, because I do not yet feel quite up to the Undertaking, but should have stretched a point if you had thought it an unavoidable duty.

My Doctor, who wants me to go to Carlsbad before the year is out, has hitherto thought that I had not yet recovered sufficient strength

from my late liver attack to stand the otherwise beneficial effects of the Sprüdel.

Prince Bismarck is to go to Kissingen, but has meanwhile gone to Varzin and has left strict orders at Berlin to send him nothing which could disturb his peace of mind.—

Hatzfeldt, as usual, professes to know nothing of the Chancellor's views, to the great discomfort of inquisitive Diplomatsists, but complains that he is overworked.

Princess William's confinement is now daily expected,—after which the Crown Prince and Princess propose to go to England for sea bathing.

The heat in Berlin is at present intolerable and everybody is going away.

With many thanks, Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 July 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Hatzfeldt is so reserved about the Conference that none of my Colleagues can obtain satisfactory answers from him in reply to the many telegraphic queries they receive from their respective governments. He simply says that Prince Bismarck will reserve his decision until the English and French Governments are agreed, and will give no opinion on the conflicting plans under discussion which my Colleagues are instructed to question him about.

They all, have come round the impression that the German Govt., with a view to popularity in the coming general election, wish it to appear that they have protected the interests of the German Bondholders, who, according to the Frankfort Chamber of Commerce, represent fifteen million Pounds Sterling of the Unified Loan, against the proposed  $\frac{1}{2}\%$  reduction of interest.

The unexpected attitude assumed by the financial delegates is to my mind so grave a disappointment and fraught with so much danger that I cannot conceive why the Powers do not set them right.—It almost looks like a conspiracy to force England into assuming the whole and undivided responsibility for the future of Egypt,—which was, as you know, always Bismarck's wish and advice.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 2 August 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I am in perfect despair at Prince Bismarck's present inclination to increase his popularity before the general elections, by taking up an anti-English attitude.

Compelled by the Colonial mania, which has gradually come to the surface in Germany, to act contrary to his better convictions in the Angra-Pequenña question, he has discovered an unexplored mine of popularity in starting a Colonial policy, which Public Opinion persuades itself to be anti-English, and the slumbering, theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth & our Freedom has awakened and taken the form of abuse of everything English in the Press.

The laxity of our Quarantine regulations has always been a German grievance and the news that the German Government has brought it before the Conference, has been hailed with enthusiastic approval in the German Press.

Men like Professor Virchow and Dr. Koch<sup>25</sup> accuse us openly of having brought the Cholera to France!

My hope is that this Anti-English mania may not last longer than others, but my fear is that it will increase until the general elections are over.<sup>26</sup>

I am anxiously looking forward to the final result of the Conference?

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 16 August 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I congratulate you on having brought the Powers in Conference conspiring against us, to their senses,—and the Session to a close,<sup>27</sup>—but I hear with sincere regret that you have not been well—?—

My Doctor will not let me off Carlsbad this year, so I am going to ask you to let me go to Bohemia first and Bedfordshire afterwards during the recess.

The newspaper quarrel over “Angra Pequena” “frise le ridicule”!—The “Times” lectures Bismarck for his “passing fit of ill humour” the “Nord Deutsche Allgemeine” replies that the “passing fit may become eternal as regards England,”—the “National Zeitung” thinks Germany strong enough to disregard English annexations and take what she pleases in Africa,”—whilst the “Standard” proposes “to return blow for blow”!

All this might be amusing if it were not “too stupid.”

<sup>25</sup> Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) was the director of the pathological institute in Berlin Robert Koch (1843-1910) headed the German scientific expedition to Egypt and India 1883-1884, to investigate the cholera epidemic. He discovered a positive test for the presence of Asiatic cholera in 1884; he had earlier isolated the tubercle bacillus, and in 1905 was awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine. Six of his reports on the cholera expedition appear in *P. P.*, 1884, LXXXIII, c. 3996.

<sup>26</sup> To this point this letter is quoted in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 358-359.

<sup>27</sup> The conference on Egyptian finance, proposed by Granville in the circular dispatch of April 19, 1884, met at London June 28-August 2. See *P. P.*, 1884, LXXXIX, c. 4128; Langer, *European Alliances*, 298-299.

Of course Bismarck knows what he is about and he is taking advantage of the national craze that England opposes Germany's Colonial aspirations, as an election cry, which may finally secure him the working majority in the coming elections, he has bid for in vain in the two former general elections to the Reichstag.

My Austrian Colleague and Count Hatzfeldt minimize the importance of Count Kalnoky's visit to Prince Bismarck at Varzin as much as possible, and say that it is only to make up for not having met this year at Gastein as before.

The progress of democracy in England is a cause of very serious alarm to the Sovereigns and Governments of Germany and Austria,—and they purpose to meet it, by consolidating the monarchical League inaugurated by Prince Bismarck last year.

Yours sincerely,

AMPTHILL.

*Confidential.*

*Aug. 21 1884.*

MY DEAR AMPTHILL,

After some consideration I have written the enclosed to Herbert Bismarck.<sup>28</sup>

Our late personal relations are a reason for writing to him rather than to his father, and it is less of a measure.

I doubt its doing good, but I do not see that it can do harm, and I rather regret not having sent it before the visit to Varzin.

Cannot you do something in the same way?

This country can afford to be isolated for a time, but the having Egypt on her arms makes a very great difference.

Unless you can say something likely to be of use it may be better to abstain.

Münster seemed to think that the German F. O. is more hostile than the Chancellor.

A new difficulty has occurred about Angra Pequena. The German charge d'Affs. gave in their claim, but it appears that the Commander of the German man of war has proclaimed an addition of all the islands within gunshot of the mainland. The Colonists declare that these have been declared to be [gap] since 1867.

I am having the facts verified.

Yours sincerely,

G[RANVILLE].

<sup>28</sup> For text of letter, Granville to Herbert Bismarck, Aug. 20, 1884, see E. T. S. Dugdale, *German Diplomatic Documents* (London, 1928), I, 183-184, and G. P., IV, 79-80. For Herbert Bismarck's reply of August 30, see *ibid.*, 80-83.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Aug. 23/84.

DEAR SANDERSON,

Lord Ampthill is, I am sorry to say, again confined to bed, and suffering very much from another sharp liver attack, so has asked me to attend to all business for him this Messenger. He was however so much better this morning that Lady Ampthill allowed me to send him the 2 private letters from Lord Granville which came last night by special Messenger. He opened them and read them and begged me to write and telegraph to you that he hoped in a few days to be able to attend to them, Lady A. said he seemed much interested by them, but he is very weak as the pain has been very great this time.

I am signing for him the Desp: which he had drafted before taking ill on Wednesday. Since then there is nothing in the way of official news to add.

Nothing of course has transpired of what passed at Varzin, though it is conjectured that the Chancellor and Ct. Kalnocky discussed most of the important questions of the day, & as the German Agent in Egypt was also at Varzin I suppose they also had a talk about Egypt. Count Hatzfeldt who has his leave in his pocket intends leaving for his country place tonight.

I hope the irritating articles in the Press which have done so much harm are dying out here,—the Colonial fever seems to have been a little appeased by the report of Dr. Nachtigall's achievements near Fernando Po and the Gold Coast which has appeared in the *unofficial* papers, but which is not doubted by the public.

Should the rumours of the German Emperor's intention to meet the Emperors of Russia and Austria on the Polish Frontier turn out to be true, the meeting would probably be about the 12th September, as on the 15th it is expected that he will go to the Manouvres on the Rhine which have been put off till then.

I shall keep the Messenger Seeds [?] for a few days in case Lord Ampthill should be well enough & wish to communicate with Lord Granville before the next usual Messenger leaves.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

The illness proved fatal. Odo William Leopold Russell, first Baron Ampthill, died August 25, 1884.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> For an account of his last illness and death see Taffs, *Russell*, 375-376.






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**CHAPTER IX**  
**LETTERS, OCTOBER, 1884–FEBRUARY, 1885**

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## CHAPTER IX

### LETTERS, OCTOBER, 1884-FEBRUARY, 1885

The death of Lord Ampthill<sup>1</sup> deprived Britain of an unusually able diplomatist at a time when Anglo-German disputes over colonial issues were approaching a crisis. In West, South, and East Africa German agents were extremely active in building up territorial claims, and the northeastern portion of New Guinea was earmarked as a German colony. The latter action aroused much excitement in Australia, where it was recalled that only a little more than a year earlier representatives of Queensland had claimed all of the eastern or non-Dutch portion of the island for Britain, only to have the annexation disallowed at home. Merchants in Capetown disliked German intrusion on the sub-continent of Africa; other British economic interests objected to having territory on the East African mainland opposite the island of Zanzibar pass into the hands of Germany. British efforts to obtain approval of the powers for financial reforms in Egypt failed, and the course of events in that part of the world was rapidly moving toward the tragedy of the fall of Khartoum, capital of the Egyptian Sudan, and the death of one of England's great popular heroes, General Charles Gordon. By the end of August, 1884, the British government finally decided upon sending the expedition to the Sudan, but it arrived too late to save Gordon. This decision had been reached after much searching of hearts, especially on the part of the prime minister, who recalled Napoleon III's ill-fated Mexican expedition. Gladstone believed that with an army tied up in the Sudan all the world could bully Britain.<sup>2</sup> There were signs that his forebodings might come true. The British military attaché in Berlin had, as we have seen,<sup>3</sup> called attention to Russian activities in the Middle East, and shortly after New Year, 1885, Russia seized Pendjeh on the western boundary of Afghanistan—an attack upon India by that route was then considered a possibility.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Lord Ampthill's post was filled without delay. On September 14 Granville tele-

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the reception in Berlin of the news of Lord Ampthill's death see Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, I, 53-54.

<sup>2</sup> Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 240-244.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, Swaine's report of June 21, 1884.

graphed Charles Stewart Scott, British chargé d'affaires at Berlin, that Sir Edward B. Malet would be Ampthill's successor. The new ambassador assumed his duties early in October, and between that time and his leave of absence the following February Anglo-German relations became rather strained.

Although Malet was welcomed by Bismarck as the son of an old friend from his Frankfort days, it was soon made abundantly clear that the German chancellor would not allow private sentiment to affect his determination to secure everything possible for Germany in the way of colonial possessions. The Malet-Granville correspondence shows definitely the embarrassments created by the Egyptian financial problems, the complications which arose at the Berlin conference on western Africa, 1884-1885, and the role of the colonial issue in Anglo-German relations.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 Oct. 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You were, I know assured of Prince Bismarck's friendly feelings towards me, but I think the inclosed copy of a letter from him to my Father may interest you.

I find the house upside down and I am compelled to live at the Hotel and, with a view to the future, I am most anxious that the necessary repairs should be taken in hand as soon as possible.

I have seen no one as yet with the exception of Dr Busch and therefore do not trouble you with anything political.

Dr Busch thinks the Emperor may receive me at Baden.

Believe me to be, dear Lord Granville,

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Copy of Prince Bismarck's letter, enc. in Malet's of Oct. 11, 1884.*

FRIEDERICHSRUH, 2<sup>nd</sup> Oct. 84.

DEAR SIR ALEXANDER,<sup>4</sup>

I have been doubly gratified by the nomination of your son for Berlin as it procured me the pleasure of receiving a letter from you, and the assurance that you and Lady Malet kindly remember old friends and times past.

Our residence at Frankfurt and our friendly relations there never have ceased to hold their place in the first rank among the grateful reminiscences of my own and my wife's past life. I shall be very glad to renew acquaintance with the distinguished diplomatist, whom I first knew when his mother styled him "the baby"! He will be heartily welcome in my House and I am sure to entertain with him the same intimate and trusty intercourse that made official business easy between me and our much regretted friend Lord Ampthill.

I hope, dear Sir Alexander, that your health did better than mine withstand the injuries of age and I wish that Lady Malet and yourself may for long and happy years to come, watch with unvaried satisfaction the rising career of Sir Edward. I beg to convey to Lady Malet the respectful expression of my faithful attachment.

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<sup>4</sup> Sir Alexander Malet (1800-1886) entered the diplomatic service in 1824. He was British minister to the Germanic Confederation at Frankfurt, 1849-1866, when he retired.

My wife who is detained at Berlin will be delighted to see our new Ambassador as soon as he arrives.

Believe me to be, dear Sir Alexander,

Yours heartily,

(sd) v. BISMARCK.

[Copy]

MY DEAR MALET,

*October 14, 1884.*

I return the Chancellor's charming letter. I hope you will be able to see something of him. His last communications have not been of a very courteous character.

We like the conference,<sup>5</sup> but of course wish to know what it is about.

I cannot admit the doctrine that a conference is of no use, if any previous understandings have been arrived at. Prince Bismarck must remember some instances, where he has been most successful by a different course.

But I hope to send you very soon a despatch saying what we really want.

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, Oct. 18, 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

D<sup>r</sup> Busch told me today that Prince Bismarck would probably not be in Berlin till the end of next week. D<sup>r</sup> Busch is very courteous in his manner and apparently anxious to give matters in general a more friendly tone than that which marks the communications of Baron Plessen. Till I have seen Prince Bismarck, however, I feel that I can in no way judge of the real temper and intentions of the German Govt. towards us, and I will not take up your time with idle speculations.

M. Bleichröder, who, as you know, is a politician, says that he does not fear any complications in the West African question unless we have any secret engagement with the Portuguese from which we cannot retreat, otherwise he says all should be plain sailing for us and even to our advantage, and to the advantage of a better understanding between us and Germany—on the other hand he is very anxious about Egypt and sees no issue from the difficulties. He feels sure that Germany will not pardon Egypt for violating the law of liquidation and will push the legal onslaught to the bitter end unless Egypt expresses contrition and even at the 11<sup>th</sup> hour asks for permission to do what it has already done without permission. His language

<sup>5</sup> Germany and France issued a joint invitation to a conference which was to consider questions of common interest concerning West Africa and the prevention of conflict over future divisions of territory in that area. The conference met at Berlin, November 15, 1884–February 26, 1885. The protocols and the general act of the conference may be found in *P. P.*, 1884–1885, LX, c. 4361.

on this point was almost identical to that held by Kalnoky to Sir A. Paget<sup>6</sup> (see last paragraph of his no 270 of Oct. 4) "Let them make some excuses for the manner in which they have acted and promise the Powers not to repeat anything of the kind in the future. Let them ask in short for a bill of indemnity. There would be time for them to do this before the mixed tribunals meet"—and Bleichröder here is almost exactly in the same strain. The German Govt. is indifferent to all arguments showing necessity. It is urged on by the conviction that, at whatever cost, it must be absolutely established that international agreements are not to be set aside without the consent of the parties to them. Therefore unless Egypt acknowledges its error I am afraid we shall get deeper into the mire.

Believe me to be, dear Lord Granville,

Yours sincerely,

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

*Confidential.*

*Oct. 20, 1884.*

DEAR MALET,

The Duke of Cambridge is going to Germany to attend the Margrave of Hesse's and the Duke of Brunswick's funeral.<sup>7</sup>

He is much occupied as is natural with the succession to Brunswick and his own claim, in case the Duke of Cumberland puts himself out of the question.<sup>8</sup> He will be anxious to consult you.

You will find in the Archives of the Embassy all the information which has been accumulated.

The matter is not one in which it would be politic for us to take any public action, but of course as representative of Her Majesty you will give what assistance you can properly do to a Member of the Royal Family.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, Oct. 24. 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The Duke of Cambridge has forwarded to me your letter of the 20<sup>th</sup>. I will do all I can to be of service to H. R. H. but I must be very careful, for if it were supposed that I was advocating his claims

<sup>6</sup> Sir Augustus Berkeley Paget (1823-1896) was British ambassador at Vienna, 1884-1893; he had been British minister to Italy since 1867, being raised to the rank of ambassador in 1876.

<sup>7</sup> The Margrave Frederick of Hesse (1820-1884) had died on October 14. Duke William of Brunswick (1806-1884) died on October 18.

<sup>8</sup> The Duke of Cambridge (1819-1904) was Queen Victoria's cousin and nearest agnate to the Brunswick line. See the statement of his claims, October 25, 1884, below, memorandum of October 25, 1884.



I should do more harm than good, as the subject is an extremely delicate one here.

I have, I think, said in my Despatch on the subject all that Prince Bismarck said to me that was worth repeating. He was exceedingly cordial in manner but evidently wished to restrict conversation to talking of old times at Frankfort and when I took hold of a Despatch lying beside me to refer to one of the questions on the West African Conference he got up and said he had to go to the Emperor. I then detained him to give him the courteous message from your Lordship and it was while he was standing to take his leave, that he made the remarks which I have transferred to the Despatch. In writing officially I have said that he complained of the "Colonial Office". As a matter of fact it was not the office but Lord Derby whom he mentioned by name and to whom he attributed all the difficulties which he alleged to have been made. He told me that the neuralgic pain in the side of his face now never left him, though it was never so acute as formerly when it came on at intervals.

His manner was so gentle & benevolent that I could hardly recognise the harsh grim soldier that I remembered him to be when I saw him at Meaux in 1870.

I go tonight to Brunswick and return tomorrow or Sunday.

Believe me to be very sincerely yrs,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Nov. 1, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

When I was at Brunswick the Duke of Cambridge spoke to me about his position as nearest Agnate of the late Duke and asked me to speak at Berlin in his behalf, if I had an opportunity, within the limits prescribed to me by your Lordships letter of the 20<sup>th</sup> ult<sup>o</sup>. I said to H. R. H. that I should be sorry to make any error in explaining His views and that I should, therefore, be much obliged if He would give me a memorandum stating precisely what he wished me to say—and H. R. H. was good enough in consequence, to draw up for my guidance a memorandum of which I herewith enclose a copy. He also entrusted to me a letter for the Emperor, which he requested me to give to the Chancellor for transmission at the same time that I explained H. R. H.'s views to His Highness.

I was not able to see Prince Bismarck. I, therefore, told Count Hatzfeldt that I was precluded from taking any official action in the matter, but that as representative of Her Majesty I was to give to H. R. H. such assistance as I properly could and that as I was anxious that Prince Bismarck should know exactly what H. R. H.'s views were, I gave to H. E. a copy of the memorandum which H. R. H. had

drawn for my guidance and I begged that Prince Bismarck would deliver H. R. H.'s letter to the Emperor. H. E. took the letter & memo: but made no remark on the Brunswick question.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> I saw the Crown Prince and I also gave a copy of the memorandum to H. I. H. confidentially telling Him what had passed between Count Hatzfeldt and me. H. I. H. hazarded the opinion that the Duke was ineligible either to reign or be regent in Brunswick because he was a foreign Prince but H. I. H. assured me of his friendly disposition towards H. R. H. in the matter.

I have not been able to hear what is likely to be done—The whole matter is kept very secret.

Believe me to be dear Lord Granville,

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy of the Memo: given by the Duke of Cambridge to Sir E. Malet and referred to in the latter's letter of Nov. 1, 1884.]

*Mem. for Sir Edward Malet*

What I am anxious that you should make known with [*sic*] at Berlin, with as little delay as possible both to the Emperor and Prince Bismarck is this,

That, in the event of the Duke of Cumberland's claim to the Duchy of Brunswick, not being recognized, or set on one side, I should hope and expect that the rights of the Agnates of the house of Brunswick of which I am the solitary Representative should at all events be respected, and that I should in such case of course be prepared to accept the Regency if such should be deemed desirable, either for the Duke of Cumberland's son, at present a child, or indeed in my own interest as the next heir, that I should of course never allow Brunswick to be made use of as the spot for any intrigues of the Hanoverian party, having no sort of connection with anybody at Hanover, and never having mixed myself up in any way with the Hanoverian difficulties. The only stipulation I should make is, that, whilst ready at all times to attend to the interests of the Duchy, and to reside occasionally at Brunswick, I could not give up my position in England and that it must be clearly understood that I am to retain that.

(sd) GEORGE.

BRUNSWICK, Oct. 25/84—

*Private.*

BERLIN, 1 Nov. 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have written just now, rather hurriedly to be in time for the messenger, a Despatch about the meeting at Sciernevic, The infor-

mation was given to me by Mons. Liteano, the Roumanian Minister.<sup>9</sup> He said that his view as to the reopening of the question on the Dardanelles was hardly more than a surmise but that the rest was founded on evidence which gave him little doubt of its exactness. As he must be deeply interested in the question and gave me the impression of being a quick and penetrating man I have thought it worth while to sketch what he said in a Despatch.

Believe me to be dear Lord Granville,

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 8 Nov. 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

There is nothing private to record this week.

I have had a letter from the Duke of Cambridge about his claims, but I fear that I am not in a position to be of much use to His Royal Highness. I have ventured to recommend that he should have himself legally represented before the Courts which are to deal with the validity of the will & the distribution of the property.

This time next week the Conference will have opened. I am very glad that I shall be assisted by such thoroughly competent men as Meade, Anderson<sup>10</sup> & Crowe, for I fear that I shall need their counsel at every turn.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Telegram to Sir E. Malet. Cypher. No. 14184*

*Private.*

F. O., Nov. 14. 84.

Make following personal and confidential request from me to Prince or Count Bismarck for my guidance in the Cabinet:—I presume the Chancellor does not think that England should bear the whole burden of financial responsibility in Egypt.<sup>11</sup> Would he object to state confidentially the main principles of what he would consider a satisfactory arrangement.

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

<sup>9</sup> A Three Emperors' Agreement had been signed at Sciernevic on September 17, 1884, but the contemporary reports of the conversations at the meeting were of course purely speculative. Varnaw Liteano was the Rumanian minister at Berlin, 1880-1888.

<sup>10</sup> Percy Anderson, chief of the African department of the foreign office, was a technical delegate to the Berlin conference. He was subsequently knighted for his services at the conference.

<sup>11</sup> A British commission headed by Sir Evelyn Baring had reported on June 28, 1884, that a loan of eight million pounds would be required to cover Egyptian indebtedness incurred since the Law of Liquidation in 1880, and that changes should be made in the law itself to enable the Egyptian government to balance its current budget. A deficit of almost a million pounds was in prospect for 1884. See Milner, *op. cit.*, 180-185.

*Teleg. Decypher. Malet to Granville**November 15, 1884.*

I have informed Prince Bismarck of your private and personal communication of yesterday. He said to me that he was unwilling to give advice because if followed, he must use pressure on France to accept it and this he would not do. He said Y. L. should endeavour first to come to an arrangement with France and that, if fair proposals were refused by France, you could appeal to the other Powers with much better chances of success.

The greater the financial sacrifices made by England, the greater would be the prospect of an arrangement being come to, but he urged that, if England were prepared to make sacrifices you should not do it straight off, which, he said, would be throwing your money into the water, but that you should negotiate with France, offering to make such sacrifices as the price of an agreement with her. In this way you would disarm the opposition of the financiers which was the great obstacle to a settlement. He added that England's mediation with China could be most usefully employed as another inducement.<sup>12</sup>

*Private.**BERLIN, 15 Nov. 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I sent to Prince Bismarck this morning to say that I had a private communication to deliver to him from your Lordship and he requested me to come to him at once. I have embodied nearly all he said in a Despatch as it was very interesting and could be given without mentioning that I had had any Message to give him.

The gist of his reply was that he could not give us a scheme for an Egyptian settlement, because he was resolved not to use any pressure toward France. He said "pressure on our part to make France do what is disagreeable, may mean war between us. Therefore I will not exert it."—With this reserve you will see that he said a great deal which throws light on the situation. Of course he has equal talent for speech and reticence, but I do not think that on this occasion he left much unsaid and what he does say, can, I believe, always be trusted.

One characteristic remark I have omitted in my despatch. He said that if war were to break out between France and Germany again each would naturally be glad of our assistance and that, formerly, he had always been sure that if we did not give it to Germany we should at all events not give it to France, but that he had not felt so sure of

<sup>12</sup> Granville was active at this time in attempts to mediate the dispute between China and France over Tonkin. See Mitchell, *Bismarckian Policy of Conciliation with France*, 143, and P. P., 1884-1885, LXXXVII, c. 4359.

this since Mr Gladstone's uncalled for and unprovoked attack upon Austria<sup>13</sup> and Germany previously to his accession to office.

He also said that if France went to war again Germany could beat her as before, provided she had no allies—and it was in connection with this remark that he made the other which I have related first.

The first meeting of the Conference ran off the reel. The Prince and I divided the labours as far as speaking went for no one else said anything of importance. H. H. said to me again this morning that he should side with us on the Niger question whether France accepted or not.<sup>14</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*November 19 1884.*

MY DEAR MALET,

The Queen has objected to Prince Bismarck being styled "His Highness" in our Despatches.

She says that he is only "Durchlaucht" which is "serene Highness" and that "Highness" is the equivalent of "Hoheit" a higher title.

Our researches here have not made it absolutely clear whether Prince Bismarck has formally received the title of Durchlaucht or not. Perhaps you know.

But Lord Granville desires me to say that in future it will be better that Prince Bismarck should not be described as "His Highness" in Despatches. The difficulty can easily be turned by the use of expressions such as "The Chancellor", "The Prince" and the ordinary "he".

Yours ever,

(sd) J. H. SANDERSON.

*Teleg. to Sir E. Malet, sent in cypher Nov. 21, 84, 7-8 p. m.*

*Private and confidential.*

Convey my warm thanks to Bismarck for the expression of his views.

I should have been glad if he had been able to give an answer to the particular question which I put, but I well understand the reasons of his reticence. What he has said to you will be of great use to me.

I have already in consequence of his advice sounded the French Govt., whether they would enter into confidential communications in

<sup>13</sup> See above "1880," n. 26.

<sup>14</sup> The question was whether the responsibility for supervising the free navigation of the Niger should be assigned to England or to an international commission.

a spirit of conciliation. They have absolutely declined, in courteous terms and wish that our proposals may be made to the Powers.

I hope in a short time to send confidentially to Bismarck the character of our proposal.

The difficulty of simultaneous communications apart from the wish to have the Chancellor's objections, is the certainty of publicity.

*Teleg. from Malet to Granville. Decypher*

*Private and Confidential.*

*22 Nov. 84.*

I informed Prince Bismarck this morning of the contents of your Lordship's private telegram dated yesterday.

He said that even when your Lordship's Egyptian proposals are before him he shall not be able to state an opinion on them, until he knows that of other Powers, because his first duty is to Germany, and it would not be in her interests that he should lend the weight of his approval to proposals objected to by France.

He was surprised at the French refusal to enter into confidential negotiations.

He said that if he were Your Lordship he should, notwithstanding make known your proposals to France and endeavour to elicit its objections. He said the failure of fresh proposals would not be founded upon opposition from Germany or the Powers acting with her except in so far as Germany would not use its influence to force them on France.

*Private.*

*BERLIN, 22, Nov. 1884.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

In addition to what I have stated in my private telegram, today, Prince Bismarck said that France now was in favour of a Pentarchy in Egypt to consist of England, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy, but that he had no details as to how they proposed to put the idea into working form. If it were realised he considered that Italy would hold the balance as Germany and Austria worked together and would generally remain neuter. He said that, to his mind the wisdom of endeavouring now to obtain his advice and support in the Egyptian question, was doubtful as it showed timidity which in its turn proved imperfect appreciation of European affairs. He advised financial sacrifices because the effect of England's money being in Egypt would give us a hold in it which must be recognized. He had difficulty in exactly understanding our present policy. If we really wished to give it up altogether and retire we could do so. Our vacuum would be quickly filled by rebels or by the French or

possibly the Turks. In any case we should be quit of it. If we desired to remain more drastic measures than those we at present employed were necessary.<sup>15</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 23 Nov. 1884.

MY DEAR SANDERSON,

We have an early post, which, I think, brings letters to London by 5 o'clock on the following day, but it leaves too early for Chancery work. The inclosed reached me last night & I send them on to you—to be succeeded of course by the despatch of other copies officially.

I had to work yesterday against time. From 11 to 12 I was engaged with the Chancellor—at one the Conference met, whence I got back just in time to sign, get off a tel: about what we had done and write a rather hurried private letter to Lord Granville before dressing to dine with the Emperor at 5.

There were other things which I wished to say in my letter to Lord Granville, especially that Prince Bismarck had been present at the party the previous evening, given by the Crown Princess on her birthday and that the Princess spoke to him for [a] long while. It was the first time that the Prince had appeared in Society for three or four years. He asked me who a lady was to whom I had just been presented and I told him that it was the Princess William (wife of the eldest son of the Crown Prince.)

Yesterday also the Chancellor appeared at the Conference banquet given by the Emperor and I presented to him the British delegates. To illustrate how he has buried himself of late years, Cadogan<sup>16</sup> who has been here three years had never even seen him before the party at the Crown Princess's.—He has as you will have observed been communicative to me but the only way to get him to talk is to let him run on if you interrupt him to correct what he says he shuts up—and I have thought it best to ascertain his mind, as far as he will give it, than to enter into discussions which he is impatient of accepting.

Ever yours,

E. B. MALET.

*Private.*

November 23, 1884.

MY DEAR MALET,

You seem to be getting on fairly well—at least I do not see the cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

<sup>15</sup> See Knaplund, *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, 196–197.

<sup>16</sup> Henry George Gerald Cadogan (1859–1893), grandson of the third Earl of Cadogan, was third secretary at the British embassy in Berlin.

When new points arise which require reference home, we should be glad to have the opinion of the delegates on the spot.

What may I tell the Duke as to the probability of dates.

Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

[Copy]

*Private and Confidential.*

*November 23, 1884.*

MY DEAR MALET,

Your telegram arrived just in time to prevent the transmission of our plan by telegraph for communication to the Chancellor.

I send it now to you for you to use confidentially, if you think it judicious, or if I telegraph to you to do so.

Pray tell the Prince what I have said in the 1st sentence, and say that I will press the French Government to communicate with us officially or officiously.<sup>17</sup>

But I am not sanguine.

I suspect their reluctance is for a reason which they do not give.

They are probably prepared to make concessions but desire to save Ferry<sup>18</sup> and Waddington from the responsibility of being the parties to make the concession.

Always supposing that they do not wish to prolong the difference (which I am inclined to assume,) they would probably like to be able to say to their Chambers "The other Powers are favourable. There is no vital objection to the plan, we do not think it desirable to separate ourselves from the Powers and from England".

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

MY DEAR SANDERSON,

The Chancellor is undoubtedly a *Durchlaucht*—you will see him styled *Altesse Serenissime* on the 1st Protocol of our Conference & the Germans are too great sticklers on such points for it to be supposed that there can be any mistake.

I will endeavour to get decree concerning it.

Ever yours,

E. B. MALET.

<sup>17</sup> Granville dispatched a memorandum concerning the Egyptian debt settlement to the British ambassadors on November 24—*P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVIII, c. 4337, 20-21. See Knaplund, *op. cit.*, 205-206.

<sup>18</sup> Jules Ferry (1832-1893) was premier of France, 1883-1885, and noted for his part in France's colonial expansion.



*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 Nov. 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I hope you will excuse me for telegraphing rather urgently about the U. S. extension project<sup>19</sup>—I had by me the instruction to protest against its discussion and I found that all my colleagues, with the exception of the Turk, were inclined to see, at all events, what could be made of it. I own that I was alarmed at the prospect of England's protesting against a discussion having for its object the extension of the principle of free trade and having the Porte for its sole supporter against all the European powers. It seemed to me to be such an inversion of England's natural mission that I worded my message perhaps more strongly than was necessary. I was much relieved on receiving your Lordship's reply.

I am in constant communication with my advisers and all that I have done hitherto has been under advice from them though of course, in the course of discussion, points may arise, which I must decide on the spot for myself, such for instance as giving up Fernan Vaz and accepting Selte Kamma,<sup>20</sup> but even in this instance I had assured myself in conversation with them that the point was not one which need be contested hotley [*sic*].

My general cue has been to be conciliatory on the first basis and to reserve my fire, if fire be necessary, for the discussion with regard to the Niger.—

The Association people are very angry at France claiming the Coast as far as Massabe.<sup>21</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Nov. 26 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have not been able to see the Chancellor. I therefore wrote him a letter, of which I enclose a copy herewith. To this I have had no reply, but from what the Prince said to me when I originally spoke to him on the subject, I think that he will not ask to see the plan and will wait for it to come in the regular course.

<sup>19</sup> On November 19, 1884, at the Berlin conference, the American minister, John Kasson, proposed that free trade be extended to the part of Africa lying between the Congo basin and the Indian Ocean. The British were anxious to protect existing sovereign rights in that area, e. g., Zanzibar and Mozambique. See Malet's summary to Granville, Dec. 23, 1884, in *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LV, c. 4284.

<sup>20</sup> These were places on the frontier of the French colony of Gaboon. The question was which should be named as the northern limit for freedom of commerce.

<sup>21</sup> The International Association of the Congo grew out of the Brussels conference of 1876 and was intended to supervise the exploration and trading of each national group, although the Belgians did most of the actual work. England did not join. Stanley's explorations in the Congo, 1879-1884, were conducted in behalf of the Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo, a Belgian-Dutch organization linked with the association. See Langer, *op. cit.*, 290-291.

I have this morning received the despatch transmitting an amended copy of the plan for the financial settlement of Egypt and I keep it in my private box till further orders.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Copy of letter from Malet to Bismarck, referred to in the former's letter of 26/11/84*

*Private and Confidential.*

BERLIN, Nov. 25 1884.

DEAR PRINCE BISMARCK,

Lord Granville writes to me that my report of the conversation which I had the honour to have with you on the 22nd instant arrived just in time to prevent the telegraphic transmission of the plan of Her Majesty's Government, with regard to Egyptian finances, for communication to your Serene Highness.

He has now sent it to me to use confidentially, if I think it advisable, and, on this point, I can only trust to Your Highness's kindness to let me know whether you would like to see it.

Lord Granville will press the French Government to communicate with him regarding it officially or officiously.

With reference to the proposed addition of German and Russian members to the "Caisse de la Dette", he remarks that it requires an alteration of the Law of Liquidation. Her Majesty's Govt. hope that the Powers will consent to adopt several changes of this Law, and he thinks that they had better be considered together,—but Her Majesty's Govt. are ready to give their friendly consideration in conjunction with other Powers to the proposal, and to the manner of carrying it out, if it is agreed to.

Believe me to be, etc., etc., etc.,

(sd) E. B. MALET.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., Nov. 26. 84.

MY DEAR MALET,

You appear to be getting on swimmingly at the Conference, and I am glad to find that Bismarck is so well inclined to give you monologues.

Our great difficulty with him is exactly the position which he takes. He advises us to retain Egypt, & if we reject what appears to be disinterested advice, he is relieved from the responsibility of helping us.

But the very fact that Egypt obliges us to step upon Eggs when we negotiate with him shows some of the inconvenience of a permanent occupation—Not to mention the permanent sore with France.

But be this as it may, it gives the Chr. an excuse for saying, if you do not take my advice & prefer a shilly shally course, why should I trouble myself more on the subject.

It is very absurd & unnecessary for Russia to be on the Caisse, but I do not see that she could do much harm considering the present limited functions of that institution.

Germany has an interest, since the Rothschilds transferred so large an amount of Egyptian debt to Frankfort.

In any case we shall not make a fight about it, although we ought to have the Presidency with a casting vote.

I told Münster yesterday that I did not tell him our financial proposals, because Prince B. objected to receive them. You are aware that you can let him have them in strict confidence whenever you & he wish. I said to Münster that we should probably telegraph to have them simultaneously delivered.

We are in communication with the French & Chinese, but do not make any progress.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Teleg. from Sir E. Malet. Decypher*

BERLIN, 27 November 1884.

Consul Count Bleichröder told me last night that he had given the details of the proposed settlement of Egyptian finance to Prince Bismarck on the previous day. He proceeded to enumerate the points correctly. He said he had had no difficulty in getting them but did not say whence.

Prince Bismarck had said that he reserved all expression of opinion till he received them officially.

The Count said to me that he doubted the project finding favour because it diminished the interest on the unified, which was held principally abroad, and retained it intact on the privileged, which is held nearly exclusively in England.<sup>22</sup>

*Telegram from Malet. (Decypher)*

*Private and Confidential.*

28 Nov. 84.

Prince Bismarck said to me this morning that your Ldp: had informed the French Govt. that he had recommended your treating

<sup>22</sup> The Law of Liquidation in 1880 had set up two categories of the Egyptian Funded Debt: a Privileged Debt of £22,587,000, serviced by the revenues of the state railways and telegraph and the port dues of Alexandria; if these revenues were not enough to meet the annuity of the sinking fund, which was calculated to extinguish the debt in sixty-one years, that was to be the first charge on the revenues assigned to the Unified Debt. The Unified

with them separately on Egyptian affairs before coming to the Powers. That M. Ferry had been greatly surprised and had desired the French Ambassador here to ask for explanations of the Prince.

The Prince went on to say he had considered the communication which had passed between us to be secret. He pointed out that he had refused advice and that what he had said afterwards was speaking in a friendly way to me as to what he should do if he were the English Minister. He could not consider that the communication to France was authorised and he should not be able in future to speak to me, even academically, as to the course to pursue.

I think the point that specially touches the Chancellor is that he has come to an agreement to treat the Egyptian question in common with the other Powers and that this communication of your Ldp: gives the French an impression that he was departing from the engagement in our favour.

*Telegram to Malet*

*Private and Confidential.*

5.20, November 28, 84.

Express my regrets to P. Bismarck. What happened was that Waddington dwelt strongly upon the jealousy the Powers would feel of communications between England & France.

I answered that I had reason to believe that this would not be the case. He assumed that I had learnt this from Prince B.

But I never stated that I had rec<sup>d</sup> advice from His Highness.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Nov. 29 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I went to Prince Bismarck yesterday about the International Association. He said he had not time to look at the papers and asked me to give them to Count Hatzfeldt. We then spoke about the Conference and it was not till the conclusion of our interview that he mentioned his grievance regarding the alleged communication to France that you were acting on his advice in asking them to treat confidentially on the subject of the Egyptian settlement. He said that Monsieur Ferry had been "stupefied" at learning it and that it had been very disagreeable to him to have to explain matters to Baron de Courcel. He had not denied that he had recommended us to come to an agreement first with France and he had told Baron de Courcel that he had given other advice, to wit, that if England would concede European control in Egypt, it would go a long way

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Debt, first established in 1876 by the khedive, in 1880 was set at £57,776,000, to which customs receipts and taxes of four provinces were assigned. See Colvin, *Making of Modern Egypt*, 102-103.

towards inducing them to agree to our proposals and that to this piece of advice he had had no reply.

(This relates to what I said in the first Paragraph of my letter of the 22<sup>nd</sup> inst. to Y. L.)

He went on to say that the use of his name in the matter at all was unauthorized, that he had explained to me that he could not give advice and that what he had said afterwards was merely in a friendly spirit to me, as if I had had a farm and he were talking over the best way of managing it. After what had happened he could not, he said, even speak to me so far as what he thought.

Having listened to all he had to say I observed that I could not believe that you would have made such use of what had passed between us and that I thought it more likely that the French had at first refused to treat separately on the ground of its being distasteful to the other Powers and that then you might have said on this point you were satisfied and so have led up to the natural conclusion that you had assured yourself beforehand by communication with the Prince. However he was not to be appeased.

I have now written to him and have given him the substance of your Lordship's telegram in reply to mine.

The explanation is exactly what I had suggested—whether it will satisfy him or not I cannot say he has not made any reply.

He was complaining in his manner not harsh or disagreeable though he said disagreeable things and silly things, for instance, he said that any wish on your part to promote dissension between him and France would not only not be successful but would draw Germany and France closer together. I replied to this that the thing was utterly out of the question, that it was impossible that such a thought should ever have occurred to you.

Bleichröder told me today that Bismarck had for some ten days been in low spirits even with his own family.

The same authority told me that he learned from Paris that there was no chance of Ferry agreeing to our Egyptian proposals.—and that he (Bleichröder) was very uneasy at the whole prospect in connection with Egypt.

The Conference is going on well.

Believe me . . . etc.,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Teleg. From Malet. Decypher*

*Private & Confidential.*

*D 6.55*

*pm., Dec. 1, 1884.*

*R 11*

Prince Bismarck said to me to day that he could not form any judgment as to whether the final judgment on our Egyptian proposals w<sup>d</sup>

be satisfactory or not, but that he was certain that the present state of the negotiation was not so, as the Powers were merely able to ask each other what they thought & no one was pronouncing an opinion, he felt sure that there would be [group omitted] & he did not think any satisfactory result w<sup>d</sup> be come to without verbal comm<sup>ns</sup>.

Could not deliberation on the subject between representatives of England, Germany, France & perhaps Italy be authorised at Paris?

This is only a suggestion of my own. The Prince did not make any suggestion.

*Teleg. from Malet. Decypher*

*Private & Confidential.*

*Dec. 1, 84.*

Bismarck said to me today that unless H. M.'s Govt. could contemplate with indifference whole of the territories of the Association passing into the hands of France which he could not believe, then ought to at once recognise it, in order to give it the vitality which should enable it to combat with greater success the claims of France.

He spoke to me on the subject with great earnestness and begged me to use my utmost endeavours to induce your Ldp: to accede to the recognition.

You know his habit of balancing one thing against another and I feel sure that if we refuse, we shall suffer for it on some other point of much greater importance to us.

*Teleg. to Malet*

*2.30 pm, Dec. 2, 84.*

Thank Chancellor for his suggestion. There would be obvious objections to a Conference, but we see none to a confidential exchange of views among the Ambassadors. We leave it to your discretion to arrange with Prince Bismarck as to best way of doing this without delay which is much to be deprecated—presuming the suggestion to be agreed to by all the Ambassadors.

*Teleg. from Malet. Decypher*

*Private & Confidential.*

*BERLIN, 6.4 p. m. 5<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1884.*

No answer yet. I have now written to ask for one; I was told last night that Prince Bismarck had said he could not reply yet.

[Copy]

*Private & Confidential.*

*F. O., Dec. 3. 1884.*

MY DEAR MALET,

You seem to have acted with great tact and discretion at the conference, and all appears to be going on well, tant que ça dure.

I was much annoyed on a point upon which I am extremely sensitive, any reproach for indiscretion with regard to friendly and confidential communications.

If I committed an indiscretion with regard to the Chancellor's communication to you, it was, like the lady's baby, a very small one. Münster spoke to me on the subject on Monday. I gave him the same explanation as I gave you, adding that the idea of my wishing to excite a bad feeling between the German and the French Governments, was on my honour, absolutely without foundation.

You must know how absolutely false it is.

I have found Waddington straight-forward and pleasant to do business with—but he piques himself on his penetration and I have on one or two occasions discovered that he sometimes reports, not only what I say to him but something which he reads between the lines—a most dangerous invention.

Nobody gets so wrong as those who think they can see through millstones.

But he does his duty in reporting to Ferry what he hears or believes.

Whether Ferry and Courcel add colours to the shield, I cannot tell. You wrote an excellent letter to G[ladstone] with which he was perfectly satisfied.

If you have matters to say, which you prefer not going beyond myself, please always add "personal".

We are well out of our great home difficulty. It ought to strengthen us a little abroad.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Dec. 5, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The announcement of the intended recognition of the International Association has come at a very useful moment for us in the Conference, as it assures us the cooperation of the German Belgian and United States Representatives in securing what we desire with regard to the Niger.<sup>23</sup>

When I read the Despatches which come in, such as those from Sir R. Morier & Lord Lyons together with newspaper articles, I feel in some dismay as to the ultimate intentions of the Chancellor. You will have gathered from the Reports which I have sent you, that his general tone towards us is neither cordial nor friendly and, perhaps, what has struck me most is the suspicion which he shows as to our policy towards Germany, hinting at a wish on our part to hinder

<sup>23</sup> The British government extended recognition to the association as the Congo Free State on December 16, 1884. Germany had announced recognition on November 8, and the United States as early as April 23, 1884.

the good understanding which he wishes to cultivate with France. I have done my utmost to assure him that there is not the slightest foundation for such a suspicion.

Setting all rumours and prognostications aside, I may say that nothing has yet taken place in the Conference to show that he has any designs against our interests.—He has begged that we would recognise the Association on the special ground that it will assist in preventing its territories falling a prey to France and, on his own principle that one good turn deserves another, I shall be much disappointed if I do not find that our willingness to meet his views on this point, does not induce him to give us a helping hand on others which are of vital consequence to us.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Teleg. to Malet*

*Private & conf.*

2.30 pm, Dec. 5, 84.

Have you any answer yet to my telegram of Dec. 2 suggesting exchange of views amongst Ambassadors on our Egypt Finance proposals.

*Teleg. from Malet. Decypher*

*Private & Confidential.*

BERLIN, 12.5 p. m., December 6, 1884.

Count Hatzfeldt came to see me last night: he said he could get nothing from Prince Bismarck about Egypt, because he has got into a state of great irritation against us on account of reports regarding the Cameroons, Samoa and Bechuana land.<sup>24</sup> He said the Prince had written to Count Münster yesterday in his own hand about it, a very rare thing for him to do.<sup>25</sup>

It seems to me that the Chancellor is for the moment in a general state of irritation quite as much from his difficulties in his Parliament as from these alleged but unfounded grievances.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Dec. 6, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Hatzfeldt came to me last night. He told me that Prince Bismarck was much moved at the reports which had reached him as to our proceedings at the Cameroons Samoa & Bechuana and that he had written to Count Münster on the subject. I spoke very strongly to Count Hatzfeldt about the unreasoning nature of the Prince's suspi-

<sup>24</sup> These troubles are discussed briefly in Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 367-369, 374. For details on the Cameroons see Harry R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914* (New Haven, 1938), 55-57, and *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LV, c. 4279; for Bechuanaland, *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LV, c. 4224 and c. 4227; for Samoa, Sylvia Masterman, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> For Bismarck to Münster, December 5, 1884, see *G. P.*, IV, 91-93.



cions. I said that for a long time past we had been doing everything in our power to conciliate him, but that I could not say how long this would last, if we saw that all our efforts were fruitless and that instead of recognising them, he held aloof from all friendly action towards us. The Count himself was very reasonable. I have at his request sent him a letter about Bechuana a question which I told him I had really thought the Prince could not seriously suppose to be connected with a design to hinder German Colonial enterprise.

We have sat from 2 to 7½ on the Commission and I have only time to send this line. I think that Prince Bismarck must be in a general state of irritation at the rebuffs which he receives in Parliament <sup>26</sup> and that we are receiving the contre coup.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*Dec. 10, 1884.*

MY DEAR MALET,

Some important despatches will not be in time for tonight, but will go in Münster's bag tomorrow.

Bismarck's letters (one signed by himself) are arrived.

He withdraws the complaint as to my breach of confidence in repeating to Waddington his recent advice.

He promises that nothing disagreeable to me or out of accord with what I have written shall appear in his blue book.

But he complains of Samoa, the Cameroons and Bechuanaland.

I send you a record of my conversation with Münster on these 3 points which he cannot imagine not being satisfactory.

I have suggested with some circumlocution that Bismarck should himself examine Meade about Colonial Policy. I have also told Münster that we are doing all we can to accelerate matters about the Congo, because we believe that it is the Chancellor's desire, that it should come smoothly and soon to an end—that the objects of the Conference are great and important, but as to the mere pressure of time not comparable to the Egyptian Finance proposal—that we have framed a scheme that we believe will meet the case as far as Egypt is concerned, and it is one which we can press upon Parliament and not without a reasonable hope of our influence being sufficient. That we acknowledge the interest Europe feels in the matter, but it is an interest based upon the prosperity of Egypt. This prosperity depends upon a quick solution of the payment of the indemnities and the reestablishment of the solvency of the country.

<sup>26</sup> In the newly elected reichstag, Bismarck was defeated on three separate issues between November 26 and December 15. See the *Annual Register*, 1884, 293-294.

That the proposal sufficient now will be insufficient if there is delay,—and that we therefore hope not only for a favourable answer but for an early one.

Italy has confidentially given in her adhesion to our scheme.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

P. S. Please thank Bobsy [Robert Meade] for his letter and show him this one.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Dec. 13, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I trust that the manner in which I have begun the negotiations regarding the territorial arrangements in the Congo, will meet with your approval. I thought it would look well as a desire on your part to befriend the Portuguese, as far as we were able to do so having to contend with much hostility toward them on the part of the Germans. I had authority from Count Hatzfeldt to say any hard words about them that I liked, but he insists on a modification of their colonial tariffs. I do not think he will push this to the extreme if the Portuguese absolutely refuse. When, however, I saw Serpa<sup>27</sup> this morning he made no opposition in theory to that part of the proposition and only dilated on the difficulty of his Govt. passing a bill on the subject through the Cortes. With regard to only receiving the South Bank of the Congo, he was intractable and said that he, as Minister, would never consent, I begged him not to give that advice, as, if it were followed, Portugal would get nothing at all.

The Germans have need of us now and so are, I think, coming round in their general tone. I am extremely glad to learn by your letter of the 10<sup>th</sup> that Bismarck has withdrawn his complaint in regard to the communication of the advice given by him to your Lordship, to France. It was I think the least he could do.

I have not seen him for some time, but I have continually told Hatzfeldt that we now feel that we have a claim to his help in the Egyptian question.

Believe me . . . etc.

E. B. MALET.

*Teleg. from Malet. Decypher*

*Private.*

BERLIN, <sup>D 7</sup><sub>R 8</sub> p. m., Dec. 14, 1884.

Following from Meade to you: "See my private letter to you by last night's messenger. Busch called on me today. My memo: has been

<sup>27</sup> M. le Conseiller de Serpa Pimental (1825-1900), second Portuguese delegate to the Berlin conference, had been Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, 1881-1883.

before Prince Bismarck who will see me in a few days time. Meanwhile Under Sec<sup>y</sup> of State for For: Affs. is to ascertain as to German interests on north coast of New Guinea. Ask Herbert [Bismarck] whether if portion of coast must be reserved for Germany he prefers its independence or protection by Germany: if the latter, which seems to me preferable, as then all the coast would be under responsible Powers, I would suggest German Protectorate for such reserved territory in case of necessity.

Desirable I shd. be able to tell Prince Bismarck that the orders suggested in my private letter have been actually sent to Consul & Governor—Private letters to both might be preferable: Something has been already said officially to the Governor”.

*Private & Confidential.*

BERLIN, 14 Dec. 84.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Baron Lambermont, the Belgian Plenipotentiary,<sup>28</sup> who is watching, *sub rosa*, the interests of the King of the Belgians, has asked me to read a letter from His Majesty of which I inclose a copy.

Baron Lambermont does not think that there are grounds for the assertion made in the newspaper extract, but nevertheless he is anxious that your Lordship should know the King's intention supposing it were to turn out to be true.

Baron Lambermont undertakes to send this letter by private hand.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy of extract & letter from King of Belgium referred to in above letter from Malet.]

(Newspaper extract) “*L'Événement*, 11 X<sup>bre</sup> '84

BRUXELLES, 12 December 1884.

“La Conference du Congo. Un accord s'est établi entre La France et le Portugal au sujet du Congo. En fait la Conférence est terminée. Une convention ou un traité sera passé entre les cabinets de Paris et de Lisbonne. On croit, du reste, que ce sont les deux seules puissances qui pourront s'entendre. Grâce aux droits qu'elles possèdent toutes deux sur le Zaire.”

CHER BARON,

Il me revient de source confidentielle que la France et le Portugal s'entendent pour se jeter, la première sur le Niadi-Guillon le second sur le bas Congo à l'issue de la Conférence. V<sup>e</sup> avez intérêt a savoir pour votre direction personnelle que, si un acte pareil s'accomplit, je

<sup>28</sup> Baron Lambermont was secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs at Brussels.

suis irrévocablement décidé à licencier sur l'heure tout mon personnel en Afrique après lui avoir donné l'ordre de détruire tout le matériel, et à me retirer complètement.

Je ne me crois par le disit, comme Roi des Belges, d'exposer mon pays aux conséquences d'une lutte que j'aurais comme particulier à entamer en Afrique contre deux Puissances amies de la Belgique et dont l'une est Garante de sa neutralité.

Croyez moi, Cher Baron, Votre tout dévoué,

(sd) LEOPOLD.

*Private and Personal.*

BERLIN, Dec. 20, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I hear today that the Conference will be adjourned from Monday to the 6<sup>th</sup> of Jan.

This is done to let the territorial question be settled but, in the present temper of the disputants, I do not think that a week will bring them together.

Meantime I am obliged to remain much against my will & were my fiancée<sup>29</sup> not as sensible as she is, I should be still more uncomfortable.

I have asked Meade to send his advice about New Guinea privately. I do not wish it to be supposed that I in any way endorse it on the contrary.<sup>30</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

E. B. MALET.

*Private & Personal.*

BERLIN, Dec. 20, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

The King of the Belgians telegraphed and wrote to me, on the occasion of my signing the Convention with the Congo, and I inclose a copy of the answer, which I have made to him. I fear my reply will be by no means agreeable to His Majesty, but I do not know whether there is anyone here or near Him who will tell him the truth. Of course I may be wrong, but I believe he will obtain little or nothing by holding out and that unless the matter is adjusted while the Conference is sitting his chances will be small indeed. As to the £200,000 which he asks, it is manifestly impossible that the French should be

<sup>29</sup> Malet's fiancée was Lady Ermytrude Sackville Russell (1856-1927), daughter of Francis Charles Hastings, ninth Duke of Bedford. They were married on March 19, 1885.

<sup>30</sup> On August 6, 1884, the British cabinet had decided to make the eastern half of New Guinea a British protectorate. The German government protested in September, when informed of the British intention, and attempts were made at a compromise. Early in December Meade unofficially suggested in Berlin a trade whereby Germany would receive islands off the coast of Southwest Africa in return for permitting Great Britain to annex New Guinea. Germany replied on December 20 with the unexpected announcement that the German flag had been raised and a trading company established under German protection on the northeast coast of New Guinea. See A. J. P. Taylor, *Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885* (London, 1938), 67-69.

able to give them. I doubt the French Chamber giving half the sum for the whole Congo, and I much doubt whether a commission on the spot would find much to represent the £200,000.

The French would, I think, be willing to submit the whole question to the arbitration of a commission w<sup>h</sup> should go to the Congo, but this the Association apparently shrinks from.—Myself, I believe the best plan to be, to settle, and that it is now or never.

Believe me . . . etc.

E. B. MALET.

*Copy of letter from Malet to King of Belgians*

*Private & Confidential.*

BERLIN, 20 Dec. 1884.

SIRE,

I have the honour to thank Your Majesty for your very kind letter of the 17<sup>th</sup> instant. I can assure Your Majesty that I signed the Convention with a very sincere satisfaction and I have also to thank Your Majesty for the telegram which gave me the pleasing intelligence that the news had arrived on the anniversary of Your Majesty's accession.

There is however much yet to do and I hope that Your Majesty will not object to my giving my views as to the course to be pursued, speaking in my private entity, not as Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I would give the French the line they ask, that is the parallel 5°12'. They will not diminish this claim, because they are secure that no pressure will be brought to bear on them to induce them to do so. The Germans will do nothing and we shall do nothing beyond giving those platonic expressions of goodwill which are often more irritating than expressions of hostility. On the other hand if Y. M. gives way you will attain a fresh territory which could in no other way come into the possession of the association, because, if nothing is settled, either Portugal or France will take possession when the Conference ends, at least it seems to me that they would probably do so. After all what the French now require in addition (according to Col. Strauch) to their former requirements is about 100 miles of the left bank of the Congo from Stanley Pool downwards—but if the Association possessed the remainder of the right bank to the mouth and then to Massabe and the left bank to 5 miles below the highest point to which the largest ocean steamers can go, as an outlet to that vast area which is traced upon the map till it reaches Lake Tanganyika, it seems to me that it will be an empire with an outlet sufficient for the grandest human ambition.

The rules of freedom of trade would bind the French on their part of the Congo. The railway could run along the opposite side at that point. There would no longer be any question of the Association

being strangled. If I thought that by holding out the Association would get more from the French I would advise this, but I do not think that there is any hope of it, and I greatly fear that if the matter is not settled now, it will lose the right bank of the Congo to the mouth, and that France will perhaps also refuse to recognise it on the territory on the left bank now claimed by Portugal. Whereas if the Association now settles with France the latter would join Germany and England in using pressure on Portugal.

If the Association agree, it should set aside all discussion as to the rights to certain territories and merely ask for recognition with such and such frontiers.

I must again ask Your Majesty's pardon for expressing myself so freely and giving vent to views which may not be agreeable to Y. Majesty. I can only say that as far as my humble judgment goes I am endeavouring to serve what appears to me to be Your Majesty's true interests.

I have the honour to be,

Sire, Your Majesty's most obedient humble servant,

(sd) EDWARD B. MALET.

*Teleg. to Malet*

*Private.*

*Dec. 22, 84.*

Use your discretion as to retaining experts at Berlin. I should regret Meade losing an opportunity of seeing Bismarck.

*Teleg. to Malet*

*Private.*

*Dec. 23, 1884.*

Meade may tell Bismarck that instructions are being sent to Governor and Consul on Gold Coast in sense suggested in his private letter of 13<sup>th</sup>. We are following his advice as regards New Guinea but this should not be mentioned at present.

[Copy]

*Private.*

WALMER CASTLE, *Dec. 23, 84.*

DEAR MALET,

I condole with you sincerely and with your betrothed, to whom this delay must be very annoying, but I am afraid there is no help for it.

I have just received your telegram about the experts.

I am glad you keep Meade, as he may be of use, if by any chance Bismarck recovers his good humour.

I presume we shall accept his annexations of the islands as accomplished facts—with a complaint as to the manner.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The annexation of Rock and Long Islands and the coast of New Guinea gave Germany command of the main trade route from Singapore.

Take any favourable opportunity of urging how unfair it is to us, to Egypt, to the Bondholders, and to the Indemnity holders, that no answer should be sent to us on the subject of our Egyptian financial proposals.

I have desired the Angra Pequena papers to be sent to you, if possible by tonight's messenger.<sup>32</sup>

Can you manage without committing yourself, to have the memorandum and the Despatch of Sir Hercules [Robinson] <sup>33</sup> extensively published in Germany.

I presume there is no way of counteracting what appears to be a system with the Chancellor to create irritation in Germany against us.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) G[RANVILLE].

*Private.*

BERLIN, Dec. 23, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

On the last occasion that I saw Prince Bismarck (the 17<sup>th</sup> inst.) he spoke to me about his desire to get away for a time in order to take rest.

He said that he found so many difficulties in the way that he should not be able to do it, but that he greatly needed repose.

In the first place there was the opposition of the Emperor, who had become so accustomed to trust him implicitly, that He would do no business unless prepared & signed by the Prince. Secondly all Europe was closed to him on account of his position. He could not go anywhere without some particular motive being attributed and besides that he would always be within reach of reference. Thirdly he was by no means certain what the effect upon himself would be of having no work to do. One Doctor had told him that if his work were taken away from him he would die in four months.

He said he should have liked to go to Egypt, but he did not know how it would be taken.

I said that I thought he ought to make a journey so that no time should be given to him to feel the absence of work. He might go for instance to Jerusalem and from there to Egypt and straight up the Nile. In this way he would be seeing things from day to day of powerful interest and three months would be quickly gone. We were the only Power who could object to his going to Egypt and I felt sure that no such objection would come from us.

<sup>32</sup> P. P., 1884-1885, LVI, c. 4262 and c. 4265.

<sup>33</sup> Sir Hercules Robinson (1824-1897), governor of Cape Colony and high commissioner in South Africa, 1880-1889, in November, 1884, persuaded the British government to send Sir Charles Warren with an expedition which resulted in the annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885. Warren's memorandum on Bechuanaland, Oct. 29, 1884, may be found in P. P., 1884-1885, LV, c. 4227.

He replied that he should greatly like to go to Jerusalem, that the other place open to him was Madeira, but he really feared the effect on himself of being so completely cut off from news as he would be there.

I mention all this because it may be that he spoke of Egypt with intention and that a civil message on the subject from you would be agreeable to him and remove his hesitation. Should you feel inclined to send such a message, perhaps you would be so good as to telegraph it, as he still seems to be waiting to make up his mind and Count William Bismarck, his son, told me yesterday that he thought his father would like Egypt but hesitated for fear of the newspapers.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

WALMER CASTLE, Dec. 24, 84.

DEAR MALET,

The English Press is not mollified by our Blue Book—as to Angra Pequena.<sup>24</sup>

With regard to the International Association, I hope you will be as stiff as you can in their favour against the French.

On all matters which affect the interests of Germans as well as British Traders you would have a lever to apply to the Chancellor.

Are any of the Commercial men left who could stir up their brother German traders?

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

*Teleg. to Malet*

*Private.*

*Sent Dec. 26, 84.*

We quite appreciate the desirability of rest for Prince Bismarck as regards his health and work.

But this makes it urgent that you should represent in courteous but earnest language how important it is for the welfare of Egypt, for the sake of the bondholders and the Indemnity holders that we should have an early answer to our financial proposals.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Dec. 27, 1884.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have spoken strongly to Prince Bismarck on previous occasions pointing out that it is in every ones interests, not alone ours or Egypt's, that a speedy answer should be given to our proposals and

<sup>24</sup> See above, n. 82, and Aydelotte, *Bismarck and British Colonial Policy*, 125-126.



he has always met me with the same answer. "It is no use our agreeing if France does not, and it is against our interests to bring pressure to bear upon her to get her to agree—come to an arrangement with France and you will not find us in the way." I have spoken in the same sense to Count Hatzfeldt and Doctor Busch, they, however, merely listen to what is said and give back nothing in return. I think that there is cause for anxiety in the continuance of the Chancellor's hostile attitude toward us, after the cause which gave rise to it has disappeared. The situation, which is the result of it, requires very careful attention. We have I think done our utmost to propitiate him and I cannot see that it has had any effect. Is this not due to an intention to maintain a grief against us to be used as an excuse at the opportune moment?

Cartwright's Father <sup>25</sup> writes from Rome that in a conversation which he had had with Schlösser the German Minister to the Vatican, the latter had let fall words indicating the German desire to possess Delagoa Bay—and added "but the Portuguese want too high a price". The words do not show unequivocally that overtures have been made and abandoned in consequence of the Portuguese asking too much and Mr Cartwright purposely made no inquiry.

I hope to get the memo: about Angra Pequena and the Desp: from Lord Derby published in the *National Zeitung*, whence it would be copied into other papers.

Bleichröder has promised to do it for me.

I cannot help thinking that Bismarck will do more than he will allow to transpire in favour of the Association as he must see the ridicule which will attach to the Conference if it results in the collapse of the new state.

Believe me . . . etc.

E. B. MALET.

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P. S. I go to Weimar on Monday and shall be back here on Tuesday or Wednesday at latest.

E. B. M.

[Copy]

*Private.*

*Dec. 31, 84.*

MY DEAR MALET,

It is really of no use for me to write about Egypt, or about Conference.

I shall probably send you a message on Saturday as we are to have a cabinet on Friday afternoon.

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<sup>25</sup> Probably Aubrey Cartwright, father of William Cartwright, British second secretary in Egypt, 1882-1884.

Pray thank Meade for his interesting letter of the 24<sup>th</sup> <sup>86</sup> I will do what he wishes respecting his report which is now with Gladstone.

I highly approve of his remaining. (Pray tell Miss Meade that I hear she has worn out the soles of her dancing shoes.)

We have followed his advice about Rock and Long Islands.

I will ask the Colonial Office to send Hemming out again.<sup>87</sup>

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

Happy new years day.

*Private.*

*Dec. 31, 1884.*

MY DEAR MALET,

Thanks for your letter. The only thing pleasant is that Bismarck may do more than he promises about the International Association.

I did not respond to your suggestion to encourage B. to go to Egypt.

I can conceive nothing more inconvenient.

He would certainly not be convinced in our favour by the European colonists. He would be the centre of intrigue and he would be considered a counterpoise to Wolsley [*sic*].<sup>88</sup>

You could not retract what you said, but it would be better, if the matter was referred to again, to say that you supposed such a visit might be made much of in the Newspapers with the usual misconception.

Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

*Telegr. from Meade. Decypher*

*Private and Personal*

*BERLIN, 31 Dec. 1884.*

Following from Meade: "Much pleased at Lord Derby's kind letter. Am writing to thank him. Might I suggest that my C. B. should be deferred to Queen's Birthday, unless Anderson, who has done all the Conference work, has also been considered, giving it to me just now looks as if it is on account of Conference, for which his claims are far superior."

*Private.*

*Jan. 3, 1885.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Meade has shown me his private letter to you and his telegram on the subject of his C. B. and I am sure you will have appreciated his

<sup>86</sup> P. P., 1884-1885, LIV, c. 4290, contains Meade's memorandum, dated December 24, of a conversation with Bismarck on colonial questions, pp. 8-11.

<sup>87</sup> Sir Augustus William Lawson Hemming (1841-1907), principal clerk of the colonial office, was frequently sent out on special missions during the eighties.

<sup>88</sup> Sir Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913) headed an expedition on the Nile in 1884 to rescue General Gordon. Wolseley reached Khartoum January 28, 1885. See Bernard Allen, *Gordon and the Sudan* (London, 1931).

delicacy of feeling with reference to Percy Anderson. With regard to the latter, I had always intended, at the close of the Conference, to do what lay with me to bring his great services in regard to it, before you, but what has taken place leads me to do so at once privately. He has been the moving spirit and my guide throughout the proceedings. He has conciliated the traders and missionaries who have been here. He has spoken with much effect and persuasiveness in the commission. I fancy that if we have the Niger now, *de facto*, in our possession it is mainly due to the pains which he has bestowed upon the question long previous to the meeting of the Conference and as victory in regard to it has been the touchstone of our success in the Conference, I hope that such reward as that success may deserve may be given to Anderson entirely.

Hatzfeldt is still ill and those who have seen Prince Bismarck lately say that he is still in a nervous and irritable mood. When the Conference closes Dr Busch will be appointed Minister at some Foreign Court and Herbert Bismarck will succeed him here. The appointment will place Count Hatzfeldt in rather an awkward position as foreign diplomatists will prefer talking to the Under Secretary to talking with the Chief.

I think the Prince has given up his desire to go abroad—so that the question of his going to Egypt is shelved. If he had gone I cannot help thinking that a man of his keen insight would have winnowed the chaff from the grain. He would have detected the scandalous lies of the local french press, which pass as current coin in Europe. He would better have estimated the difficulties which the capitulations place in our way and would have recognized the hopelessness of the scheme to govern the country internationally.

I wish you and Lady Granville a very happy New Year,  
Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Jan. 10, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I had some conversation with Doctor Busch, this afternoon, on Egyptian matters and, from what he said, I gathered that he must have knowledge of the counter proposals to be made by France.<sup>29</sup> He said that he had reason to believe that they were framed in a conciliatory spirit and that the principal divergence in the English and French views was as to the yielding power of the Egyptian resources,

<sup>29</sup> The French counterproposals were presented to the powers a week later. See Mitchell, *Bismarckian Policy of Conciliation*, 189-191. The text of the proposals may be found in *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVIII, c. 4337, pp. 96-99.

that the French thought we still estimated the revenue which could be obtained at too low a figure. He added that he sincerely thought that we should not find it difficult to come to an understanding. I also said a few words to Baron de Courcel to day on the same subject and he said that, so far as he could gather from a private letter from M. Ferry, no counter propositions would be made, but only observations on our proposals with suggestions as to modifications of them. He said that M. Ferry had observed that he had been much disappointed at our proposals being unaccompanied by any political proposals, such as those which had preceded the London Conference, as the political part was that to which France attached the most weight, but that, as the English proposals were purely financial, he should consider them from that point of view only and that his reply would not deal with other points.

I can only hope that what Busch and de Courcel said to me may turn out to be correct.

It is a curious coincidence that the news of the little engagement at the Cameroons should have reached Berlin on the precise day on which the debate in Parliament is to take place on the vote of money for the salary of the future Governor.

I shall probably hear on Monday what Prince Bismarck intends to do with regard to the Association and Portugal—I think that the best thing to be done would be for the Powers (as soon as the Association has come to terms with France) to acknowledge the territorial limits of the new State without any reference to Portugal, but all this should be done before the Conference breaks up.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

DEAR MALET,

WALMER CASTLE, *Jan<sup>y</sup>. 14/85.*

For public & private reasons you must have been sorry at our delay in re 3<sup>rd</sup> basis, but it was absolutely necessary to be sure of our ground.<sup>40</sup>

I presume we shall get the French proposals the day after tomorrow—and I trust an early Cabinet will help to decide how we deal with them.

The accounts I have from a Foreign Dip., & your note encourages me to hope that we shall be able to deal with them without much delay.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

<sup>40</sup> The reference is to the agenda of the Berlin conference. The third basis was concerned with the nature of the formalities to be observed in dealing with future occupations on the coast of Africa. It was first debated at the conference on January 7, 1885.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Jan. 17, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I cannot but consider that Prince Bismarck continues to be unfriendly notwithstanding his speeches in the Reichstag. In the Egyptian question, he has, as you will see ere this reaches you, gone in with France, but he gave me no hint that he intended to take this active step, he indicated rather a policy of abstention until France and England were agreed. His sending a reply almost simultaneously with the French and advocating the French proposals was unnecessary and appears to me to be distinctly unfriendly.<sup>41</sup>

The Italian Ambassador has told me that the French proposals have not been communicated at Rome and he held the omission to be a slight. I think the Assab expedition might be used very usefully at Suakin, if only to show the extent of the alliance and the troops might really be extremely useful.<sup>42</sup>

I hope you will be able to accept the modified wording of the article respecting "Protection" now being discussed in Commission, not in order to suit the Germans who deserve nothing from us, but because refusal on our part would look as if we were resolved to maintain the Dog in the Manger policy of simply giving Protection for the purpose of keeping other Powers out of certain territories which we cannot use ourselves, but do not like anyone else to use.

We shall have to abandon this pretension (if we have it) sooner or later and this is an opportunity which ought not to be lost because it will form a precedent on which we can act when we are inconveniently pressed to take places that we do not want.

I am sorry that we are abandoning the Association to the tender mercies of Portugal. There will not be much left of it when both France and Portugal have had their meal.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Teleg. from Sir E. Malet ———**Private and Personal.*BERLIN, D 3.25  
R 5 p. m., 23 Jan./85

Would it not be possible to let political outweigh the legal considerations in regard to 3<sup>rd</sup> basis as the parts of the coast affected by it are so small. Opinion is gaining ground that we have some object in contending for paper protectorates and this is irritating the Germans.

<sup>41</sup> The extent of Franco-German cooperation is fully revealed in Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 190.

<sup>42</sup> An English expedition had been sent to Suakin in 1884. The Suakin-Berber road provided an alternate to the Nile route to Khartoum, but Wolseley early in January twice refused the offer of a demonstration from Suakin to aid Gordon, whose extreme danger had been made clear in a message received December 30.

All the other Powers distinctly say they regard the obligations undertaken as only applying to Africa.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Jan. 24, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

You will be able to judge better of the sincerity of Prince Bismarck's statement to me today, as related in a long despatch, than I can. If Count Münster treated the instructions to him of the 5<sup>th</sup> of May lightly and did not himself see the exceeding importance of them, a great responsibility attaches to him, for all our difficulties seem to date from non-acceptance of the overtures then made. My impression is that Prince Bismarck does, at present, intend to do things which are disagreeable to us in Zululand or elsewhere, whether he will change when he sends us a new ambassador I cannot tell. He may leave the post unfilled up. He said that Ct. Münster did not like giving disagreeable messages, but that it was necessary to have an Ambassador who did not prefer his private friendships to his public duties. The despatch which the Prince read to me and which is to be sent to Count Münster now, is as unpleasant a document as an Ambassador could receive.<sup>43</sup>

I think that the Prince tries to lead one sometimes to understand a certain thing by using words which convey such an impression without stating the thing itself, so that, if the question turn up again, he may be able, if it suits him, to deny that he ever did in fact make such a statement.—For instance, today he certainly conveyed to me that there was an understanding between him and France similar to the one which he had instructed Count Münster to endeavour to come to with us by the Despatch of the 5<sup>th</sup> of May—and that as such an agreement existed it was no longer open to him to treat us on a similar basis.

Now I am inclined to doubt the existence of such an understanding. I doubt France having come to such terms with Germany. I think that isolated acts of mutual benefit may be leading up to an understanding of such a nature. But I cannot help fancying that were you to desire it, Prince Bismarck would find a way to detach himself if the bait were big enough. He, however, declines to say what that bait is, but I cannot help thinking that he wants us to offer something.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Jan. 31, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

D<sup>r</sup> Busch said to me today that he was in communication with S<sup>t</sup>. Petersburg as to the question, wh<sup>h</sup> you required to be answered,

<sup>43</sup> Bismarck's instructions to Münster of May 5, 1884, may be found in Dugdale, I, 170-171, and his emphatic dispatch of January 25, 1885, in *ibid.*, 188-190. The difficulty is thoroughly discussed in Aydelotte, *op. cit.*, 70-72.

before you would advise the Khedive to admit German and Russian Commissioners to the Caisse. He said the matter was difficult since he did not see how to avoid the increase of expenses unless the salaries of the other commissioners were docked and he did not know whether they were under contract or not. If I remember right they are under contract, but I am not certain. Are we prepared to reduce the salary of our Commissioner or do we expect the German and Russian Govts. to pay their own commissioners? Could we not suggest £1000 a year as a sufficient salary, all to be reduced to that ratio as circumstances admitted and the Russian and German commissioners to begin at it—a speedy arrangement of the question is certainly very desirable as the amour propre of both countries is engaged—and the matter, now that we have conceded the principle, is indifferent to us.

I fear I cannot yet see the end of the Conference because if the Association comes to terms with Portugal which appears possible, the neutrality question<sup>44</sup> will again be brought forward and may prolong our discussions for some time.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Teleg. from Malet. Decypher*

*Private.*

BERLIN, D 6-50  
R 9 p. m., Feb. 3/85.

I am anxious to call Your Lordship's special attention to my telegram no 22 of to-day about the Association. It appears to me very much as if the Portugese [*sic*] had bought off the opposition of Germany to their occupation of mouth of Congo, and were making a strong effort to ruin the Association. It [*sic*] existence seems now dependent on help from us. There is a very strong feeling on the subject at Manchester, and I think I ought to tell you privately that the Agents of Association here are told from England that there seems to be persistent opposition to the Association in certain quarters within the F. O.

*Private.*

BERLIN, Feb. 7, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I cannot but think that Prince Bismarck has overreached himself in his latest white book, for his case nearly all rests on the pro mem-

<sup>44</sup> Provision was made for the powers owning territory in the Congo basin to proclaim neutrality in Articles 10-12 of the general act of the conference. For Malet's summary of what was done, dated February 21, 1885, see P. P., 1884-1885, LV, c. 4284, 4-5.

oria which it appears was never presented. When I saw him on Thursday we had a profitless discussion on the Colonial question. He accusing us of unfriendliness and I retorting that I thought we had much more to complain of than he had, among other things he said "I joined in the French (Egyptian) proposals [*sic*] only because you occupied territory on the north of New Guinea in defiance of the agreement with us not to do so". This was too much for me and I replied with some warmth that it appeared to me that it was he who had broken the agreement and that it was his doing so which led us to occupy. He suddenly changed the conversation by showing me the telegram which he had just received announcing the fall of Khartoum and he was very sympathetic and kind on the subject and said that he most earnestly hoped that the news might not be confirmed,—so I thanked him for his congratulations on Abu Klea and he said that our victories had really given him great pleasure.<sup>45</sup>

I was surprised at his consenting to make a joint representation with us and France to Portugal. M. de Courcel had said that I was on a fruitless errand as he had done his best to persuade him and had failed—of course I had perhaps the advantage that I was able to tell him that the Portugese [*sic*] wished pressure to be put upon them, but, as is his wont he had begun the conversation by a long monologue to explain why he would do nothing. I waited till he had done and then spoke to him at length and read out to him the advice which the French Ambassador was prepared to give in writing on which he said "well why should not we give that advice too"—That I said is just what I have come here to propose to you to do, and so the matter was settled.

The heart breaking news from Khartoum has caused great sorrow here and all eyes are turned on what we mean to do in consequence.<sup>46</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 26 Feby. 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I fear that Prince Bismarck means more mischief—I cannot but think that his annoyance at the note about the Cameroons was feigned, as I had received a hint two days ago that something was brewing with regard to Egypt and that the Prince was going to endeavour to prevent a financial settlement apart from a political one. I made an appeal to him and said that it was not generous to increase our difficulties when those which surrounded us were already so great, he replied that the post by which he stood was the Colonial one and

<sup>45</sup> See Allen, *Gordon and the Sudan*, pp. 416, 417, 430-432.

<sup>46</sup> The death of General Gordon on January 26, 1885.



that so long as we treated him badly on that question we must expect counter strokes elsewhere. He said that he should like to send Hatzfeldt to London—Hatzfeldt is an able and conciliatory man and is I believe an excellent Ambassador who would, I should think, be much liked in London. The Prince spoke to me for a long time after the conference and said that if he outlived the Emperor he should retire as he was too old to serve a new master, but that he foresaw much trouble in the future and that he was full of anxiety for his country—what he should most like would be that some scoundrel should shoot him when the Emperor died. There was something melancholy in the man who has made the Empire foreseeing so clouded a future for his work.

I leave tonight at 9½ sleep tomorrow night at the Embassy at Paris and cross to London on Saturday and go as usual to no. 19 Queensberry Place.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

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**CHAPTER X**  
**LETTERS, MARCH-JUNE, 1885**

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383



## CHAPTER X

### LETTERS, MARCH-JUNE, 1885

Sir Edward B. Malet left Berlin on February 26 and returned on April 15, 1885. While the ambassador was away on his honeymoon, Charles Stewart Scott acted as British chargé d'affaires. He and the military attaché, Colonel Swaine, corresponded privately with Lord Granville's secretary, Sir Thomas H., later Lord, Sanderson; but neither Scott nor Swaine had direct contacts with Bismarck and the imperial family; they gathered their information from less exalted sources. Upon Malet's return Lord Granville was again supplied with accounts of opinions expressed in private conversations between the British ambassador and the emperor and Bismarck. However, the latter did not unburden himself to Malet as he had done to Odo Russell during Russell's early years in Berlin.

By the spring of 1885 Britain had abandoned her opposition to German colonial expansion in Africa and Oceania; she was still in need of German support in her efforts to reform the finances of Egypt, and she had been informed bluntly that colonial concessions were the price demanded by Germany for such aid. Moreover, the crisis in Anglo-Russian relations over Penjdeh necessitated help from Germany for the British proposal to have the dispute arbitrated; it was hoped in Britain that the emperor of Germany would consent to act as one of the arbitrators. In this connection it is interesting to find that the British foreign office sought the advice of the German crown princess on the choice of arbitrators and that representatives of Turkey in Berlin apparently would have welcomed an Anglo-Russian war.

With the fall of the second Gladstone government in June, 1885, Lord Granville's long connection with the foreign office ended. His farewell note to Malet contains an indirect admission of failure. The outgoing foreign secretary believed that from then on Malet would "find matters easier"; and he hoped that his successor, Lord Salisbury, would be able to settle the troublesome Egyptian questions. At no time had real cordiality existed between Granville and Bismarck; when their relations ended they were farther apart than ever before.



*Private.*

BERLIN, *March 6/85.*

Dear Sanderson,

Ld. Granville will have already seen both Sir E. Malet & Herbert Bismarck & have a clear idea of the situation here.

I send you the following in case it would interest Lord Granville, as I did not like to put it into an official Despatch.

After reading the Chancellor's famous speech on Tuesday I saw Dr. Busch and had a friendly & confidential chat with him.<sup>1</sup>

I said I could not conceive anything more disastrous to friendly negotiation than the recent appeals to the forum of public opinion to pass judgement on differences between the two Govts. which I could not help thinking quite capable of arrangement in the way of confidential diplomacy, but I would appeal to him to say whether we had not been the last to take the public into our confidence & to break through the rule of not publishing confidential documents till after intercommunication of their contents.

With the first part of my remarks he heartily concurred, in regard to the latter he had nothing to say but that no one could regret the unfortunate misunderstandings on both sides more than he did himself, & in saying this he was evidently sincere.

He then went on at once to speak of Lord Granville's speech in the House of Lords,<sup>2</sup> & said that he had been thunderstruck by it, & quite understood the natural irritation of the Chancellor leading him to reply with his recent disclosures to the Reichstag, that the words attributed to His Lordship had been a regular "coup de flèche" & sounded as if meant to wound & to injure Germany's good relations with France & other Powers. I said that we had only the newspaper reports of the Speech, but I must confess to him in confidence that I had always believed, from what I had heard in confidence from Lord Ampthill, that Prince Bismarck had on several occasions—perhaps not very lately—advised our taking Egypt, that even now I did not see that Lord Granville's reported words conveyed much more than the Chancellor himself had admitted to the Reichstag.

<sup>1</sup> On March 2, 1885, Bismarck spoke to the reichstag, expressing irritation at the opposition to his colonial policy and criticizing the publication of confidential documents and summaries of confidential conferences. He denied that he had given the British categorical advice on Egypt. See the account of his speech in the *Annual Register*, 1885, 244–245.

<sup>2</sup> In defending the Egyptian policy of the British government, Granville said in the house of lords on February 27 that Bismarck's advice was "to take Egypt." Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXCIV, 1581.

We held Cyprus as leaseholders under the Sultan, & yet people often said that we had *taken* it. No one could have imagined that we were advised to annex Egypt by force in the teeth of the Sultan & other powers, but I had always understood that at one time Prince Bismarck in his anxiety to see a settled state of affairs in the East, had expressed a wish that Egypt should be taken in hand by some strong European Govt. & had indicated England as the Power which he would prefer to see there.—

Dr. Busch admitted this, always *subject to the consent of the Sultan*, & said that he had himself often had very confidential talks with Lord Ampthill on this subject, though he had always expressed a doubt whether that consent could be obtained without some change of our present representation at Cairo.

I then said that as he had understood Prince Bismarck's soreness at Lord Granville's Speech in the House of Lords, he would, I thought, be equally able to enter into Lord Granville's feelings when he received the purport of the Prince's last confidential communication to Sir E. Malet,—I said that sounded to me very like an unprovoked menace, rather thinly veiled, to a Power which had a right to claim to treat with Germany on a footing of equality.

This fact & the circumstances under which Lord Granville was called upon to reply to an attack in the House of Lords wd. to my mind account for many remarks which might possibly not have been made in calmer moments. I felt certain that there was no intention of damaging by them Germany's good relations with France as these could only be a matter of satisfaction to us in the interest of peace, & I could not see why we could not be all three on good terms.

He was evidently glad to learn that I had been careful to telegraph home the conciliatory ending of the Prince's speech as he evidently attaches much importance to it & was confident in its sincerity.

I then laughingly expressed regret that he had been apparently inundated with our notes, adding that I believed we had not yet counted up the pages of their correspondence, but I would promise him as far as I was concerned to try & make any notes I might have to write as short as possible.

I said that I thought the Chancellor's idea of trying to settle as many questions as possible in confidential conversations an admirable suggestion, but I hoped he would not take it amiss if I reminded him that there was a little difficulty in that way here, as reticence had not infrequently been carried a little far even in the most friendly conversations, & I believed that I was not wrong in assuming that especially on Colonial questions the Chancellor kept the direction of things a good deal in his own hands, & that he was not always at Berlin or at leisure to be interviewed.

Dr. Busch did not deny this but said with a smile that, if it only rested with him, he was sure many questions might be quickly & satisfactorily settled by friendly conversations.

He is evidently much worried by the whole business & longing for the day to be fixed for his appointment to a quieter & less anxious post.

He agreed that all we had said should be considered as private & quite unofficial.

Yours very sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.\*

*Private.*

BERLIN, March 14/85.

Dear Sanderson,

I was delighted to hear from Herbert Bismarck that his visit had had so good an effect in clearing up misunderstandings & smoothing the ground for a good settlement of all colonial difficulties. He said that nothing could exceed the kindness of Lord Granville & our Govt. & that he felt he had brought back excellent news & good seed for the future from his long conversations with Lord Granville—That I was to expect a long Despatch recording what had passed, but was to be sure not to write a long Note on it but speak in its sense, or perhaps give a Memorandum as it had been arranged that for the future oral interchanges were as far as possible to be substituted for Notes. I expressed my delight as we were at present short of hands & liked to select our very best penmen for Notes which were to come under the Chancellor's eye, & that Conversations were the pleasanter as they required two people to speak, otherwise we often only heard the answers to our remarks when the Prince's views had been ascertained & communicated in London. He said he was sure his father would see me in any case of necessity.

I asked him if he happened to know whether the Financial Agreement (Egypt) had already been signed, & he gave me the information recorded in my telegram of the 12th,<sup>4</sup> saying that I might perhaps like to telegraph it. I had seen M. de Courcel in the morning, so I added to my telegram his version—although it was not till this morning that he gave me the full particulars reported in my today's Desp: M. de Courcel seemed to think Prince Bismarck was not over anxious to see the Egyptian difficulty settled, & on my expressing curiosity as to the secret motive for this, he admitted that it might possibly to keep [*sic*] a useful lever at hand to use in negotiations with us on other questions.

\* Charles Stewart Scott (1838-1924), secretary of the Berlin embassy, was acting chargé d'affaires in Malet's absence. Later he served as ambassador at Copenhagen, 1893-1898, and at St. Petersburg, 1898-1904.

<sup>4</sup> See *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVIII, c. 4447, p. 5. The agreement was signed on March 18.



When I saw Herbert Bismarck last night he seemed anxious that I should not think he had willingly misled me as to the date when the Agreement could be signed. He had not mentioned the 14th on my observing that I understood the Suez Canal Commission was to meet on the 16th, but that could not be now as Derenthal<sup>5</sup> was still at Cairo & had only just been telegraphed to go to Paris for the Commission.

I asked M. de Courcel what he had learned about the Chartered Company in E. Africa, as I had been afraid to put any questions here on the subject lest they might be misinterpreted,—& whether he had discovered whether it touched on Zanzibar territory or not—I hoped that it would turn out to be harmless & an acquisition that the Germans could be welcomed to as not injuring anybody else's acquired rights. He said that he had done his best to get accurate information but the German Govt. were evidently anxious to be very reticent on the subject, & he could send his Govt. no more news than the German papers gave. He felt that it must trench somewhere on Zanzibar territory, as he believed the Sultan claimed to go nearly as far as Lake Taganiyika [*sic*]. I observed that I believed the financiers & men of business here looked upon it as a very unpromising venture, but he said he thought it was one which the German Govt. attached considerable importance to, this conclusion he drew from the standing of the men engaged in it & the fact that Rolfs had officially announced the acquisition to the F. Consuls at Zanzibar at the same time as the Charter was published here. He complained of the great secrecy with which Pce Bismarck surrounded his colonial aims as causing them difficulties very similar to ours. The French Govt. he said, had given Nachtigall letters of introduction just as we had done, & he had used them to interfere with their Colonial acquisitions, but he added the Germans have a way of their own to do business & love reticence.<sup>6</sup>

Ct. Launay the Italian Ambassador<sup>7</sup> complained to me that he was being kept quite out in the dark here as to what was going on & suffering the "contrecoup" of Germany's irritation with England, I said I hoped that was now a thing of the past & yesterday he told me he had said to Dr. Busch that he hoped that now that Germany had evidently made it up with England, he would get the benefit of the change too, & that Dr. Busch had laughed but said nothing, & he could not get him to answer the repeated questions of the Italian

<sup>5</sup> Von Derenthal was German agent and consul general at Cairo and therefore a delegate to the Suez Canal commission, which sat in Paris, March 30–June 13, 1885.

<sup>6</sup> Bismarck had requested the British government on April 19, 1884, to give assistance to Dr. Gustav Nachtigal, who was being sent from his post as German consul general at Tunis to West Africa to investigate German commerce there. Actually his mission resulted in the German occupation of the Cameroons on July 14, 1884. See Rudin, *op. cit.*, 36–38.

<sup>7</sup> Count Launay was Italian ambassador at Berlin, 1867–1892.

Govt. as to who or how many Delegates they were going to send to the Suez C. Commission or tell him anything about the financial agreement.

I think the general impression here, in spite of some of the rabid Anti-English papers who remain dissatisfied & distrustful of us—is one of relief at the arrangement of our diplomatic differences. But people are all inclined here to take a rather Russian side on the Afghanistan question & to ridicule the idea of our being in serious earnest or able to hold our own with so many hot irons in the fire.\*

I attribute much to the disastrous encouragement which—during the heat of the argument—was indirectly given in official quarters to the Anti-English party—which is always strongest in N. Germany (which is also anti-foreigner of every description). I believe the chief object of the encouragement was to carry the Colonial Bills through the Reichstag, but it was a dangerous weapon as the feeling was excited too far & will take time to allay. I find many of my Colleagues under the impression that Bismarck's hand is to be seen in the Russian advance in C. Asia, they conclude this from its following the meeting of the 3 Emperors & the rapprochement between Russia & Germany after a long bout of coolness, also the reestablishment of the German mission at Persia. Without going so far as suspecting direct connivance on the part of Germany, the more sensible are convinced that Russia bargained at Skierniewice<sup>9</sup> for free hands in the East of the Black Sea, if she kept quiet in E. Europe, & that she satisfied herself that on account of the Colonial difficulty England would not get much moral support from Germany, also that the present occasion was propitious, but one cannot conceive Pce Bismarck running so counter to all his known policy as to wish to rekindle an Eastern question in any shape.

I hope I haven't bored you with too long a letter, you must be very anxious & have your hands full.

If you think anything I have written likely to interest Lord Granville will you please show it to him.

Yours very sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

[Copy]

*Private.*

F. O., 28 March 85.

DEAR M<sup>r</sup> SCOTT,

Pray ask C<sup>t</sup> Herbert Bismarck to offer to his father the Chancellor my best wishes on his birthday. As I shall be the same age myself a month later, I do not venture to use the word "congratulations".

Yrs sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

\* See Lobanov, *Russia in Asia*, 177-180.

<sup>9</sup> See above, Malet, "1884," n. 9.

*Private.*

BERLIN, March 28/85.

DEAR SANDERSON,

Just a line to ask you to let Lord Granville know that the person referred to in my *Secret Desp*: of today is Herr von Bleichröder, who is deep in the great Chancellor's confidence, & is also himself deeply interested financially in Russia's solvency, having been the House which furnished her last loan, on Bismarck's assurance that peace in Europe had been secured, & that Russia would not embark in war. He is naturally himself very much alarmed & this fact must give colour to his own views.

At the same time I am convinced that he has repeated accurately Prince Bismarck's views, & that the latter is to be believed as to sincerity in desiring peace, & anxiety to act, as far as his engagements will let him, with England.

I think the hint about "localizing" the war if it unfortunately breaks out, as [*sic*] important, it may have some reference to the Baltic.<sup>10</sup>

Yrs sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

P. S. I hope I was not indiscreet in stating frankly my personal views, as I saw that the impression here was that our preparations & big talk were all "*swagger*" or meant simply to cover a contemplated retreat from the Soudan, & draw off the attention of the country from Egypt.<sup>11</sup>

*Private.*

BERLIN, 28. 3. 85.

MY DEAR SANDERSON,

I have just returned from tête à tête lunch with Pce. Dolgorouky, Russian A. D. C. attached to the personal staff of the Emperor of Germany.

Our conversation soon became deeply emersed [*sic*] in the present Afghan question. He was very warlike, but took much pains to try & point out to me the dangers *we* were running by tempting Russia's peaceful intentions, & the dangers *we* would be imposing on *ourselves* by a war with Russia & its consequences, that I came away imbued with the belief he had gone out of his way to try & frighten me in hopes that through me a new channel might be opened by means of which our Govt. might be induced to modify its demands & War be averted.

Or in other words, the impression left on my mind by the conversation was that Dolgorouki was playing a game at "brag," &, although

<sup>10</sup> England feared a war would break out momentarily with Russia over Afghanistan, which England had promised to defend against unprovoked attack. The crisis was reached in the Penjdeh incident, in which Russian troops on the Afghan frontier defeated Afghan troops on March 30. See Langer, *op. cit.*, 312, and Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 440.

<sup>11</sup> See Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II, 405, and Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 183-185.

there can be but little doubt that Russia is preparing for a possible war, that she is far from ready at present, & that by playing a game at "brag" now she may temporize with us until she has completed all her arrangements & will then become brutal & aggressive.

I have shown this letter to Scott.

Yours sincerely,

L. V. SWAINE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 28. 3. 85.

MY DEAR SANDERSON,

Since my arrival here 10 days ago I have seen a great many people of all sects & classes.

"Mes Intimes" at the Office of the General Staff inform me that they know absolutely nothing of Russia's movements in Central Asia. They have made inquiries at St. Petersburg but their military attaché reports that such is the veil that is drawn in front of all Russia's actions both military & civil in Asia, & especially towards the Afghanistan Frontier, that no outsider can obtain the least information of what is going on.

But this leaves the impression that there is a good deal going on, both as regards the Railway works beyond Kizil Arvat, & concentrations of troops & stores at points within an easy reach of the undefined boundary of Northern Afghanistan.

As regards the feelings of Germans towards England it is more one of regret at the late misunderstandings than one of hostility. The Germans *like ourselves* are a vain people, & like the French are a very touchy people—but touchy not like the French because they are an arrogant & blustering nation, but because they are a young nation suddenly hoisted on the highest pinnacle of military strength in Europe. They owe this rapid promotion to one man. He is their God (barring of a few red caps in the Reichstag) & what he says must be right. Under Lord Beaconsfield's Govt. they believed we were more friendly disposed towards them than we now are; consequently their disappointment at our apparent leaning towards France & their vanity is roused because they think we are hindering their extension of interests & influence outside Europe which their pet man desires to obtain for them.

The whole matter lies in a nutshell.

Germany though generally represented by us allegorically as a student drinking beer we should be making a great mistake if we consequently handled her a la student in our dealings with her.

Far from being as rough in her feelings as she appears outwardly when represented drinking & smoking, she in reality has all the delicate little vanities of a woman, & the Englishman who deals with the

German should be a veritable Don Juan in his delightful & insinuating manner, & in irresistible powers of persuasion.

Such a man was my late chief Lord Ampthill, although he had the additional quality of possessing "la main de fer sur un gant de velour." It would be difficult to look the world over & find a 2nd Lord Ampthill. He grew up with the Empire, & after his death the Empress, in grieving over our loss & their loss & to show how his friendship was valued here, told me "He was English Ambassador in Berlin & German Ambassador in London."

I am delighted to have Malet here as my Chief & from what I know of him of old, I fully believe, when Time has given him the chance, he will be well liked & appreciated in this Capital.

Excuse this long story & believe me

Yrs sincerely,

L. V. SWAINE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, April 4th 1885.

MY DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I gave your Lordship's message to Count Herbert Bismarck, & he has now asked me to tell you that his father was very much touched by your remembrance of his birthday & desired his sincere thanks for your good wishes to be conveyed to you.

The enthusiasm of the National Demonstration was beyond description. I called on the Prince with the other heads of missions & found him radiant with satisfaction & in the best of spirits.

He is, I hear, very much taken aback by the change of government in France as he relied chiefly on M. Ferry for the maintenance of the "entente cordiale" & had a very high idea of his prudence.

There is nothing as yet to indicate a political object in connection with Riza Pasha's visit to Berlin,<sup>12</sup> but as he stops here some days longer, I shall keep my eyes & ears open.

I think that if our differences with Russia had resulted in a serious conflict—a contingency which they seem to think here has now been avoided—we should have had to prepare for Prince Bismarck sacrificing every other interest to his desire to localize it, & perhaps even to his endeavouring to secure the neutrality of Turkey.

He is sensitively anxious to avoid giving Russia any ground for suspicion that he is on *too good* relations with England at the present moment, hence the disinclination of the local Press to give more than a passing notice of the recent visit of the Prince of Wales, for fear that political capital might be made of it.

The articles in the Cologne Gazette taking the Russian view of the Afghanistan question, were, I am told on very good authority,

<sup>12</sup> Ali Riza Pasha was first secretary to the sultan of Turkey.

many of them written by Herr von Lindau who is connected with the Foreign Office & whose pen is often used by the Prince.

No more mischievous articles could have been written at this precise moment than Herr Blowitz's letters from Paris about the Prince of Wales's visit, they caused deep irritation & might have done serious harm in high quarters.

Believe me, my dear Lord Granville,

Your Lordship's very faithful,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

*Private.*

BERLIN, April 11/85.

DEAR SANDERSON,

I send you the enclosed letter from Swaine which I think Lord Granville might like to read. It gives what I believe to be the opinion of the leading military Authorities here, who have not to take political consideration into account.

Bleichröder who is again my authority for most of the information in my Secret Desp: today, strongly insists on the improbability of Russia at this moment embarking in a war unless actually forced to do so, that her placing a tax on the coupons of her foreign loans should be taken as a peaceful & not as a warlike sign, as it will render it quite impossible for her to raise a sixpence anywhere on the Continent, & that she is not in the position she was before the Turkish war to draw sufficiently on her home credit.

He ought to know the financial situation of Russia well as he has been so frequently consulted by M. de Giers on the subject & has the best sources of information at his disposal.

He is however evidently very much alarmed & has been sounding his friend the Chancellor as to whether he could not do something to avert the threatened catastrophe.

A question which he asked me & begged me to answer personally, but not to mention again, was rather significant. It was whether I thought the Indian Govt. would regard with equal alarm, as in regard to Afghanistan, a Russian occupation of Persia & her extension in that direction to the sea, leaving Afghanistan untouched, I replied at once that in my private opinion this would constitute almost a greater danger to India than a Russian occupation of Afghanistan. He then begged me to forget his question entirely.

It may have been only a private idea of his own, knowing what Russia's real ambition was. But it may also have been thrown out by the Great Chancellor. In any case please keep this as secret as you can, if you think it worth mentioning to Lord Granville.

Said Pasha, who professes to be personally very friendly to England wished me, I think, to have some hint of the difficulties which we should have to encounter if things came to the worst.

I may perhaps be able to let you know soon the nature of any steps likely to be taken to keep Turkey quiet, if you have not earlier information from Constple. or Vienna.

I write this in the greatest hurry to catch the Messenger.

Yrs sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

*Private.*

BERLIN, 11 April, 85.

MY DEAR SCOTT,

At Count Hatzfeldt's dinner last night I sat next to General Count von Waldersee,<sup>18</sup> the Chief, next to Field Marshal Count Moltke, of the General Staff of the Germany Army.

He asked me whether we had any further details of the fight between the Russians & Afghans at Penjdeh. This question opened a conversation on what chances there were of a peaceful or other solution of our negotiations with Russia.

Count Waldersee said that the holders of Russian Stock in England had been very clever some time ago to get rid of their Russian papers & the people of Germany had been fools enough to buy them up. This very naturally influenced them strongly in a wish for peace.

But, he continued, looking at it from a Military point of view he felt that never again would we stand opposite to Russia in more favourable circumstances. He doubted whether at any time in our History the Mother Country, India, & our Colonies were so closely bound together by mutual friendship as they were at this moment; & he doubted whether Russia had ever been in a worse condition financially speaking than now. She had not a single friend—not even Holland, he thought—who would advance her one farthing for warlike or any other purposes.

Russia was now further from her proper base on the Caspian than we were from India, supposing the theatre of war to be in the Herat neighbourhood. This would not be so in a year or two hence, as by that time the Rail from Kizil Arvat along the Persian Frontier would be considerably advanced, far more so than our line to Quetta, which would appear still to require two years for completion. Count Waldersee looks upon a war between Russia & England in Asia as one of the certainties in store for History, to report on. When therefore he says that he looks upon today as the more favourable moment for us, he may be said to be reechoing the feeling of scientific soldiers of Germany.

But it must be understood that my conversation with him confined itself to the military policy.

<sup>18</sup> Count Alfred von Waldersee (1832-1904), later field marshal, since 1881 had been a member of the German army's general staff, as chief assistant to von Moltke, whom he succeeded, 1888-1891.

One other point he touched upon was the means of communication between Sir P. Lumsden & London.<sup>14</sup> He warned me against trusting to any other but the telegraph line through India to England.

If you think it worth while to make any use of this letter pray do so, but very confidentially.

Yrs sincerely,

L. V. SWAINE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, April 18, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

We arrived here safe and sound on Wednesday the 15th after a pleasant week at Paris and two days at Brussels, where the King was most kind to us. His Majesty has presented me with his portrait in oils as a wedding present and partly in souvenir of the West African Conference.

The Empress received my wife yesterday and was most gracious to her not the least of H. M.'s kindness being Her receiving her so quickly—and today the Crown Princess was also kind enough to receive her—so now we are all ready for our official receptions which will take place immediately—I am glad to say that Ermyn seems to take to her public duties as if she were to the manner born.

I have been here too short a time to write on politics. I gather that if we go to war Germany will dedicate her energies to compelling Turkey to remain neutral.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, April 18, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I inclose an account of a conversation between Colonel Swaine and Said Pacha, Turkish Ambassador at Berlin. He was Turkish minister for foreign affairs while Lord Dufferin was treating the Egyptian question there in 1882, and his views are useful as showing the turn of thought which the possibility of a renewed alliance has taken in his mind. It is not unlikely that he has endeavoured to harmonise his project with the desire of Prince Bismarck to prevent the struggle spreading to Europe.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

<sup>14</sup> General Sir Peter Stark Lumsden (1829-1919), a member of the Council of India, 1883-1893, was British commissioner for the demarcation of the northwest boundary of Afghanistan, 1884-1885.



[Copy]

*Private.**14th April, 1885.*

I yesterday paid Said Pasha, whom I had known in Constantinople, a visit. He asked me what people said in England of affairs on the Afghan frontier, I replied that the Newspapers representing public opinion seemed very determined as to what we had to demand of Russia, and that, failing her acceptance of our proposals we had no alternative but to go to War.

His Excellency then burst forth in regret that since the Crimean War England and Turkey had not managed to remain throughout on better terms.

"When that war was over if the Queen of England had hoisted Her banner and the Sultan had hoisted another one and the People of Turkey had been called upon to elect under which of the two they would rally, I can assure you, such was the love and affection we then bore to you, that we would en masse have rushed for your Queen's."

"But it is your system of Government also that prevents our knowing à quoi nous tenir. In 1877 and 78 the Government appeared inclined to help us against Russia, but the opposition prevented it. What has been the consequence? Russia overran our country, forced us to pay a heavy indemnity, and deprived us of some of our most valuable Provinces and strongholds. But the hardest blow of all which you struck us was taking fair Thessaly from us.

"By your own actions you have weakened us, and we can never again be so good an ally to you: Our Country is not what it was and there is not a farthing in the Exchequer, C'est d'ûr. Yet we like you for all that, for you are the only country to which we could ever look for an ally. Germany can be our good friend—nothing else; nor can any other Great Power be either friend or true ally to Turkey.

"You, who have hurt us, and, let us say, indirectly helped to despoil us cannot now expect us to make advances to you for an Alliance should a War between England and Russia break out. You must court our friendship and come to us with offers, if you have any to make.

"If we were to come to an agreement, we should be obliged to hold 150,000 men ready in Europe to oppose any disturbing elements that might appear on our frontier there, for already Russia is setting to work in Bulgaria, to prepare for possible coming events. A minister not taking this precaution would be guilty of great neglect.

"But we could also collect an army of 350,000" (these two totals appear to me greatly exaggerated as to Turkey's power) "on the Russian frontier in Asia Minor if you will pay them. With them and with you we could drive the Russians back across the Caucasus. Give us back at the end of the war, Kars, Ardahan and Batum;

create a Caucasian state similar to Eastern Roumelia or Bulgaria under the Suzerainty of the Sultan; let us take back the indemnity which Russia claimed after our last war, and you will have satisfied our wishes and amour propre, our old friendship will be revived, and all past forgotten.

"Remember that all I have said to you has been en ami, as Said, the Turk, and not as the Ambassador."

I was struck that nothing passed Said Pasha's lips with reference to Turkey in Europe, or to Egypt. His whole mind seemed concentrated on what Turkey hoped to regain in Asia alone were she to throw off her neutrality and boldly join England's interests in the event of a War with Russia. Could such a basis for an alliance have been prompted by the hope of localizing a war and thereby to gratify the rumoured wishes of Germany?

(sd) L. V. SWAINE.

*Private.*

BERLIN, April 25, 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE.

Prince Bismarck came yesterday to be presented to my wife and remained chatting very pleasantly for nearly an hour, but did not touch on politics beyond a few words in the ante-room as he was leaving. He asked me if I had any news and expressed himself as not being very hopeful now of a peaceful issue. He said "We can do nothing" I remarked that it was known that both the Emperor and he desired peace and that I understood that they could not do more than let this be known, unless they were specially asked to do so. He said it was unfortunate at this juncture that we were not on more friendly terms with the Sultan and that a continuance of the traditional English policy would have been useful now, that the Sultan although personally not courageous was a power and could be useful. I observed that I feared that we should at all events have to begin our battle alone for that I did not think that any of the European Powers except, perhaps, Italy were well disposed towards us. He shook hands with me and said "Well we, at all events, are personally and politically friends."

Public opinion here, which for a long time remained optimist [*sic*] with regard to the prospects of peace, has completely veered round and I can only attribute this to its being now understood that Russia intends either to humiliate us or to go to war. Bleichröder whom I saw this morning appeared to consider war to be inevitable and said that every day lost in declaring it would now increase our disadvantages.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

*April 27<sup>th</sup> 1885.***MY DEAR MALET,**

Lord Granville is anxious to obtain what information can be gathered as to the publication of M. de Gier's Despatch of March 31/April 12.

The facts are as far as we know them as follows. The Despatch was received by M. de Staal on the 17<sup>th</sup> and a copy sent to [by] him in a private letter to L<sup>d</sup> Granville in which he mentioned that he had no instructions to read or give a copy of it, and that it must be considered as a verbal & confidential communication. It was not therefore sent into the office but remained with other papers in Lord Granville's boxes though it was seen by Currie<sup>15</sup> & I believe by the Cabinet.

The Russian Embassy state that no copy of the despatch was sent to Berlin until the next messenger went there from St. Petersburg. They did not know when that messenger arrived at Berlin. It would be important to know this. The copy which was made & sent to Ld. Granville contained one error which M. de Staal said he did not think it necessary to correct. In the first paragraph the original runs "nous faisons appel à la sagesse de M. Gladstone." The copy sent to Lord Granville runs "nous faisons appel à la sagesse du Cabinet Britannique."

The Despatch was published in the *Gaulois* of April 22 as received from its private correspondent at Berlin. The text given is not the original. It is either a re-translation into French from a German translation, or as it seems to me is intentionally amplified, for almost all the characteristic French words are retained.

It also appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of April 22, as received from the Berlin Correspondent of the Central News agency. The English translation seems clearly taken from the original French, but a whole sentence is omitted towards the close. That which says "Nous ne faisons ces observations que pour écarter toute apparence d'intentions agressives ou d'hostilité préméditée de la part de nos généraux".

This sentence is not omitted in either of the other versions.

The *National Zeitung* at Berlin also published the Despatch on the 22<sup>nd</sup> April, and the *Standard & Times* telegraphed home translations. I presume the *National Zeitung* gave a German translation. The English version taken from it is certainly not so close a rendering as that given by the Central News to the *Daily Telegraph*, but the sentence towards the close is not omitted.

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<sup>15</sup> Philip H. W. Currie (1834-1906) had been assistant undersecretary of the British foreign office since 1882. In 1888 he became permanent undersecretary, and in 1893 was appointed ambassador at Constantinople, and transferred to Rome, 1898-1903.

What is curious however is that in all three versions Gaulois, Daily Telegraph & National Zeitung, the expression British Cabinet or British Govt. is substituted for "Mr Gladstone", in the first paragraph of the Despatch. The Russian Embassy declare that no copy of the despatch could have come from them, and that this particular alteration shows that it must have been from Lord Granville's copy that the publication originally emanated. It might be a coincidence, but if so it is an odd one.

If it were so, it could only be by an act of gross treachery.

Will you kindly get a copy of the National Zeitung of April 22, or whatever issue contained the despatch and send it home.

Can you ascertain in any way when the Russian Embassy at Berlin received copy of the Despatch. I believe they have already been taken to task by their own Govt. about the publication. Is it possible to ascertain whether the Central News Correspondent really got hold of the despatch at Berlin.

The Russian Embassy here say that you knew of the despatch before it was published. Did anybody tell you of it? or was it only by Lord Granville's reply to some of the statements in it that you knew of it.

I enclose copy of the Despatch & the several Newspaper versions, which please return.

Yours ever,

(sd) T. H. S[ANDERSON].

P. S. Is it possible that in the copy of the Despatch which was sent to the Russian Embassy at Berlin, the alteration was made which Staal had made here. If Staal (as is not unlikely) telegraphed that he had made the alteration they would very likely have made it also at St. Petersburg.

Staal says it was an accidental error, but that I cannot think.

*Private.*

BERLIN, May 2, 1885.

MY DEAR SANDERSON:

In the enclosed memo: I have got together all that is possible, as to the publication of the Russian Note of the [*sic*] 31 March/12 April. The upshot of it is that it is most probable that the note was given for publication here by some one connected with the German Foreign Office.

I need only add that I cannot conceive why the Russian Embassy in London should say that I knew of the Despatch before it was published. It certainly is not the case and when I first saw it, I doubted its being genuine.

It appears pretty certain that the F. O. here is made acquainted officially or otherwise with Russian notes before they reach their

destination. I was told yesterday very privately that Prince Bismarck was in possession of the Russian reply to our demands, but I could not elicit whether it was favourable or the reverse.

Ever yours,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Memorandum*

*Secret.*

The Russian Note of April 12 was first published here in the *National Zeitung* of the 22nd April (Morning edition) a number of this edition is enclosed herewith—It cites as its authority a private telegram from St. Petersburg of the 21st 8½ p. m.

The London *Daily Telegraph* publishes the same text (with the omission of one sentence referred to in Mr. Sanderson's letter) simultaneously with the *National Zeitung* and states that it received it from its Berlin correspondent.

There does not appear to be any permanent correspondent of the Central News at Berlin, or if there is he has been able to keep his incognito in spite of all efforts of other correspondents to detect his existence. The News was probably given to the Agency in Exchange as it is frequently, and offered to all the London papers equally.

The permanent correspondent at Berlin of the *Daily Telegraph* only telegraphed the text on the 22nd at the same time as the other correspondents who saw it in the *National Zeitung*.

The following facts communicated to me in strict confidence on my promising to make a discreet use of them may throw some light on the Authors of the indiscretion.

On the 12th April, the date of M. de Gier's note a gentleman in close & confidential connection with the Berlin Foreign Office told the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* that a Note had just been sent to London by Mr. de Giers, that he was aware of its tenour and that it would be most unsatisfactory to the English Government. The Correspondent informed his employers in London confidentially and told them to be on the Look out for it.

On the 21st April *in the morning* the same gentleman asked the correspondent whether he had now read the text of the Note he had referred to in the *Nord. Allgemeine Zeitung*, he replied that he had not and went home and looked up all the German papers for it in vain. The text only appeared first in the *National Zeitung* the next morning—the 22nd—and in the *Nord. Allgemeine Zeitung* in the evening of the 22nd as taken from the *National Zeitung* (the evening edition of the *Norddeutsche* is enclosed herewith).

The *Daily Telegraph* in London having been already warned to be on the look out evidently saw the importance of the news offered for

sale by the Central News and made use of it, while the other papers appear to have waited for direct news from their own Berlin correspondents.

This would clearly show that the German Government had early and very accurate information from St. Petersburg.

The Cologne Gazette of the 23rd April publishes the text of the Russian Note, but its version is not a literal reproduction of that of the *National Zeitung*:—while rendering very faithfully the original French text of the Note, some of the phrases are turned very differently— (Enclosed is the number of the Cologne Gazette in question).

This is followed by an observation of the Cologne Gazette's Berlin Correspondent (whom I think it would not be difficult to identify with the same person who gave the information to the correspondent of the *D. T.* on the 12th and 21st) to the effect that the version of this Note must not be regarded as a forgery, but that it has evidently been published with M. de Gier's consent.

The question remains, how did the German Foreign Office get the official text and when.

General von Werder the German staff Officer personally attached by the German Emperor to the Emperor of Russia, and holding the same confidential position at St. Petersburg as Prince Dolgorouky does here arrived at Berlin from St. Petersburg on the 14th, and was at once received by the Emperor in a long audience and also, I believe by Prince Bismarck.

The Russian Embassy has not a regular service of Couriers from St. Petersburg, but I believe is sometimes a month or six weeks without receiving a *Feldjäger*,—but every official leaving for Berlin has to enquire at the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, and, if called upon, take charge of Despatches.

The Grand Duke and Gd Duchess Serge<sup>16</sup> with their staff arrived at Berlin in the morning of Saturday the 18th and spent a few hours at the Embassy before going on to Darmstadt. Despatches were no doubt brought by some member of the Staff. As the text was known at the Foreign Office here on the following Monday the 20th—it having been evidently intended to publish it on the morning of the 21st in the semi-official paper, an intention which seems to have been abandoned at the last moment in order to let it appear for the first time in an unofficial paper.—I am inclined to think that the text reached the Russian Embassy here on the 18th. In any case it seems clear that the Berlin Foreign Office was privy to, if not the author of the premature publication.

<sup>16</sup> The Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovitch (1857-1905), son of Tsar Alexander II, in June 1884, married Princess Elizabeth of Hesse (1864-1918).

*Private.*BERLIN, *May 2, 1885.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I gather that there is constant communication between this [F. O.] and St. Petersburg of documents bearing on the situation, and I have little doubt that the Russian Note of the 12th April was given for publication by some one connected with the Foreign Office here.

I have endeavoured to ascertain from Said Pasha whether Hatzfeldt really gave the advice that Turkey had better side with England than with Russia, if forced to do one or the other and though, very reticent, his conversation led me to believe that it was true. He dilated a good deal on the point that we must no longer expect to be received by the Turks with enthusiasm even in case of an alliance, as the general feeling towards us has changed of late years—But he said that any Turk who studied history must know that if they were compelled to choose between an English and a Russian alliance they must take the former but that it would necessitate 200,000 men at once between Constantinople and the Northern frontier and that he did not see at present where they were to get them on a sudden emergency.

De Courcel has told me that the French Govt. has, like Germany and Austria, advised Turkey to remain neutral.

The sympathy in Germany inclines to the Russian side—but the Powers that be are fully alive to the fact that it is not to the interest of any state in Europe that Russia should cripple England—They are not however so much averse to war as they look forward to both powers being weakened, by which those Powers who remain at peace will be comparatively strengthened. This prospective advantage would disappear if the war spreads and therefore they are devoting all their advice towards localising it.

Swaine is of opinion from words let fall in high quarters that the Russians intend to fight.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Decypher. Sir E. Malet**Private.*BERLIN, *D 7.45*  
*R 9.— p. m., 6 May 85.*

I have seen the Crown Princess. Her Imperial Highness is inclined to suggest the King of Denmark or the King of Italy as Arbitrator.<sup>17</sup> She does not think it would be advisable to ask the German

<sup>17</sup> Arbitration of the Afghan frontier question arising from the Penjdeh incident was to be the final solution if failure resulted from the negotiations in London which England and Russia agreed to resume by an exchange of notes, May 1-4. See *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVII, c. 4418, pp. 40-41.

Emperor for many reasons. The King of the Belgians would be a good choice for us, but probably would not be accepted by Russia.

*Decypher. Sir E. Malet*

*Private and Personal.* D 10.50  
BERLIN, R 11.30 p. m., 6 May/85.

I will not act on Yr. Lordship's Telegram of today until you tell me again to do so. The advice of the Crown Princess was founded on a belief that the Emperor is favourable to Russia, but, in my opinion, any decision which He might give would bear more weight in England and Russia than that of any Sovereign and is therefore to be preferred.

*Teleg. to Malet. (Cypher)*

*Private.* May, 7 85, 8.30 am.

Your telegram 10. p.m. Proceed [in re German emperor as arbitrator]

*Teleg. to Malet. (Cypher)*

*Private.* May 7. 85. 1.7 pm.

Give Crown Princess following from the Queen:—

Ministers wish that the German Emperor should be asked to act as arbitrator in the Penjdeh incident. His great military experience, position and character would enable him to form a just estimate of the circumstances.

(sd) G[ranville].

*Private.* BERLIN, May 9 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have some hope that the text of the Arbitration Convention<sup>18</sup> may induce Prince Bismarck to change his views as to the possibility of recommending the Emperor to arbitrate, as it is worded in such a manner as to admit of an award being given, which shall hurt neither party and I pointed this out to Herbert Bismarck this morning when I gave it to him. He had nothing to say himself on the subject, having apparently had the padlock applied which closes the lips of all officials here.

Prince Bismarck, when I saw him on Thursday, spoke of the constant danger which Russia was to Germany and the extreme care which he had to take in all relations with it. He said that the de-

<sup>18</sup> A provisional agreement on the Afghan boundary between Granville and Staal, the Russian ambassador in London, reached during the first week of May, was apparently the basis for the arbitration convention. See *P. P.*, 1884-1885, LXXXVII, c. 4389, Granville to Thornton, May 8, 1885, and *ibid.*, pp. 75-76, for the protocol which finally ended the matter on September 10. Bismarck advised the German emperor not to act as arbitrator in a letter dated May 27, 1885, which may be found in Dugdale, I, 204-205.



cided line which he had taken at the Congress of Berlin ought to have acquired for him the lasting gratitude of Great Britain, but that, now, for the sake of his own Country, he was unable to act in a manner which might open up old sores with Russia and therefore he hesitated to advise the Emperor to accept.

It has been said here for some days that Germany ought to keep out of the question and when a general opinion is expressed the chancellor is usually the source whence the inspiration comes.

I urged strongly that we were not yet out of the wood, but that if H. M. would accept, confidence would be firmly restored and the other negotiations would have a much better chance of success.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *May. 16. 1885.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Count Bismarck, in speaking to me today on the question of arbitration, said that his Father had asked him to tell me confidentially, for your Lordship's information that the text of the Russian agreement of the 18th of March, as given in the draft arbitration convention, did not precisely correspond with a communication which he had had from the Russian Govt., purporting to give the same agreement, as, in the latter version, certain places were mentioned beyond which the Russians should not advance.

Count Bismarck said that as the Russians would not join H. M. Govt. in asking the Emperor to arbitrate, this was now merely of historical interest. I, however, mention the matter as I presume some other Sovereign will now be asked.

Baron de Courcel left unexpectedly for Paris on Saturday last and his doing so has given rise to conjectures. The Italian Ambassador told me that he thought something more was brewing in connection with the Egyptian question. He said that the German Govt. was much dissatisfied with the deduction of 5% from the Egyptian Coupon, and considered it to be illegal before the ratification of the Egyptian convention, which alone authorised it. He seemed to think that if a turn for the better had not lately taken place between England and Germany the latter would have formally protested; as it was he had been told by Count Hatzfeldt that the German Govt. had only "expressed its views on the subject". The act in their opinion fortifies the pretension which they have already made that they cannot consider our presence in Egypt as a safeguard against illegalities and that therefore they are bound to seek a further power of surveillance.

Count Bismarck seems now to be well satisfied with the progress made in the settlement of the Colonial questions and made no complaints when I saw him today.

The appointment of Dr. Krauel to supervise them here in the place of Herr V. Kusserow is very satisfactory.<sup>19</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

BERLIN, *May 23 1885.*

MY DEAR SANDERSON,

It may be useful to remember that the present constitution of the Alexandria Sanitary Board is the work of the redoubtable Baron Napoleon Maximilien Charlemagne de Ring directeur Politique at Paris, who was my first French Colleague at Cairo. It was entirely his child and I agreed to it only in order to maintain friendly relations with him at the time of the Condominium.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps the French amour propre might be aroused at the attempted destruction of this french offspring by Germany.

I do not, however, know whether we have any fundamental objection to the reconstitution of the Board.

Ever yours,

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *May 23. 1885.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I have had two conversations with Baron de Courcel since his return on the day before yesterday. He was at some pains to give me to understand that his sudden journey to Paris was not caused by any fresh conspiracy between him and Prince Bismarck against us. He said that he had been anxious to see M. Freycinet on his assuming office, to talk over affairs in general and that, although he had been to see Count Hatzfeldt immediately on his return, it was a visit of courtesy as "he had nothing to say to him."

We spoke about Egypt and I said that the difficulties which, to my mind, were gratuitously created for us by Germany were hindering the wish of H. M. Govt. to get away from it within a calculable time, that my idea was that we wished for the neutralization of Egypt, so as to withdraw our responsibility with regard to it, but to institute a stable Government there, and that, as long as we were hampered at every turn by the interference of Foreign Governments, the realization of this programme was impossible. Prince Bismarck, I said, had told me when I first came here that we ought either to withdraw from Egypt or to adopt much more drastic measures with regard to it. M. de Courcel replied that this was the language which the Prince had

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Krauel was an adviser to the German foreign office, 1885-1891. For his work in the settlement of the Cameroon question at this time, see Rudin, *op. cit.*, 61-64.

<sup>20</sup> The dual control of Egypt by France and England lasted from 1876 until the English occupation in 1882.

always used, that he grounded it on the declaration that Germany was not interested in the fate of Egypt, but that, for his part, he thought that the Prince was much more interested in the matter than he pretended, for that he was advising M. de Freycinet to be much more firm and exigent than appeared to be advisable. He declared that M. de Freycinet, on the contrary, took the same view as that which I had put forward. He believed Mr. Gladstone to be sincere and a friend to France, and that, if it were possible to smooth our path in Egypt, it would in reality be the best policy for France, as leading to a more proximate retirement of the British forces, but that Germany was urging him on to oppose us in various small things and was not pleased at the reluctance which M. de Freycinet evinced to act upon its advice. I observed that the object of Germany was so transparent that it could deceive no one. As long as we remained in Egypt, friendly relations between England and France, such as they were of yore, were impossible, and, that the sore should continue and increase, was obviously to the advantage of the Chancellor's policy. I hoped that M. de Freycinet would not be led away by so shallow a policy. He reiterated that M. de Freycinet was really well disposed and seemed to see things in their true light. Another person to whom I have spoken lately and who always appears to me to have a very just appreciation of the general political situation is Monsieur Litcano the Roumanian Minister. He said that Prince Bismarck had not concealed, since the Skiernevice interview, that Russia would renew its activity, but that he had thought that it would be in the direction of Persia not of England, as had turned out to be the case. M. Litcano is convinced that at that interview *carte blanche* was given to Russia to do what it liked in the East, provided it renounced Slave propaganda in the countries where Austria desires to extend its influence. He said that Russia had now been checked by the unexpected firmness of England but that we must not expect her to remain quiet and that she will next probably turn her attention to Persia.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, May 30 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

Lord Roseberry <sup>21</sup> [*sic*] will give you the latest phase of the Chancellor's mind as far as he chose to disclose it. I have a feeling that there is a chance for the better not in his disposition towards us,

<sup>21</sup> Archibald Philip Primrose, fifth Earl of Rosebery (1847-1929), at this time was Lord Privy Seal and visited Berlin, May 22-26. See the Marquess of Crewe, *Lord Rosebery* (New York and London, 1931), 192-193. Lord Rosebery was Gladstone's foreign secretary in 1886 and 1892-1894 and subsequently prime minister.

but in his intentions towards us and that it arises from some sort of check that he has met with in Paris.<sup>22</sup>

The Emperor is better today and is to see the Chancellor for the first time since he was taken ill, but I fancy he has been worse than was allowed to be known. The Crown Princess came to see my wife this morning after having seen His Majesty and said that he was not looking at all well and that she much wished that his Doctors could be changed.

Prince Bismarck leaves for Kissingen on Monday or Tuesday and will not return till the end of the month for his second son's wedding.

Believe me . . . etc.

EDWARD B. MALET.

*Private.*

BERLIN, June 4 1885.

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

With reference to your Private Telegram of the 1st instant, on the subject of Zanzibar, I now inclose copy of a letter to me from Count Herbert Bismarck, together with a copy and translation of a memorandum containing Prince Bismarck's reply to the question asked by Your Lordship.

The first proposition is acceptable provided it be added that it is understood that the territory over which Germany has claimed protection be excluded from the discussion. With regard to the mention in Count Herbert's letter of this addition as "words that I proposed to add" I may mention that I merely formulated what he said was a "sine qua non" to the acceptance of the proposal.

The second proposition with regard to the map of the territories claimed by Germany is agreed to providing the western boundaries are not required.

Proposition no 3 does not find favour. The Prince states that the Sultan's protest has already been answered. Count Herbert says in his letter to me "The only remaining point would be to couch no. 3 in other terms so as to avoid the 'Inquiry'." I take it that the wish is that the Sultan should be informed that England and Germany are acting together on a complete understanding.

As far as I can understand, Germany denies the right of the Sultan to any territory on the Continent beyond a strip of coast and is only willing to examine the title of the Sultan to that strip. For instance Count Herbert in speaking of the scheme of English capitalists to obtain a concession from the Sultan in connection with a settlement between the Coast and the lakes, sources of the Nile, observed that the Sultan had nothing to do with that territory except perhaps as

<sup>22</sup> See Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 195-198.

regards the coast and that, except for a railroad to the Coast, there was no occasion to ask for a concession from the Sultan.

If we go in with Germany we must be prepared to go in for a complete reversal of our previous policy with regard to the Sultan which I apprehend to have been to consolidate the power of the Sultan on the main land. I believe the large view to be that this would ultimately be to the Sultan's benefit on account of the influx of trade and the consequent great increase of the commercial importance of Zanzibar but I doubt its being possible to work it through the Agent who has previously upheld the opposite system. If we cannot or will not work with Germany, we shall be in a very awkward position because the German protection will be rendered effective despite us and our influence with the Sultan must collapse, to say nothing of the chances of Zanzibar being bombarded.

We have stated to Germany already that "the supposition that H. M.'s Govt. have no intention of opposing the German schemes of colonization in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar is absolutely correct" (no. 171 Africa) and according to the Germans "Zanzibar" means the Island of Zanzibar alone. The mainland is simply East Africa with rights appertaining to the Sultan along the coast.

Meantime the pressing question is the withdrawal of the Sultan's troops from the territory over which the German protectorate has been proclaimed—until this is done Count Herbert says that his Father will hear of nothing, but he constantly repeats to me that the withdrawal would be effected immediately, if only we would tell the Sultan to order it.

This is to be the momentary test of our friendliness towards Germany—and it would be of great assistance if your Lordship could telegraph to me that advice to this effect had been telegraphed to Sir John Kirk<sup>23</sup> with instructions to see it acted on.

I cannot help feeling that the telegrams hitherto sent to Sir John Kirk have had the flavour of half heartedness about them and may have left him in doubt as to which way H. M. Govt would ultimately lean.

I must ask you to excuse me for the freedom with which I have written. I am very anxious that the Zanzibar question between England & Germany should not become acute.<sup>24</sup>

Believe me . . . etc.,

EDWARD B. MALET.

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<sup>23</sup> Sir John Kirk (1832–1922), physician and naturalist, had been Livingstone's chief assistant on the Zambesi expedition, 1858–1863, and was now virtual ruler of Zanzibar as British consul general, 1873–1887.

<sup>24</sup> See Coupland, *op. cit.*, 395–418. The correspondence on the Zanzibar question from January to November, 1885, is contained in *P. P.*, 1886, XLVII, c. 4609.

*Teleg. Decypher from Sir E. Malet*

*Private.*

BERLIN, *D 4.30*  
*R 7 p.m., June 6/85.*

Count Bismarck has privately called my attention to Reuter's telegram from Zanzibar in Times of the 4th & apprehends possible difficulties from Sultan's hoisting his flag at Chagga & Kilimanjaro.

A short telegram from the German Consul General states that Sultan has replied to his counter-protest respecting Witu in a most unbecoming manner. German Govt. evidently mistrust full tact of their Consul and think he may have acted unadvisably. He is about to be replaced; meanwhile Count Bismarck relies on assurances of good will given by H. M. G. which I have repeated to him, & thinks Sultan will keep quiet if satisfied that he will receive no support from England.

*Private.*

BERLIN, *June 6th 85.*

DEAR SANDERSON,

In Sir Edward's absence I sent Lord Granville today a private telegram about Zanzibar, leaving it to his judgement on his return whether to extend it in official form or not.

I got a private letter from Herbert Bismarck last night containing the telegram (as enclosed) from Reuter's Agency at Zanzibar & saying that "he hoped the report would prove unfounded but he still wished me to see it as showing the evident desire of some people to kick up a row & create difficulties on that coast."

I thanked him for sending it as I had not yet seen it & I confessed that I had personally been under the impression that the Sultan of Zanzibar's Authority already extended in some form to Chagga & Kilimanjaro & that Sir E. Malet had mentioned to him in conversation the fact of Genl. Matthews being at Chagga.—I hoped however that the Sultan's actions at those places, if confirmed, would not in any way interfere with the German protectorates, as I saw both on their maps & ours that these two districts were well removed from both Witu & the limits, as far as we knew them, of the German protectorates in the South.

I repeated the substance of our positive instructions to Kirk, & the assurances which Sir Edward had given of our readiness to welcome & assist German enterprize in districts outside the limits of any other friendly power, & I added my conviction that Germany could rely on our doing our utmost to keep the black Sultan quiet, & to reconcile all interests.

I saw Count Herbert this afternoon by appointment, & pointed out on the German map the relative positions of Chagga & Kilimanjaro

to Witu & Usagara, & begged him to tell me frankly if the German Protectorates claimed any rights at those places, reminding him of the very frank communication which Sir Edward had been authorised to make to the Chancellor respecting possible English schemes in neighbouring parts.

Count H. quite appreciated this & said that Count Münster had already been told to let Lord Granville know how sensible the Chancellor was to the friendliness of this "demarche." It was in a similar spirit that he had sent me the telegram as he felt that it was absolutely necessary that we should keep touch in this question, & be frank in our communications.—He did not know that their people had established any claims in the districts in question, they were pressing them for precise details of the rights which had actually been acquired & had reminded them that it would not do to give them any vague schemes or intentions. At the same time he thought it quite unjustifiable that the Sultan of Zanzibar should make the appearance of Germany on the scene a pretext for hoisting his flag in places where he had never hitherto exercised the slightest authority. It would have been different if we had done so, but the Sultan could scarcely be termed a civilized Power. England & Germany could act together in the cause of civilisation.

He then went on to tell me of a brief telegram just received from Rholf<sup>25</sup> [*sic*] to the effect that, as instructed, he had lodged a counter-protest to the Sultan's protest against the German Treaty with Simba, & that the Sultan had replied in very improper terms. Count H. said they had no reliance whatever on Rholf's tact, & he had shown himself to be a very bad Consular Agent & a successor was on the way out to replace him,—his instructions had been to be as prudent & conciliatory as possible, but possibly he had provoked the Sultan.

He then said he was obliged to send this telegram & Reuter's to the Chancellor to Kissingen tonight, but that to palliate the effect they might have he would add the substance of our conversation.

Both Ct. Herbert, & Ct. Hatzfeldt who also spoke to me on the subject, expressed their conviction that as soon as the Sultan was satisfied that he would receive no support from England, he would change his tone & everything go on smoothly on the basis of Lord Granville's proposals & the agreement privately made with Lord Roseberry [*sic*].

In the course of conversation I mentioned that I saw from correspondence from Zanzibar dated previous to any ideas of German action at Witu that the trouble between Zanzibar & Simba had some-

<sup>25</sup> Frederick Gerhard Rohlfs (1831-1896) was German consular agent in Zanzibar, 1884-1885.

thing to say to charges brought against the latter of kidnapping & slave trade & might have no connection with the Germany treaty.

I cannot help suspecting that the E. African Compy has designs on the whole country to the back of the Zanzibar Coast stretching from Witu as an outlet to their protectorates in the South & that the Society is pressing the German F. O. to try & prevent the Sultan from any action which might forestall them in this.

Herbert Bismarck professed himself not well up in the Geography of the interior but said he was just expecting someone who would be able to coach him up in it.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES S. SCOTT.

[Attached to the above letter is a newspaper cutting reading as follows:]

*"ZANZIBAR, June 3.*

"In virtue of a treaty of alliance concluded by Germany with Simba the rebel chief of Lamo, the German representative has called upon the Sultan of Zanzibar to suspend hostilities against the chief.

"The representative of the Sultan of Zanzibar has received at Chagga & Kilima-Njaro deputations of native chiefs who petitioned the Sultan to hoist his flag in their territory. Complying with their request, the Sultan has accepted the suzerainty of the country.

"Treaties of commerce have been concluded by Zanzibar with Italy & Belgium."

[Following Mr. Scott's letter is this Memo. of Lord Derby's:]

This looks very like the first step towards annexing Zanzibar. I should place no faith in German assurances.

D. *June 8.*

BERLIN, *June 20. 1885.*

DEAR LORD GRANVILLE,

I think that I have said all that I have to say this week on Zanzibar in my public Despatches. We ought not to let off the Germans for acquiescing in our giving protection to the African company<sup>28</sup> and we should make their consent a condition of our helping them with the Sultan of Zanzibar, but the proposal should be worded with care so as not to put forward the Sultan's rights, which the Germans contest. I am afraid that if we insist on the shadow we shall lose the substance.

<sup>28</sup> A British East African company was founded by Sir William Mackinnon (1823-1893). See Coupland, *op. cit.*, 300-318.



I cannot help thinking that an agreement may be come to which shall be advantageous to all three Germany England and the Sultan, but it should be done as soon as possible for we know the excessive impatience of the Chancellor and his inclination to high handed proceedings.

Believe me . . . etc.,

EDWARD B. MALET.

[Copy]

18 CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE, *June 25 1885.*

MY DEAR MALET,

One line and of farewell & regrets.

I rejoice much at your success, & you will no doubt find matters easier now.

I sincerely hope that Salisbury will be able to settle some of the questions, which are most pressing in Egypt. I have no doubt that he will be desirous of coming to terms with Russia.

Please take an opportunity of saying a civil goodbye to Herbert Bismarck for me.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) GRANVILLE.

# INDEX

## A

- Aali Pasha, 36  
 Abaza, Ara, 209 and n. 40  
 Abbedin Pasha, 147 and n. 37  
 Abdul Hamid II, 183  
 Abeken, Heinrich, 47 and n. 5, 48, 52, 56, 84  
 Abel, Dr. Carl, 83, 123  
 Acton, Lord, 47 n. 1  
 Adam, Madam Juliette, 302 and n. 29, 303, 313  
 Afghanistan, 19; and Russia, 335, 345, 392-399. *See also* Central Asian question  
 Africa, partition of, 8  
 Africa, west coast of, 329, 330. *See also* West African conference  
 Alabama arbitration, 56  
 Alabama claims, 50, 54 n. 34, 55, 60 and n. 46  
 Albany, Duke of. *See* Leopold, Prince  
 Albert, the Prince Consort, 13  
 Albrecht, Prince, 293 and n. 10  
 Aleko Pasha, 325  
 Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, 220, 263, 299, 304, 325; and the Princess Victoria, 327 and n. 21  
 Alexander II, 95, 101 n. 30, 103, 107, 108, 116, 117, 121; assassination of, 209 and n. 38, 213, 214. *See also* Russia, Emperor of  
 Alexander III, 104 and n. 34, 209, 213, 221, 273, 316, 403; coronation of, 258, 259, 292, 293; and William I, 222, 223  
 Alexandria, bombardment of, 245, 270 and n. 36; naval demonstration, 264 and n. 29  
 Alexandria Sanitary Board, 407  
 Alfred, Prince. *See* Edinburgh, Duke of  
 Ali Nizami, 239 and n. 74, 240  
 Ali Rizah Pasha, 394 and n. 12  
 Alliance system, 9  
 Alphonsists, 91  
 Alsace and Lorraine, 14, 15, 33, 34  
 American-German relations, 83, 84  
 American press, attacks on Lord Odo Russell, 74 and n. 70  
 Ampthill, Lord. *See* Russell, Lord Odo  
 Ampthill, Lady. *See* Russell, Lady Emily  
 Anderson, Percy, 352 and n. 10, 375, 376  
 Andrassy, Count Julius, 66 and n. 56, 67, 159, 175, 215  
 Anglo-American relations, 37, 71  
 Anglo-French alliance, 75, 94  
 Anglo-French commercial treaty, 69 and n. 60, 75, 94  
 Anglo-French control of Egypt, 16, 134, 135, 407 and n. 20  
 Anglo-French entente, 8, 245  
 Anglo-French policy in Egypt, 245-248  
 Anglo-French relations, 17, 49, 81, 95, 96  
 Anglo-German alliance, 19, 26, 81, 84, 85  
 Anglo-German colonial rivalry, 16, 17, 309 and n. 2, 317-319, 322-324, 329-334, 340, 345, 346, 373, 379, 385, 388, 389, 391. *See also* Britain and Germany  
 Anglo-German relations, 7, 17, 36, 56, 81, 139, 393, 394  
 Anglo-German tariff relations, 116  
 Anglo-Portuguese treaty, 329 and n. 22  
 Anglo-Russian crisis, 1885, 19  
 Anglo-Russian relations, 17, 86 and n. 9, 87, 89, 111, 133, Ch. X, *passim*  
 Angra Pequena, 329, 330, 332-337, 339, 340, 372, 373  
 Arabi Pasha, 266, 274 and n. 42  
 Arco, Count L., auf Valley, 147 and n. 36  
 Argyll, Duke of, 111 and n. 50  
 Armenia, 16, 263, 335  
 Armenians, 8  
 Armenian question, 223, 231, 233, 300, 304  
 Armenian reform, 184  
 Arms controversy, 1870-1871, 40, 41

Arnim, Count Harry Karl Kurt Edward von, 58 and n. 82, 90, 91, 97, 98, 289; and Bismarck, 118; on German-Italian alliance, 60

Artin Effendi, 212

Asia, Central, 86 and n. 9. *See also* Central Asian question

Augusta, Empress of Germany, 17, 51 and n. 22, 55, 75, 99, 109, 110, 119, 172, 273, 274, 292, 303, 313; popularity of, 57; and Britain, 122; and Bismarck, 59, 77, 124; and French reader, 248 and n. 5; and Kulturkampf, 58; and Queen Victoria, 124, 254, 255; on Lord Odo Russell, 394; visit to England, 57 and n. 39, 60, 61, 65

Augustenburg, Prince Christian of. *See* Christian, Prince

Australasia, Monroe Doctrine for, 16

Austria and Albanian question, 158; and Bulgaria, 158, 299; and Russia, 182, 133, 158; and Turkey, 16, 141. *See also* Eastern question

Austro-German alliance, 12, 141-144, 158, 160, 223

Austro-German tariff relations, 176-180

Austro-Prussian war, 7, 100

## B

Baden, Grand Duchess of, 122, 311

Baden, Grand Duke of, 71 and n. 64, 72, 122, 233, 298, 311, 320

Bagdad Railway, 226

Baker, Valentine, 155 and n. 46, 241

Balan, Hermann von, 67 and n. 58, 74

Balkan boundaries, 8; problems, 16

Balkan crisis, 1875-1878, 8

Bancroft, George, 50 and n. 18, 58, 64, 65, 71, 74, 83, 84

Baring, Sir Evelyn, 352 n. 11

Barnabò, Cardinal, 70

Bazaine, Marshal, trial of, 120 and n. 65

Beaconsfield, Lord. *See* Disraeli, Benjamin

Bearne, Sir O., 335

Bechuanaland, 365, 366

Bedford, Duchess of, 233

Bedford, sixth Duke of, 18; eighth Duke of, 63 and n. 51; ninth Duke of, 18, 53 and n. 33, 54

Belgians, King of, 405. *See also* Leopold II

Belgium, British alarm concerning, 37; Catholic party in, 33

Belmont, August, 62 and n. 49

Benomar, Count, 282 and n. 50

Berlin conference, 1880, 137, 145, 148-152, 155, 163, 171, 188, 212

Berlin conference, 1884-1885. *See* West African Conference

Berlin, Congress of, 12, 131-134, 146, 163, 167, 184, 406

Berlin Memorandum, 133, 265

Berlin press, 105

Berlin, Treaty of. *See* Treaty of Berlin

Bersôt, M., 248

Bernstorff, Count Albrecht von, 30 and n. 24, 33, 36, 39, 40-42, 74, 90, 91, 96, 97; and London conference, 37; on Rumanian Jews, 63

Beust, Count Friederich Ferdinand von, 27 and n. 19, 32, 69, 75, 76, 107, 121

Bigelow, John, 50 and n. 18

Bismarck, Count Herbert, 185, 222, 223, 235, 238-242, 250, 254-259, 267, 270, 274-280, 289, 291, 296, 312, 313, 323, 329, 332, 336, 337, 340 and n. 28, 368, 376, 387, 389-391, 394, 405, 406, 409-414

Bismarck, Princess, 91, 208, 238, 256

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 9, 10, 43, 49, 52, 53, 56, 62, 74, 99, 107, 113, 114, 120, 123; advises British annexation of Egypt, 322, 323, 359, 360; alliance overtures to Britain, 133-137; attacks Lord Granville, 387-389; attitude toward Lord Odo Russell, 54; British suspicion of, 124, 225; conversations with Lord Odo Russell, 19, 29-35, 66-68, 87-89, 103-105, 120, 164-169, 188-191, 322, 323, 332, 333; diplomacy of, 7-10; fear of, 272; fears assassins, 32, 33; fears France, 323; fears Franco-Russian alliance, 139, 145, 148, 288; fears Gladstone, 170

Bismarck's foreign policy, 132-137, 159, 160; health, 54, 58, 117, 157, 208, 291, 292, 301, 315, 316, 372, 373; humiliation of, 1875, 182 n. 5; title, 354, 357

**Bismarck, Prince Otto von—Continued**

Bismarck, letter to Sir Alexander Malet, 347, 348; political maneuvers, 121, 122, 202-206, 289; power of, 12, 13, 57, 256; secret service fund, 101; visit to Egypt, 372-374

Bismarck and the German imperial family, 17; and the Crown Prince, 68, 89, 233-236, 372; and the Crown Princess, 68, 236; and Empress Augusta, 68, 75, 77, 85, 86; and William I, 75, 83, 85, 89, 297, 372, 382

Bismarck and Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 327; and Arnim, 53 n. 82; and Beust, 75; and Disraeli, 14, 132, 133; and Freycinet, 252, 253; and the Brunswick succession, 350, 351; and Gambetta, 227; and Gladstone, 14 and n. 9, 132; and Gortchakoff, 103-106; and Lord Granville, 15, 16, 319, 320, 360-364, 366, 387-389, 394, 395; and Rumanian Jews, 63; and Sir Edward Malet, 347, 348; and Lord Odo Russell, 111, 287; and Lord Salisbury, 14; and Thiers, 60; and the Queen of Württemberg, 51

Bismarck and Anglo-French alliance, 139, 290; and Anglo-Russian relations, 102; and Armenia, 300; and arms controversy, 1870-1871, 40, 41; and Austria, 143-145, 154, 158, 162, 170; and the Balkans, 182, 138, 137; and Britain, 35, 68, 69, 83, 84, 121, 122, 132-137, 139, 143-146, 159, 165-168, 197, 265, 271, 275, 276, 291, 295, 296, 322, 323, 338-340, 348, 364-366, 378-381, 387-393; and the British blue books, 87, 272; and the British colonial office, 350

Bismarck and Central Asian question, 164; and the Congo association, 375, 377; and Egypt, 226, 227, 245-247, 251-253, 255, 260-262, 283, 317, 321, 327, 338, 348, 349, 352-367, 381, 382

**Bismarck, Prince Otto von—Continued**

Bismarck and Europe, 120, 139, 142; and Fiji, 318, 319; and France, 8, 28, 38, 59, 124, 125, 143-146, 154, 167, 168, 170, 220, 287, 288, 353, 354, 374, 378, 394, 395

Bismarck and German colonies, 17, 87, 88, 119, 309 and n. 1, 329, 331, 333-335, 337, 339, 365, 390; and German court intrigues 59; and German-Italian alliance, 60; and German parliament, 236, 313; and German politics, 229, 231, 232, 234-236, 334, 336, 338-340; and the German press, 297, 298; and German protective tariff policy, 157, 177-180; and German socialists, 17, 185; and German workmen's insurance, 205, 206, 312

Bismarck and Greek boundary question, 166, 167, 184, 195-197 and n. 12, 208, 213-215; and Hanoverian funds, 101; and Kulturkampf, 17, 58, 301, 303, 304. *See also* Bismarck and the Roman Catholic Church

Bismarck and the London conference, 25, 27, 42. *See also* London conference, 1870

Bismarck and Luxemburg, 1870, 37. *See also* Luxemburg. Bismarck and meeting of the three emperors, 1872, 66; and Montenegrin boundary question, 151, 154; and the Near Eastern question, 148, 153, 162, 163, 213, 214, 371, 372, 381; and the Penjdeh crisis, 19

Bismarck and the Roman Catholic Church, 14, 55, 56, 71, 105, 185, 203, 220, 221, 272, 296, 297, 311, 312; and Russia, 7, 8, 85, 86, 101-105, 167, 168, 213, 214, 222, 223, 256; and San Juan boundary arbitration, 71; and the Smyrna demonstration, 162, 163; and Spain, 301; and the Three Emperors' League, 81, 275, 277. *See also* Three Emperors' League

- Bismarck, Prince Otto von**—Continued  
**Bismarck and Turkey**, 140, 145, 156, 165-168, 170, 171, 173-175, 194, 225, 226, 239, 241, 242, 394; and the United States, 315; and the West African conference, 354, 356. *See also* West African conference  
**Bismarck on Anglo-Austrian-German alliance**, 26; on Anglo-French alliance, 144; on Anglo-French policy in Egypt, 268-270; on Anglo-Russian relations, 104, 108, 109, 174, 408  
**Bismarck on Prince Alexander of Battenberg**, 325; on Andrassy, 67; on Arnim, 90, 91; on Empress Augusta, 58, 67; on Austria, 215; on Belgium, 33; on Britain's policy in Egypt, 224, 254, 321, 322, 407, 408; on the British government, 89  
**Bismarck on Bulgaria**, 325, 327; on Central Asian question, 108, 397, 399; on the Congo Association, 363, 365; on Egypt, 267-269, 271, 272, 314, 316, 332-334, 355, 356, 361, 362; on Empress Eugenie, 33; on the Fiji claims, 325, 326, 337; on France, 215, 289, 293, 311; on Franco-Russian alliance, 167; on French policies, 322; on Germany, 382; on German government, 67; on a Germany navy, 87, 88  
**Bismarck on Gortchakoff**, 67; on Haymerle, 197, 215; on Irish question, 191; on Italian statesmen, 105; on Luxemburg, 33 and n. 29; on the Near East, 30, 31, 188-191; on Russia, 215, 405, 406; on Russo-German relations, 320; on Spain, 104-106; on Turkey, 217, 218, 275, 399; on William I, 66, 67; on Zanzibar, 410-414  
**Bismarck, Count William**, 373  
**Bismarcks**, the, 94  
**Bitter, Karl Herman**, 203, 204  
**Black Sea conference**, 1870. *See* London conference, 1870  
**Black Sea clause**, 25; neutralization of, 37; question, 31, 32  
**Bleichröder, Gerson von**, 9, 72 and n. 65, 193, 235, 283, 315, 316, 348, 362, 392, 395, 399; and Egypt, 360  
**Blind, Carl**, 83  
**Blowitz, Henry S. O. de**, 227 and n. 59, 395  
**Boffondi, Cardinal**, 70  
**Bonaparte, Prince Victor**, 311 and n. 4  
**Bonapartists**, the, 114  
**Bosnia, insurrection in**, 251 and n. 9  
**Bowyer, Sir George**, 99 and n. 28, 120 and n. 66  
**Bremen, commercial interests of**, 17  
**Bright, John**, 186, 216  
**Brincken, Baron F. H. von**, 147 and n. 34, 149  
**Brisson, M.**, 254  
**Britain**, 12, 288  
**Britain and Africa**, 356; and Bismarck, 43; and the Carlists, 99 and n. 28; and the Congo, 373  
**Britain and Egypt**, 16, 245-248, 250 ff., 314, 327-334, 338, 352 and n. 11, 359, 360, 366, 367  
**Britain and France**, 8, 11, 12, 134, 135, 223, 224, 255-257, 287, 288; and Franco-Prussian war, 23-25  
**Britain and Germany**, 84, 117-119, 288, 309, 385-389; and German colonial expansion, 329, 330; and German officers in Turkey, 155, 156, 230-232  
**Britain and Greece**, 146; and Luxemburg, 37; and New Guinea, 369 n. 30, 371; and Persia, 111; and Russia, 25, 345, 346, 385, 390 ff., 404, 414. *See also* Anglo-Russian relations  
**Britain and Sino-French war**, 360; and the Sudan, 392; and Turkey, 398, 399; and Zanzibar, 410-414  
**British army reforms**, 91 and n. 15, 92  
**British attitude toward Bismarck**, 10, 143-145; attitude toward Germany, 10-13  
**British colonial office**, 16; colonial policy, 16; elections, 12, 81, 124 and n. 75, 125, 131; embassy in Berlin, 47 n. 3  
**British imperial expansion**, 13, 16, 181  
**British foreign policy**, 39, 132-137; tariff policy, 136  
**British press and Franco-Prussian war**, 28; and Angra Pequena question, 373

British population and trade, 12  
 Brunnow, Count Ernest Philip, 87 and  
   n. 37, 86 and n. 10, 87, 108, 111  
 Brunswick, 99-101  
 Brunswick, ex-Duke of, 53 and n. 81  
 Brunswick succession, 349 and n. 8, 350-  
   352  
 Bulgaria, 167, 168, 304. *See also* Alex-  
   ander, Prince of Bulgaria  
 Bulgaria and Russia, 325, 327; and Tur-  
   key, 325, 327  
 Bulgarian nationalism, 141  
 Bülow, Bernhard von, 115 and n. 56,  
   117-119, 125  
 Busch, Moritz, 172, 173 and n. 64, 207  
   and n. 36, 224, 226, 227, 259, 266, 272,  
   274, 290, 300, 347, 348, 367, 374, 376,  
   377, 379, 387-390

## C

Cadogan, Henry George Gerald, 356 and  
   n. 16  
 Cadorna, Carlo, 39 and n. 40, 118 and n.  
   63  
 Calice, Baron Heinrich von, 211, 212  
 Cambridge, Duke of, 99 and n. 27, 111,  
   112 and n. 51, 157, 158 and n. 51, 349  
   and n. 8, 350-352  
 Cambridge, Princess Mary, 112 and n.  
   51, 113  
 Cambridges, the, 99, 110, 112 and n. 51  
 Cameroons, 365, 366, 377, 381  
 Campbell, Forbes, 99  
 Camphausen, Otto, 116 and n. 60, 221  
 Candahar, 195 and n. 11, 200  
 Cape Colony, 330, 334  
 Carlists, the, 99  
 Carolath, Princess, 238, 239  
 Cartwright, Aubrey, 374  
 Cartwright, William, 374  
 Castellans, the, 59  
 Catholic Church, 14, 71. *See* Kultur-  
   kampf, Jesuits, Folk Laws, Papacy,  
   Pius IX, Pope, Ultramontane, Vatican  
   and Vatican Council  
 Cavendish, Lord Frederick, 268 and n.  
   26  
 Cavour, Count Camillo di, 32 and n. 28  
 Cazalet, E., 270  
 Central Asia, 335, 391 ff.  
 Central Asian question, 86, 87, 89, 345,  
   394, 395; arbitration of, 404 and n.  
   17, 405 and n. 18, 406  
 Challemel-Lacour, Paul Armand, 296  
   and n. 15  
 Chambord, Count of, 49 n. 15, 115 and n.  
   57  
 Champagne, occupation of, 34  
 Chandordy, Jean Baptiste, 39 and n. 39  
 Charles, King of Rumania, 31 n. 27  
 Charles, Prince of Prussia, 55 n. 35,  
   290 and n. 5  
 Charles, Princess, 55 and n. 35, 116  
 Charlotte, Princess, 303  
 Childers, Hugh C. E., 280 and n. 47, 281,  
   328  
 China and France, 8  
 Christian, Prince of Augustenburg, 13,  
   112, 277  
 Christian, Princess, 218 and n. 48, 277  
 Clarendon, Lord, 18, 56, 199  
 Clark, Sir Andrew, 300 and n. 24  
 Cobden, Richard, 136  
*Cologne Gazette, The* 394, 395, 400-404  
 Colley, Sir George Pomeroy, 199 n. 19  
 Colvin, Sir Auckland, 228 and n. 61, 276  
 Congo, the International Association of  
   the, 358 and n. 21, 361, 363-371, 373-  
   375, 377, 378, 380  
 Connaught, Duke of, 158, 279, 298  
 Connaught, Duchess of, 298  
 Constantinople, conference of ambas-  
   sadors at, 157, 201, 215 and n. 43,  
   267-269 and n. 33  
 Cork, Lord, 337  
 Corti, Count Luigi, 206 and n. 34, 207,  
   210  
 Courcel, Baron de, 253 and n. 13, 254,  
   257, 259, 260, 264-266, 269, 278, 282,  
   315, 361, 364, 377, 381, 389, 390, 404,  
   406  
 Crete, cession of to Greece, 190  
 Crowe, Sir Joseph Archer, 143 and n.  
   27, 153, 154, 185, 352; letter from,  
   202-206; memorandum, 176-180  
 Crown Prince of Germany, 17, 27 and n.  
   16, 29, 38, 42, 43, 48 n. 11, 49-51, 53,  
   54, 57, 65, 97, 98, 101, 115, 116, 124,  
   142, 172, 227, 229, 233, 247, 248, 270,  
   272, 279, 292, 298, 298; visit to Spain,  
   287, 301-304, 311, 312; and Bismarck,  
   233-236; and Britain, 281, 337; and  
   J. A. Crowe, 154; and French Repub-  
   lic, 289; and German colonization,  
   119, 337; and Italy, 277; and the Pope,  
   311, 312; on British annexation of

Crown Prince of Germany—Continued  
Egypt, 277, 278; on the Brunswick succession, 351; on the French Republic, 311

Crown Prince of Prussia. *See* Crown Prince of Germany

Crown Princess of Germany, 13, 17, 27 and n. 16, 48 n. 11, 49, 51-53, 55, 57, 59, 65, 75, 97, 98, 101, 102, 115, 116, 119, 122, 150, 172, 233, 248, 254, 272-274, 279, 281, 292, 298, 303, 312, 337, 397, 409; and Bismarck, 13, 236; and Hatzfeldt, 239; and San Juan award, 73, 74; on William I as arbiter, 404, 405

Cumberland, Duke of, and the Brunswick succession, 351

Currie, Phillip H. W., 400 and n. 15

Cyprus Convention, 16, 136

Cyprus, occupation of, 304; and Britain, 388

D

*Daily Telegraph, The*, 96, 400-404

Danish war, 7, 10

Danube conference, 291 and n. 7, 293-295

Danube, control of, 26, 30, 31

Danubian Principalities, 31 and n. 26

Davis, John Chandler Bancroft, 58 and n. 40, 83

De Angelis, Archbishop, 70

Delagoa Bay, 374

Delbrück, Friedrich Rudolf, 50 and n. 19, 55, 72, 75, 76, 115, 116

Denmark, King of, 404, 405

Denmark, position of, 10

Derby, Lord, 12, 131, 216, 265, 290, 374, 375; and Fiji question, 318; on Black Sea clause, 25; on German policy in East Africa, 413

Derenthall, von, 390 and n. 5

Dervish Pasha, 267 and n. 35, 268

Dickson, Dr. J. R. L., 109 and n. 47

Dino, Duke of, 72 and n. 67, 116, 117

Dinos, the, 59

Disarmament, 92

Disraeli, Benjamin, 12, 14, 81, 216, 234, 304; and Egypt, 322; defeat of, 136; foreign policy, 131-137; purchase of Suez Canal shares, 16

Dolgorouki (Dolgourouky), Prince Nicholas, 222 and n. 54, 259 and n. 20, 317, 392; Princess, 261 and n. 22

Dreikaiserbund. *See* Three Emperors' League

Drigalski, General, 169

Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria), 8, 139

Dufferin, Lord, 158 and n. 50, 192, 219, 226, 231, 238, 241, 276, 279, 319, 397

Dulcigno, naval demonstration off, 154, 162, 165, 183, 194

Du Plat, Sir Charles Taylor, 290 and n. 6

## E

East Africa, British chartered company, 413 and n. 26; German chartered company, 390, 413

Edinburgh, Duke of, 107 and n. 41, 122, 124 and n. 74, 216, 293, 294

Egypt, 8, 19, 260, 314, 372-374, 414; Anglo-French control of, 16, 226, 256, 257; British intervention in, 245, 246, 275, 287, 288, 331; British troops in, 331; crisis, 223-226; conference on, 1876, 377; conference on, 1884, 321, 322, 328-332, 338, 339 and n. 27; law of liquidation, 314 and n. 6, 316, 317, 321, 322, 330, 348, 349, 359, 360 n. 22; neutrality, 25; German press on, 281; Turkish intervention in, 226, 251-253, 257, 259, 265-267, 269, 270; war in, 378 and n. 42; and Bismarck, 283; and Britain, 309, 322, 323, 359, 360; and the powers, 355, 356, 361, 362; and the Three Emperors' League, 266

Egyptian finances, 13, 17, 135-137, 321, 327 and n. 20, 330, 331, 338, 352 and n. 11, 354-357, 359, 360 and n. 22, 366, 367, 372, 373, 377, 378, 385, 389, 406

Egyptian Public Debt Commission (Caisse de la Dette Publique), 321 and n. 21, 322, 330, 331, 359, 360, 379, 380

Elliot, Sir Henry, 192

Elphinstone, Sir Howard, 290 and n. 6

Emperor of Germany. *See* William I

Emperor of Russia. *See* Alexander II and Alexander III

Emperors, meeting of, 65 and n. 55, 66, 67

Empress of Germany. *See* Augusta, Empress

England. *See* Britain

England, Bank of, 72

- Eugenie, Empress, 114; negotiations with Bismarck, 83  
 Eulenburg, Count Botho, 202 and n. 27, 203  
 Eulenburg, Count Friedrich Albrecht von, 85 and n. 6, 86, 116, 123  
 European concert, the, 9, 143, 149, 153, 192, 194, 266; and Egypt, 253, 268-270
- F**
- Falk, Dr., 12 n. 7, 301  
 Falk Laws, 12, 303  
 Faucher, Julius, 52 and n. 27  
 Favre, Jules, 23 and n. 7, 39, 42  
 Fenians, 295  
 Ferry, Jules, 329, 357 and n. 18, 361, 362, 364, 377, 394  
 Fiji Islands, 317-319, 325, 326, 328, 329, 337; German claims in, 298, 337  
 Fish, Hamilton, 50 n. 18, 106  
 Fish, Nicholas, 50 and n. 18  
 Fitzgerald, Lord Otto, 119 and n. 64  
 Fleury, General Count Emile Felix, 53 and n. 32  
 Forckenbeck, Max von, 77 and n. 73  
 Forster, William Edward, 262 and n. 25  
 France, 8, 9, 12, 49 and n. 15, 81; and Africa, 358 and n. 20; and Bismarck, 8, 245, 246; and Britain, 287, 288; and China, 8; and the Congo Association, 363, 368-371, 374, 377, 379  
 France and Egypt, 16, 245-248, 322, 328, 330, 357, 376; and Germany, 34, 353, 354, 362, 379, 407, 408; and Greek boundary question, 16, 146, 147, 187, 188; and London conference, 1870, 27, 36, 41, 42; and Madagascar, 287, 288; and Tunis, 8; and Turkey, 189  
 Franco-Belgian relations, 35; Franco-German relations, 33, 34, 58, 59, 72, 73, 81, 96 and n. 22, 106, 120, 121; Franco-Italian relations, 8, 135; Franco-Russian relations, 40, 98, 96, 288  
 Franco-Prussian war, 7, 8, 10, 15, 17, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 36, 38, 40, 41, 72, 84  
 French Catholic party, 59  
 French elections, 102  
 French government, 1870, 28, 84, 85  
 French war indemnity, 34; war of revenge, 84, 92, 96, 102, 103; war scare, 1875, 8 and n. 2
- Francis Joseph, Emperor, 121  
 Frankfort, annexation of, 7, 8  
 Frankfort, Diet at, 19  
 Frankfort, Treaty of. *See* Treaty of Frankfort  
 Frederick Charles, Prince, 48 and n. 10  
 Freycinet, Charles Louis, 150 and n. 10, 245, 261, 266, 271, 408; and Bismarck, 252-254; and Egypt, 252, 253, 260
- G**
- Gambetta, Léon, 28 and n. 21, 224, 227, 233, 234, 237, 254, 287, 289; visit to Bismarck, 228; and Egypt, 245-249, 252-254; government, 84  
 Geneva arbitration, 54 n. 34, 55. *See also* Alabama claims  
 George III, 11; sons of, 11  
 George IV, 11  
 George, Princess, 314 and n. 8  
 Gérard, Auguste, 248 and n. 5  
 Germany, 10-12, 77, 103, 124, 287, 288, 302; Russian hatred of, 299; tariff policy and tariff history, 76, 77, 135, 136, 157, 176-180  
 Germany and alliance with Austria and Britain, 31; and Anglo-French commercial treaty, 76; and Angra Pequena, 373; and Austria, 125; and Britain, 32, 55, 56, 63, 75, 309, 339, 387-389  
 Germany and Central Asian question, 404; and Delagoa Bay, 374; and Denmark, 88; and Egypt, 245-247, 406, 408; and European peace, 34, 103; and Fiji, 317-319, 322, 323, 325, 326, 328; and France, 92, 362, 378, 379, 387; and French war of revenge, 58, 59  
 Germany and the Irish question, 229; and Italy, 92, 116; and the Near East, 30, 31, 153, 318, 319; and the Netherlands, 87, 88; and New Guinea, 368, 369 n. 30, 371, 372; and the Poles, 56, 88, 89; and Portugal, 367, 380  
 Germany and Russia, 36, 85, 86, 92, 93, 95, 102-105, 121, 141, 142, 213, 315, 391, 396, 403, 404; and Spain, 303, 304; and the Suez Canal, 322; and Turkey, 16, 31, 155-157, 297; and Turkish railways, 297; and the Vatican, 62; and Zanzibar, 390, 409-414  
 German army, 120, 121, 124, 167  
 German Centre party, 232



- German colonial expansion, 288, 300 and n. 1, 318, 319, 365, 366, 385; colonial interests, 322-324, 329, 331-337; colonial party, 329-337, 341
- German elections, 230 and n. 63, 232, 331, 334, 336, 338
- German empire, 8; feudalism, 73 n. 68
- German financial interests in Egypt, 322, 332-334, 338, 360; in Russia, 395-397
- German foreign trade, 12
- German imperial family and Britain, 93, 94, 126; and Russia, 32. *See also* Crown Prince and Crown Princess, Empress Augusta and William I
- German-Italian alliance, 63
- German militarism, 14
- German National party, 124
- German parliament, 67, 105, 115 and n. 58, 125
- German politics, 296
- German press, 68, 69, 76, 86, 197, 334, 336, 341, 394
- German socialism, 17
- Ghika, Princess, 313
- Giers, Nicholas Karlovich de, 217, 221, 223, 226, 263 and n. 27, 264, 266, 273, 281, 282, 293, 294, 395; dispatch, 400-404
- Gladstone, W. E., 12, 110, 132, 170, 200 and n. 23, 216, 275, 294 and n. 12, 323, 364, 375, 400, 408; anti-imperialism of, 16; liberal doctrines, 13; Midlothian campaign, 16, 186; Near Eastern policy, 194; speeches, 253 and n. 11; and Armenia, 184; and Austria-Hungary, 142 and n. 26, 187, 354; and Bismarck, 12-14, 37; and the Balkans, 253; and *The Daily Telegraph*, 96; and Russia, 163; and Turkey, 16; and the Vatican, 14 and n. 12; on Alsace-Lorraine, 15; on Bismarck, 127; on Cyprus, 184; on Egypt, 328; on the Kulturkampf, 127; on transfer of peoples, 14; on the Sultan, 183; on the Sudan, 345; on Treaty of Frankfort, 14; on Vatican Decrees, 14 n. 12
- Gladstone government, 12, 15, 19, 81, 131, 136, 137, 385
- Gneist, Professor Heinrich R. H. F. von, 59 and n. 43
- Gold Coast, 371
- Gontaut-Biron, Arman Elie, 49 and notes 14 and 15, 59, 125
- Gordon, General Charles, 345, 378 n. 42; death of, 381 and n. 46
- Gortchakoff (Gortchakow), Prince, 30 and n. 23, 35, 39, 53, 89, 95, 101, 108-107, 117, 121, 134, 221, 222; and Bismarck, 135; and meeting of three emperors, 1872, 66, 67; Mlle. de, 317
- Goschen, George Joachim, 140 and n. 24, 142, 145, 184, 193, 195-197, 199, 201, 207-209, 213-215, 251, 272; letters, 198, 199, 209-213; and Greek boundary, 226, 227
- Gossler, Gustav von, 203 and n. 30, 204
- Gourko, General, 314, 315
- Granville, Lady, 49, 53, 77, 154 and n. 43, 258
- Granville, Lord, 15 n. 13, 16, 18, 19, 25, 95, 171 and n. 62, 233 and n. 66, 279 and n. 46, 400; and Bismarck, 15, 16, 137, 319, 320, 328-331, 361-364, 366, 385, 387-389, 391, 394, 395, 414; and imperial expansion, 16, 118; and German colonial expansion, 17; and the London conference, 37; on Alabama negotiations, 62; on Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, 270; on Anglo-German alliance, 26; on arms controversy, 1870-1871, 40, 41; on Herbert Bismarck, 257, 258; on Prince Bismarck, 120, 321, 348, 372; on bombardment of Paris, 23-25; on Egypt, 249; on the Empress Augusta, 61; on Franco-German peace, 38, 39; on Freycinet, 257; on German crown prince, 42, 43; on nihilist conference, 216; on Turkish intervention in Egypt, 267; on war, 39
- Greece, King of, 154
- Greco-Turkish boundary, 16, 137, 157, 173, 183, 184, 187-202, 210-213, 219, 228
- Greco-Turkish relations, 173

## H

- Hamburg, commercial interests, 17
- Hammond, Edmund, 27 and n. 17, 72 and n. 66, 74
- Hanover, annexation of, 7; and royal house, 99 and n. 23, 100, 101, 112
- Hartington, Lord, 233 and n. 67, 234

Hatzfeldt, Count Paul von, 162 and n. 56, 172, 199, 201, 206-215, 225, 226, 228, 230-232, 238-241, 251, 253, 259, 260, 262, 264, 266, 267, 270, 278, 279, 298, 299, 312, 315, 318, 319, 328, 329, 337, 338, 340, 341, 350, 351, 361, 365, 374, 376, 382, 396, 404, 406, 412; on British blue books, 279; on Egypt, 327, 330; on Morocco, 327; on Turkey, 264, 329; on Russo-German relations, 320

Haymerle, Baron Heinrich Karl, 158 and n. 49, 142, 174, 175, 192, 195, 215, 223, 226, 237

Hélène, Princess, 251, 252, 254

Heligoland, sale of, 110 and n. 48

Hemming, Sir Augustus William Lawson, 375 and n. 37

Henry, Prince, 233 and n. 65

Hesse-Darmstadt, 8; Grand Duke of, 13

Hesse, Frederick Charles, Prince of, 57 n. 38

Hesse, Margrave Frederick of, 349 and n. 7

Hirschfeld, Herr, 250

Hobart Pasha, 241 and n. 76

Hochberger, Dr., 299, 300

Hohenlohe, Cardinal, 59 and n. 41, 62

Hohenlohe-Longenbourg, Prince of, 48 n. 9

Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Prince, 97 and n. 23, 152, 154-156, 159, 207, 227, 252, 253, 269, 278, 279, 302

Hohenzollern, House of, 100, 101

Holland, Queen of, 87 and n. 11

Holstein, annexation of, 7

Holstein, Frederick von, 9, 227 and n. 60

Hudson, Sir James, 47 n. 1

Huene, Baron, 335

Humbert, Crown Prince of Italy, 60 and n. 43, 61; visit to Berlin, 63

I

Ignatieff, Count Nicholas Pavlovitch, 121 and n. 67, 122, 221 and n. 52, 234, 256, 263, 282

India office, 335

International Workingmen's Association, 66 and n. 57

Ireland, 261-263; home rule, 117; university bill, 81

Italy, King of, arbiter between Russia and Britain, 404, 405; visit to Berlin, 116

Italy and Egypt, 322, 378

Italo-German alliance, 60

Itzenplitz, Count Heinrich von, 85 and n. 6, 89

J

Jesuit expulsion, 59, 62, 65

K

Kalnoky (Kalnocky), Count Gustav von, 237 and n. 71, 238, 264, 266, 293, 340, 341, 349

Kamecke, General von, 295

Kanitz, Baron Julius von, 105 and n. 37

Kantacusenos, General, 304

Károlyi, Count Aloys, 49 and n. 13, 55, 124, 142 and n. 26

Khedive, the, 250, 259, 260, 380

Khiva expedition, 104 and n. 35

Khurdistan, 335

Kimberley, Lord, 335

Kirk, Sir John, 410 and n. 23, 411

Koch, Dr. Robert, 339 and n. 25

Kotzebue, Princess, 263

Kulturkampf, 12, 17, 55, 71, 75, 81, 86, 87, 120

Krauel, Dr., 407 and n. 19

Krause, H. von, 84 and n. 4, 97, 98, 110

*Kreutzzzeitung*, The, 85

Kusserow, Herr von, 407

L

La Ferronages, the, 59

La Ferronays, Henry Auguste, 147 and n. 35

Lambermont, Baron, 368-370

Launay, Count, 390 and n. 7

Lautz, General, 335

Layard, Sir A. H., 149, 151, 228

League of Three Emperors. *See* Three Emperors' League

Le Flô, General Adolphe Charles Emmanuel, 60 and n. 44

Leo XIII, 221

Leopold II, 35 and n. 34, 368-371, 397. *See also* Belgians, King of

Leopold, Prince, Duke of Albany, 250 and n. 8, 251-258, 299

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 123 and n. 72

- Liberals, foreign policy of, 186, 187  
 Limburg-Stirum, Count Frederick William, 156, 157 and n. 47, 159, 160, 172  
 Lindau, Herr von, 895  
 Lister, Thomas Villiers, 116 and n. 59  
 Litcano, Varnav, 352 and n. 9, 408  
 Lobanoff, Prince Alexis Borisovich, 140, 146 and n. 31, 149, 151, 207-209, 221  
 Loftus, Lord Augustus, 17, 23, 47 and notes 1 and 3, 101 and n. 32, 105, 117  
 London conference, 1870, 25-27, 30-32, 36, 37, 39-42  
 Lumsden, Sir Peter Stark, 397 and n. 14  
 Luther festival, 299 and n. 23, 301  
 Luxemburg, 83 and n. 29, 36-39; guarantee of, 290 and n. 4; railway question, 53  
 Lüderitz, Herr F. A. E., 386  
 Lyons, Lord, 39-41, 93 and n. 16, 173 and n. 65, 328, 364; letters from, 245 n. 2  
 Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, 113 and n. 52, 199
- M**
- Madagascar, 287, 288  
 Malcolm Khan, 109  
 Malet, Sir Alexander, 19, 347 and n. 4, 348  
 Malet, Sir Edward, 19, 223 and n. 56, 224, 228, 247, 346, 385, 387, 388, 410, 411  
 Malet, Lady, 369 and n. 29, 397, 399, 409  
 Manchester, Duchess of, 216  
 Manteuffel, General Edwin Hans Carl, 98 and n. 26, 99  
 Margaret, Princess, 57 n. 37  
 Marguerite, Crown Princess of Italy, 61 and n. 48; visit to Berlin, 63  
 Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia, 107  
 Marx, Karl, 66 n. 57  
 Mathews, General L. W., 411  
 May Laws, 203 and n. 28  
 Meade, Robert Henry, 352, 366, 367, 369 and n. 30, 371, 375 and n. 36, 376  
 Meade, Mrs. Robert Henry, 200 and n. 22  
 Mecklenburg, Duchess of, 61 and n. 47  
 Mecklenberg Strelitz, Grand Duchess of, 112 and n. 51  
 Meiningen, Duke and Duchess of, 48 notes 8 and 9  
 Melbourne, Lady, 255 and n. 15  
 Melchers, Archbishop, 221  
 Melikoff, 209 and n. 89  
 Merv, 317 and n. 10, 335  
 Metternich, era of, 15  
 Metternich, Prince, 182; Princess Pauline, 107 and n. 42  
 Metz, 84, 88  
 Michael, Grand Duke, 320 and n. 14  
 Michel, Grand Duke, 314  
 Millutine, 167  
 Mohrenheim, Baron Arthur, 282 and n. 49, 293, 294, 315  
 Moltke, Fieldmarshal, Count Helmuth Karl Bernhard von, 7 and n. 1, 40, 84 and n. 3, 91, 92, 95, 101 n. 30, 157, 166, 167, 299, 396; conversation with Lord Odo Russell, 91-93; plans for campaign in Italy, 63; on Anglo-German relations, 92; on Austro-Russian relations, 93; on France, 92  
 Morechini, Cardinal, 70  
 Morier, Sir Robert, 47 and notes 1 and 2, 52 and n. 26, 248 and n. 6, 364  
*Morning Post, The*, 170  
 Morocco, French intrigue in, 327  
 Montenegrin boundary, 16, 137, 140, 141, 146 ff., 157, 183  
 Montpensier, Duke of, 311 and n. 3  
 Mukhtar Pasha, 231 and n. 64, 300  
 Müller, Professor Max, 14  
 Münster, Count, 49 and n. 17, 50, 91, 97-99, 101 and n. 83, 102, 105, 109, 110, 118, 123, 125, 135, 146, 151, 191, 195, 197, 208, 218, 232, 249, 250, 259, 261, 262, 266, 270-272, 275, 276, 280, 281, 290, 291, 303, 314, 320, 323, 325, 326, 330, 332-334, 336, 340, 360, 364-366, 379; and German colonization, 119; and Hanoverian question, 100, 101, 112, 118; on Herbert Bismarck, 280  
 Musurus Pasha, Constantine, 37 and n. 38, 170, 200 and n. 24, 201
- N**
- Nachtigall, Dr., 329, 341, 390 and n. 6  
 Nancy, 84  
 Napier, Lord, 94 and n. 18  
 Napoleon I, 57  
 Napoleon III, 82, 34, 38, 53 and n. 32, 85 and n. 7, 120  
 National party in Germany, 100

National Liberal party in Germany, 204  
*National Zeitung, The*, 400-404  
 Near Eastern question, 26, 30, 36, 132-137, 141-143, 153, 162-164, 171  
 Nelidoff, Count Alexander, 273 and n. 41  
 New Guinea, 368, 369 and n. 30  
*New York Herald, The*, 74 and n. 70  
 Nice, 33  
 Niger, the, 354 and n. 14, 358, 364, 376  
 Nihilist conference, 216, 217, 219, 220  
 Norechini, Archbishop, 70  
 North German Confederation, 8  
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 280 and n. 47, 281  
 Nothomb, Jean Baptiste de, 53 and n. 29, 75  
 Novikoff, M., 211

## O

Orloff, Prince, 217, 315, 316, 320  
 Orsini Plot, 216 and n. 46  
 Osborne, Lady Emma, 122 and n. 70  
 Ottoman empire. *See* Turkey  
 Otway, Arthur, 39 and n. 41  
 Oubril, Count Paul Petrovitch, 49 and n. 12

## P

Paget, Sir Augustus, 349 and n. 6  
 Palikao, General Charles, 34 and n. 30  
*Pall Mall Gazette*, 40, 323, 327  
 Panebianco, Cardinal, 69 and n. 62, 70  
 Palmerston, Lord, 9, 10, 216, 221 and n. 51  
 Pan Slavism, 139, 160, 209, 210, 213, 256, 299  
 Papacy, the, 69-71  
 Paris, Comte de, 311 and n. 3  
 Paris, bombardment of, 10, 23-25, 42; siege of, 28, 29, 34, 38, 41  
 Patrizi, Cardinal, 70  
 Penjdeh, 19, 345, 385, 405  
 Perponcher, Count Wilhelm von, 97 and n. 25, 219, 315  
 Persia, Shah of, 108 and n. 43, 109-111  
 Persia and Russia, 395-397  
 Petre, Sir George Glyn, 52 and n. 25  
 Philippe, King Louis, 114 and n. 54  
 Pigeon, M., 248  
 Plus IX, 70, 221  
 Plessen, Baron Ludwig von, 312 and n. 5, 348  
 Poles, Germanization of, 56

Pollignacs, the, 59  
 Ponsonby, Sir Henry Frederick, 326 and n. 19  
 Pope, the, 63, 297; offered asylum at Malta, 23 and n. 2; and Crown Prince, 311, 312  
 Porte, the, 16, 137, 145, 162, 215, 225; and Balkan boundaries, 141, 142; and Egypt, 320. *See also* Turkey  
 Portugal, Crown Prince of, 298  
 Portugal and the Congo, 367-371, 377, 378, 380; and Germany, 380  
 Prevost, Admiral James Charles, 64 and n. 53, 71  
 Prince Imperial, 114  
 Prussia; annexations, 1866, 13; army of, 7; education act, 1872, 49 and n. 16  
 Prussia, Queen Dowager of, 51 and n. 20, 119 and n. 64, 123  
 Prussian aristocracy and Bismarck, 117  
 Prussian constitution, 7  
 Puttkammer, Robert von, 203 and n. 29, 204

## R

Radowitz, Joseph Maria von, 122 and n. 69, 214  
 Radziwill, Prince, 261, 263  
 Radziwills, the, 59, 94 and n. 17  
 Rantzau, Count Kuno, 320 and n. 13  
 Ratibors, the, 59  
 Reichsrath deputation, 1870, 36  
 Reshid Bey, 239 and n. 75, 240  
 Reuss, Prince, 101 and n. 31, 114  
 Ring, Baron N. M. C. de, 407  
 Robinson, Sir Hercules, 372 and n. 33  
 Rodd, Sir James Rennell, on Odo Russell, 18, 19  
 Roeder, Chamberlain von, 48 and n. 7  
 Roerdansz, Rudolf von, 84 and n. 5  
 Rohlf, Frederick Gerhard, 390, 412 and n. 23  
 Roon, Fieldmarshal, Count Albrecht Theodor Emil von, 7 and n. 1, 83 and n. 2, 85, 86, 89  
 Rosebery, Lord, 15, 408 and n. 21, 409, 412  
 Rothschild, Alfred Charles de, 193 and n. 10  
 Rothschild, Baron Meyer de, 62 and n. 49

- Rothschilds, the, 193, 233; transfer Egyptian debt to Frankfort, 360
- Rouher, Eugene, 88 and n. 12
- Rowton, Baron, 150 and n. 38
- Rudolf, Crown Prince, 274 and n. 43, 302 and n. 27
- Rumania, 16, 31 n. 26; Jews in, 8; and Turkey, 31
- Rumania, King Carol of, 31 n. 27, 237
- Russell, Constance, 48 n. 8
- Russell, Hastings. *See* Bedford, ninth Duke of
- Russell, Lady Emily, 86, 47, 48 n. 8, 55, 56, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 77, 94, 117, 119, 125, 126, 164, 273, 274, 279, 300, 303, 313, 341
- Russell, Lord, 12, 18, 39, 53 n. 33, 81, 102, 106, 108; on Egypt, 314; on Kulturkampf, 120 and n. 66; on Treaty of Paris, 25
- Russell, Lord Arthur, 53 and n. 33, 54
- Russell, Lord Odo, 9, 14 n. 9, 17 n. 16, 18, 19, 23-25, 48 n. 8, 226, 388, 394; health, 64, 65, 219, 220; death of, 341; attacks upon by American press, 74 and n. 70; appointment to Berlin, 47 and n. 1; conversations with Bismarck, 19, 29-35, 66-68, 87-89, 103-105, 120, 164-169, 188-191, 322, 323, 332, 333; conversation with Moltke, 91-93; mission to Versailles, 25; reception in Berlin, 18, 19, 47, 50
- Russell, Odo, and Bismarck, 17, 18, 287, 385; on Anglo-German relations, 137; on Bismarck, 144, 145, 170, 225, 257; on German colonization, 309 and n. 1; on the occupation of Smyrna, 161, 162
- Russia, Emperor of, and William I, 60. *See also* Alexander II and Alexander III
- Russia, Empress of, 107
- Russia, anti-German feeling in, 121; expansion of, 81; financial position of, 395-397; German financial interests in, 392; German hatred of, 288, 299
- Russia and Afghanistan, 317 and n. 10, 335, 392-399; and the Balkans, 141-143; and Britain, 320, 345, 390 ff, 399, 404, 408; and Bulgaria, 299, 325; and Central Asia, 335, 395-397; and the Russia and Afghanistan—Continued Danube, 291 and n. 8; and Egypt, 276; and France, 8; and Germany, 315, 396; and Greece, 149; and Persia, 408; and London conference, 27; and Turkey, 160, 398, 399
- Russian agent, 53
- Russian circular, 1870, 30-32, 39
- Russo-German alliance, 103-105, 320
- Russo-Indian railway schemes, 123
- S
- Saburoff (Sabouroff), Peter Alexandrovitch, 143 and n. 29, 150, 151, 174, 217, 221-223, 227, 282, 293, 315, 316
- Sackville, Lord, 290 and n. 6
- Sadoullah Bey, 297
- Sagans, the, 59, 72 and n. 67
- Said Pasha, 210, 297, 300, 395, 396, 398, 399, 404; on Anglo-Turkish relations, 398, 399
- St. Hilaire, Barthelemy, 187, 194, 207
- St. Vallier, Charles Raymond Comte de, 150 and n. 39, 173, 174, 217, 224, 237, 254, 257, 278
- Salisbury, Lord, 14, 131-137, 154, 414; on Austro-German alliance, 12
- Samoa, 365, 366
- Sanderson, Sir Thomas H., 337, 385
- San Juan arbitration, 54, 55, 63 and n. 52, 65, 67, 74; award, 71 and n. 63, 73
- Sargent, Mr., 315
- Saurma, Count, 271 and n. 39
- Savoy, 33
- Saxe-Weimar, Duke of, 59 and n. 42
- Saxe-Weimar, Grand Duke of, 55 n. 35
- Saxony, King of, 73 and n. 69, 114 and n. 55
- Schellendorf, General Paul Bronsart von, 295 and n. 13
- Schleinitz, Alexander Gustav Adolf von, 57 and n. 38, 73
- Schleinitzes, the, 94
- Schleswig, annexation of, 7
- Schlözer (Schlösser), Baron Kurd von, 220 and n. 49, 374
- Scholz, Adolf, 204 and n. 32
- Schweinitz, Baron Hans Lothar von, 97 and n. 24, 105, 218, 219, 259, 313, 317
- Schwenigen, Dr., 301
- Sclerneck, meeting at, 351, 352 and n. 9, 391, 403

Scott, Charles Stewart, 346, 385, 389 and n. 3  
 Sedan, 11, 23 n. 6, 24, 38  
 Serano, Don Francisco, 104 and n. 36, 105  
 Serge, Grand Duchess, 403 and n. 16  
 Serge, Grand Duke, 403 and n. 16  
 Server Pasha, 210  
 Sforza, Archbishop, 70  
 Schouvaloff, Count Peter, 85 and n. 8, 86 n. 9, 89, 90, 104-106, 273, 275, 299, 314, 315  
 Schouvaloff Convention, 134  
 Simmons, Sir John Lintorn Arabin, 146 and n. 32, 147-152, 304  
 Sino-French war, 9, 287  
 Skobeleff, 256 and n. 16, 282  
 Smyrna demonstration, 160-162, 165, 166, 183, 194  
 Socialism, Marxian, 17  
 Sonneman, Herr, 249  
 Sophie, Princess Dorothea, 236 and n. 70  
 South Africa, Monroe Doctrine for, 16  
 Spanish question, 102-105, 117, 118  
 Staal, M. de, 317 and n. 11, 400-404  
*Standard, The*, 339, 400-404  
 Stanley, Dean, 122 and n. 70  
 Stanley, Lady Augusta, 122 and n. 70  
 Stockhausen, Baron, 250  
 Stollberg, Count, 301  
 Stourdza, 295  
 Straits question, 26, 31, 32  
 Strathnairn, Lord, 65 and n. 55  
 Strousberg, Bethel Henry, 226 and n. 57  
 Stumm, Baron Ferdinand von, 259 and n. 21, 275  
 Sudan, the, 19  
 Suez Canal, 132, 331; Commission, 390, 391; Company, 134, 135; shares, 16, 134, 135  
 Sultan of Turkey, 16, 26, 210; and Egypt, 246, 247, 250, 251, 262, 281, 322; and Germany, 297; and Montenegrin boundary, 147; and Tunis, 281  
 Sulu, 118 and n. 62, 119, 281 and n. 48, 282, 303  
 Swaine, Colonel Leopold Victor, 295 and n. 14, 304, 345, 385, 395, 397, 404; letter, 396, 397; memorandum, 305, 335; reports, 324, 392-394, 396, 399  
 Switzerland, 33  
 Sydney, Lord, 125

## T

Talleyrand, Prince, 264  
 Talleyrands, the, 59, 264  
 Teesdale, Sir Christopher Charles, 119 and n. 64  
 Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 274 and n. 42  
 Tenterden, Lord, 18, 170, 274 and n. 44; memorandum, 14 n. 9; on Odo Russell, 18  
 Testa, Baron, 212  
 Thiers, Louis Adolphe, 35 and n. 32, 58, 60, 75, 90, 121; foreign policy, 93-95; mission, 35; peace offer, 35; and Arnim, 114; and Franco-Russian alliance, 99, 102, 103; on France, 1873, 113, 114; on Napoleon III, 114  
 Thile (Thiele), Hermann von, 48 and n. 6, 52, 55, 56, 64, 67, 74, 84  
 Thomson, W. Taylour, 109 and n. 46  
 Thornton, Sir Edward, 62 and n. 49, 227 and n. 58  
 Three emperors' agreement, 352 n. 9; meeting, 351, 352  
 Three Emperors' League, 8, 16, 67, 81, 94, 95, 115 and n. 58, 117, 133, 139, 145, 222, 223 and n. 53, 225, 237, 245-247, 288, 323, 391; and Egypt, 265  
*Times, The*, 76, 85 and n. 8, 123 and n. 73, 302, 323, 327, 339, 400-404  
 Tissot, Charles Joseph, 37 and n. 36, 39, 40, 206 and n. 35, 207, 210, 227, 266 and n. 32  
 Torrington, Lord, 208 and n. 37  
 Treaty, Anglo-Portuguese, 329 and n. 22  
 Treaty of Berlin, 16, 140, 141, 153, 163-166, 171, 173, 234, 299; of Frankfort, 14; of London, 273; of Paris, 25, 30, 299; of San Stefano, 133, 141, 273, 299; Tripartite, 1856, 26, 27, 31; and Germany, 30; of Washington, 54 n. 34, 64 n. 52, 68 and n. 59, 69  
 Triple Alliance, 8, 16, 135, 184, 185  
 Trochu, General Louis, 34 and n. 31  
 Tsarina, the, 209 and n. 41  
 Tunis, 135; affairs of, 123 and n. 71; French intervention in, 8, 16; French occupation of, 184, 220  
 Turkey, 394-396; in Asia, 16; British officers in, 230; German officers in, 230; guarantee of, 30, 31; military strength, 398, 399, 404; position of, 140; reforms, 142; and Britain, 404;

## Turkey—Continued

and Egypt, 245-248, 329; and London conference, 36; and Russia, 398, 399

## U

Ujes, Hugo, Duke of, 300 and n. 25

Ultramontanes, the, 74

United Kingdom, the. *See* Britain

United States of America and Franco-Prussian war, 41; and Spain, 117 and n. 61; and West Africa, 364; and West African conference, 358 and n. 19

Uxkull, Baron, 316 and n. 9

Uxkull, Baroness, 316

## V

Vatican, the, 87; and Germany, 59

Vatican council, 17; decrees, 14

Victoria, Princess, 233 and n. 65, 292 and n. 9, 312; and Prince Alexander, 327 and n. 21

Victoria, Queen, 9, 11, 51, 57, 112, 113, 119, 238, 287, 299, 302, 316, 321, 324, 326; attacks upon, 52 and n. 28, 254 and n. 14, 255; popularity in Germany, 254, 255; and Hanoverian question, 99 and n. 29; and Münster, 98, 99; on Bismarck's title, 354

Virchow, Rudolf, 339 and n. 25

## W

Waddington, William Henry, 135, 328, 330, 357, 361, 364

Waldeck Pyrmont, Prince of, 250 and n. 8, 252

Waldersee, Count Alfred von, 396 and n. 13

Wales, Prince of, 51 and n. 23, 119, 122, 201, 209, 216, 218, 233, 296, 394, 395; popularity in Berlin 293, 294

Wales, Princess of, 122, 209

Walewski, Count, 114 and n. 53

Walker, General Sir Charles P. B., 62 and n. 50, 84, 124

Wallace, Donald Mackenzie, 302 and n. 28

Walsham, Sir John, 229 and n. 62, 271, 272

War scare, 1875, 12, 132

Warren, Sir Charles, 372 n. 33

Washington, Treaty of. *See* Treaty of Washington

Werder, General von, 222 and n. 54, 408

West African conference, 19, 329 n. 22, 348 and n. 5, 350, 352, 354-358 and n. 19, 361, 363-370, 374-377, 380

Wettendorf, Councillor, 155 and n. 45, 169

William I, 7 and n. 1, 17, 27 and n. 20, 29, 35, 37, 38, 48, 54, 58, 59, 96, 99, 105, 106, 108-110, 119, 123, 125, 303; as arbiter between Britain and Russia, 404, 405; bewilderment of, 58, 59; health of, 53, 109, 114-117, 119, 120, 122, 236, 291, 292, 313, 320, 390, 409; speech to parliament, 94, 95; and Alexander III, 222, 223; and Bismarck, 68, 75, 85, 119, 171, 234, 235; and Britain, 60, 61, 65, 77, 149; and concert of Europe, 157; and Duke of Cambridge, 157, 158; and Egypt, 263, 264; and France, 58, 59; and French Republic, 289; and German annexations, 88, 89; and German-Italian alliance, 60; and German parliament, 73, 75; and the Gladstone government, 63, 64; and Hanover, 100, 101; and the imperial crown, 86; and Ireland, 263; and the Kulturkampf, 58, 59; and occupation of Smyrna, 162; and Queen Victoria, 124, 254, 255; and Russia, 60, 101, n. 30, 103-105, 263, 264, 404, 405; and San Juan arbitration, 54, 55, 64 and n. 52, 71, 73, 74; on British royal family, 298, 299; on Empress Augusta's visit to England, 62; on Lord Granville, 63, 64

William, Prince, 200 and n. 25, 255, 258, 259, 293, 302 and n. 27; on Britain, 324; on Egyptian campaign, 324

William, Princess, 302 and n. 27

Windthorst, Ludwig, 221

Wittgenstein, Prince, 35 and n. 34

Wladimir, Grand Duke, 261

Wolff, Herr von, 204 and n. 33

Wolkenstein, Count, 294

Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 375 and n. 38

Wood, Sir Evelyn, 200 and n. 20

Württemberg, Queen of, 51 and n. 21, 52; on Bismarck, 51

## Z

Zankow, Dragan de, 325 and n. 16

Zanzibar, 95, 390, 409-414











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